A. December, 1945.
Q. Yes. You knew at the time you spoke to Heisig that he was going to be called as a witness, didn't you?
A. I assumed that because of his presence? here at Nurnberg.
Q. And you knew you were going to be called as a witness, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you telling the Tribunal that you didn't tell the defense lawyers about this, conversation until quite recently?
A. I did not quite follow the sense of your question.
Q. Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not report this conversation with Heisig to the Defense lawyers until quite recently?
A. Perhaps in February or March it was that I told the defense counsel about this conversation.
Q. I just want to put the dates to you. The U-boat Commander Eck was sentenced to death on the 20th of October. Do you know that?
A. I did not know the date.
Q. Death sentence was taken by the Commission on the 21st of November and he was executed on the 30th of November. That is to say he was executed before you had this conversation. Did you know that?
A. No. I am just finding that out now.
Q. At any rate, the Witness Heisig knew it before he gave his evidence, didn't he?
A. Obviously. Otherwise, he most likely would have told me about it.
Q. Just listen to a question and answer from his cross examination. It si page 2676 of the transcript. This is a question by Dr. Kranzbuehler: "In your hearing on the 27th of November were you not told that the death sentence against Eck and Hoffmann had already been set?" Answer: I do not know whether it was on the 27th of November. I know only that here I was told of the fact that the death sentence had been carried out. The date I can not remember. I was in several hearings." Now if that is right -
THE PRESIDENT: When was that evidence given?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: That was given on the 14th of January, My Lord.
Page 2676 of the transcript.
A. I did not understand who gave this testimony.
Q. The witness Heisig, when he gave evidence here in Court. So that whether or not he was deceived, as you suggest, before he gave his affidavit, he at least knew the true facts before he gave evidence here to the Tribunal?
A. Then he told un untruth to me.
Q. Now, I want to ask you one question on the order of the 17th of September, 1942. That is the order that you say you monitored in the Naval War Staff and saw nothing wrong with. Did the Defendant Raeder see that order?
A. That I can not say with certainty.
Q. You were Chief of Staff Operations at that time?
A. Yes, but you can't expect of me that I could remember every incident which took place in six years of war.
Q. Oh, no, but this was an important order, wasn't it?
A. Certainly, but there were very many important orders in the course of six years.
Q. Would you normally show an important operational order to the Commander in Chief?
A. My task was to present to the Chief of the Staff of the Navy the important things and he decided which matters were to be presented to the Grand Admiral.
Q. Are you saying that you wouldn't have shown this to the Chief of the Staff?
A. No. I am sure he had knowledge of this.
Q. Have you any doubt that this order would have been shown to Admiral Raeder?
A. That I can not say for I do not recall.
Special Duties. You became Admiral Special Duties in June, 1944, is that right? Doenitz and in his absence represented him, did you not?
A I never participated at any discussions as his deputy. Doenitz Was represenented to the Chief of the SKL. they affected military operations in one way or another, were they not?
Q. What I am putting to you is that at that stage of the war the importance of all questions chiefly depended on how they affected the military situation. taken at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, wasn't it?
Q Now, I want you to look at a record of one of Admiral Doenitz's visits That is a record of a visit to the Fuehrer's Headquarters on the 28th and 29th of August, 1943.
You weren't there yourself, but your immediate superior, Vice-Admiral Meisel, accompanied. Admiral Doenitz, and the names of the Naval Delegation are set out at the top of the page, admiral Doenitz, Vice , Admiral Meisel, Chief of Staff of the SKL, Captain Rehm, etc. And your program as set out was: after your arrival, at half-past eleven, conversation With Commanderin chief of Navy, Commander-in-Chief Luftwaffe; 1300, situation conference with the Fuehrer closing with a further conversation between the Commander-in-Chief, Navy, and the Commander-in-Chief, Luftwaffe; then at 1900 the Commander-in-Chief Navy left. After that Admiral Meisel had a conversation with Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office. Then a conversation with General Jodl; an evening conference with the Fuehrer, and then a midnight conference with Himmler. On the next day a situation conference with the Fuehrer; then a conversation with the Chief. of the General Staff of the Air Force. And then he left. that he had conversations, various conferences with other officials?
quarters, and he participated in situation conferences with the Fuehrer, and on top of this he had military conversations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe.
Q And that shows, doesn't it, the whole business of government being carried on at the Fuehrer's Headquarters?
A No, not at all. I have already said the Grand Admiral solely and alone participated at the military situation conferences with the Fuehrer and beyond that one or two discussions with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. He had a conversation with him as well. Office, and so on?
A The Grand Admiral had no discussions like that at all. On the 28th of August at 1900 hours he returned as shown from the table, and further discussion with the Chiefs of Staff of the SKL were had.
Q But I was putting it to you that this was a typical visit. If Admiral Doenitz hadn't left, he would have had these other conversations and not Admiral Meisel, isn't that right? opportunity to come to the headquarters, and according to the minutes he obviously used his opportunity -
Q I don't want to waste time with it. I suggest to you --chat when admiral Doenitz went there he normally saw any other Ministers and conversed with then on any business affecting the Navy. the Navy and he spoke with those who Were concerned with these problems. to the Geneva Convention -- that is C-156, GB-209, page 69 of the English Prosecution Book, at page 102 of the German. Look at page 102.
Now, as you told us yesterday, you initialed those minutes, didn't you, and a copy was marked to you, isn't that right?
Q Were they accurate?
headquarters.
Q They were an accurate record, were they? them.
Q Now, did you agree with Admiral Doenitz's advice that it would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs to save face with the outer world? Did you agree with that? sentence which was formulated by me -- how I interpreted that, and I have nothing to add to that statement. In the sense in which I stated it yesterday, I agree with it. bombed towns, wasn't it? .Wasn't that the breach of the Convention that he wanted to make? only the agreement about prisoners of war, but everything else --all agreements which had been made at Geneva. without warning? Just look at that sentence.
Q Look at the last sentence, "It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary."What were these measures? giving then and the advice Which you described as the rather romantic ideas of a young expert on the document about sinkink without warning at night. Let me put it to you: What the naval Officer said --document C-191 --as to sinking without warning: Don't give written permission; don't tell anyone but at all costs save face with the world.
Do you see any difference?
A I already testified yesterday that the difference is very great. Grand Admiral Doenitz spoke against the renouncing of the Geneva Convention and he said if measures of intimidation or counter-measures against bombing attacks on cities are to be taken, then in any event the Geneva Convention cannot be renounced.
Q Now, I want to put to you a few questions about prisoners of war. So far as naval prisoners of war were concerned, they remained in the custody of the Navy, didn't they?
A I am not informed about the organisation of prisoner of war camps and its system, but in my recollection they were put into atemporary navy camp; then into further camps, about which I do not know as to whether they belonged to the navy or to the OKW, and to when they were subordinate.
telling us how well they were treated. Haven't you seen them? capture was reported to the Naval War Staff, wasn't it?
Q Now, do you remember the Commander Order of the 18th of October, 1942? commanders, didn't you?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the document is C-179, and that was put in as United States Exhibit 543. It is in the bundle
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: C-179.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: And it is in that bundle that Sir David Maxwell Fyfe handed to the Tribunal when cross-examining the defendant. I think it is either the last or very near to the last document in the bundle. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q Did you approve of that order? under No. 1, the reasons are given so clearly that I must realize and must at that time have realized its justification.
Q You knew what handing over to the SD meant, didn't you? You knew that meant shooting?
Q What do you think it meant? counter-espienage; that they were to be kept prisoners among more severe measures or, perhaps, that they, might be shot.
Q But you hadn't any doubt that it meant that they might be shot, had you?
is clear. it on to commanders?
A I would like to refer you to No. 1 of this order, in which it said -
Q Do you mind answering the question? Did it occur to you that they might be shot when you signed the order sending it on to commanders?
A Yes, yes; the possibility was there.
DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for defendant Raeder): Mr. President, the witness was asked whether he approved of these orders. I donot believe that Colonel Philliiore can cut off the answer from the witness by saying that he may not refer to No. 1 of the order. I believe that this point 1 of the order is decisive for this witness.
Mr. President, the witness, Admiral Wagner
THE PRESIDENT: You have an opportunity of reexamining the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, why do you interrupt?
DR. SIEMERS: Because Colonel Phillimore has interrupted the answer on the part of the witness and I believe in cross-examination the answer of the witness should be heard.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal does not agree with you.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I understood him to have already made the same point that the defendant made once. I only interrupted him when he sought to make it again. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q I put my question once again. When you signed the order sending this document on to lower commanders, did it occur to you then that these men would probably be shot? Service might be shot was clear to me.
Q Was it also --
A I haven't finished yet. But only those people were to be given over to the Security Service who had not been captured by the Wehrmacht, Commando Division.
Q Did it also occur to you that they would be shot without trial? captured by the Wehrmacht? Would you look at paragraph 3.
"From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and airplanes for their actions or whether they are dropped by parachute; even these individuals when fired should apparently be prepared to give themselves up. No pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW for publication in the report of the military forces."
Are you saying it didn't refer to men captured by the military forces?
A Yes, I am maintaining that statement. The entire paragraph does not say that the men who were captured by the Wehrmacht, by the armed forces, are to be turned over to the SD, to the Security Service, and that was the question.
Q Now, read on in the last paragraph.
"If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc., fall into thehands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD."
A Yes. It is expressly stated here that only those people are to be turned over to the SD who are not captured "by the Wehrmacht, but through the. police, and the Wehrmacht might not have any jurisdiction on this.
Q Indeed it's not. That capture by the police is given as one possible instance. But you know, you know in practice, don't you, that there were several instances where commandos were captured by the navy and handed ever to the SD under this order; don't you know that?
Q Well, let me just remind you. Would you look at the document 512-PS.
That's also in that bundle, My Lord, as United States Exhibit 546. It's the second document. October, "individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proved in the cases of --"
Haveyou got it?
A No, I'm sorry, I haven't found the place as yet.
A No, I can't find that place.
Q You got it now?
A No , the text which you are quoting, Mr. Colonel, I haven't found that spot. I haven't found the text you're quoting.
May I please ask you to repeat this passage?
Q You got it?
Q You just read the first sentence which I've read, and then go on to the second sentence.
"The importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, two-man torpedo Drontheim, and Glider Plane Stavanga, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions."
Do you say that you don't remember the two-man torpedo attack on the Tirpitz in Drontheim Fjord?
A No, No, I'm not asserting that I do not remember. I do remember it.
Q Yes, Didn't you see in the Wehrmacht communique after that attack what had happened to the man who was captured?
AAt this moment I can't recall.
Q Let me just remind you. One man was captured, Robert Paul Evans, just as he was getting across the Swedish border, and he was -- that action took place in October, 1942 -- he was executed in January, 1943, on the 19th of January, 1943. UK-57 which was put in as GB-64.
THE PRESIDENT: UK-57?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: UK-57, My Lord. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q (Continuing) Do you say that you don't remember seeing any report of his capture or of his shooting or of his interrogation?
Q You now tell us you do remember. Just tell us what you remember. Do you remember seeing his capture reported?
A That I do not remember exactly; but I do remember that there was a report to the effect that such a man, a considerable time after the attack on Tirpitz, had been captured, to my knowledge, but this did not take place through the navy.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, through same error I am afraid I haven't got it here. May I just put the facts, and if necessary put the document if I can produce it in time. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q I suggest to you that Robert Paul Evans., after his capture, was personally interrogated by the Commander-in-Chief Navy of the Norwegian North Coast. Do you say you know nothing of that?
THE PRESIDENT: Can't you hear?
THE WITNESS: No, I didn't hear a thing. There was a disturbance on my earphones. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q I will put it again. Do you say that you are not aware that Robert Paul Evans was personally interrogated after his capture by the Admiral, Norwegian North Coast? British Navy against German Naval forces, wasn't it? That is so, isn't it?
Q No, but you must know that, don't you? You were Chief of Staff Operations at the time. were not reported to you in the Naval War Staff? Commanding Admiral in Norway did actually carry through this interrogation.
Q Did you see a report by that Admiral?
Q Was it clear to you that that report was based on interrogation?
Q And you say you didn't know that this man Evans, some two months after his capture, was taken out and Shot under the Fuehrer order?
Q I will put you another instance. Do you remember the Bordeaux: incident in December 1942 ?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: That if 626-PS, My Lord. That is also in the bundle. In was originally put in as United States Exhibit 502. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q I'm sorry; it is the Toft Fjord incident I am putting to you, 462-PS. Do you remember this incident in Toft Fjord in March 1943? in that fhord, yes.
Q Yes. And did you not see in the Wehrmacht Comminique "Fuehrer Order executed"? must have read it. that attack were shot, and that you knew it at the time? captured.
Q If you will look at the document:
"An enemy cutter was sighted, Cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew, two dead men, ten prisoners."
Then look down:
"Fuehrer Order executed by SD."
That means those ten men were shot, doesn't it?
A Just a moment please. It mustmean that.
Q Yes. Now, I just put to you the document that I referred to on the Trondheim episode, D-864. This is an affidavit by a man who was in charge of the SD at Bergen and later at Trobdheim, and it is the second paragraphs:
"I received the order to transfer Evans from Trondheim Missionshotel to the BDS, Oslo. This order I received by telegram or telephone from the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei and the Sd, Oslo. I cannot tell who signed the telegram or the telephone call from Oslo. I cannot say for certain to whom I passed the order, but I think it was to Hauptsturmfuehrer Hollack.
I know that the commander in Chief Navy of the Norwegian Northern Coast had interrogated Evans himself."
And then he goes on to deal with Evans' clothing.
I put it to you once again: Do you say that you did not know from trio Admiral Norton Coast himself that he had interrogated this man? knew about, as is shown by your own war diary.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: By Lord, this document was put in as GB-229. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. New, that is an contract from the SKL War Diary, isn' it? the Naval commander west France, but I think that was a mistake wasn't it? War Diary yesterday.
Q Just read the first sentence. I think it shows clearly it was the SKL War Diary.
"9 December 1943. The Naval Commander, West France, reports..." and then it sets out the incident. Then, the third sentence, "The Naval Commander, West France, has ordere that both soldiers be shot immediately for attempted sabotage if their interrogation which has been begun, confirms what hat so far been discovered; their execution has, however, been postponed in order to obt in more information.
"According to a Wehrmacht report" -- I think that is a mistranslation -- "According to the Wehrmacht communique, both soldiers have meanwhile been shot. The measure would b in accordance with the Fuehrer's special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform."
That is from the SKL War Diary, isn't it? the War Diary of the SKL. matter up later, but I suggest to you that this is the SKL War Diary, which at the time -
A (interposing): I cannot recognize the assertion unless I have the original. Staff Operations at the time, must have been fully aware of that incident. Do you deny that? matter. reported to you? people was transferred from the SD and received from the Headquarters direct. capture of seven seamen, six of the Norwegian Navy and one of the Royal Navy, at Ulven, near Bergen in July 1943. That is Document D-649 in the prosecution Document Book, GB-208.
Do you remember this incident? Do you remember the capture of those seven men by Admiral von Schrader with his two task forces? how I happen to remember.
Q But do you remember the incident?
THE PRESIDENT: Which page?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is page 67 of the English document book, page 100 in the German.
BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE: don't remember any of those incidents? about this.
Q Didn't your commanders report when they captured an enemy commando? about those incidents now? that which I personally remember.
Q Do you know what happened to these non? You know they were captured in uniform, don't you? There was a naval officer with gold braid around his am. That is a badge you use in the German Navy, isn't it?
A. I have already said that I do not recall this matter.
Q. Well, let me just tell you and remind you. After interrogation by naval officers and officers of the SD, both of whom recommended prisoner of war treatment, these men were handed over by the Navy to the SD for shooting. They were taken to a concentration camp, and at 4 o'clock in the morning they were and out one by one, blindfolded, fettered, not told they were going to be shot, and shot one by one on the rifle range.
Don't you know that?
A. No.
Q. Didn't you know that is what handing over to the SD meant?
A. I have already stated that the giving over to the SD might have brought with it several possibilities.
Q. Do you know that then their bodies were sunk in the fjord with charges attached, and destroyed, as it says in the document, "in the usual way"? Paragraph 10 of the affidavit. And their belongings in the concentration camp were burned.
A. No, I know nothing about that.
Q. Very well. A further point; Do you remember that in March or April 1945, at the very end of the war, this order, the Fuehrer Order, was canceled by Keitel.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: That is paragraph 11 of the affidavit, My Lord.
Q. Do you remember that? Just read it.
A. Yes, I have heard of that.
Q. Yes. You thought you were losing the war by then, and you had better cancel the Commando Order, isn't that the fact?
A. I do not knew just what reasons were given by the OKW for rescinding this order.
Q. Isn't this right: You didn't worry about this order in 1942 when you thought you were winning the war, but when you found you were losing it, you began to worry about international law. Isn't that what happened.
A. No. I would like to refer to No. 1 of the Commando Order. It says clearly and unequivocally that they had orders that these commandos were made up of criminal elements of the occupied territories, that they had orders to kill prisoners whom they found detrimental, that other commandos had orders to kill captives, and that orders to this effect had fallen into our hands.
Q. Did you ever make any inquiries to see whether that was true?
A. It is absolutely impossible for me to investigate official notices which I receive from my superiors.
Q. You were Chief of Staff Operations; you received every report on the commando raids, didn't you?
A. In each case I was interrogated and I testified, but I cannot remember the details.
Q. When you were Chief of Staff Operations, did you not receive a full report every time there was a British commando raid?
A. I have already said that I believe that even such reports were made to the SKL in the course of routine conferences.
wanted to. Here you were a senior staff officer, commando raids, Are you saying you didn't personally see and read a full report of evety one? I remember about it. trial, without telling then they were going to be shot, without seeing a priest do you say that --
AAbout the navy?
Q Do you say that wasn't murder?
A I do not wish to maintain that at all. I do maintain and assert that those cases in which men were shot by the navy, I most likely did receive know ledge of those cases, and I am of the opinion that these people which were captured as saboteurs were not soldiers but they were criminals and -
Q Let us get it perfectly clear. Are you saying that the action taken in shooting these commandos on all those occasions, are you saying that was perfectly proper and justified? I thought you agreed with me it was murder, just on which is it? time. Do you say that men captured in uniform should be taken out and shot with out trial? cannot consider then as soldiers and soldiers within international law.
Q Are you saying that this action was perfectly proper -- are you?
A Yes; in toto, yes,
Q Shoot helpless prisoners without trial, and bully neutrals who can't complain? That is your policy, is it? in a two-man torpedo? belonged to a sabotage group and that besides the regular navy attack on the shi other aspects were present which marked him as a saboteur.