BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
that communists were to be removed quietly and without its being noticeable?
A No, such an order or such a plan did not exist. Of course, there we a considerable number of communists in the Navy, something which was known to every officer. These communists in the majority did their duty as Germans just as well as any other German. the spring of 1945 he advised the continuation, the hanging on in the war. This had been called evidence for the fact he was a fanatical Nazi. Did you and the majority of the Navy regard him as such?
A No, the admiral's attitude was not considered to be political fanaticism. It was considered that he was feeling his natural duties as a soldier to the last. I am convinced that that was the view of the great majority of the en tire German Navy, the non-commissioned officers and the officers.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant's counsel want to ask questions
DR. SIEMERS: Dr. Siemers, defense counsel for Grand admiral Raeder. BY DR. SIEMERS: have held. I should like to make quite sure who in the Naval Command Staff was a leading position under Grand Admiral Raeder and I an thinking of the decisive years before the outbreak and after the outbreak of the war. Who was the chief of staff during the last two years before the war, the beginning of the war? was Admiral Schniewind. From 1941 until the retirement or even after Raeder's retirement was Admiral Fricke. These, therefore, were the two officers who worked under Admiral Raeder in the Naval Command Staff in the highest commissions. They were the immediate advisors of the Grand Admiral.
Q And the Naval Command of several departments, didn't they?
numbers.
Q And which was the most important department? BY THE PRESIDENT: observe the lights? When that yellow light goes on, it means you are going too fast?
The most important department was the Operations Department, which had No. 1. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q And the other departments, 2, 3, what were they doing? the Obtaining of Information?
Q Who was the chief of the Operations Department?
A Beginning in 1937 and until 1941 it was Admiral Fricke. From 1941 until after Raeder's retirement I was the chief of that department. I should first of all like to ask you to speak briefly about Raeder's principal points of view during the time you were working for him. development in cooperation with Britain. Questions regarding the type of ships, training and tactical schooling in the foreground. As far as aggressive wars were concerned, Grand Admiral Raeder did not during any conference which I attended ever refer to them. Nor did he at any time make any preparations in that direction. against a war with Russia? reasons: first, that he considered that a break with Russia was wrong and not tenable, and second, for strategic reasons he was convinced that our entire Strength should be concentrated on the fight against Britain. couldn't be carried out, the Grand Admiral worked for a strategy in the Mediterranean, so that Britain's policy of encirclement should be fought against in that manner.
Q The Navy had comparatively numerous dealings with Russia during the time there was friendship between Russia and Germany.
This was due to supplies. Did everything in that respect, as far as you know, run smoothly? naval stocks, did go toRussia; for instance, completed ships, heavy artillery and other such material. view laid down in the Pact?
A Yes, that was the Grand Admiral's point of view. that he had never pothered about international law and that he had broken international contracts as a matter of principle if ever this were practical. Can you say anything about his opinions and views in that respect?
A Yes, that is completely wrong. Admiral Raeder was always anxious that every measure for naval warfare introduced be examined from the point of view of international law. We had a special expert on international law on the Naval Command Staff for that purpose, and we on the Operations Staff had nearly daily contact with him. and advising the waging of a war against Russia, and that he had tried to get Japan to fight the United States. What is your opinion on that?
A I consider that there is no basis for such an accusation. I know that Grand Admiral Raeder attached particular importance to it, that all naval war measures -- and this is especially applicable to the critical year of 1941 the United States of America. He has in fact forfeited a number of perfectly sound military measures so as to prevent incidents with the U.S.A. For instance, in the summer of 1941, he ordered that in a large area outside the U.S.A. submarines should be withdrawn, although that area could certainly be regarded as the free seas. A certain mine-laying action which had already begun against the British port of Halifax, in Canada, was forbidden byhim, so as to prevent at all costs the situation where a United States steamer should strike such a mine.
And finally, attacks also against British destroyers in the North Atlantic were forbidden by him because of those fifty destroyers which had been handed over to England by the United States. Out of this fact there was the possibility that British and American destroyers could be mistaken for each other. nevertheless occupied Iceland, when British Warships were being repaired in American shipyards, when American naval forces had orders that all German units should be reported to the British fleet and when finally President Roosevelt in July, 1941, gave the order to his forces to attack German submarines on sight.
Q. Did Admiral Raeder ever make a statement in the Naval Command Staff that there were no objections to a war against America and that the American fleet and American submarines weren't worth much?
A. No, Admiral Raeder as an expert could hardly have made any such unreasonable statement.
Q. Didn't Raeder, to the contrary, state expressly that he considered the American fleet very strong and that one couldn't fight simultaneously tin such first-rate powers as American and Great Britain?
A. Yes, and we were perfectly aware of the fact that America's entry into the war would mean a most substantial strengthening of the enemy forces.
Q. But then an one occasion Grand Admiral Raeder had suggested in a war diary that Japan ought to attack singspore. Was there any discussion about Pearl Harbor in connection with that in the Naval Command Staff?
A. No, not at all. The attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was a complete surprise, both to the Grand Admiral and the Naval Command Staff, like any other department. That is my conviction.
Q. Weren't there any continuous naval-military discussions and conference. between Japan and Germany?
A. No, before the entry in the war with Japan, no military discussions in my opinion and in my conviction took place.
Q. I should now like to show you Document C-41-
(Addressing the President) Mr. President, this is GB-69. Later on, the British Delegation will submit it in the Document Book against Reader, and I don't know now whether I can refer to it at this time. It is not contained in the trial brief against Raeder. The new Document Book, C.H. contains it on page 18.
THE PRESIDENT: You can put it in now, if you want to. You can offer it in evidence, if you wish. It is already in evidence through the Prosecution. So you can put it to the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has mentioned it, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Q. This is a document signed by Admiral Fricke and it is dated the 3rd of June, 1940. It is headed, "Expansion of Areas on the Question of Bases." Detailed consideration of future plans is contained that document, and I should like to ask you if Raeder had given the order to prepare this memorandum or how it happened that this memorandum was compiled.
A. Grand Admiral Raeder did not give the order to draft this memorandum. This constitutes personal theoretical thoughts of Admiral Fricke regarding the possible developments and possibilities for the future. They are pretty fantastic, and they had no practical significance.
Q. Was this study discussed in a large group in the Naval Command Staff or was it conferred about?
A. No, in my opinion, only the operations officers had knowledge of this document which in its entirety proves that this isn't a well-thought out study made by order of the Grand Admiral but some thoughts jotted down at the moment they occurred to Admiral Fricke.
Q. Was that document passed on to any outsiders at all?
A. I think I can remember that this document wasn't sent to anybody outside. It was used only within the operations department. The Grand Admiral, too, in my opinion did not have knowledge of it, particularly since this letter she is that he didn't initial it.
Q. You have a photostat copy of that letter. Are there any ether initials an it which night show that this was put before Grand Admiral Raeder? How was this sort of thing generally handled in oho Naval Command Staff?
A. Every document that was to be put before the Grand Admiral had on its first page, in the left margin, a remark saying "to be put before the GA before dispatch" or "to be reported during situation reports". And then on that spot the Grand Admiral would initial it with a green pencil or the officers of his personnel staff would indicate that it's been put before him or give some such indication.
Q. And there are no such indications on this document, are there?
A. No, no.
Q. I should now like you to see document C-38, which is a document of the Prosecution. Its number is GB-225. It is contained in Raeder's document book of the Prosecution on page 11. The war between Germany and Russia began on the 22nd of June, 1941. According to the last page, or, rather, last but one page of the document, the Supreme Command of the armed forces in Germany had, as early as the 15th of June -that's the week before the outbreak of the war -- ordered the use of arms against enemy submarines near the southern corner of Memel. This is supposed to have been done following an application from the Naval Command Staff. The Prosecution are basing the accusation on this document, and, once more, referring to an aggressive war, and, unfortunately, the Prosecution have only submitted the last page of this document.
They did not produce the first and second page of the document because, if they had done so, then this accusation would probably have been dropped. May I put it to you, Mr. Witness, what is contained there, and I quote:
"On the 12th of June, at 2000 hours, one report came from the guarding vessels which had been put into their station at 2000 hours, 20 sea miles west of Oslo, that there had been sighted an unknown submarine which had surfaced and was proceeding on a westerly course, after being called by wireless and replied with a letter to which no significance could be attached." did not, first of all, reply to ES call? the arrangement of recognition signals; that is to say, that there is a call and a reply. By this means the identity of the ship and its origin can immediately be ascertained and, if there is a wrong answer to an ES call, then this proves that this was not a vessel of the own fleet. remember, of a similar kind showing that ships appeared which were clearly the ships of the enemy?
A Yes. I remember that there were individual cases when unknown submarines appeared of the German Baltic ports. Later on it was found that when the stations of our own submarines were consulted that these were indeed enemy vessels.
Q. Were these facts the reason why the Naval Command Staff were asked that certain ships should now be fired on? Greece. It has been ascertained from the war diary that on the 30th of December, 1939, the Naval Command Staff made an application to the effect that Greek ships in the American blockade zone and of Great Britain may be treated as hostile.
Since Greece was neutral at the time, there has been an accusation of a breach of neutrality against Raeder. caused the Naval Command Staff and the Chief Raeder to make such an application to the OKW? of its merchant navy fleet at the disposal of Great Britain and that these Greek vessels were sailing under the British command. were not principally treated as hostile but only the American blockade zone? which occurred in June, 1942. The Naval Command staff made an application to the OKW to be allowed to attack Brazilian ships, although Brazil at that time was still a neutral.
The war with Brazil started some two months later on the 20th of August. What reasons were there for such a step? America, according to which they were being attacked by aircraft, which could on, have flown from Brazilian bases. To begin with, that question was clarified by means of inquiries, and it turned out that the reports were correct. Over and air that, I think I can remember personally that even at that time it was generally known that Brazil was giving bases to the United States, with which we were at we or placing those bases at their disposal.
Q. So that this was due to a breach of neutrality on the part of Brazil
Q. I shall submit to you C-176 and D-658. The document C-176 has the number GB- 228. These two documents are based on this command order. That's the order to destroy sabotage troops. which occured in December 42, Raeder was participating. In the document C-176, on its last page, you will find something which I shall quote.
"On the 11th of December 1942, shooting of the two captured Englishmen by a commando under the Port Commander at Bordeaux, numbering one to sixteen men, in the presence of an officer of the SD, the Security Service, and by order of the Fuehrer."
Previous entries, which. I don't want to quote in detail would give the same picture. And they show that the Secutiry Service, the SD,..were including them in the proceedings and that they were in constant direct touch with the Fuehrer. prisoners were shot, did know anything at all about this matter, hear about it, whether they know anything about this direct order from Hitler which is mentions in this connection? way come to the Naval Command Staff. The Naval Command Staff knew the tactical events in connection with this enterprise in Bordeaux and, over and above that, knew nothing at that time.
therefore, not discuss this case previously and it was not put to them, is that correct?
A I Am certain that this was not the case; that they did not hear about it.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, may I ask the Tribunal to take notice of the fact that this war diary is not the war diary which has been frequently mentioned, the diary of the Naval Commander in the west, that is, therefore, unknown to the Naval Command Staff that this is why the Naval Command Staff did not know of this case.
THE PRESIDENT: You are referring to document C-176?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: C-176, Yes, Mr. President, and likewise D-658. This in turn, is the war diary of the Naval Command Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the reference to it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: This is D-658, which will show .the following: According to reports of the armed forces, these two soldiers have since been shot. The measure would be in keeping by special order by the Fuehrer. That has been submitted by the Prosecution, and it shows -- and it is something I shall refer to later -- it shows the Naval Commander Staff knew nothing about the entire episode because, even this shows an entry dated the 9th of December, whereas the whole affair happened on the 11th.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be the time to break off.
(A recess was taken) BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Mr. Admiral, now I am submitting to you Document UK-45.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, UK-45 corresponds to USSR-130. This document deals with a report by the SKL dated the 29th of September 1941, addressed to the Group North, and it deals with the future of the city of Petersburg. raze the city of Petersburg from the face of the earth. The Navy itself was not to be concerned with that announcement. Despite that, this report was sent to Group North. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Mr. Witness, I will return to this point, but I would like to ask you first -- you have a photostatic copy of the original --to please tell me whether Raeder knew and saw this document before he resigned, or could have seen it. did not see this document. There are no notices or other comments to that effect on the document. report which is mentioned in Point 2 by Hitler. Why did the SKL, the Naval Warfare Command, receive this report and transmit it, even though the Navy itself was not concerned therewith? occupation or attack, the shipyards and the port installations and all other naval installations were to be spared so they might be used as bases later or. That suggestion, as set down in this document, was turned down by Hitler. That may be seen from Point 3 of this document. accordingly, and in the case of a later occupation of Leningrad he could not count on this port as a base. attention to the point to which the witness just referred, and that is III of USSR-130. I quote:
"The original demand of the Navy to spare the docks, ports, and other installations important to the Navy, is known to the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The fulfilling of this demand, because of the attack on Petersburg, is not possible." Commander in Chief of Group North. that is, whether he transmitted it or disposed of it in any way, or don't you know anything about that? was not the intention that this document be passed on, for it was meant solely and exclusively for Group North. On the basis of this document, the preparations which Admiral Karls had made as far as the Navy was concerned were stopped, and the personnel which had been earmarked for this were put at other disposal. That was the only measure which the Navy took on the basis of this document, and the only measure which could have been taken.
DR. SIEMERS: Perhaps I might tell the Tribunal that in my document book Raeder, under No. 111, I should like to submit an affidavit which contains this fact, that nothing was passed on by Group North, so the leading docks and yards and their Commanders never had any knowledge of this document. Commander-in-Chief in Finland, and I should like to come back to this point when I present the case on behalf of Grand Admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions?
COLONEL PHILLLIMORE: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the question asked by Dr. Siemers, I was going to leave the cross examination on those points to the cross examination of the defendant Raeder, so as to avoid any duplication
BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. AS I understand the evidence which the defendant Doenitz has given, and your evidence, you are telling the Tribunal that in respect of the treatment of neutral merchant ships, the German Navy has nothing to reproach itself with.
Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And the defendant has said that the German Navy was scupulous in adhering to orders about the attitude towards neutral shipping, and the neutrals were fully warned of what they should and should not do. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Admiral Doenitz has also said that there was no question of deceiving neutral governments; they were given fair warning of what their ships should not do. Do you agree?
A. Yes.
Q. Now. I want just to remind you of what steps were taken as regards neutrals, as they appear from the defense documents. respect for all rules of neutrality and compliance with all agreements of international law which were generally recognized was to be observed.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, that is D-55, page 139.
THE PRESIDENT: In the British document book?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: In the defense document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Defense.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: Doenitz 55. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE.
Q. And then, on the 28th of September, a warning was sent to neutrals to avoid suspicious conduct, changing course, zig-zagging, and so on. That is Doenitz 61, page 150. advised to refuse convoy escort. That is Doenitz 62, at page 153.
On the 22nd of October, there was a repitition of the warning, Doenitz 62, page 162; and on the 24th of November, the neutrals were told that the safety of their ships in water around the British Isles and in the vicinity of the French coast could no longer be taken for granted. That is Doenitz 73, at page 206; and then from the 6th of Januaryonwards, certain zones were declared dangerous zones. That is right, isn't it?
A No. On the 24th of November, a general warning was issued that the entire United States fighting zone was to be considered dangerous -- the specialized zones which, since January, were designated as operational zones, this was not made public since in the framework of the first warning, they stayed within the limitation and this was only for the internal use within the navy.
Q That is the point I want to be clear about. The zones that you declared from the 6th of January onwards, those weren't announced. Is that a fact?
A Yes; the neutrals were warned on the 24th of November that all of these areas which had been designated as operational areas, would be dangerous for shipping. onwards, no further specific warning was given. Is that the case?
A That is correct. After this general warning, there was no special or singular warning as to specific areas as to that. by this declaration of an enormous danger zone, you were entitled to sink neutral shipping without warning?
A Yes. I am of the opinion that in this area which, for us, since the United States of North America, as well as for the rest of the shipping, it was considered dangerous, consideration was not to be taken for neutrals. neutral government was given fair warning that its ships would be sunk without warning if they were anywhere in that zone? neutral countries were notified officially that the entire United States of America fighting zone was to be considered as dangerous and that the German Reich could have no responsibility for losses in combat in this area.
Q That is quite a different case. Don't let us have any mistake about this. Are you saying that by that warning, you were entitled to sink neutral ships anywhere in that zone without warning, sink on sight? neutral shipping anywhere in that zone, as from the 24th of November? time onward to take no special consideration for neutral shipping. Each exception which we could have given our U-boats would have meant that they could not have sunk hostile ships either.
Q It isn't a question of any special consideration. Are you saying that you became entitled to sink on sight any neutral ship or sink it deliberately whether or not you recognized it asneutral?
THE PRESIDENT: Surely you can answer that question yes or no.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I am of that opinion. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE: rules? believe that is competent. That is a matter for international law.
Q At any rate, that is what you proceded to do isn't it? You proceeded to sink neutral ships on sight and without warning anywhere in that zone?
A Yes; not just anywhere but in the operational zones laid down by us.
Q But where very you could, wherever you could? are of the opinion that in this case, we were concerned with secured areas near the hostile coast whichcould not be considered the open sea.
Q And that is what you decided to do upon the very start of the war, wasn't it? That is what you decided to do? London Agreement.
Q Would you look at the document which was put in yesterday. My Lord, it is D-851. It is put in as GB-451. It is a memorandum of the 3rd of September.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: The only new document that Sir David Maxwell Fyfe put in cross examination. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q Would you look at the third paragraph: "The navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England which can be achieved with the forces available, can only be obtained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated in the enclosed map." Do you still say that you didn't intend from the start of the war to sink neutral shipping without warning as soon as you could get Hitler to agree to let you do so? Do you still say that?
A Yes, explicitly. In this document, in the first paragraph it says that in the material sent to thenavy, the question of unrestricted U-boat warfare against England is being discussed and I cannot judge these materials if they are not submitted to me.
Q You were in the General Staff at that time. You were in charge of the Department 1-A. This point of view mast have been put forward by your department. Foreign Office, to adhere strictly to the London Agreement until we had proof that the British merchant shipping was armed militarily and was being used for military purposes. Here, we are concerned solely with an exchange of an opinion and informing of the foreign Office.
Q I didn't ask for your general view on the document. We can read that for ourselves. Your object was to terrorize the small neutrals and frighten then from sailing en their ordinary lawful occasions. Isn't that right?
A No.
Q And isn't that why, in the orders you issued in January of 1940, you excepted the larger countries from this "sink on sight" risk? Would you look at document C-21. That is GB-194, at page 30 of the prosecution document book in English; page 59 to 60 in the German. Now, just look. It is the second entry on page 5, the 2nd of January 1940. Report by 1-A." That is you, isn't it? That was you, wasn't it? "Report by 1-A on directive of armed forces -- High Command -- dated 30th of December, referring to intensified measures in naval warfare in connection with "Fall Gelb" (case yellow). "In consequence of this directive, the navy will authorize simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the sinking by U-beats without any warning, of all ships in these waters near the enemy casts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, pretense should be made that mines are being used. The behavior of and use of weapons by U-boats should be adapted by this purpose." That has nothing to do with the arming of British merchant ships? That is not the reason that is given, is it? The reason is because it fitted in with your operations for "Fall Gelb".
A I didn't understand the last sentence.
Q You don't give as your reason that the British were arming their merchant ships. The reason you give is that it was necessary in connection with intensified measures for Fall Gelb. Why is that?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The German translation is so inadequate that it is almost impossible to understand the question. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q I will put the question to you again. The excuse for this directive is. to be the intensification of measures is connection with Jail Gelb. You notice, don't you, that nothing is said about the arming of British merchant ships as Justifying this step? That is correct, isn't it?
A May I have time, please, to peruse this manuscript first? the neutrals on the 24th of November 1939.
Q Nothing is said about the warning of the 24th of November. If you were entitled, as you have told us, under that to sink neutral ships, there wouldn't be any need for this special directive, would there?
Q No. Now, let's just-
A (Interposing) because of military reasons and politicalreasons we ordered that there was to be the excuse of mines, and that was the special point of this order. 18th of January, will you? You have get it? 18th of January.
Q That is the actual order for sinking without warning. You notice the last sentence:
"Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan and Russia are exempted from these attacks." And then Spain is added in pencil.
Isn't it right that you were out to terrorize the small neutrals and to bully them, but you weren't running any risks with the big ones?
A No, it wasn't like that. It is to be explained as follows: That, as a matter of course, military disadvantages are to be bargained for if political advantages are to be derived therefrom.
