safety of your own boats and your own personnel.
Q Why did you put into the order "The rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of ships and crews"? What was the point of putting these words in, unless you meant to encourage people to destroy enemy ships and crews?
A I had explained that quite carefully yesterday. I had preached during all these years that you must not rescue when your own safety is in danger. In the case of the Laconia I told that to the troops, in four wireless messages, due to my anxiety and worry. Apart from that, I experienced it again and again that submarine commanders were taking the danger from the ai too lightly, and I have explained how that is to be explained psychologically. I described yesterday how the Air Forces increased and that consequently under no circumstances would I have given the reason and told these people again that if there is danger from the air you must do that and that, you must not rescue, or rescuing is contrary to the most primitive manner of warfare. The reason is because there was no question -- I was taking away from the commandants any arguments on questions of air attack. After all, my experience with losses and the steady presence of the Air Force, which is historical, and increasing more and more, and on the basis of my experience I had to give directly acute orders to the commandants saying, "You can't go on like that or we shall be attacked and killed by the opponents whilst we rescue their own men." That was why that could not come into it. I did not wish to give the commanders another opportunity of thinking out or discussing this vital point. I told you yesterday that I could have added that if we do not consider the danger from the air and we rescue the opponent and are being attacked by that very opponent, then that rescue is against the most primitive principles of warfare. I didn't want to do that, because I didn't want any discussions or arguments. We all had the impression that I said "don't rescue because there is air danger", that this idea was worn-out Because the commanders would nevertheless lose their own liberty of decision.
Q But if you had simply said "You are forbidden to rescue", and if you had wanted to give a reason "You are forbidden to rescue because in view of the Allied air cover it is a matter of too great danger for the safety of yourself and your boat ever to rescue at all, " that would have been quite clear.
Why didn't you put it that way?
A No, not at all. That is what I have just said. Because, again, a commander in some theatre, some part of the sea, might have an idea there wasn't danger from the air and the next moment there was an aircraft and he was smashed. time that you got this order out -- Captains Gote and Hessler, had you not?
A Yes, that's right. against the issue of this order, did they not?
AAs far as I can remember, they roughly said this: "The bulk of the submarines" -- and this is what I have said here -- "the bulk of the U-boats, that is, more than 90 per cent of then were already fighting the convoys, so that those orders wouldn't affect then at all. And the question was: Did we want to issue such a general order at all, and whether there were further developments which were forcing us currently to issue yet new orders, namely, 'Stay on the surface as little as possible' wouldn't make an order superfluous but since I was responsible for every possible loss of a submarine I had to give this additional order and my staff agreed with me perfectly as far as this measure was concerned.
Q Didn't you say when you were interrogated on the 22nd of October and on other occasions "Gote and Hessler told me, 'Don't make this wireless; you see, one day there can be a wrong appearance about; there can be a misinterpretation of that.'" Didn't you say that?
was made. But it wasn't misinterpreted, or I wouldn't have issued the order. We were thinking of the effects on the outside world.
Q And wasn't the effect that you wanted to produce that you would have an order which could be argued was merely a prohibition of rescue and would encourage the submarine commanders who felt that way as to annihilating the survivors of the crews? which we submitted. Apart from the case Moehle, nobody misunderstood this order at all and when we compiled the order we weren't aware of that fact. That becomes clear from the correspondent which we had from commandos and it becomes clear from my inquiries when I asked whether they had in anyway considered such a possibility.
A What's more, this order doesn't show that and the cause as such doesn't indicate it. We were rescuing for all we were worth, but this is the subject, "rescue or don't," and nothing else, This is the final stage of the Laconia case.
Q You said that "we issued the order." Do you remember saying this on an interrogation on the 6th of October?
"I am completely and personally responsible for it, because Captains Gote and Hessler both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or likely to be misinterpreted."
Do you remember saying that, "I am completely and personally responsible" because both your staff officers had pointed out that it was ambiguous? Did you say that?
A I don't suppose I said it like that. I am not sure, but I say now the during the interrogation I was told that Captains Gote and Hessler made this order and in reply to that I said, "It is quite immaterial, I am responsible for the order." And apart from that, the discussion on that order we discussed whether one ought to issue such an order; in Admiral Gote's or Captain Hessler's brain the thought might crop up that such an order could be misunderstood by us -- that is, the U-Boats.
That I emphatically stated during the interrogation. I have expressly stated that these considerations and the discussion of that question whether the order was to bepublished or not was having nothing to do in the case of these two people, that the order could be understood among us, and that too was contained in an interrogation.
Q You were making clear that it was the first occasion. I made it clear that you weren't blaming your junior officer that had advised you against this and this, and you were taking the responsibility on this occasion yourself. That is true, these junior officers advised you against it? In your own words, they both expressly stated that they considered the telegram ambiguous and liable to be misinterpreted, that's right, isn't it, they did say that?
A I didn't see the discussion after the record was made, and I didn't sign it; but I can tell youquite clearly -- and this becomes clear from another discussion -- that I have said that I myself will assume full responsibility. That was important to me. The only reasonwhy the whole question came up was because the interrogating officer told me these officers had written the order and then it was going around: in my head that under no circumstances should these officers be held responsible if they wrote my order. That was the sense of my statement. ago, that both Captain Gote and Captain Hessler advised you against issuing this order, are you? Now I have heard that both are saying they hadn't advised against it but that I might have or somebody else -- I don't knew for certain, but the way I recollect it, it was that both had advised against it.
If 90 per cent of our submarines should work in convoy work, whether it was advisable to issue such an order, they were being forced into the water anyway and we still couldn't possibly rescue since we were below the surface, I said, "No there are still cases when such a thing can happen and where the commander is then put into that emergency and then I shall/relieve him of the decision." That was the discussion and what we were up against and nothing else.
Q We will continue. That is the first part of the order. Take paragraph 2, "the orders for bringing in Captains and Chief Engineers still apply." Now, Defendant, you know perfectly well that in order to find the captain or chief engineer the U-Boat has got to go around the lifeboats or wreckage and make inquiries, "where is the captain?" And you know very well that the usual practice of the British merchantmen was to try and hide the captain and prevent than finding out who he was. Isn't that the practical position that had to be met, that you had to go around the lifeboats asking for the captain if you wanted to bring him in? Isn't that so?
A Not to that extent, no. I had stated quite clearly yesterday that the risk of taking aboard one man was much shorter as far as time was concerned, and would not in any way limit the diving ability of the boat, whereas the rescuing of others would interfere. for which a certain risk would have to be assumed during such a war; and, thirdly, that the significance of that paragraph appeared to be lean and always remained so. This order if you want to understand it like this and tak it out of its context, spoke against the statement, namely, I want these people killed, because here I want somebody taken prisoner, but if I kill somebody first then I can't take him prisoner. are to bring in captains and chief engineers to find out what you can from them.
Look at the third paragraph: "Rescue ship crews only if their statements will be of importance for U-boats that is, of importance for you to learn from then the position of Allied ships, or the measures the Allies are taking against submarines." That is the point against two and three isn't it? You are only to take prisoners if you can find out some useful thing from them? we should try to get as much intelligence material as possible, and since I couldn't take the whole crew prisoners on a U-boat, I have to confine myself to the most important person. I remove these people from further fighting, whereas the others may fight later. Of course, if I consider the limited room on a U-boat, I take only the important ones.
Q I don't want to take up a lot of time but Iwant you to tell me this:
Did I understand your explanation of the word "again" in the War Diary to be that you had drawn the attention of certain submarine Commanders by your telegrams during the Laconia incident, is that your explanation? four wireless messages which we have read on this matter during the preceding days, and that have been submitted to the Tribunal yesterday.
Q I put to you a moment ago a question and you said the "again" refers to the messages you have sent out during the Laconia incident? I think you agree with that, don't you?
Don't be afraid to agree with what I say. When was that? I assumed that the parson was summarizing the whole event, and that was probably the way he mentioned it. He was a petty officer and I don't know what he meant in that connection at that time. conversations which I put to you a few moments ago? who gave evidence he had not heard of the Hitler and Oschina conversations either, don't you think he could not have heard about it? forward the same argument during a lecture he heard as Hitler put forward in his conversations with Oschina? had told the story differently than he did during his interrogation. During these examination he has admitted that, I have not said anything about fighting against rescued personnel, but everything else he said is so un-clear that I don't attach much value to his credibility, and certainly he stated quite clearly that I had not done this by lecture but during discussions, which is of no importance, and, fourthly, it may be that the subject was opened dealing with new construction in America and the finding of crews for these new ships. it is possible. reference to the American Ship building program and the difficulty of finding crews? Do you agree with Heisig on that?
A Thatwas in the German Press. It was full of it and everybody knew it regarding the ship building the building program would be useless if you could destroy or frighten off sufficient navy merchant crews. That is the point in Hitler's conversation, and that Heisig said you said. Did you say that? ments would be made difficult, that is a matter in my war diary, and perhaps I talked in a similar way before these cadets. page 76 in the German Translation?
A Page 37?
Q Page 37 is the English. It is an order dated in September of 1943. I just want you to look at the last sentence:
"In view of the desired destruction of ship's crews, their sinking is of great value."
A I haven't found the page yet. German.
A That can't be right.
Q Perhaps you would help me, Sergeant Major, would you?
(The place is indicated to the witness)
Q "In view of the desired destruction of ship's crews, their sinking is of great value, and it is continually pressing, the need for ships crews." rescue ships were heavily armed, they had air craft and were just aspossible to be sunk by a convoy as any other ships. If there were crews which we would have like others, it was, of course, our right to give an order that these rescue ships should be sunk. Apart from that they were used as traps for submarines. ships, the destruction of ship's crews - Now I want to ask you one or two questions about Moehle. He commanded the U-boat operations from 1942 until the end of the war.
That is nearly three years, and as he told us, he has a number of decorations for gallant service.
Are you telling the Tribunal that Commander Moehle went on briefing submarine commanders on a completely mistaken basis for three years without any of your staff or yourself discovering this? You saw every U-boat commander when he came back. had doubts in connection with this order, as he declared here, and that he didn't clarify it right away, but unfortunately I can't think he could have had such doubt. He had the opportunity to clarify the matter and I don't know whether my staff or anybody else but the Submarine staff had any idea he had any doubt. your Submarine commanders. I can't get the Commander and this is a letter from his widow, I want you to say what you think of a passage in it.
She says: In the second paragraph - "Captain Moehle syas he had not found any U-boat Commanders who has the supposed order to fire at defenseless seamen who were in distress at sea."
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I object against the use of this letters. I think this is the sort of letter which has been ruled out as an exhibit and it isn't sworn, and it is a typical letter such as Mr. Justice Jackson repeatedly criticized.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The only point I make is this: The man himself has not come back. The widow can give information as to how he understood his orders before he went out, and I should have submitted it with probative value. I think in Article 19 it occurs, My Lord. I won't use it if there is the slightest doubt about it before the Tribunal.
THE WITNESS: It isfull of incorrect statements, too.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait it just a minute.
THE WITNESS: It isnot true.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have only just finished reading this letter--
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal is considering the matter at the moment.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: May I just add one argument of mine first?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have heard your argument and we are considering the matter. should not be used.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: As your Lordship pleases.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: own document books which Dr. Kranzbuehler put to you yesterday. It is Volume 2, page 92, Exhibit 42. Before I ask you a question about it there is one point that I would like you to help me on. In your interrogation you said that on the 22nd of October - you said that about two months after that order of the 17th of September you issued orders forbidding U-boats to surface at all, isthat right? You gave orders for biddU-boats to surface, is that right?
A That isn't possible at all in connection with a submarine; depending on whether it was day or night, or according to the situation of the weather, we would alter our orders and give them orders when they had to surface.
Q They weren't to surface after attacks, weren't to surface at all before or after attacks; isn't that the effect of your order? the surface for attacks, but it depended on these things, and we were trying to take no risks. surface as little as possible and you tell me it was your order?
Q Did you give orders as to surfacing? considering the weather, considering the part of the sea they were in, and considering whether it was day or night. The order was different according to these factors. There were changes, too; if we had experiences showing that night was more dangerous than day, then we surfaced during the day But then after that we might have the impression that it was better to surface during the day, because then one could at least see the attacking aircraft, so we changed. air cover became so heavy that -- I quote your own words. You say: "Two months later there were no submarines at all who came in the situation to get up." That is, as I understood it, surfacing became very difficult in view of the heavy nature of allied air attacks; is that right?
A Yes, they didn't have a chance to come to the surface in certain parts of the sea without being attacked forthwith, at once; that is just the point. But this is the difference in that connection: the submarines were alarmed, a general alarm, when otherwise we weren't and even when they had been alarmed completely there were still these losses and these difficulties which occurred.
Q Now I want you to look at Page 93. It is the page after the one I referred you to in Volume 2 of your document book, paragraph 1: "The percentage of sunk merchant vessels in convoys in 1941 amounted to 40 per cent; in the entire year of 1942 to barely 30 per cent; in the last quarter of 1942 to 57 per cent; in January, 1943, to about 65 per cent; in February to 70 per cent; and in March to 80 per cent." Your worst period was the first three-quarters of 1942, isn't that so. That appears from your own figures.
A Which "worst period"? I don't understand.
A Yes, but how do you mean, "worst period"? 1941 amounted to 40 per cent
A You mean merchant ships?
Q Yes. I am reading your own War Diary, or rather the S.K.L. War Diary.
"In the entire year of 1942 to barely 30 per cent --"
A From convoys?
Q Convoys, yes. So that the worst period that you had was the first three-quarters of 1942?
A No. In 1942, as I have said when I described the entire situation, a large number of submarines were just outside the ports, such as Trinidad and the like. But we aren't mentioning this in this connection - we are only mentioning in this list the sinkings carried out by those boats which were fighting against convoys in the Atlantic. was the first three-quarters of 1942? It must have been around 30 per cent.
A No, no, no. My most successful period was the year of 1942. year of 1942 your percentage of sunk merchant vessels in convoys is only 30 per cent, whereas in January and February and March, 1943, it got up to 65, 70 and 80 per cent?
A Right. Of the merchant ships sunk in 1942, 30 per cent were sunk in the Atlantic, but the total figure was much larger than, forinstance, in the year of 1943 when 65 and 70 per cent were sunk; and that is simply because at that time in 1943 we could no longer sit outside a pert like New York, for instance. This is only mentioning percentages of sinkings in the Atlantic from convoys. percentage of convoys was low, when you had had that pressure that I have gone into with you before, there was every reason for you to issue an unequivocal order which would have the effect of getting these submarine commanders who wanted to destroy the crews of the ships. In 1943 your U-boats weren't surfacing, your convoy proportions had gone up, and there wasn't any reason to make your order more explicit. That is what I am suggesting to you, Defendant.
A This is the point, that was the situation that we said. Beginning in the summer of 1942 we had the experience of the suddenly increasing danger from the air.
This danger was having its effect everywhere, on the sea --
and that includes these parts of the sea where submarines were not fighting convoys.
Q Now I just want you to help me on one other point. Dr. Kranzbuehler put to you yesterday that Kaditaenleutnant Eck said that if he had come back he would not have expected you to have objected or been angry with him for shooting up the crew of the Pileus. You said you know that Eck was carrying this order of yours in your locker when he did shoot up the crew of the Pileus?
A Yes, but I also know that this order didn't have the slightest effect regarding his decision as Eck is expressly saying his decision to shoot the crew had quite a different aim. His aim was to remove the wreckage because he was afraid for his boat just as for other boats which would have gone to pieces otherwise in this particular part of the sea. He stated emphatically and expressly that any connection in his thoughts with the order which he had aboard quite accidentally, referred to the "Laconia", and this condition did not exist. "Noreen Mary" and the "Antonico ", which are on pages 47 and 52 of the prosecutions document book, where witnesses give specific evidence of the U-boat carrying out attacks on them when they are, in one case, on wreckage, and, in the other case, in the lifeboat. Will you look at the "Noreen Mary" on page 47 of the document book? The statement of the survivor is on page 49 and 50. He deals with this point, he says in the fourth paragraph -page 85 of theGerman book, page 50 of the English one; I have got the English document; "I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our life-beat which was upside down and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only about 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst fromthe machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing, and submerged, after which I climbed back to the bottom of the boat."
The statement by the Brazilian gentleman -- which you will find on page 52.
Do you have it?
A Yes, I've got it.
Q Fifteen lines from the foot, he says: "The enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in No. 2 lifeboat." Assuming -- of course one has to assume -- assume that Mr. McAlister and Signor De Oliveira Silva are speaking the truth, are you saying that these U-boat officers were acting on their own?
A. It is possible. I can believe that subjectively they managed that; but I want to point out this night battle of the "Antonico", which lasted twenty minutes. It was quite possible that shots might have been assumed or shots directed against the ship could hit a rescuing vessel. At any rate, if during a night attack, during twenty minutes, some one is making a report that it is subjective -- and everyone know how different these reports are and everyone who know them will know how many errors will creep into them -- if, during such a night battle, the U-boat had wanted to destroy these people, then it wouldn't have left after twenty minutes as is stated in the report, particularly since the person is stating that he could hardly see the submarine in the darkness. These are all very vague statements.
In the case of the "Noreen Mary", it is quite similar. A large number of statements are made which are certainly not true; for instance, that the submarine was supposed to have a swastika on its tower. Not a single submarine was painted in that way when it went to sea. And, if some one is near some wreckage or a lifeboat and shots are happening nearby, then he will always feel that he is being shot at. It was for that very reason that a number of cases of the Anglo-American side have been raised by us; not because we wanted to raise an accusation, but because we wanted to show how very sceptical one has to be regarding these reports. half years of war and considering the large number of attacks.
Q. Yes, and for, of course, the two and a half of these years that the submarine commanders have been shooting up survivors, you're not likely to get many cases, are you? I just want to ask you one other point -
A. Commanders of submarines, with the exception of the case Eck, did in no case shoot down shipwrecked persons -- in no case.
Q. That's what you say.
A. That's not true. It's not true. There's no case proved. To the contrary, with great devotion did we rescue. Never has there been an inclination amongst the submarine personnel that shipwrecked personnel should be proceeded against, with the exception of the case Eck, for certain clear-cut reasons.
Q. Well, now, tell me this: Did you know that the log of the Athenia was faked, after she came in?
A. No, it wasn't faked. There was a clear order that the case of the Athenia should be kept secret for political reasons and, as a result, the log had to be altered.
Q. I see. You don't like the word "faked". Well, I'll use the word "changed"; that a page was cut out of the log and a false page had been put in. Did you know about that?
A. I can't tell you that to-day. It's possible. Probably Captain Lemm, either from me or my staff, received the order that the case is to be kept a secret; and that order he certainly must have received. And following that, he or the flotilla would have taken the log, which went to ten departments of the navy, and altered it correspondingly. What else could he do; he had no choice. If for political reasons -
Q. I want to know, was it your order and with your knowledge that that log was altered from, I suppose, the truth into the falsity in which it exists today? That is a simple question. Can you answer it?
A. Yes. Either it was done by my order or, if it hadn't been done, then I would have ordered it because the political instructions existed that it was to be kept secret. The fighting men had no other choice, therefore, but to alter the document. Afterwards, after the case happened, commanders of the U-boats had orders to make any false entries. Especially in the case such as the Athenia, it was ordered afterwards that it was to be kept secret and nothing must appear in the log.
Q. Well, now, I have only one other point to deal with you, and I can deal with it quite shortly. You were a firm adherent of ideological education for service personnel, were you not?
A. Yes, and I can explain my reasons.
Q. Well, I just want to get this, and then you can explain your reasons afterwards. You thought it consense that a soldier should have no politics, didn't you? If you want to -
A. But, of course, yes. The soldier had nothing to do with politics, but, on the other hand, he had to stand behind his home state during the war.
Q. And you wanted your commanders to indoctrinate the navy with Nazi ideology, didn't you?
A. I wished that commanders should tell the units that the German nation was the source of strength for our warfare, and that, since we were the beneficiaries of this unity, we should take care of that unity; that that source should remain in existence. respect. That disintegration of the nation would have had its effect on the troops at once; that is quite clear.
Q. Look at page 7 in the English document book. I think it puts it almost exactly as in my question.
A. Seven?
Q. Yes, seven. The last sentence from the very start.
"The whole of the officers' corps must be so indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the National Socialist state in its entirety. The officer is the exponent of the state. The idle chatter that the officer is non-political is sheer nonsense. " That's you view, isn't it?
A. I had written that. I have said that, but you've also got to read the first sentence, which says that our discipline and our strength is as high as a tower and it's above that of 1918. The reason is because the nation is behind us.
If that hadn't been the case, then our troops would have fallen apart; that's the reason why I said that again and again, the same principle.
Q. Tell me, how many men were you attempting to apply this to or how many men had you got in the Navy on the 15th of February, 1944? I want to see what body you were trying to effect. How many? A quarter of a million?
A. More, 600,000 or 700,000.
Q. Now, I would just like you to turn to the next page, page 8 in the British document book, which gives your speech on Heroes' Day, the 12th of March, 1944. You say this?
"What would have become of our country today if the Fuehrer had not united as under National Socialism, split into parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable to it, and letting as a defense our present uncompromising world outlook? We would long since have succumbed to the burdens of this war and be subject to the merciless destruction of our adversaires."
What did you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry?"
Q. I wanted to say that we were living in a very large community and that this represented strength.
Q. No, that's not what I asked.
A. That all forces should serve that community.
Q. I'm asking you, what did you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry"? It's your phrase, and you tell us what you meant by it.
A. I could imagine that, considering the considerable burden of bombing attacks, the holding out of the population in the towns would be more difficult if such an influence was taking place; that's what I wanted to say.
Q. Well, now, can you tell me again; what do you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry?"
A. It means that the strength to hold out of the people, in which I was interested as a soldier in the battle of the nations for life and death; that that might have had a disintegrating effect.
Q. Well, now, that's what I want to know. You were the supreme commander and indoctrinated 600,000 or 700,000 men. Why were you conveying to them that Jews were a spreading poison in the party politics? Why was that? what was it that you objected to Jews; that made you think that they had a bad effect on Germany?
A. That statement was made during my speech on Heroes' Day. It just show that I was of the opinion that the strength of holding out of the nation could be preserved better than if there were Jewish component parts in the nation.
Q. This sort of talk, "spreading poison of Jewry" produced the attitude in the mind which caused the death of five or six million Jews in these last few years. Do you say that you knew nothing about the action and the intention to do away with and exterminate the Jews?
A. Yes, of course, I'm saying that. I didn't know anything at all about it. If such a statement was made, then that doesn't furnish evidence that I knew about any methods which were used against Jewry.
Q. No, but I'm putting -
A. This happened in '43.
Q. Well, what I'm putting to you is that you are joining in the hunt against this unfortunate section of your community and leading six or seven hundred thousand of the Navy on the same hunt. to you -- page 76.
A. Nobody amongst my men was thinking of employing force against Jews, not a single one, and nobody can draw that conclusion from that sentence.
Q. Well, now, just look at page 76. This where you're dealing with the promotion of under-officers and men who have shown themselves to be personalities in warfare. You, first of all, say:
"I declare that the leaders of units responsible for ratings and the flotilla commanders and other commanders superior to them should interest themselves more in the promotion of these under-officers and men who have shown in special situations in the war that, thanks to their inner attitude and firmness, by energetic and inner drive, in short, owing to their gifts of personalities, they are capable of taking right decisions independently and of carrying them out without wavering in their aim and with willing acceptance of responsibility.
"An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser CORMORAU in Australia, a petty officer, acting as camp senior officer, had all Communists, who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camps, systematically done away with in such a way that the guards did not notice, This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution and, after his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown he is fitted to be a leader."