Q May I please explain to this Lordship that I am. not on the question of sinking. I am on the question of survivors. Did you take any action with the U-boat commander Kapitaenleutnant Ernst for not having assisted in the rescue of survivors?
A No. But I did tell him that if he was on the spot where this rescue went on he should have helped. December, 1939?
A No, he didn't. that it only applied for ships which were secured. Armed, presumably. Book, page 69 in the German Document Book. It is the report of the conversation between Hitler and Oschima a d you say that you were told nothing about it. Now I want you just to follow about half way down, half way through the extract, where it says:
"After having given further explanations on the map the Fuehrer pointed out that however many ships the United States built, one of their map problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason even merchant ships would be sunk without warning, with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes a long time."
Now, did you agree with that argument of Hitler's that once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people? Did you think that that was a sound argument in the question of sea warfare against the United States? Foreign Office, and I stated my opinion, which is that I do not believe that it would take a long time to train seamen since American wasn't lacking replacements.
Consequently I would not be of the opinion that this would have a scaring-off value if these pe ple were not rescued.
Q So you don't agree with t e Fuehrer's reasoning on that point?
A No, I don't agree to the last part, namely, that there is a lack of now seamen. it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting now people. That is, I suggest to you that the new people would be scared off by the news of the sinking and killing of the first people. Did you agree that that was a sound argument. That is what I want your view on. which I cannot judge. English version, which is your report to the Fuehrer on the 14th of May 1942. Do you see the last sentence where you are advocating a rangepistol? You say:
"A rangepistol will also have the great advantage that the crew will not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of crews will no doubt cause difficulties for the assignment of crews for the great American construction program."
A It is perfectly clear and it is correct if they haven't got the same crews and have to have new ones it will make it difficult; but this doesn't mention a scaring off. The positive fact is stated that now crews will have to be trained. frightening or terrorizing effect on the getting of new crews if the old crews were sunk under conditions where they would probably lose their lives? people. The American Minister Knox said that whereas in 1941, the sinking of German U-boats was not known, he nevertheless was expecting the scaring-off value, as far as my submarines were concerned. That is his opinion. I can only say that the silent disappearing did not have a scaring-off value. It is a matter of taste against the crews after the vessel was sunk. Isn't that so?
A. Yes. He asked whether we couldn't proceed against the crew. I have already said that when I heard of the Oschima discussion here, I believed that this question to Grand Admiral Raeder and myself was the result of that Oschima discussion.
My answer to that of course is no. and kill them while they were still on the boat. That was your answer, wasn't it? A No. My answer was that proceeding against shipwrecked personnel was out of the question, but as a matter of course one must use the best possible weapon. Every nation does that. the crew would not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick sinking of the ship. That is why you wanted to use the rangepistol.
A Yes. And also for that reason because the crows of the steamer, sinc they were fighting with arms, were considered commandos. was in your mind. Now, the Fuehrer raised this point again on the 5th of September 1942, as is shown in your document book. Volume 2, Page 81.
A. I do not have it. Where is it?
Q. It begins with the discussion in the OKW situati n of 5 September 1942. It is Exhibit 39, page 81, and it is in the English document book, volume two.
A. Yes, I have found it now.
Q. It arises out of an incident of the sinking of the mineboat "Ulm", an there is a question of whether British destroyers had fired with machine arms on soldiers in lifeboats, and the Fuehrer gave orders to the naval command to issue an order according to which "our warships would use reprisals," and if you look a little lower down, you say that, "That the matter had been investigated by your operations staff, and it is stated, "It could not be proved beyond a doubt that the fire had been aimed at the crew boarding the lifeboats.
The enemy fire was evidently aimed at the ship itself." page, and you say, "It is the opinion of the Naval War Command that before issuing reprisal orders, one should take into consideration whether such measures, if applied the enemy against us, would not in the end be more harmful to us than to the enemy.
Even now our ships have only in a few cases the possibility to save shipwrecked enemy crews by towing the lifeboats, etc., whereas the crews of sinking German U-boats and merchant vessels so far, as a rule, have been pick up by the enemy. To turn matters in our favor, we would have to order, not on to abandon, but also to fight against shipwrecked enemy crews as a measure of reprisal.
"It is significant in this respect that so far it could not be proved th in the cases on record where the enemy used arms against shipwrecked Germans such action was ordered or covered by an order of an official British office. We would hve to count on it that knowledge of such a German order would be us by enemy propaganda in such a manner that its consequences could not easily b foreseen."
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have objections agains this type of procedure. The document about which this cross examination is being made is not a document submitted to me as evidence. I have not submitted it yet. I do not know whether it is customary during these proceedings that exhibits of the Defense are submitted and can be submitted by the Prosecution. I had suggested for this very reason some time ago that the documentary evidence should begin so that the Prosecution should have an opportunity to use my evidence, my exhibits in cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objection to the document which is in your document book being offered in evidence?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I shall offer the document, Mr. President, but I only want to avoid that now during cross examination my documents should be read by the Prosecution because my entire documentary evidence is being upset through that. This particular case does not play a decisive part for me, but it the Prosecution are proposing to make other documents of mine the subject of their cross examination, documents which have not yet been submitted by me, I should like to ask that the cross examination be interrupted and I now be afforded an opportunity to submit my documents.
THE PRESIDENT: That will only waste time, will it not? It would not do any good; it would only waste time.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I do not think it would be a waste of time if I, as Defense Counsel, ask that I be allowed to. submit my own documents to the Tribunal myself and that they shall not be quoted from my document book to the Tribunal by the Prosecution, because the type of presentation and the questions attached to that do, of course, give these documents a certain character.
TEE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, The Tribunal thinks there is no objection to the course that is being taken. You have had the opportunity already of putting this document to the witness. You will have a further opportunity of putting it to him again in re-examination.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q. So that there was fresh pressure on you to take this course, that is, to fire on the crews of sunken vessels in September, was there not?
A. No, that is not correct. This document of the Naval Command Staff only became known to me here. I was not in the picture therefore, but it is true that in accordance with this document, the Naval Command Staff had apparently had orders from the OKW to compile a list of all such cases and that the Naval Command Staff was purely occupying itself with the belief that one would have to be very careful in judging these cases and that it advised against reprisal measures.
It appears to me that this document had the very purpose to convince that principally such reprisals should be refrained from. through an inquiry to the Naval Command Staff on this point in September?
A No, I did not know that. I just said I do know this entry from the log of the Command Staff, together with the appendix which is attached to it and which I first heard of here.
Q You first heard of it here? September, then we will pass on to another document. That is what you say, that you did not know about it in September 1942? the "Laconia" in any detail, but I want you just to tell me about one, I think, one or two entries. I think it is page 40 of your own document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not on page 41?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged to Your Lordship. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q It is page 41, at the bottom. It is for 20 September, 1320 hours. That is your wireless message to the U-boat Schacht. Do you see that? message that the boat was despatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and poles? Is that true?
boats in tow, and it is on page 40. It was clear, considering the entire situation, that a submarine, with vessels in tow, could not remain on the surface without losing a great deal of value. That is the reason for what is mentioned under the second order on page 40, which says that the boats with British should be cast adrift. That was the one reason, and then on page 41 there comes a long wireless message which is, in fact, a summary. It was understood however that he considered his boat in danger through having to stop, and so on and so forth, and that there had been two air attacks, and then he received that wireless message. Since I had not spoken against the saving of Englishmen, I received the impression that in the occurrence the Italians, who after all were our allies, were getting the short end of the stick. That is proved by the figures.
Q You have given a long explanation. Now, is that wireless message true, that the boat was despatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that true or not true? it is even more clarified by the event as such, as well as the impression that the total number of British personnel was counted among them, whereas a large number of Italians drowned, but that impression did not arrive until the end.
THE PRESIDENT: You understand the light, do you not? BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When you were interrogated about this matter, you said that you were under great pressure at the time, and I think the pressure came to you from Hitler through Captain Fricke. Is that right?
A No, not "only"; "also" but not "only". The pressure, as I have very clearly explained here, was due to worry and anxiety regarding the fat of my submarines. I knew that they were now being greatly jeopardized, and we have had evidence of that because of the bombing. Secondly, of course, Frick passed on the Fuehrer's orders, but I have also stated here that in spite of that order, I remained in favor of rescuing, in spite of the fact that that was a military mistake. My worry and anxiety were, of course, mostly for the submarines, for my submarines.
tge 14th of May; you had then had the Laconia incident, and during that incident you had had the pressure from the Fuehrer. Now, wasn't it because of this -
Q Very well, I will correct it. You had had the report to the Fuehrer on the 14th of May. You have told me that. There was then the Laconia -
A But that has nothing to do with the Fuehrer's order referring to the case of the Laconia. In the case of the Laconia the Fuehrer merely stated correctly that no boats should be endangered during rescue activities. deal with. You had had the 14th of May, the Laconia incident, and then an order to stop, from coning through, from the Fuehrer.
A No, in the case of the incident of the Laconia I didn't think of the discussion of the 14th with the Fuehrer, and couldn't, because that was an entirely different subject. This was entirely a matter of the rescue here. There was no connection between the two.
Q We will see about that. Turn to page 36 in the British Document Book, or pages 71 to 75 in the German Document Book -
A You mean the Prosecution's book?
Q Yes, the Prosecution's book; 36 in the English or 71 to 75 in the German.
AAnd in the English?
safety of your own boats and your own personnel.
Q Why did you put into the order "The rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of ships and crews"? What was the point of putting these words in, unless you meant to encourage people to destroy enemy ships and crews?
A I had explained that quite carefully yesterday. I had preached during all these years that you must not rescue when your own safety is in danger. In the case of the Laconia I told that to the troops, in four wireless messages, due to my anxiety and worry. Apart from that, I experienced it again and again that submarine commanders were taking the danger from the ai too lightly, and I have explained how that is to be explained psychologically. I described yesterday how the Air Forces increased and that consequently under no circumstances would I have given the reason and told these people again that if there is danger from the air you must do that and that, you must not rescue, or rescuing is contrary to the most primitive manner of warfare. The reason is because there was no question -- I was taking away from the commandants any arguments on questions of air attack. After all, my experience with losses and the steady presence of the Air Force, which is historical, and increasing more and more, and on the basis of my experience I had to give directly acute orders to the commandants saying, "You can't go on like that or we shall be attacked and killed by the opponents whilst we rescue their own men." That was why that could not come into it. I did not wish to give the commanders another opportunity of thinking out or discussing this vital point. I told you yesterday that I could have added that if we do not consider the danger from the air and we rescue the opponent and are being attacked by that very opponent, then that rescue is against the most primitive principles of warfare. I didn't want to do that, because I didn't want any discussions or arguments. We all had the impression that I said "don't rescue because there is air danger", that this idea was worn-out Because the commanders would nevertheless lose their own liberty of decision.
Q But if you had simply said "You are forbidden to rescue", and if you had wanted to give a reason "You are forbidden to rescue because in view of the Allied air cover it is a matter of too great danger for the safety of yourself and your boat ever to rescue at all, " that would have been quite clear.
Why didn't you put it that way?
A No, not at all. That is what I have just said. Because, again, a commander in some theatre, some part of the sea, might have an idea there wasn't danger from the air and the next moment there was an aircraft and he was smashed. time that you got this order out -- Captains Gote and Hessler, had you not?
A Yes, that's right. against the issue of this order, did they not?
AAs far as I can remember, they roughly said this: "The bulk of the submarines" -- and this is what I have said here -- "the bulk of the U-boats, that is, more than 90 per cent of then were already fighting the convoys, so that those orders wouldn't affect then at all. And the question was: Did we want to issue such a general order at all, and whether there were further developments which were forcing us currently to issue yet new orders, namely, 'Stay on the surface as little as possible' wouldn't make an order superfluous but since I was responsible for every possible loss of a submarine I had to give this additional order and my staff agreed with me perfectly as far as this measure was concerned.
Q Didn't you say when you were interrogated on the 22nd of October and on other occasions "Gote and Hessler told me, 'Don't make this wireless; you see, one day there can be a wrong appearance about; there can be a misinterpretation of that.'" Didn't you say that?
was made. But it wasn't misinterpreted, or I wouldn't have issued the order. We were thinking of the effects on the outside world.
Q And wasn't the effect that you wanted to produce that you would have an order which could be argued was merely a prohibition of rescue and would encourage the submarine commanders who felt that way as to annihilating the survivors of the crews? which we submitted. Apart from the case Moehle, nobody misunderstood this order at all and when we compiled the order we weren't aware of that fact. That becomes clear from the correspondent which we had from commandos and it becomes clear from my inquiries when I asked whether they had in anyway considered such a possibility.
A What's more, this order doesn't show that and the cause as such doesn't indicate it. We were rescuing for all we were worth, but this is the subject, "rescue or don't," and nothing else, This is the final stage of the Laconia case.
Q You said that "we issued the order." Do you remember saying this on an interrogation on the 6th of October?
"I am completely and personally responsible for it, because Captains Gote and Hessler both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or likely to be misinterpreted."
Do you remember saying that, "I am completely and personally responsible" because both your staff officers had pointed out that it was ambiguous? Did you say that?
A I don't suppose I said it like that. I am not sure, but I say now the during the interrogation I was told that Captains Gote and Hessler made this order and in reply to that I said, "It is quite immaterial, I am responsible for the order." And apart from that, the discussion on that order we discussed whether one ought to issue such an order; in Admiral Gote's or Captain Hessler's brain the thought might crop up that such an order could be misunderstood by us -- that is, the U-Boats.
That I emphatically stated during the interrogation. I have expressly stated that these considerations and the discussion of that question whether the order was to bepublished or not was having nothing to do in the case of these two people, that the order could be understood among us, and that too was contained in an interrogation.
Q You were making clear that it was the first occasion. I made it clear that you weren't blaming your junior officer that had advised you against this and this, and you were taking the responsibility on this occasion yourself. That is true, these junior officers advised you against it? In your own words, they both expressly stated that they considered the telegram ambiguous and liable to be misinterpreted, that's right, isn't it, they did say that?
A I didn't see the discussion after the record was made, and I didn't sign it; but I can tell youquite clearly -- and this becomes clear from another discussion -- that I have said that I myself will assume full responsibility. That was important to me. The only reasonwhy the whole question came up was because the interrogating officer told me these officers had written the order and then it was going around: in my head that under no circumstances should these officers be held responsible if they wrote my order. That was the sense of my statement. ago, that both Captain Gote and Captain Hessler advised you against issuing this order, are you? Now I have heard that both are saying they hadn't advised against it but that I might have or somebody else -- I don't knew for certain, but the way I recollect it, it was that both had advised against it.
If 90 per cent of our submarines should work in convoy work, whether it was advisable to issue such an order, they were being forced into the water anyway and we still couldn't possibly rescue since we were below the surface, I said, "No there are still cases when such a thing can happen and where the commander is then put into that emergency and then I shall/relieve him of the decision." That was the discussion and what we were up against and nothing else.
Q We will continue. That is the first part of the order. Take paragraph 2, "the orders for bringing in Captains and Chief Engineers still apply." Now, Defendant, you know perfectly well that in order to find the captain or chief engineer the U-Boat has got to go around the lifeboats or wreckage and make inquiries, "where is the captain?" And you know very well that the usual practice of the British merchantmen was to try and hide the captain and prevent than finding out who he was. Isn't that the practical position that had to be met, that you had to go around the lifeboats asking for the captain if you wanted to bring him in? Isn't that so?
A Not to that extent, no. I had stated quite clearly yesterday that the risk of taking aboard one man was much shorter as far as time was concerned, and would not in any way limit the diving ability of the boat, whereas the rescuing of others would interfere. for which a certain risk would have to be assumed during such a war; and, thirdly, that the significance of that paragraph appeared to be lean and always remained so. This order if you want to understand it like this and tak it out of its context, spoke against the statement, namely, I want these people killed, because here I want somebody taken prisoner, but if I kill somebody first then I can't take him prisoner. are to bring in captains and chief engineers to find out what you can from them.
Look at the third paragraph: "Rescue ship crews only if their statements will be of importance for U-boats that is, of importance for you to learn from then the position of Allied ships, or the measures the Allies are taking against submarines." That is the point against two and three isn't it? You are only to take prisoners if you can find out some useful thing from them? we should try to get as much intelligence material as possible, and since I couldn't take the whole crew prisoners on a U-boat, I have to confine myself to the most important person. I remove these people from further fighting, whereas the others may fight later. Of course, if I consider the limited room on a U-boat, I take only the important ones.
Q I don't want to take up a lot of time but Iwant you to tell me this:
Did I understand your explanation of the word "again" in the War Diary to be that you had drawn the attention of certain submarine Commanders by your telegrams during the Laconia incident, is that your explanation? four wireless messages which we have read on this matter during the preceding days, and that have been submitted to the Tribunal yesterday.
Q I put to you a moment ago a question and you said the "again" refers to the messages you have sent out during the Laconia incident? I think you agree with that, don't you?
Don't be afraid to agree with what I say. When was that? I assumed that the parson was summarizing the whole event, and that was probably the way he mentioned it. He was a petty officer and I don't know what he meant in that connection at that time. conversations which I put to you a few moments ago? who gave evidence he had not heard of the Hitler and Oschina conversations either, don't you think he could not have heard about it? forward the same argument during a lecture he heard as Hitler put forward in his conversations with Oschina? had told the story differently than he did during his interrogation. During these examination he has admitted that, I have not said anything about fighting against rescued personnel, but everything else he said is so un-clear that I don't attach much value to his credibility, and certainly he stated quite clearly that I had not done this by lecture but during discussions, which is of no importance, and, fourthly, it may be that the subject was opened dealing with new construction in America and the finding of crews for these new ships. it is possible. reference to the American Ship building program and the difficulty of finding crews? Do you agree with Heisig on that?
A Thatwas in the German Press. It was full of it and everybody knew it regarding the ship building the building program would be useless if you could destroy or frighten off sufficient navy merchant crews. That is the point in Hitler's conversation, and that Heisig said you said. Did you say that? ments would be made difficult, that is a matter in my war diary, and perhaps I talked in a similar way before these cadets. page 76 in the German Translation?
A Page 37?
Q Page 37 is the English. It is an order dated in September of 1943. I just want you to look at the last sentence:
"In view of the desired destruction of ship's crews, their sinking is of great value."
A I haven't found the page yet. German.
A That can't be right.
Q Perhaps you would help me, Sergeant Major, would you?
(The place is indicated to the witness)
Q "In view of the desired destruction of ship's crews, their sinking is of great value, and it is continually pressing, the need for ships crews." rescue ships were heavily armed, they had air craft and were just aspossible to be sunk by a convoy as any other ships. If there were crews which we would have like others, it was, of course, our right to give an order that these rescue ships should be sunk. Apart from that they were used as traps for submarines. ships, the destruction of ship's crews - Now I want to ask you one or two questions about Moehle. He commanded the U-boat operations from 1942 until the end of the war.
That is nearly three years, and as he told us, he has a number of decorations for gallant service.
Are you telling the Tribunal that Commander Moehle went on briefing submarine commanders on a completely mistaken basis for three years without any of your staff or yourself discovering this? You saw every U-boat commander when he came back. had doubts in connection with this order, as he declared here, and that he didn't clarify it right away, but unfortunately I can't think he could have had such doubt. He had the opportunity to clarify the matter and I don't know whether my staff or anybody else but the Submarine staff had any idea he had any doubt. your Submarine commanders. I can't get the Commander and this is a letter from his widow, I want you to say what you think of a passage in it.
She says: In the second paragraph - "Captain Moehle syas he had not found any U-boat Commanders who has the supposed order to fire at defenseless seamen who were in distress at sea."
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I object against the use of this letters. I think this is the sort of letter which has been ruled out as an exhibit and it isn't sworn, and it is a typical letter such as Mr. Justice Jackson repeatedly criticized.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The only point I make is this: The man himself has not come back. The widow can give information as to how he understood his orders before he went out, and I should have submitted it with probative value. I think in Article 19 it occurs, My Lord. I won't use it if there is the slightest doubt about it before the Tribunal.
THE WITNESS: It isfull of incorrect statements, too.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait it just a minute.
THE WITNESS: It isnot true.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have only just finished reading this letter--
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal is considering the matter at the moment.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: May I just add one argument of mine first?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have heard your argument and we are considering the matter. should not be used.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: As your Lordship pleases.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: own document books which Dr. Kranzbuehler put to you yesterday. It is Volume 2, page 92, Exhibit 42. Before I ask you a question about it there is one point that I would like you to help me on. In your interrogation you said that on the 22nd of October - you said that about two months after that order of the 17th of September you issued orders forbidding U-boats to surface at all, isthat right? You gave orders for biddU-boats to surface, is that right?
A That isn't possible at all in connection with a submarine; depending on whether it was day or night, or according to the situation of the weather, we would alter our orders and give them orders when they had to surface.
Q They weren't to surface after attacks, weren't to surface at all before or after attacks; isn't that the effect of your order? the surface for attacks, but it depended on these things, and we were trying to take no risks. surface as little as possible and you tell me it was your order?