That was your view of the way to conduct a war at sea; that is right, is it not?
A Yes; and there was a sufficient number of British statements according to which it is quite correct that during war time -- and we were at war with England -- it could not be permitted that neutrals should be in a position to support the belligerents, especially if they had been warned previously not to enter these zones. According to international law, that is quite legal.
Q We will discuss the matter of law with the Tribunal. I want to get at the facts.
That is the position which you adopt? And equally, if you found a neutral vessel outside the zone using its wireless, you would treat it as if it were a ship of war of a belligerent power, would you not? If a neutral vessel used its wireless after seeing the submarine, you would treat it as a ship of war of a belligerent power, would you not?
Q I see. As I say, the matters of law rest with the Tribunal. I am not going to argue these with you. But, apart altogether from international law, did it ever strike you that that method of treating neutral ships was completely disregarding the life and safety of the people on the ships? Did that ever strike you? danger of these zones. If they entered into these zones, they had to run the risk of damage. Otherwise, they should stay away. That is what war is. For instance, on land, one would also take no consideration if all of a sudden a neutral chain of trucks would bring ammunition or supplies to the enemy. Then we would consider it in the same light. It is, therefore, quite admissible to draw an operational area around the enemy's country in the ocean. Those are the instructions I got from international law, although I am only a soldier.
area. Whoever gets into a combat area has to take the consequences.
Q I see. That is your view? I do not think it could possibly be put more fairly. November entry into these zones, because they said, "We do not want to enter these zones." square miles around Britain was committing an unneutral act and was liable to be sunk without warning at sight. That is your view of how war at sea should be conducted; that is right, is it not?
A Yes. For the neutrals special lanes were given. They did not have to enter the combat area unless they went to England. Then they had to run the risk of war. C 21; that is, on page 30 of the English book and pages 59 to 60 of the German, you see that in all these cases -- you take the one in Paragraph 2, Page 5, Conference with the Head of Naval War Staff on the 2nd of January; that was the intensified measures in connection with the Fall Gelb -- that is, the invasion of Holland and Belgium -- it mentions the sinking by U-boats without any warning of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. acting in accordance with what you believe to be international law, did you so act only in areas where mines could be employed?
A That, also, I have already explained. It is not a question of legality but of military necessity. In an area where mines can be laid, for military reasons, I cannot explain to the enemy clearly what means of combat I am using.
You operated in the same way. I remind you of the French area, the French warnings that mines had been laid around Italy. And you did not state, either, with what means or weapons you were going to operate. That has nothing to do with legality. That is purely a question of military necessity.
putting to you is this: that you were pretending to neutrals that you were acting in accordance with the London Treaty, whereas you were actually acting not in accordance with the treaty, but in accordance with instructions you laid down for yourself, based on military necessity. pretending to, and getting the advantage fraudulently of appearing to, comply with the treaty. And that, I suggest is the purpose of these orders that you would only do this where mines could be laid. Isn't that what was in your mind?
the neutrals clearly that in these areas there would be combat actions, and that if they entered they would be endangered, We did not pretend anything, but we told them definitely, "Do not enter these zones." England did the same thing.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, doesn't the next sentence bear upon that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Your Lordship; I am very much obliged to your Lordship. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: following?
"The Navy will authorize, simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the sinking by U-boats without any warning of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, pretense should be made that mines are being used. The behavior of and use of weapons by U-boats should be adapted for this purpose." fool the neutrals--to use your own phrase? Do you still say you were not trying to fool the neutrals?
A No, we did not fool them because we warned them before. During a war I do not nave to say what weapon I want to use; I may very well camouflage my weapon. But the neutrals were not fooled. On the contrary, they were told "Do not enter these zones." Whether I used this or that military method in these areas has nothing to do with the neutrals. responsibility tothe seamen from boats that were sunk? Would you have in mind the provisions of the London Treaty, and willyou agree that your responsibility was to save seamen from boats that were sunk wherever you could do so without imperiling your ship? Is that, broadly, correct?
A Of course, if the ship behaved according to the London Agreement itself; that is to say, if it did not occur in these zones.
Q Oh? Do you really mean that? That is, if you sank a neutral ship which had come into that zone, you considered that you were absolved from any of your duties under the London Agreement to look after the safety of the crows?
after the combat, to take care of the shipwrecked if the military situation permits, just the same as others have done in their operational areas.
Q That is what I put to you, defendant. Please believe me, I don't want to make any false point. I put to you: If they could do so without imperiling their ships, that is, without risking losing their ships. Lot us got it quite clear. Do you say that in the zone which you fixed there was no duty to provide for the safety of the crew, that you accepted no duty to provide for the safety of the crow? after combat if the military situation permitted it. That can be read in the Geneva Convention or in the agreement as to its application.
Q Then it didn't matter whethwr the sinking was in the zone or out of the zone. According to what you say, you undertook exactly the same duty towards survivors whether it was in the zone or outside the zone. Is that right? treated according to the Prize Ordinance, only inside the zone they were not.
Q What I can't understand is this--and really, I hope I am not being very stupid. What was the difference? What difference did you consider existed in your responsibility towards survivors if the sinking was inside the zone or outside the zone? That is what I want to get clear. according to the Prize Ordinance. According to the London Agreement, we were obliged, before the ship was sunk, to take all measures for the safety of the crew. That obligation was not given inside the zone. In that case the Hague Agreement for the application of the Geneva Conventionwas the basis, where care should be taken of the shipwrecked if the military situation permits.
to kill, the survivors of a ship that is sunk would be an appalling order to give? to a soldier's morals and that I have never contributed to that by any order, not even in the way of reprisals; and suggestions of that kind have been made to me. and your own branch of the service, there was a possibility that some U-boat commanders would have refused to comply with an order to annihilate survivors?
Q I think it is quite a fair question. What if it were given in express terms, "Annihilate survivors after you sink a ship"? You know your officers.
Would there, at any rate, have been some danger that some of them would have refused to carry out that order?
A Yes. As I know my U-boat forces, there would have been a storm of indignation against such an order because, in the face of the clean idealism of these people, they would never have done it. I would never have given such an order, nor would I have permitted such an order to be given.
Now, just look at page 33 of the English document book. That contains your own Standing Order No. 154. Let me read it to you, rather slowly, if the Tribunal does not mind. It says:
"Do not pick up survivors and take then with you; do not worry about the merchant ship's boats: weather conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war."
First of all, tell me, what do you mean by "your next 12? Doesn't that mean the next attack on a vessel? of the London Treaty. The Treaty, you remember, says that a warship, including a submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchar vessel without first having placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. "For this purpose, the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel." had you not, when you were drafting this order? And you were deliberately excluding from your order the matters mentioned in the London Treaty? Listen to your order:
"Do not worry about the boats; weather conditions", one thing mentione in the Treaty, "and distance from land", another thing mentioned in the Treaty, "play no part.
Your order could have been put in other language almost as clearly: "Disregard all the matters that are stated in Paragraph 2 of the London Treaty."
Now tell me, didn't you have the London Treaty in front of you when you drew that order? but I stated in detail yesterday that we dealt here with the struggle against a protected ship, an escorted ship, as can be seen from the entire order, of which you have taken just one excerpt. Therefore, the Hague Agreement, which has nothing to do with escorted ships, could not apply. Coast, the greatest danger existed of being attacked by enemy escorts. The Agreement has nothing to do with a fight against an escorted merchant ship.
Those are two entirely different things; and that order applied to this area, or this zone, for that kind of combat against an escorted ship. I explained that clearly yesterday. attacking ships in convoy, would you look at page 26 of the English document book and at page 57 of the German document book? There you will find the account of the sinking of the Sheaf Mead on the 27th of May, 1940. And if you will look at the U-boat's log, opposite the time group 1648 hours -- which is on page 27 of the English and page 57 of the German -- this is what the log says:
"A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved themselves on wreckage and capsized boats. We fish out a buoy; no name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He says, hardly turning his head 'Nix, Nein.' A young boy in the water calls, 'Help, help, please.' The others are vary composed", and so on. "They look tired and, naturally, they have a lock of cold hatred on their faces. Then on to the old course." English, you will find the last sentence from the survivor's report describes the submarine as doing this:
"They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us in the water. Otherwise they just watched us but said nothing. Then they submerged and went off without offering us any assistance whatever."
says that there was a young boy in the water calling "Help, help, please", and your submarine takes a few photographs, submerges, and then goes off.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought you to refer to the passage just after the name of the vessel, under 1648, "It is not clear"?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "It is not clear whether she was sailing as a normal merchant ship. The following seemed to point to the contrary." And then, my Lord, it gives a number of matters. I am not taking this instance as a matter of wrongful sinking; I am taking it as an instance of carrying out this order.
I am very much obliged to your Lordship, but that is why I didn't do it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours).
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wasn't it your practice in May, 1940, to see personally the logs of all U-beats when they arrived? cannot hear. when they returned from their trips?
A (No response) when they returned from their trips? The logs, which arrived several weeks after the entries were made since they were written in the port, were then submitted to me by my Chief of Staff; and early, if they contained statements which were additional to the verbal report. incident?
Q Do you new observe that the "Sheaf Mead" was not sailing in convoy?
A Yes. I notice. And I also knew that it was an armed ship and that the orders which the commandant had said that he was entitled to sink it as an armed ship. It also appears from the log that he could not decide on firing torpedo until he had ascertained that the ship was armed. That is very clearly expressed in this document.
Q May I please explain to this Lordship that I am. not on the question of sinking. I am on the question of survivors. Did you take any action with the U-boat commander Kapitaenleutnant Ernst for not having assisted in the rescue of survivors?
A No. But I did tell him that if he was on the spot where this rescue went on he should have helped. December, 1939?
A No, he didn't. that it only applied for ships which were secured. Armed, presumably. Book, page 69 in the German Document Book. It is the report of the conversation between Hitler and Oschima a d you say that you were told nothing about it. Now I want you just to follow about half way down, half way through the extract, where it says:
"After having given further explanations on the map the Fuehrer pointed out that however many ships the United States built, one of their map problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason even merchant ships would be sunk without warning, with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes a long time."
Now, did you agree with that argument of Hitler's that once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people? Did you think that that was a sound argument in the question of sea warfare against the United States? Foreign Office, and I stated my opinion, which is that I do not believe that it would take a long time to train seamen since American wasn't lacking replacements.
Consequently I would not be of the opinion that this would have a scaring-off value if these pe ple were not rescued.
Q So you don't agree with t e Fuehrer's reasoning on that point?
A No, I don't agree to the last part, namely, that there is a lack of now seamen. it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting now people. That is, I suggest to you that the new people would be scared off by the news of the sinking and killing of the first people. Did you agree that that was a sound argument. That is what I want your view on. which I cannot judge. English version, which is your report to the Fuehrer on the 14th of May 1942. Do you see the last sentence where you are advocating a rangepistol? You say:
"A rangepistol will also have the great advantage that the crew will not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of crews will no doubt cause difficulties for the assignment of crews for the great American construction program."
A It is perfectly clear and it is correct if they haven't got the same crews and have to have new ones it will make it difficult; but this doesn't mention a scaring off. The positive fact is stated that now crews will have to be trained. frightening or terrorizing effect on the getting of new crews if the old crews were sunk under conditions where they would probably lose their lives? people. The American Minister Knox said that whereas in 1941, the sinking of German U-boats was not known, he nevertheless was expecting the scaring-off value, as far as my submarines were concerned. That is his opinion. I can only say that the silent disappearing did not have a scaring-off value. It is a matter of taste against the crews after the vessel was sunk. Isn't that so?
A. Yes. He asked whether we couldn't proceed against the crew. I have already said that when I heard of the Oschima discussion here, I believed that this question to Grand Admiral Raeder and myself was the result of that Oschima discussion.
My answer to that of course is no. and kill them while they were still on the boat. That was your answer, wasn't it? A No. My answer was that proceeding against shipwrecked personnel was out of the question, but as a matter of course one must use the best possible weapon. Every nation does that. the crew would not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick sinking of the ship. That is why you wanted to use the rangepistol.
A Yes. And also for that reason because the crows of the steamer, sinc they were fighting with arms, were considered commandos. was in your mind. Now, the Fuehrer raised this point again on the 5th of September 1942, as is shown in your document book. Volume 2, Page 81.
A. I do not have it. Where is it?
Q. It begins with the discussion in the OKW situati n of 5 September 1942. It is Exhibit 39, page 81, and it is in the English document book, volume two.
A. Yes, I have found it now.
Q. It arises out of an incident of the sinking of the mineboat "Ulm", an there is a question of whether British destroyers had fired with machine arms on soldiers in lifeboats, and the Fuehrer gave orders to the naval command to issue an order according to which "our warships would use reprisals," and if you look a little lower down, you say that, "That the matter had been investigated by your operations staff, and it is stated, "It could not be proved beyond a doubt that the fire had been aimed at the crew boarding the lifeboats.
The enemy fire was evidently aimed at the ship itself." page, and you say, "It is the opinion of the Naval War Command that before issuing reprisal orders, one should take into consideration whether such measures, if applied the enemy against us, would not in the end be more harmful to us than to the enemy.
Even now our ships have only in a few cases the possibility to save shipwrecked enemy crews by towing the lifeboats, etc., whereas the crews of sinking German U-boats and merchant vessels so far, as a rule, have been pick up by the enemy. To turn matters in our favor, we would have to order, not on to abandon, but also to fight against shipwrecked enemy crews as a measure of reprisal.
"It is significant in this respect that so far it could not be proved th in the cases on record where the enemy used arms against shipwrecked Germans such action was ordered or covered by an order of an official British office. We would hve to count on it that knowledge of such a German order would be us by enemy propaganda in such a manner that its consequences could not easily b foreseen."
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have objections agains this type of procedure. The document about which this cross examination is being made is not a document submitted to me as evidence. I have not submitted it yet. I do not know whether it is customary during these proceedings that exhibits of the Defense are submitted and can be submitted by the Prosecution. I had suggested for this very reason some time ago that the documentary evidence should begin so that the Prosecution should have an opportunity to use my evidence, my exhibits in cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objection to the document which is in your document book being offered in evidence?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I shall offer the document, Mr. President, but I only want to avoid that now during cross examination my documents should be read by the Prosecution because my entire documentary evidence is being upset through that. This particular case does not play a decisive part for me, but it the Prosecution are proposing to make other documents of mine the subject of their cross examination, documents which have not yet been submitted by me, I should like to ask that the cross examination be interrupted and I now be afforded an opportunity to submit my documents.
THE PRESIDENT: That will only waste time, will it not? It would not do any good; it would only waste time.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I do not think it would be a waste of time if I, as Defense Counsel, ask that I be allowed to. submit my own documents to the Tribunal myself and that they shall not be quoted from my document book to the Tribunal by the Prosecution, because the type of presentation and the questions attached to that do, of course, give these documents a certain character.
TEE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, The Tribunal thinks there is no objection to the course that is being taken. You have had the opportunity already of putting this document to the witness. You will have a further opportunity of putting it to him again in re-examination.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q. So that there was fresh pressure on you to take this course, that is, to fire on the crews of sunken vessels in September, was there not?
A. No, that is not correct. This document of the Naval Command Staff only became known to me here. I was not in the picture therefore, but it is true that in accordance with this document, the Naval Command Staff had apparently had orders from the OKW to compile a list of all such cases and that the Naval Command Staff was purely occupying itself with the belief that one would have to be very careful in judging these cases and that it advised against reprisal measures.
It appears to me that this document had the very purpose to convince that principally such reprisals should be refrained from. through an inquiry to the Naval Command Staff on this point in September?
A No, I did not know that. I just said I do know this entry from the log of the Command Staff, together with the appendix which is attached to it and which I first heard of here.
Q You first heard of it here? September, then we will pass on to another document. That is what you say, that you did not know about it in September 1942? the "Laconia" in any detail, but I want you just to tell me about one, I think, one or two entries. I think it is page 40 of your own document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not on page 41?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged to Your Lordship. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q It is page 41, at the bottom. It is for 20 September, 1320 hours. That is your wireless message to the U-boat Schacht. Do you see that? message that the boat was despatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and poles? Is that true?
boats in tow, and it is on page 40. It was clear, considering the entire situation, that a submarine, with vessels in tow, could not remain on the surface without losing a great deal of value. That is the reason for what is mentioned under the second order on page 40, which says that the boats with British should be cast adrift. That was the one reason, and then on page 41 there comes a long wireless message which is, in fact, a summary. It was understood however that he considered his boat in danger through having to stop, and so on and so forth, and that there had been two air attacks, and then he received that wireless message. Since I had not spoken against the saving of Englishmen, I received the impression that in the occurrence the Italians, who after all were our allies, were getting the short end of the stick. That is proved by the figures.
Q You have given a long explanation. Now, is that wireless message true, that the boat was despatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that true or not true? it is even more clarified by the event as such, as well as the impression that the total number of British personnel was counted among them, whereas a large number of Italians drowned, but that impression did not arrive until the end.
THE PRESIDENT: You understand the light, do you not? BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When you were interrogated about this matter, you said that you were under great pressure at the time, and I think the pressure came to you from Hitler through Captain Fricke. Is that right?
A No, not "only"; "also" but not "only". The pressure, as I have very clearly explained here, was due to worry and anxiety regarding the fat of my submarines. I knew that they were now being greatly jeopardized, and we have had evidence of that because of the bombing. Secondly, of course, Frick passed on the Fuehrer's orders, but I have also stated here that in spite of that order, I remained in favor of rescuing, in spite of the fact that that was a military mistake. My worry and anxiety were, of course, mostly for the submarines, for my submarines.
tge 14th of May; you had then had the Laconia incident, and during that incident you had had the pressure from the Fuehrer. Now, wasn't it because of this -
Q Very well, I will correct it. You had had the report to the Fuehrer on the 14th of May. You have told me that. There was then the Laconia -
A But that has nothing to do with the Fuehrer's order referring to the case of the Laconia. In the case of the Laconia the Fuehrer merely stated correctly that no boats should be endangered during rescue activities. deal with. You had had the 14th of May, the Laconia incident, and then an order to stop, from coning through, from the Fuehrer.
A No, in the case of the incident of the Laconia I didn't think of the discussion of the 14th with the Fuehrer, and couldn't, because that was an entirely different subject. This was entirely a matter of the rescue here. There was no connection between the two.
Q We will see about that. Turn to page 36 in the British Document Book, or pages 71 to 75 in the German Document Book -
A You mean the Prosecution's book?
Q Yes, the Prosecution's book; 36 in the English or 71 to 75 in the German.
AAnd in the English?