Q Now, if you would look at the first sentence, "Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working party by prisoners from the concentration camps." 'I don't think we need trouble with coppersmiths, but if you will look at the end of the document, the very last you will see Item 2 of the summing up reads "Twelve thousand concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor. Security service agrees to this. existence of concentration camps?
Q And I think you wont further, didn't you, when asked about this on the 28th of September? At that time you said: "I generally knew that we had concentrations camps. That is clear.
"Question: From whom did you learn that?
"Answer: The whole German people knew that.
Don't you remember saving that?
A Right. The German people knew there were concentration camps, but they didn't know anything about the conditions and methods therein. von Ribbentrop said he only heard of two -- Oranienburg and Dachau? It was rather a surprise to you, was it?
knew about Dachau and Oranienburg too.
Q But you say here you knew there were concentration camps. Where did you think you were going to get your labor from? What camps? was going to be partly foreign labor?
A I didn't think about that at all, and I should like to make a statement now, about how these demands occurred. large-scale transports. Gradually there was the necessity of moving masses of poor refuges, hundreds and thousands of them, from eastern and western Prussia. They were at the sea-coast end starving and suffering from epidemics and shot at, and I tried to bring them to Germany. For these reasons I was looking for merchant ships which weren't actually under my jurisdiction, and in this connection I discovered that eight ships which had been ordered in Denmark -that out of those eight, seven had bean destroyed by saboteurs just before being completed. Subsequently I called a meeting of all departments concerned with those ships and asked them, "How can I help you?" What can I do so that we can get ships more quickly and so that damaged ships may be repaired more quickly?" were making suggestions to me, and amongst these suggestions was one for the acceleration of work repairs and such, that concentration camp prisoners should be used. The clear-cut reason which was given was that such employment would take place under very good conditions; they would be excellently fed and they would like that type of work. natural matter for me that amongst the suggestions -
Q (Interposing) A -- please allow me to finish.
-- that in my collections of proposals I included this particular one, particularly since there would be no deterioration in the condition of these people, since no doubt their feeding would improve. these people had been better fed under me, I would have turned them down. I had not the slightest reason for any such act. I didn't know anything about conditions.
Q I am sure we are grateful for your explanation. But I just want you to tell me, after you had proposed that you should get 12,000 people from concentration camps did you get them?
A I don't know. I didn't concern myself with that. After the meeting I had a memorandum prepared that was submitted to the -
Q Keep to the answer. The answer is that you don't know whether you got them or not, assuming that you did get them.
A I didn't get these people at all. That wasn't any of my concern and consequently I don't know whether these people who were responsible for the whole affair did receive that increase of workers or not.
Q But you held a position of some responsibility; if you get 12,000 people from concentration camps into the ship-building industry, they would have to work alongside people who weren't in concentration camp would they not? have gotten 12,000 people out of concentration camps, who work alongside people not in concentration camps, that the conditions inside the concentration camps remain a secret to the other people and to all the rulers of Germany?
A First of all, I don't knew whether these people arrived; secondly, if they did come, then I can well imagine that they had orders not to talk; and thirdly, I don't even known what camps these came from, whether they weren't people of a certain strength or ability of output of work, and were in quite different, camps. At any rate, I wasn't concerning myself with the carrying out or the methods of the whole proposal, because it was none of my business. concerned in the matter, and I acted on their behalf so that the question of repairs was being attended to. It was just my duty concerning the refugee transports which were at that time coming under my jurisdiction. I would do exactly the same today. That is how it happened.
Q. Well now, just look a little down the document to the fourth paragraph, after it says: Translator's note. If you will look at the English, the paragraph beginning: Since elsewhere. Have you found that? This is after, as you have told us, you express your worry about the sabotage in the Danish and Norwegian shipyards. I just want you to look at your proposal to deal with saboteurs. "Since elsewhere measures for exacting atonement, taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in Prance was completely supressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration. "That is what you were suggesting, Defendant, was a collective penalty against the whole working party where any sabotage occurred; isn't that so?
A. Yes. I have to give an explanation in that connection.
Q. That is all right. But otherwise, it is so?
A. First during that meeting departments outside of the Navy which were concerned with shipyards stated that in France sabotage had been prevented by introducing certain reprisals. The affidavit of an officer who participated in that meeting and who composed the record, or these brief memoranda, now proved to me that the conception of reprisals at the time was the taking away of additional rations which these people were issued, and this was to come to Norway and Denmark. That is what this means. And, secondly, I told these people, "It is impossible that we, with our foreign currency, and our material, could be building ships there. If these ships are mearly finished, then that sabotage which the workers assisted has destroyed them now." The answer I received was that it was the only possibility to separate these people from those who were carrying on sabotage.
Q. The whole of this explanation that you have given us is in this document which is in front of the Tribunal, Ha e you anything to add to what is in the document?
A. That is quite right, and I have to add this: It meant that these workers were to be treated exactly as ourselves. They, too, were also housed in barracks, and the Danish and Norwegian workers wouldn't have suffered in any way.
Q. I want you to look at one more sentence: "By the employment of the working parties concerned, that is concentration camp workers, their output would not only be increased to a hundred per cent but the cessation of their previously good wages might possibly result in their being considerably deterred from sabotage." That fairly represents your view of the way to treat Norwegian and Danish workers, does it not?
A. This was a measure of safeguarding so as to get control of the sabotage.
Q. Well now, just turn back to Page 70 of the English document book, Page 103 in the German document book. This is on extract from the minutes of a meeting between you and Hitler on the 1st of July, 1944, signed by yourself. Have you got it?
A. I hove got it.
Q. Concerning the general strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says: "The only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such men are on everybody's lips whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court martial proceedings, silence with regard to those who are condomned without trial." Do you agree with that statement of Hitler's?
A. No.
Q. Then why did you distribute it to Operations Department for circulation if you didn't approve of it?
A. I didn't agree to the procedure, but it also contains certain though of the Fuehrer. What is more, this was not an agreement between the Fuehrer and myself; it was minutes of the meeting which the officer who was accompaing me had made regarding the military situation, and it contained certain points ---
Q. Will you try and answer my question? It is a perfectly simple one. It is, why did you distribute that to Operations for circulation? What was there in these few lines that was of interest to your officers? What did you think was valuable for your officers to know in that dreadful piece of savagery that I have just quoted to you?
A. It is very simple to say. The officer who wrote the record included this in order to inform our departments that there was a general strike on in Copenhagen. That is why that one paragraph from that long discussion was introduced, so that the departments knew that there was a strike on in Copenhagen. That was the whole reason.
Q. I am suggesting to you, Defendant, that you circulated that to your officers to inculcate ruthlessness among them. That is my suggestion. What do you say to that?
A. To that I say that is perfectly wrong. I can tell you also that I didn't even hear that statement made by the Fuehrer, but it is perfectly possible that it was taken down by the accompanying officer, Wagner, for the reason which I have just given you, so as to warn these people that there was a general strike in Copenhagen.
Q. Now, Defendant, I am not going to argue with you about your knowledge of documents you have signed. I have questions to do with documents you haven't signed, so let's pass on to the next one.
A. I know the document. I know it because I have signed it.
Q. Page 69, that is Page 4 in the English document book or Page 102 in the German document book, the minutes of the conference on the 19th of February, 1945, between you and Hitler -
A. No, that is not right.
Q. No, I beg your pardon, It is an extract from the minutes of the Hitler conference on the 19th of February, 1945; and then there is a note -
A. No. It says here: Participation of the Supreme Commander of the Navy During the Military Discussion. There wasn't any special conference.
Q I didn't mean to say "special". I said the Hitler conference.
Q On the 19th. Now the first sentence of paragraph I says; "The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention." The last sentence is: "The Fuehrer orders the Commander in Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of this step and to state his opinion as soon as possible." And if you look down on the next minutes of the conference on the 20th of February, which is headed: Participation of C and C Navy in a Hitler conference on 20 February at 1600 hours, it reads as follows: "The C and C of the Navy informed the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations staff, General Jodl, and the representative for the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Fuehrer's headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany's possible renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Even from a general standpoint it appears to the Commander in Chief of the Navy that this measure would bring no advantage."
Now look at the last sentence: "It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs to save face with the outer world." That means, put in blunt and brutal language: "Don't denounce the convention but break it whenever it suits you", doesn't it?
Q What does it mean? Let's take it word for word. "It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary"; aren't these measures contrary to the rules of the Geneva Convention?
Q Answer my question first and then make a statement. You have done it before, but try to answer my question. "These measures considered necessary", if they don't mean measures contrary to the terms of the Geneva Convention what do they mean? Answer that question first.
A They are measures against our own troops. I have heard -- I was told that the Fuehrer had said that because in the West the front was not solid and because he had heard that American and British propaganda was making men desert and run off that he intended to leave the Geneva Convention, so I stated before my staff: "How can you think of such an idea, to throw overboard a century-old international law." Maybe that statement was made, that I said: "Let's take measures which are necessary"* but no concrete measures were thought of in that connection. Nobody thought of any concrete measures and none was introduced. What my own feelings were regarding treatment of prisoners of war, that can best be heard from those British prisoners of war who were in my camps. And that is the situation regarding this affair. In other words, the Chief of all the Armed Forces departments fought against the renouncing of the Geneva Convention. They were not for it.
Q Is that your total explanation of "to carry out measures considered necessary"? You have nothing else to add on that point? Well, I shall pass to another one. Do you remember saying to Dr. Kranzbuehler yesterday that when you became Commander in Chief of the Navy that the war was purely a defensive war? Do you remember saying that to your counsel yesterday?
Q That wasn't your fault, was it? It wasn't your fault that it remained limited to the countries engaged when you took over? Do you remember your advice to Hitler on the meeting of the 14th of May, 1943? about the Sea Transport for Sicily and Sardinia? Do you remember having a discussion on that and do you remember you warning Hitler that your U-boat losses were fifteen to seventeen U-boats a month and that the position as to the future of the U-boat war looked rather gloomy? Do you remember that?
Q And do you remember Hitler saying: "These losses are too heavy. This can not go on." And did you say to Hitler: "Now our only small outlet for sorties is the Bay of Biscay and control of this involves great difficulties and already takes up ten days of the U-boats' passage time.
The best strategic solution lies in the occupation of Spain, including Gibraltar." And did Hitler remark: "In 1940 this would still have been possible with the cooperation of Spain, but now, and against the will of Spain, our resources are no longer adequate." Do you remember suggesting that to Hitler on the 14th of May, 1943 and Hitler saying his resources were no longer adequate?
A I don't think that I had proposed to the Fuehrer that we should occupy Spain. I described the situation very clearly and I said that we should be blockaded in that small corner of the Bay of Biscay. I also said conditions would be quite different if there was more room; but that doesn't contain a suggestion that, under the defensive situation, we should propose to occupy Spain.
Q Let us get it clearly, I am quoting you now from Admiral Assmann's headline diary, a verbatim translation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The original is in London, My Lord. I will get the copy and put it in and certify it. This point again only arose yesterday and I haven't got it. I will have the original given and I will show Dr. Kranzbuehler this entry.
These are the words that Admiral Assmann records:
"Doenitz continues: 'Now our only small outlet for sorties is the Bay of Biscay and control of this involves great difficulties and already takes up ten days of the U-boats' passage time.'
Doenitz says, "The best strategic solution lies in the occupation of Spain, including Gibraltar."
Did you say that "the best strategic solution lies in the occupation of spain, including Gibraltar"?
A That's possible. If that's the wording you've got there, it's possible that that's the way I said it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I was going to pass on from these general -
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you passed altogether from C-158 on page 69?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I had, but I can easily return to it, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the second sentence in paragraph 1 appears to have some bearing upon the answers which the defendant has given.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry, but I tried to cut it as short to the bare bone, and I am sorry if I omit matters. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Defendant, would you return to the last document, C-158. That's the one about the Geneva Convention; it's page 69 of the English book; 102 of the German, whichever you're following. The Sergeant Major will help you to find it.
Now, if you'll look at the first paragraph, after the sentence I read, "The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention", it goes on: "Not only the Russians, but also the Western Powers, are violating international law by their actions against the defenseless population and the residential districts of the towns. It appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means for our existence, and, also, through this measure to urge our people to resist to the utmost." not these the measures considered necessary to which you were referring in the second minute?
and accurate explanation regarding where and when this information was given. I, personally, only received the information -- and I think Reichsmarshall Goering has talked about it -- according to which the Fuehrer was upset because our western front wasn't holding. It was so because these people liked to become American and English prisoners of war; and that was the cause of the whole affair, and that was the original information which I've received. As far as these records, compiled by an officer or some officers whom I don't know, is something I can't talk about. He could tell you in more detail how these things happened. I can't tell you any more than that under my oath. It was my thought that the renunciation of the Geneva Convention was in principle a great mistake and was wrong. My feelings regarding the treatment of prisoners of war is something I've just mentioned and everything else is wrong. against you as this: That you were prepared not to denounce the Convention, but you were prepared to take action contrary to the Convention and say nothing about it; and that's what I suggest is the effect of the last sentence, especially when read with these words in the first paragraph.
A I beg your pardon, but may I say one more word? If you introduce measures against inclinations to run over to the enemy, and if you introduce measures which would have a scaring-off value, then any secret background to the matter is perfectly all right; it is something I've never thought of. To the contrary, it was my own thought in my considerations: "How can one leave the Geneva Convention?" And that's what I was expressing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The document is clear.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken.) BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: put up to the Foreign Office that the maximum damage to England could only be achieved with the naval forces you had, if U-boats were permitted the unrestricted use of arms without warning against allied and neutral shipping in a wide area?
to the German Foreign Office? a memorandum of that kind, if it was ever made.
Q Now, I want you to try and remember because it's quite important. You say that the naval command never informed the flag officer of U-boats that that was their view of the war?
A I don't know. I cannot remember that the naval warfare command ever told me about such a letter to the Foreign Office. I don't believe they did; I can't say. at the letter.
My Lord, this is document D-851 and it will become Exhibit No. GB-451. wouldn't know the first part, but I'll read it to you and then we'll look at the memorandum together.
"Submitted respectfully to the Secretary of State" -- that would be Baron von Weizsaecker -- "with the enclosed memorandum.
"The Chief of the Operational Department of the Naval Command, Captain Fricke, informed me by telephone that the Fuehrer was already dealing with this matter. The impression had, however, arisen here that the political connections had again to be gone into and brought to the Fuehrer's notice anew. Captain Fricke had, therefore, sent Lt. Commander Neubauer to the Foreign Office in order to discuss the matter further." That's signed by A lbrecht on the 3rd of September 1939.
Then there is the memorandum:
"The question of an unlimited U-boat war against England is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the Naval High Command.
"The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England, which can be achieved with the forces available, can only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated in the enclosed map.
"The Navy does not fail to realize that:
"a. Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement of 1936 regard ding the prosecution of economic warfare;
"b. a military operation of this kind could not be justified on the basic the hitherto generally accepted principles of international law."
informed you before these data were submitted to the Foreign Office? randum of the Chief of the Operational Department to the Secretary of State, that is to say, a negotiation between Berlin and the Foreign Office in which the from commander, who was at the coast and was in charge of the U-boats, was not partic pating.
I don't know that letter. gining of the war without knowing that this was the view of the Naval High Command
A I did not have any knowledge of this letter. I have said already that my knowledge of it -
THE PRESIDENT(Interposing): That wasn't an answer to the question. The quation was whether you knew at the time that this was the view of the Naval High Command.
A No, I did not know that. I knew about the opinion of the Naval High Command, that step by step it tended to act according to the measures of the enemy. That I knew.
Q But you see, that is the entire difference, Defendant. That is what you said at great lengthin giving your evidence the day before yesterday and yesterday, that you were answering step by step, the measures of the enemy. You gave that evidence. Do you say that you didn't know that this was the view of the defendant Raeder, formed on the first day of the war? Do you say you didn't know it at all, you had no inkling that that was Raeder's view? I don't even know whether that was the view of Admiral Raeder. I don't know that.
Q Well, again I don't want to argue with you, but if the Commander in Chief of the Navy -- and I think at that time he called himself Chief of the Naval Staff as well -- allows the chief of his Operational Department to put this view forward to the Foreign Office -- is it the practice of the German Navy to allow post captains to put porward a view like that when it is not held by the Commander in Chief?
It is ridiculous, isn't it? No commander in chief would allow a junior of ficer to put forward that view to the Foreign Office unless he held it, would he
A I ask you to question the Commander of the Navy, Raeder. I could not give any information as to how this letter was written I don't know it. moment, you see, I have got to question you on the matters that you put forward and my next question is: dum that the U-boat command disregarded from the start the London Treaty about warning ships?
A No, on the contrary, quite on the contrary. In the West we wanted to avoid any more severe measures, and we attempted, as long as it was possible, to fight according to the London Agreement. That can be seen from all the directive that the U-boats received.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought you perhaps to draw his attention to the penultimate paragraph in that memorandum?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I probably should. My Lord, I will read the three, because if you will notice it goes on:
"The High Command does not assert that England can be beaten by unrestricted U-boat warfare. The cessation of traffic with the world trade center of England speels serious disruptions of their national economy for the neutrals, for which we can offer them no compensation.
"Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using the military method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England gives us a justification by her method of waging war, to order this form of warfare as a reprisal.
"It appears necessary, in view of the great importance in the field of foreign politics of the decision to be taken, that it should be arrived at not only as a result of military considerations, but taking into full account the needs of foreign politics."
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: at on considerations of foreign politics? Did you hear anything about that? time.
Q I see. Well now, I would like you, just before we go on to the questions, to look at page 19 of the English document book, page 49 of the German.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, the whole of the treaty, which is very short, is set out there. My Lord, I have the formal copy if your Lordship would like to see it, but it is set out in these two paragraphs. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q You see:
"1. In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.
"2. In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether a surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose, the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crow is assured in the existing sea and weather conditions by the proximity of land or the presence of another vessel which is in position to take them on board." to you upon it. English document book -- it is either page 50 or 51 in the German document bookwhere there are some figures set out.
Have you got the page?
Q You read it. You see that it says in the two sentences before:
"In a certain number of early cases, the German commander allowed the crew of the merchant vessel to get clear, and he even made some provision for this before he destroyed the vessel. Such destruction was in accordance with Article 72 of the Prize Ordinance, and therefore, for the purpose of this paper the Germans have been given the benefit of the doubt in such cases."
The following are the figures on record. This is for the first year of the war:
"Ships sunk: 241 "Recorded attacks:
221 "Illegal attacks:
112. At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning. This does not, of course, include convoy ships." ships where any measures had been taken for the safety of the crew, and secondly, it excludes convoy ships. without warning in the first year of the war?
A Yes. These figures cannot be checked. Yesterday I stated that on the basis of the use of arms by the ships, we had to take other measures legally. So I cannot check whetherin this report, which for other reasons looks propagandistic to me, that attitude of the crews and the resistance forces is taken into consideration. That is to say, the basis or checking of these figures is impossible for me. armament and on the basis of the messages and the use of these ships as members of the information system, it was legal, and that now, without warning, action would be taken against these ships. nations acted accordingly.
Q I am going to ask you some questions about that, but let's just take one example.
Was any warning given before the Athenia was sunk?
A No, I have already stated that that was a mistake. The sinking of an auxiliary cruiser without warning is quite legal. I have also stated already that after thorough examinationof the case, I expected more care of the commander, and that is why he was punished. that in the case of a merchant ship, if it were sunk without warning, it meant either death or terrible suffering to the crew and to these merchant seamen? Did that ever occur to you? treated according to the Prize Ordinance. If it does not, then the submarine has to proceed to the attack. That is legal and right according to International Law, and it was no different from what happened to German cruisers.
Q That isn't what I asked you. I wanted to know, because it is important on some of these points: Did it ever occur to you; did you ever consider that you were going to cause either death or terrible suffering to the crews of merchant ships who were sunk without warning?
Just tell us, did it occur to you or didn't it? war, and in other cases during the war suffering exists.
Q Do you view with pride of achieve ment the fact that thirty-five thousand British merchant seamen lost their lives during the war?
Do you view it as a proud achievement or do you view it with regret?
A Men are killed during wars. Nobody is proud of that; that is the wrong explanation. It is a necessity, a harsh necessity of warfare. page 58 in theGerman, whichever you care to look at. It is document C-191, GB-193. This is the 22nd of December, nineteen days after the beginning of the war. "Flag Officer U-boat intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessel sailing without lights. Previous instructions, permitting attacks on French war and merchant ships only as a defensive measure, purely French or Anglo-French convoys only north of the Latitude of Brest, and forbidding attacks on all passenger ships, give rise to great difficulties to U-beats, especially at night. In practice, there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot identify target which is a shadow in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters where French and English naval forces or merchant ships may be situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected, the measure desired by Flag Officer U-boats can be carried out. Permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the Naval War Staff. U-boat commanders would be informed by word of mouth..." and not e the last line "...and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the war diary as due to possible confusion with a war ship or an auxiliary cruiser." without lights is either persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned or active resistance to visit and search, within the Treaty? Which of either of these things do you consider it to be? if the Tribunal rule otherwise, and then you can give your explanation. My question is this: Do youconsider that sailing without lights is either persistent refusal to stop or active resistance to visit and search? Do you consider it to be either one or the other or both of these things?
Do you?
certain area of operation, the ocean area where British troop transports went from England to France --
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you will answer the question, please.
THE WITNESS: I did not understand. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: refusal to stop on being duly summoned, which is one of the matters in the Treaty, or active resistance to visit and search, which is the other matter set out in the Treaty? Now, do you consider that sailing without lights is either or both of these matters mentioned in the Treaty? risk to be taken for a warship, because during the night it is not possible to distinguish between a merchant ship and a warship and during that time, when our order was issued, that was an operational area where troop transports went from England to France, which were sailing without lights. of the matters in the Treaty, but your explanation was that you thought you were entitled to torpedo without warning any ship that might be mistaken for a warship. That is your answer, is it?