Q. I see. Will you just look at document 537-PS, which is dated 30 July 1944.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is US Exhibit 553, also put in by General Taylor on 7 January.
Q. The Sergeant-Major will point to the place. That is the document applying the commando order to military missions, and you will see again that the distribution includes OKM, Department S.K.L. Did you see that order?
A. Yes, I can see it.
Q. Did you see if at the time that it was distributed, at the end of July 1944?
A. It is quite certain that this order was not put before me because again the navy was not at all concerned with it. The Navy had nothing to do with combatting bandits.
Q. I want you now just to look very quickly, because I do not want to spend too much time on it, at 512 PS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is US Exhibit 546, which was also put in by General Taylor on 7 January.
Q. Now, that is a report dealing with the question of whether members of commandos should not be murdered for a short time in order that they could be interrogated, and the question is whether that is covered by the last sentence of the Fuehrer order, and I call your attention to the fact that it refers, with regard to interrogations, in the second sentence:
"The importance of this measure, was proven in the case of Glomfjord, two men torpedoes at Trendheim, and glider planes at Stravenko."
A. I can not find it just now.
Q. It is 512-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps you ought to read the first sentence.
SIR DAVID MAX WELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please.
A. This document is of 1942. At that time I was an officer of submarine on the atlantic Coast in the Bay of Biscay. I do not know this paper at all.
Q. That is an answer, but it is 14 December 1942, and the point is put up, which is raised in the first sentence which My Lord has just directed me to read, "Top Secret:
According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18 October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation." Then follows the sentence I have read. That was the point that was raised, and what I was going to ask you was, Did that point come up to you when you took over the commandership in chief of the navy in January 1943? Just look at the last sentence.
"The Red Cross and the BDS protested against the immediate carrying out of the Fuehrer order."
A. I beg your pardon, but I still can not find the place where this is supposed to be. I have not found that last sentence. Where is it?
THE PRESIDENT: Our translation says "after the immediate carrying out..".
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: "After", My Lord: I am so sorry. It is my fault. I am greatly obliged to Your Lordship. "Protested after the immediate --" I beg Your Lordship's pardon. I read it wrong.
A. That is of December 1942.
Q. It is only six weeks before you took over.
A. Yes, that is right, but I do not know this teleprint, and it may not be Red Cross. It probably is Reiko See. BDS is probably the SS leader for Norway.
Q. But the point that I thought might have had some interest for you was the two-man torpedoes. I thought that might have been referred to you as a matter of navy interest. However, if it was not I will come to a document that is after you took over. Give the defendant 526-PS, on 10 May 1943.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that is US 502, and was put in by my friend Colonel Storey on 2 January.
Q. You see that that is an account -- it is from the defendant Jodl's department, and it is annotated for the defendant Jodl's department, about an enemy cutter which carried out an operation in the Shetlands, a cutter of the Norwegian navy, and it gives its armament, and it says that it was an organization for sabotaging strong points, battery positions, staff and troop billets, and bridges, and that the Fuehrer order was executed by the SD. That was a cutter which was blown up by the Norwegian navy, I suppose after they were attacked, and ten prisoners were murdered.
Was that brought to your attention?
A. This was put before me during an interrogation, and on that occasion I was asked whether I had not had a telephone conversation with Field Marshal Keitel. It was later on ascertained that it was the army commander who got in touch with the OKW. It was a matter for the army commander and the SD, not for the Navy.
Q. If you deny that you ever heard about that, will you turn to page 100 of the document book.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is page 67 of the British document book.
Q. That is a summary, a summary of the trial of the SD-
A. Where is it? I can not find it.
Q. Page 100, I have told you. If you will look for it, I think you will find it. It is page 67 of the English, if you prefer to follow it in that Now I will explain to you; I think you have read it before because you have referred to it.
That is a summary by the Judge Advocate at the Trial of the SS men of the evidence that was given, and I just want to see that you have it in mind. Verreck, in the Shetlands on the naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coasts and for the purpose of laying mines.
Paragraph 5: "The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniforms at all times after their capture."
Now, you mentioned this yesterday. You see that in Paragraph 5 that:
"Deponent states that the whole of the crew was captured and taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von Schrader, the Admiral of the West Coast. The crew were taken to Bergen, and there they were interrogated by Lieutenant H.P.K.W.Fanger, a naval lieutenant of the reserve, on the order of Oberkapitan Egon Drascher, both of the Naval Intelligence Service, and this interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the West Coast.
Lieutenant Fanger reported to the officer in charge of the Intelligence Branch at Bergen that, in his opinion, all members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander Bergen and in writing to Admiral of the West Coast," and that is Admiral von Schrader. not think you will think is taken out of context of the evidence given by Lieutenant Fanger at this trial.
He was asked:
"Have you any idea at all why these people were handed over to the S. D.?" for their being handed over. This was your Officers, your outfit; that was the General in Command of the Norwegian Coast, admiral von Schrader in command of this section, and whose people captured the crew. That is your own officers. Is it true what you told the Court yesterday that the crew were captured by the S. D? Havy you any reason to believe It. Fanger is not telling the truth?
THE PRESIDENT: What is that you were quoting from then?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the shorthand notes taken on the trial of the S. S.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it been admitted?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, it has not been, but it was within Article 19.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I don't know the document which has been used, and may I please have it. Shorthand notes are being used which are unknown to me and according to the decisions of the Tribunal regarding cross examinations they must be given to me when the cross examination is carried out.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Lord, it is with great respect, but this point arose yesterday when the defendant made certain statements with regard to Admiral von Schrader. I am questioning these statements and the only way I can do it is by the use of documents which I did not 'otherwise intend to use. I shall, of course, let Dr. Kranzbuehler see them in due course.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you a copy of the German? That was to have been given the Germans, that evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have only the English transcript and I am willing to let Dr. Kranzbuehler see it, but it is all I have.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any other copy you can hand him?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I only was sent one copy.
THE PRESIDENT: After you are through with it, will you please hand that copy to Dr. Kranzbuehler?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Lieutenant Fanger, is not telling the truth when he says that these men were captured by Admiral von Schrader. is completely unknown to me. I have already, stated that neither I, the Supreme Commander of the Navy had reports on the whole story and yesterday I told you I could only question that it happened, and it says here in paragraph 6 they were captured on an Island; that they were not captured by the Navy, that that they were captured by a Section of the Police -- and if you will let me finish -- that consequently admiral Von Schrader, since they were not Navy prisoners but police prisoners, handed them back to the police, and that is why I did not receive a report. I certainly can't furnish the details of this story, because, as I have stated, I wasn't given a report of it at the time.
Q That is the point I will get to in a moment. It nowhere states in this document that they were captured by the police, but in fact that they were captured by the forces under Admiral von Schrader, who attacked this island to which this boat was moored.
A But I don't know that. It says here in the document the police raided the island but it was not clear for what purpose they raided it, and it is also quite clear that afterwards they reached the boat and that is quite clear, but they remained police prisoners as the police or police guard; had captured them there, and that is how I imagine the story should be. were captured by Admiral von Schrader's troups, and you say if Lieutenant Fanger says that you have no reason to believe his is not telling the truth, is that right?
A Yesterday I accepted that, considering von Schrader's personality and Lieutenant Fanger said this, then it has been different, but, of course, I don't know.
Q Will you look at the end of paragraph 8, the last sentence:
"There was an interview between Blomberg of the S.S. and Admiral von Schrader", and then the sent sentence:
"Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this torpedo boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuehrer's orders to the S.D.", and that they were handed over, and the Officers of the S.D., who carried out this interrogation order at the trial; that after the interrogation he was of the opinion that the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and he so informed his Superior Officer." crew were dealt with under the Fuehrer's order and executed, and it describes how they were shot and their be dies secretly disposed of. Do you say you never heard about that?
A I did not. I will state and I can prove it with my witnesses, that if the officers of the S. D. imprisoned these people then they ought to have reported it to a Superior Officer and his authority would, have been final. gated them; the Navy Intelligence said they should be treated as prisoners of war, and Admiral von Schrader said they should be handed over to the S.S. and that the SS examined them and said they should be treated as prisoners of war, and despite that, they were murdered. And you say you knew nothing about it? Did your Kapitaen Zur See Wildemann say anything to you concerning this? (Spelling) W-i-l-d-e-m-a-n-n. Let me try to bring him to your recollection. At this time he was an officer on the staff of Admiral von Schrader and dealt with this matter. Now, Kapitaen Wildemann, and I suppose we should assume, unless you know anything to the contrary, he is a trustworthy officer, he says: "I know that von Schrader made a written report on this action, and I know of no reason why the handing over of the prisoners to the S. D. should not have been reported on."
Do you still say you never got any report from von Schrader?
A Yes, I do say that; that I did not receive any report and I am equally convinced that the Supreme Command of the Navy, and I have witnesses who will prove it, did not receive it either, and where the report went I don't know. Admiral von Schrader was of the Navy and maybe it went to the Army Command, if a report was made at all.
At any rate the Supreme Command of the Navy did not receive a report on this particular matter, and that is why, that these people right from the beginning were apprehended and prisoners of the S.D. Otherwise, I think Admiral von Schrader would have reported it.
have in mind something further that Kapitaen Wildmann said; which you know probably quite well: "After the capitulation Admiral von Schrader many times said the English would hold him responsible for handing over the prisoners to the S. D.", and Admiral von Schrader was under orders proceeding to England as a prisoner when he shot himself. Did you knew Admiral von Schrader shot himself? this order?
A No, I did not know the least thing about that. I only heard about it here. no report to you?
Do you remember a few days after the capture of this M. T. B. Admiral von Schrader received a Ritterkreuz?
A Yes, but that is not connected with this matter at all. He did not furnish a report about this matter and he did not go to Berlin to get his Ritterkrauz either, as I remember. Boehm were decorated, and in the recommendations and citations, the capture of this M. T. B. was given as the reason for this decoration. You say you knew nothing about it?
A I knew nothing about it and I couldn't have known about it, because the decorating of these people would have been carried out by their Superiors and not me. The Supreme Command of the Navy did not receive a report in connection with this affair. I have that much confidence in my Supreme Command and my witnesses will prove it. Yes, they failed to receive it, because I ought to have received it in the Supreme Command.
Q My final question, and I leave this subject: Admiral von Schrader was your junior officer, and according to you, a very giant officer. Do you want the Tribunal to understand that the responsibility which broke and made Admiral von Schrader commit suicide was his responsibility, that he never consulted you and you were taking no responsibility for his acts? Is that what you want the Tribunal to understand? Schrader committed suicide because of this event, then he made a mistake, because naval personnel were not to be treated this way. He must have acted the wrong way. I did not receive the least indication of that affair.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, Will you ask the witness what he meant when he said that von Schrader was not directly under the Navy? He was under Admiral Celiax, wasn't he, who was on leave at this time?
THE WITNESS: I had said that he was net directly under the Supreme Command of the Navy in Berlin. If any reports went out -- if von Schrader made a report, then that did not go directly to me but to his superior who was in Norway. but omit the leave for the moment: His immediate superior was Admiral Celiax?
Q I want to put it perfectly fairly: Do you remember that for operations in Norway Admiral Celiax was acting under the Commander -- correct me if I am wrong -- was it General von Falkenhorst. Perhaps you can help me. Do you remember that this Admiral was acting under the Commander-in-Chief in Norway so that you will tell the Tribunal-under the Supreme Command of the Navy. Admiral Celiax, he was under the Army Commander for Norway, General von Falkenhorst, but I can only state that if these are the circumstances under which Schrader committed suicide because of this affair, then, a mistake was made when these people who were naval personnel and had been sent into a naval action were not treated as prisoners, but as I said, I don't knew. Then there was a local error.
for this action you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy knew nothing about it at all. That is what you say?
A The Knight's Cross was given to Schrader for something quite different. I awarded it. And as far as the awards to these other people are concerned, I don't know anything about that, and it has nothing to do with me, because it was done by their immediate superior. Whether these awards were in fact connected with the story, that is something I don't know -or whether there weren't other reasons for it. I still cannot imagine and don't believe it that a man like Admiral Schrader should have treated naval personnel in this manner and it doesn't say in the document either that they were being killed during a naval action but captured on an island. And it seems peculiar that the Supreme Command of the Navy should not have received a report about it, namely, that being an order and that the Army report had mentioned the story of this Commando order -- all these matters are against your version. I can't personally form an opinion of this affair and don't know it.
Q Defendant, I am not going into details. You may take it from me that the evidence at the trial has been that this cutter was attacked by two naval task forces. If Dr. Kranzbuehler finds I an wrong I will be happy to admit it. But we will pass on to another subject. Time is going.
Would you turn to page 105 of the Document Book? clear-cut violation of an order in this case, something of which the Supreme Command of the Navy was not informed. the English Document Book. Now we needn't have any trouble about this document because it is signed by you and it is a memorandum about the question of more labor for shipbuilding; and you are probably very familiar with it. But will you look at the first sentence?
A I beg your pardon, but what page is it?
A What is the number in the English?
Q Now, if you would look at the first sentence, "Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working party by prisoners from the concentration camps." 'I don't think we need trouble with coppersmiths, but if you will look at the end of the document, the very last you will see Item 2 of the summing up reads "Twelve thousand concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor. Security service agrees to this. existence of concentration camps?
Q And I think you wont further, didn't you, when asked about this on the 28th of September? At that time you said: "I generally knew that we had concentrations camps. That is clear.
"Question: From whom did you learn that?
"Answer: The whole German people knew that.
Don't you remember saving that?
A Right. The German people knew there were concentration camps, but they didn't know anything about the conditions and methods therein. von Ribbentrop said he only heard of two -- Oranienburg and Dachau? It was rather a surprise to you, was it?
knew about Dachau and Oranienburg too.
Q But you say here you knew there were concentration camps. Where did you think you were going to get your labor from? What camps? was going to be partly foreign labor?
A I didn't think about that at all, and I should like to make a statement now, about how these demands occurred. large-scale transports. Gradually there was the necessity of moving masses of poor refuges, hundreds and thousands of them, from eastern and western Prussia. They were at the sea-coast end starving and suffering from epidemics and shot at, and I tried to bring them to Germany. For these reasons I was looking for merchant ships which weren't actually under my jurisdiction, and in this connection I discovered that eight ships which had been ordered in Denmark -that out of those eight, seven had bean destroyed by saboteurs just before being completed. Subsequently I called a meeting of all departments concerned with those ships and asked them, "How can I help you?" What can I do so that we can get ships more quickly and so that damaged ships may be repaired more quickly?" were making suggestions to me, and amongst these suggestions was one for the acceleration of work repairs and such, that concentration camp prisoners should be used. The clear-cut reason which was given was that such employment would take place under very good conditions; they would be excellently fed and they would like that type of work. natural matter for me that amongst the suggestions -
Q (Interposing) A -- please allow me to finish.
-- that in my collections of proposals I included this particular one, particularly since there would be no deterioration in the condition of these people, since no doubt their feeding would improve. these people had been better fed under me, I would have turned them down. I had not the slightest reason for any such act. I didn't know anything about conditions.
Q I am sure we are grateful for your explanation. But I just want you to tell me, after you had proposed that you should get 12,000 people from concentration camps did you get them?
A I don't know. I didn't concern myself with that. After the meeting I had a memorandum prepared that was submitted to the -
Q Keep to the answer. The answer is that you don't know whether you got them or not, assuming that you did get them.
A I didn't get these people at all. That wasn't any of my concern and consequently I don't know whether these people who were responsible for the whole affair did receive that increase of workers or not.
Q But you held a position of some responsibility; if you get 12,000 people from concentration camps into the ship-building industry, they would have to work alongside people who weren't in concentration camp would they not? have gotten 12,000 people out of concentration camps, who work alongside people not in concentration camps, that the conditions inside the concentration camps remain a secret to the other people and to all the rulers of Germany?
A First of all, I don't knew whether these people arrived; secondly, if they did come, then I can well imagine that they had orders not to talk; and thirdly, I don't even known what camps these came from, whether they weren't people of a certain strength or ability of output of work, and were in quite different, camps. At any rate, I wasn't concerning myself with the carrying out or the methods of the whole proposal, because it was none of my business. concerned in the matter, and I acted on their behalf so that the question of repairs was being attended to. It was just my duty concerning the refugee transports which were at that time coming under my jurisdiction. I would do exactly the same today. That is how it happened.
Q. Well now, just look a little down the document to the fourth paragraph, after it says: Translator's note. If you will look at the English, the paragraph beginning: Since elsewhere. Have you found that? This is after, as you have told us, you express your worry about the sabotage in the Danish and Norwegian shipyards. I just want you to look at your proposal to deal with saboteurs. "Since elsewhere measures for exacting atonement, taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in Prance was completely supressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration. "That is what you were suggesting, Defendant, was a collective penalty against the whole working party where any sabotage occurred; isn't that so?
A. Yes. I have to give an explanation in that connection.
Q. That is all right. But otherwise, it is so?
A. First during that meeting departments outside of the Navy which were concerned with shipyards stated that in France sabotage had been prevented by introducing certain reprisals. The affidavit of an officer who participated in that meeting and who composed the record, or these brief memoranda, now proved to me that the conception of reprisals at the time was the taking away of additional rations which these people were issued, and this was to come to Norway and Denmark. That is what this means. And, secondly, I told these people, "It is impossible that we, with our foreign currency, and our material, could be building ships there. If these ships are mearly finished, then that sabotage which the workers assisted has destroyed them now." The answer I received was that it was the only possibility to separate these people from those who were carrying on sabotage.
Q. The whole of this explanation that you have given us is in this document which is in front of the Tribunal, Ha e you anything to add to what is in the document?
A. That is quite right, and I have to add this: It meant that these workers were to be treated exactly as ourselves. They, too, were also housed in barracks, and the Danish and Norwegian workers wouldn't have suffered in any way.
Q. I want you to look at one more sentence: "By the employment of the working parties concerned, that is concentration camp workers, their output would not only be increased to a hundred per cent but the cessation of their previously good wages might possibly result in their being considerably deterred from sabotage." That fairly represents your view of the way to treat Norwegian and Danish workers, does it not?
A. This was a measure of safeguarding so as to get control of the sabotage.
Q. Well now, just turn back to Page 70 of the English document book, Page 103 in the German document book. This is on extract from the minutes of a meeting between you and Hitler on the 1st of July, 1944, signed by yourself. Have you got it?
A. I hove got it.
Q. Concerning the general strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says: "The only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such men are on everybody's lips whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court martial proceedings, silence with regard to those who are condomned without trial." Do you agree with that statement of Hitler's?
A. No.
Q. Then why did you distribute it to Operations Department for circulation if you didn't approve of it?
A. I didn't agree to the procedure, but it also contains certain though of the Fuehrer. What is more, this was not an agreement between the Fuehrer and myself; it was minutes of the meeting which the officer who was accompaing me had made regarding the military situation, and it contained certain points ---
Q. Will you try and answer my question? It is a perfectly simple one. It is, why did you distribute that to Operations for circulation? What was there in these few lines that was of interest to your officers? What did you think was valuable for your officers to know in that dreadful piece of savagery that I have just quoted to you?
A. It is very simple to say. The officer who wrote the record included this in order to inform our departments that there was a general strike on in Copenhagen. That is why that one paragraph from that long discussion was introduced, so that the departments knew that there was a strike on in Copenhagen. That was the whole reason.
Q. I am suggesting to you, Defendant, that you circulated that to your officers to inculcate ruthlessness among them. That is my suggestion. What do you say to that?
A. To that I say that is perfectly wrong. I can tell you also that I didn't even hear that statement made by the Fuehrer, but it is perfectly possible that it was taken down by the accompanying officer, Wagner, for the reason which I have just given you, so as to warn these people that there was a general strike in Copenhagen.
Q. Now, Defendant, I am not going to argue with you about your knowledge of documents you have signed. I have questions to do with documents you haven't signed, so let's pass on to the next one.
A. I know the document. I know it because I have signed it.
Q. Page 69, that is Page 4 in the English document book or Page 102 in the German document book, the minutes of the conference on the 19th of February, 1945, between you and Hitler -
A. No, that is not right.
Q. No, I beg your pardon, It is an extract from the minutes of the Hitler conference on the 19th of February, 1945; and then there is a note -
A. No. It says here: Participation of the Supreme Commander of the Navy During the Military Discussion. There wasn't any special conference.
Q I didn't mean to say "special". I said the Hitler conference.
Q On the 19th. Now the first sentence of paragraph I says; "The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention." The last sentence is: "The Fuehrer orders the Commander in Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of this step and to state his opinion as soon as possible." And if you look down on the next minutes of the conference on the 20th of February, which is headed: Participation of C and C Navy in a Hitler conference on 20 February at 1600 hours, it reads as follows: "The C and C of the Navy informed the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations staff, General Jodl, and the representative for the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Fuehrer's headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany's possible renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Even from a general standpoint it appears to the Commander in Chief of the Navy that this measure would bring no advantage."
Now look at the last sentence: "It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs to save face with the outer world." That means, put in blunt and brutal language: "Don't denounce the convention but break it whenever it suits you", doesn't it?
Q What does it mean? Let's take it word for word. "It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary"; aren't these measures contrary to the rules of the Geneva Convention?
Q Answer my question first and then make a statement. You have done it before, but try to answer my question. "These measures considered necessary", if they don't mean measures contrary to the terms of the Geneva Convention what do they mean? Answer that question first.
A They are measures against our own troops. I have heard -- I was told that the Fuehrer had said that because in the West the front was not solid and because he had heard that American and British propaganda was making men desert and run off that he intended to leave the Geneva Convention, so I stated before my staff: "How can you think of such an idea, to throw overboard a century-old international law." Maybe that statement was made, that I said: "Let's take measures which are necessary"* but no concrete measures were thought of in that connection. Nobody thought of any concrete measures and none was introduced. What my own feelings were regarding treatment of prisoners of war, that can best be heard from those British prisoners of war who were in my camps. And that is the situation regarding this affair. In other words, the Chief of all the Armed Forces departments fought against the renouncing of the Geneva Convention. They were not for it.
Q Is that your total explanation of "to carry out measures considered necessary"? You have nothing else to add on that point? Well, I shall pass to another one. Do you remember saying to Dr. Kranzbuehler yesterday that when you became Commander in Chief of the Navy that the war was purely a defensive war? Do you remember saying that to your counsel yesterday?
Q That wasn't your fault, was it? It wasn't your fault that it remained limited to the countries engaged when you took over? Do you remember your advice to Hitler on the meeting of the 14th of May, 1943? about the Sea Transport for Sicily and Sardinia? Do you remember having a discussion on that and do you remember you warning Hitler that your U-boat losses were fifteen to seventeen U-boats a month and that the position as to the future of the U-boat war looked rather gloomy? Do you remember that?
Q And do you remember Hitler saying: "These losses are too heavy. This can not go on." And did you say to Hitler: "Now our only small outlet for sorties is the Bay of Biscay and control of this involves great difficulties and already takes up ten days of the U-boats' passage time.
The best strategic solution lies in the occupation of Spain, including Gibraltar." And did Hitler remark: "In 1940 this would still have been possible with the cooperation of Spain, but now, and against the will of Spain, our resources are no longer adequate." Do you remember suggesting that to Hitler on the 14th of May, 1943 and Hitler saying his resources were no longer adequate?
A I don't think that I had proposed to the Fuehrer that we should occupy Spain. I described the situation very clearly and I said that we should be blockaded in that small corner of the Bay of Biscay. I also said conditions would be quite different if there was more room; but that doesn't contain a suggestion that, under the defensive situation, we should propose to occupy Spain.
Q Let us get it clearly, I am quoting you now from Admiral Assmann's headline diary, a verbatim translation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The original is in London, My Lord. I will get the copy and put it in and certify it. This point again only arose yesterday and I haven't got it. I will have the original given and I will show Dr. Kranzbuehler this entry.
These are the words that Admiral Assmann records:
"Doenitz continues: 'Now our only small outlet for sorties is the Bay of Biscay and control of this involves great difficulties and already takes up ten days of the U-boats' passage time.'
Doenitz says, "The best strategic solution lies in the occupation of Spain, including Gibraltar."
Did you say that "the best strategic solution lies in the occupation of spain, including Gibraltar"?
A That's possible. If that's the wording you've got there, it's possible that that's the way I said it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I was going to pass on from these general -
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you passed altogether from C-158 on page 69?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I had, but I can easily return to it, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the second sentence in paragraph 1 appears to have some bearing upon the answers which the defendant has given.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry, but I tried to cut it as short to the bare bone, and I am sorry if I omit matters. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Defendant, would you return to the last document, C-158. That's the one about the Geneva Convention; it's page 69 of the English book; 102 of the German, whichever you're following. The Sergeant Major will help you to find it.
Now, if you'll look at the first paragraph, after the sentence I read, "The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention", it goes on: "Not only the Russians, but also the Western Powers, are violating international law by their actions against the defenseless population and the residential districts of the towns. It appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means for our existence, and, also, through this measure to urge our people to resist to the utmost." not these the measures considered necessary to which you were referring in the second minute?