Dalherus, who stood in the witness box here used the words, "I must correct myself," when he was asked about Ribbentrop, I am quoting Dalherus, He said, " I connected it with Ribbentrop since shortly beforehand the name was mentioned in some other connection."
I explained consequently that my anxiety was regarding what might happen. I have explained that very clearly and I needn't repeat it. that your anxiety was about his plane, and the point that I want to make clear to you now is that that incident did not occur on this day when Dalherus was preparing for his third visit, but occured when he was in E ngland and rang you up during his second visit. He rang you up on the evening of the 27th of August, and on page 59 of his book he says;
"Before leaving the Foreign Office, I telphoned to Goering to confirm that I was leaving for Berlin by plane at 7:00 p.m. He seemed to think this was rather late. It would be dark and he was worried lest my plane be shot at by the British or over German territory. He asked me to hold the line and a minute later came back and gave me a concise description of the route the plane must follow over Germany to avoid being shot at. He also assured me that the antiaircraft stations along our course would be informed that we were coming." confused it with this earlier incident to which Mr. Dalherus speaks, and that Mr. Dahlerus is perfectly accurate when he speaks about the second incident which occurred two days later.
A That is not at all contradictory. The first flight was concerned with the flight in darkness which brought increased danger, and I emphasize that in connection with the second journey, preparedness for war on the part of all countries had reached such a degree that this would raise certain objections. ed by my defense counsel, and that I did not tell him that Ribbentrop had planned an attack a against him. I emphasize for the last time that von Ribbentrop knew nothing about my negotiations with Dalherus.
Mar-21-M-RT-7-3
Q Do you really say that? Do you remember that on the 29th of August -first of all, on the 28th of August, at 10:30 p.m., when Henderson and Hitler had an interview. That was before the difficulties arose. It was the interview when Hitler was considering direct negotiations with the Poles. He said, "We must summon Field Marshal Goering to discuss it with him". That is in our Blue Book and as far as I know it has never been denied.
You were summoned to the interview that Hitler and Ribbentrop were having with Sir Neville Henderson.
A. No, I must interrupt you. The Fuehrer said, "We will have to have him fetched", but I was not brought in and that isn't said in the Blue Book either.
Q. But according to Mr. Dahlerus, he says:
"During out conversation, Goering described how he had been summoned to Hitler immediately after Henderson's departure, how Hitler, Goering and Ribbentrop had discussed the conference that had taken place with Henderson, and how satisfied all three of them were with the result. In this connection, Hitler had turned to Ribbentrop and siad mockingly, "'Do you still believe that Dahlerus is a British Agent?' Somewhat acidly Ribbentrop replied that perhaps it was not the case".
You say that is not true, either?
A. Herr Dahlerus is describing the events without having been present. From that description, too, it becomes clear that I arrived after Honderson. The description is a little colorful. Ribbentrop had no idea about what I negotiated with Dahlerus, and the Fuehrer did not inform him about these negotiations either. He merely know that I used Dahlerus as a negotiator, and he was, of course, opposed to him because of that very reason becauase he, as Foreign Minister, was against any other channels being used.
Q. That was exactly the point, you know, that I put to you about seven minutes ago, that Ribbentrop did not know you were using Dahlerus, so I will leave it.
A. No, I beg your pardon. I still say -- please don't distort my words -- that Ribbentrop did not know what I was negotiating with Dahlerus about and that he had not even heard that through the Fuehrer.
Q. You said "distort my words". I especially did not say to you that he know what you were negotiating about. I said to you that he know you were using Dahlerus and that, you agree, is right. I limited it to that, didn't I, and that is right, isn't it?
A. He didn't know either that I was having negotiations through Dahlerus with England at that time.
He didn't knew about that either.
Q. Well now, I want you just to help no on one or two matters. the German Government gave the strongest assurances as to the inviobility and neutrality of Belgium and Holland. Do you remember that ?
A. I don't remember it in detail, but it has been Mentioned here in Court.
Q. And do you remember that on the 25th of August 1938 the Air Staff put in a memorandum on the assumption that France and Great Britain -- oh no, that France would declare war during the case of Fall G ruen, and that Great Britain would come in? Do you remember that? It is PS-375, U.S. Exhibit 84. I want you to have it generally in wind because I an going to put a passage to you.
A, May I ask if the signature is Welter? W-e-l-t-e-r?
Q. I'll let you know. Yes, that is right.
A. In that case I remember the document exactly. It has been given to me here.
Q. That's right. I only want to recall your recollection to one sentence:
"Belgium and The Netherlands in German hands represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore, it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out, and how long it would take".
Do you remember that? It is pretty obvious air strategy, but you remember it?
A. That is absolutely correct. This is the job of a captain in one General Staff, First Department, who, in an intelligence department, would of course have to suggest the best position in his memoranda.
Q. Then, after that, on the 28th of April 1939, you remember that Hitler said that he had given binding declarations to a number of states, and this applied, to Holland and Belgium?
I think it was the time when he made a speech in the Reichstaf and mentioned a number of small states as well as that, but he said it included Holland and Belgium.
A Yes. Well, of course it has been mentioned quite a let in here. ment that I have already put to you, at the meeting at the Reichschancellory Hitler said this. "The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declaration of neutrality must be ignored."
Do you remember saying that? in Chief, which is 798-PS, US-29, he said:
"Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as well as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries."
Do you remember his saying that?
changed his opinion so that even the previous one from May may be quite different.
Q They are perfectly consistent in my estimation. He is saying that they must be occupied; that declarations of neutrality must be ignored and he is emphasizing that by saying that England and France will not violate the neutrality so it is perfectly easy for Germany to do it. necessity of that kind of reasoning. I merely want to point out that situations, politically speaking, were always different and that we, during the interrogations and during this trial, must regard the world political background of the whole story.
Q That was on the 22nd. You have agreed as to what was said. Immediately after that, on the 26th, four days later, Hitler gave another assurance. Do you remember that, just before the war he gave another assurance? the 7th of October, the day after that last assurance, the order, which is 2329-PS (G.B.105) was issued.
"Army Group B has to make all preparations according to special orders for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands."
And on the 9th of October, there is a directive from Hitler:
"Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon as forcibly as possible."
Isn't quite clear from that that all along you knew, as Hitler stated on the 22nd of August, that England and France would not violate the neutrality of the low countries and you were prepared to violate them whenever it suited your strategical and tactical interests? Isn't that quite clear?
A Not quite completely. If the political situation made it necessary and in the meantime the British opinion of the neutrality had been obtained.
Q You say not completely. That is asnear agreement with me as you are probably prepared to go.
Now I want to ask you quite shortly again in Yugoslavia. You remember that you have told us in your evidence in chief that Germany before the war, before the beginning of the war, had the very best relations with the Yugoslav people and that you yourself had contributed to it. I am putting it quite shortly. June, 1939 by a speech of Hitler at a dinner with Prince Paul. defendant Ribbentrop, Hitler and Ciano had a meeting and just lot me recall to you what Hitler said at that meeting to Count Ciano.
"Generally speaking --"
A I beg your pardon, what is the number of the document?
Q I am sorry, it was my fault -- T.C. 77 (GB 48). It is the memorandum of a conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August. Ciano's Diary?
Q Oh no, not from Ciano's Diary, it is a memorandum. This is the official report.
"Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other, while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind." towards Yugoslavia and the Fuehrer's statement to Prince Paul, wasn't it? in which connection that statement was made. As it was presented now it certainly would not fit into that.
document has been read at least twice during the trial and any further matter perhaps you will consider. But you will agree that unless I have wrenched it out of its context, which I hope I have not, that is quite inconsistent with friendly intentions, is it not? gave an assurance to Yugoslavia and he said:
"Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one and that we only desired to live in peace and friendship with her." the German Government announced that it confirmed its determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times. this, there was the Simovitch Putch in Yugoslavia. But I think you said, I want to get it quite clear, you said quite frankly in your evidence that Hitler and yourself never took the trouble or thought of taking the trouble of inquiring whether the Simovitch Government would preserve the neutrality or not. That is right, is it not?
A I did not put it like that. we were convinced that they were using these declarations to mislead. We know that this Putch was first of all directed from Moscow and, as we learned later, that it had been financially supported to a considerable extent by Britain. From that we recognized the hostile intentions and there was also the mobilization of the Yugoslav Army, which made the matter quite clear and we did not want to be deceived by Simovitch declarations. moment. But on the 27th of March, that was two days after the signing of the pact I have just referred to, there was a conference in Berlin of Hitler with the German High Command, at which you were present and do you remember the Fuehrer saying:
"The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit.
No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future, will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as means and troops suitable for it are ready. Politically it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning like undertaking. The plan assumes that we speed up the schedules of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest possible time." diplomatic negotiations, not give them a chance of assurance or coming to terms with you and to strike with unmerciful harshness, was it? completely clear about the situation and that the maneuvers on the part of Yugoslavia could only be regarded as a camouflage and deception. After the Putsch Yugoslavia had been included in the hostile front and it was therefore for us also to carry out decisive maneuvers so that we could line up our troops as quickly as possible, since our forces at that time were fairly weak. inspired by Moscow. I am not going to argue that point with you at all. But I do point out to you that this was three months before you were at war with the Soviet Union. You realize that, do you?
A Yes, that is correct. That Simovitch Putsch in particular removed the last objections of the Fuehrer regarding the fact that Russia's attitude toward Germany was hostile and that Putsch was the very last cause for him to decide as soon as possible preventative measures against that danger should be taken and secondly -
Q Just one moment. Do you know that it appears in the documents quite clearly, that the attack on the Soviet Union was postponed for six weeks because of this trouble in the Balkans? That is quite inconsistent with what you are saying now, isn't it?
A No. If you would read through my statement on that point, you would see that I said that a number of reasons connected with Russia caused the Fuehrer to order a campaign but that he reserved to himself the last decision as to whether or not he would intervene and that after the Simovitch Putsch that decision was made, that now a political student would allow a military delay, and that arises clearly from thestrategic situation at the time.
the fact that it contained the War Office and a number of other important military organizations. I am trying to summarize it but that was the effect of your evidence, was it not?
Q Now, do you remember how it was put in Hitler's order which I have just been reading to you:
"The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as poss ble with the destruction of the Jugoslavian Air Force ground instal lations."
Now I ask you to note the next word:
"And" -- "And to destroy the capital of Belgrade in attacks by waves. Besides the Air Force has to support the defense of the Army." on Belgrade was just another of your exhibitions of terror attacks in order to attempt to subdue a population that would have difficulty in resisting them.
A No, that is not correct. The population did defend them selves. Belgrade was the center of all military installations or matters, more so than the capital of any other country, and I would like to draw your attention to that. or two points on which you gave evidence -- I think at the instance of counsel for the organizations. You remember you gave evidence in answer to Dr. Babel about the Waffen SS? Do you remember that-a few days ago? not got a number, but it is the Fuehrer's ideas about the Waffen SS, and see if you agree. Oh, it is D 665, and it will be Exhibit GB 280. It is a document from the High Command of the Army, Genera Staff of the Army, "Statements of the Fuehrer re Future State Military Police", and the preliminary of the document says, "Doubts have arisen as to whether when the Fuehrer's ideas on the Waffen SS were passed on some time ago, it was intended that they should be given wider publicity," and then, if you would pass to the document, perhaps you would follow it while I read it. I do not think it has been in before:
"On 6 August 1940 on the occasion of the order for the organization of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler -- Adolf Hitler Bodyguard the existence of the Waffen-SS as sunned up below:
"The Greater German Reich in its final form will not include within its frontiers any but national entities who are, right from the beginning, well disposed towards the Reich. It is therefore necessary to maintain outside the core of the Reich a state military police capable of representing and imposing the authority of the Reich within the country in any situation.
"This task can be carried out only by a state police which has within its ranks men of the best German blood and which identifies itself unreservedly with the ideology at the base of the Greater German Reich. Only a formation composed in this way will resist disintegrating influence even in critical times. Such a formation, proud of its purity, will never fraternize with the proletariat and with the underworld which undermines the fundamental idea, but further, in our future Greater German Reich, a body of priests will only have the necessary authority over its compatriots if it is trained along military lines. Our people are so military-minded as a result of glorious events of a war-like natur and indoctrination by the National Socialist Party that a "sockknitting' police, as in 1848, or a bureaucratic police, as in 1918 no longer can prevail.
"It is therefore necessary for this state police to prove its worth and provide sacrifices of blood at the front, in closed formations in the same way as every unit of the armed forces. Having returned home in the ranks of the Army, after having proved themselves in the field, the units of the Waffen-SS will possess the authority to execute their tasks as state police.
"The utilization of the Waffen-SS in the interior is just as much in the interests of the Wehrmacht itself. We must never again tolerate in the future that the German Wehrmacht based on universal conscription should be used against its own compatriots, arm in hand, when critical situations arise in the interior.
Such a step is the beginning of the end. A state which has to resort to such methods is no longer in a position to use its armed forces against an enemy from without, and thereby surrenders itself.
Our history contains sad examples of this. The Wehrmacht in the future is intended for all time for use solely against the Reich' s foreign enemies.
"In order to ensure that the quality of the men in the unit of the Waffen-SS always remains high, the organization of the and must remain limited. The Fuehrer sees this limitation in the fact that the units of the Waffen-SS should in general not exceed five to ten percent of the peacetime strength of the Army".
Do you agree with that ? Is that a correct description of the purpose of the Waffen-SS ?
A.I am absolutely convinced that he did say that, but that does not contradict my statement.
Q. Now, I just want you, while we are on the SS, to look at a note which is Document D-729, which will be GB 281. It is on the conversation between you and the Duce in the P alazzo Venezia on 23 October 1942. At that time you were still in good standing with the Fuehrer and still retained your power; is that right ?
I will read it: It is page 35, paragraph 1.
"The Reichsmarshal then described Germany's method in fighting the partisans. To begin with, the entire live stock and all food stuff is taken away from the areas concerned so as to deny the partisans all sources of food."
A. Just a second please. Where is this ?
Q. It should be -- it is page 35, paragraph 1, but I will find it for you if you have any difficulty. I think it is marked and it begins "The Reichsmarshal --" Do you find it ?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. I will start again if I may.
"The Reichsmarshal then described Germany's method in fighting the partisans. To begin with the entire livestock and all foodstuff is taken away from the areas concerned, so as to deny the partisans all sources of food. Men and women are taken away to labor camps, the children to children's camps, and the village burnt down. Thus, for example had the railways in the vast woode* areas of Bialowiza been safeguarded. Should attacks occur, then the entire male population of villages would be lined up on one side and the women on the other side.
The women would be told that all the men would be shot, unless they (the women) indicated which of the men did not belong to the village. In order to save their men, the women always pointed out the stran ger . Germany had experienced that, generally speaking, soldiers were no use in carrying out such measures. Members of the Party discharged this task much more harshly and efficiently. For the same reason armies that were strengthened by a political creed such as the German (or the Russian) fought much more energetically than others. The SS, the guard of the old fighters of the Party, who have personal ties with the Fuehrer and who form a special on to, confirm this principle."
Q. Now, is that a correct description ?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. And this expresses correctly your views on how war against partisans should be carried out ?
A. I have transmitted this.
Just one second please. May I ask what the number of this document is, please ?
Q. Yes, I will give it again, D-729, and it becomes GB-281 organisations. You will remember that in answer, I think to Dr. Servatius, you made some remarks about the leadership corps. Do you remember that ? I just want you to have them in mind.
A. Yes.
Q. Now , will you look at the document which will be present to you, which will be document D-728, GB-282. This is a document from the Gau Leadership in Hessen-Nassau. I am sorry; there is a reference to an order of the party Chancellery dated 10 February 1945, and its subject is "Action by the Party to Keep Germans in Check until the End of the War." It is signed by Sprenger, Gaulei ter a nd Commissar for Reich Defense.
A. The date is 15 March 1945, is that right ?
Q. I am grateful to you. I knew it was just after 10 March. I have not got it in my copy, but if you say it, I will take that.
Q Yes. "I request the Kreisleiters to discuss the following with the Ortsgruppenleiters at the next official discussion and simultaneously draw attention hereby to the need for secrecy and radical action in these measures.
"I. Every German must be subjected to strict supervision regarding his political firmness and will-power.
"2. If during this supervision weaklings are found, i.e. Germans who perhaps have or might have the idea that we are losing the war or that the best thing would be to stop fighting etc., these Germans are to be given fresh strength, and faith in Adolf Hitler is to be aroused in them again.
"3. If Germans are found who spread the story that we have lost the war and that we are on the brink, this rumour is to be countered with all available means. The Kreisleiters are to have these Germans reported to them and are to ask the Gestapo to arrest them, according to the position of the rumour.
"I consider an occasional arrest or the transfer of some Germans to concentration camps as the best method of eliminating such rumour-mongers.
"4. The Ortsgruppenleiter must without fail keep all Germans in check and must without fail see to it that they all keep a stiff upper lip to the and because if courage and anger against the enemy fail behind the front, we shall lose the war.
"5. It is clear to me that our enemies are crossing the Rhine and entering in our Gau too, but they will not conquer the whole of Greater Germany and above all not National Socialism.
"6. The Kreisleiters are given strict and secret orders to with draw, on the approach of the enemy in every area, to the centre of Greater Germany.
All files, particularly the secret ones, are to be destroyed completely. The secret files about post-war reconstruction, purges among party members, the administration, enlargement, installations and deterring work in the concentration camps must be destroyed at all costs. Also the extermination of some families, etc. These files must under no circumstances fall into the hands of the enemy, since they were after all secret orders by the Fuehrer. I also hereby give the order that Germans who do not defend themselves on the approach of the enemy or who wish to floe, are to be shot down ruthlessly, or, where suitable, hanged to frighten the population." discussion about measures to be carried out. The first deals with the people who got tubercolosis and heart diseases, about not producing families. I am not going to read that in full.
But I would just like you to look at 3 and 4:
"3. Legal proceedings. No Party member may be brought before a court. In case of criminal proceedings, these are to be conducted by the Kreisleitung Party members are to be got off under all circumstances, even when they are inculpated The good reputation of the Party must under no circumstances be stained publicly as the Party is and remains the model. It is always the Non-Party members who are to be inculpated. To the eyes of foreigners, one must always show a solid party which can never be split up and whose leadership corps and Party members are unity itself.
"4. Food supply. The Fuehrer has again pointed out that the special weekly food ration cards are to be used in strict secrecy and that the supplies are always to be bought at different places. The cards will in future be distributed by the Gauleiter.
"Further weekly increases for the Party leadership are coming into force shortly:
"Meat, approximately 1250 grams, and far approximately 500 grams.
"Ortsgruppenleiters who are not down as self-providers, can also send in requests to the Kreisleitungen. I again point out the need for strict secrecy.
DR. STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): I must object to the use of this document, since I cannot recognize that it is genuine. I have not seen the original, and the doubts regarding it, as to its being genuine, are due to the fact that expressions are used which are most unusual in the German language.
THE WITNESS: I was going to raise the same objection. It is not an original.
DR. STAHMER: It says at the top, "copy," and there is not original signature. There is the type written words at the bottom, "Sprenger, Gauleiter." For instance they are using the word, "Gerichlichkeiten," legal apparatus. That is a completely unknown and unusual expression in the German language, and I cannot imagine that an official document originating from a Gauleiter could contain such a word.
THE WITNESS: I can draw your attention to yet another point showing that this is apparently not an original document. As far as this increase of fat and meat rations is concerned, I should have learned something. Not a single word of those two documents is known to me. It is a rubber stamp, this whole thing, written with a typewriter, and that includes the signature. Thus I cannot recognize the genuine character of this document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a file copy which, to the best of my knowledge was captured at the office, as it says, of the Gau Leadership. It was sent to us by the British Army of the Rhine. I shall make inquiries about it, but it purports to be a file copy and I have put the original document which we have, which is a file copy, to the witness.
(A slight pause.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I have the original document in my hands now, together with the certificate of an officer of the British Army stating that the document was delivered to him in the above capacity in the ordinary course of official business, as the original of a document found in German archives captured by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander.
Under those circumstances it is in exactly the same position as all the other captured documents. The Defense, of course, can bring any evidence which it thinks right, to criticize the authenticity of the document. The document stands on exactly the same footing as the other captured documents, subject to any criticism which you may be able to bring evidence to support.
Q. Witness, I want you to deal with the sentence in paragraph 6, "the administration, enlargement, installations and deterring work in the concentration camps must be destroyed at all costs. Also the extermination of some families, etc. These files must under no circumstances fall into the hand of the enemy, since they were after all secret orders by the Fuehrer." of the Nazi Party, and it assumes they knew all about the running of concentration camps. Are you telling the Tribunal that you, who up to 1943 were the second man in the Reich, know nothing about concentration camps?
A. First of all, I want to say once more that I do not recognize this document and that I do not know it in its entirety and that phase appears quite impossible to me. As far as the decree and the events in concentration camps are concerned, I did not know anything about that.
Q. Let me remind you of the evidence that has been given before this Court, that as far as Auschwitz alone is concerned, 4,000 people were exterminated. Do you remember that?
A. That I merely had as a statement here, but I considered it in no way proved -- that figure, I mean.
Q. If you don't consider it proved, let me remind you of the affidavit of Hoettl, who was Deputy Group Leader of the Foreign Section, of the Security Section of Amt IV of the RSHA. He says that approximately 4,000,000 Jews have been killed in the concentration camps, while an additional 2,000,000 met death in other ways. Assume that these figures -- one is a Russian figure, the other a German -- assume they are even 50 per cent correct, assume it was 2,000,000 and 1,000,000, are you telling this Tribunal that a Minister with your power in the Reich could remain ignorant that that was going on?