Those who were recaptured by the police beyond the camp, according to the Fuehrer's decree, were shot without exception Therefore, the utterance is entirely illogical and not in accord with the facts. I know nothing about it. I personally pointed out to the Fuehrer repeatedly that it is the duty of these officers to escape, and that after their return after the war, as far as I could recall, they would have to prove this escape on their return to England.
Q. You remember that the government of Germany sent an official note about this matter, saying that they had been shot while resisting arrest whil trying to escape? Do you remember that?
A. With the reply to this note I heard for the first time that this note had been sent. I did not participate in the formulating of the note. I know its contents only through the reply, for I happened to be there when the reply came in.
Q. I am not at the moment on the point that everyone now admist that the note was a complete and utter lie. I am on the point of the seriousness of this matter. Do you know that General Westhoff says in his statement: "Then, when we read this note to England in the newspaper, we were all absolutely take aback. We all clutched out heads, mad." Accroding to Mr. Wielen, who will be here, it was a contributory cause for General Nebe of the KRIPO for nights on end, not going to bed, but passing the night on his office settee. You will agree, won't you, witness, that this was a serious and difficult matter? All these officers that had to deal with it found it a serious and difficult matter, isn't that so?
A. Not only that I found this Matter serious but I myself considered it as the worst matter during the whole war and expressed myself definitely and clearly on this point and later, when I knew of the contents of the note, I know that this note was not in accordance with the truth. I was upset and expressed my statement, that as a result I told my General Quartermaster to direct a letter to the OKW that we did not wish to keep the camps for prisoner of war any longer because under these circumstances, we did not wish to stay with them any longer.
Q. And according to your evidence in chief, what you did was to turn to Himmler, asking him if he had received the order, and then you said, "I told him what excitement would result in my branch becuase we could not understand such measures and if he had received such orders, he would please inform me before carrying them through so that I would have the possibility to prevent such orders from being carried through, if possible; "and then you said that you"talked to the Fuehrer and that he confirmed that he had given the order and told me why." You, according to that evidence, still had enough influence in Germany, in your own opinion, to stop even Himmler issuing such orders or carrying --- I am sorry, I said "issuing" --- carrying out such orders.
A. You are interpreting my statement completely wrong. I told Himmler that it was his duty to call me before the execution of this matter, to give me the possibility even at this time to use my decreased influence to prevent the Fuehrer from carrying out this decree. I did not wish to say that I would have been completely successful through this attempt but it was a matter of course that as chief of the Luftwaffe, I would give Himmler my clear expression that it would have been his duty to let me know this before because I was the one who was most concerned with this matter. I told the Fuehrer in very clear words just how I felt and saw from his answers that if I had known before this in advance, I could not have prevented this decree, and we must keep in mind that two different matters or channels are concerned. This order was not given to the Luftwaffe, that these people were to be shot through the Luftwaffe but the order was given to the police. If the Fuehrer had told me "I will persist in this decree which I gave the police," I would not have been able to tell the police not to carry through the Fuehrer's decree; only if this decree should have been executed through my people, I would have had the possibility perhaps to circumvent this decree and I would like to emphasize this point strongly.
Q. Well, that may be your view that you couldn't have gotten anywhere with the Fuehrer, but I suggested to you that when all these officers that I mentioned knew about it, you knew about it and that you did nothing to prevent these men from being shot but cooperated in this foul series of murders.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are you passing from that now ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You are putting in evidence these two documents ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting them in. I put them to the witness D-731 will ge GB 280 and D-730 will be GB 279.
THE PRESIDENT: And should, you not refer perhaps to the second paragraph in 731 ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes sure.
THE PRESIDENT: It shows that apparently that in the early hours of the 25th of March the matter was communicated to the office of the adjutant of the Reichsmarshall -- the second paragraph beginning with "the escape".
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The escape of about 20 to 30 prisoners, the exact number having to be ascertained by rollcall, was reported by telephone from the Sagan Camp to the Inspektion in the early hours of the 25th of March, Saturday morning, and duly passed on in the same way by this office to the higher authorities which were to be informed in case of mass escapes. Those were: One, the Office of the Adjutant of the Reichsmarshall. Two, the OKW, for Directors of these prisoners of war. Three, the Inspector General of Prisoners of War; and four, Director of Operations, Air Ministry. I am much obliged. You must remember that the witness did admit yesterday afternoon that the news of the escape had been given to the office of his adjutant.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVIT MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged to you.
THE WITNESS: The escape was transmitted to us relatively quickly and on the utterances that you made, I would like to say that on assertions made, that I will insist for now, that I heard about this incident retroactively afterwards, subsequently.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q I have put my questions on the incident. I pass to another point I want to ask you just two or three questions about the evidence that you gave two days age, dealing with the evidence of your own witness Herr Dahlerus, who made his first visit to London on the 25th of August, 1939, after an interview and a telephone conversation with you on the 24th. I just want you to fix the date because it is sometimes difficult to remember what these dates are. At that time, you were anxious that he should persuade the British Government to arrange a meeting of plenipotentiaries who would deal with the questions of Danzig and the Corridor. Is that right?
Q You know perfectly well, did you not, that as fas as the Fuehrer was concerned, Danzig and the Corridor was not the real matter that was operating in his mind at all.
Will you let me remind you what he said on the 23rd of May. "Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all; it is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies and of the settlement of the Baltic problem." You know that, didn't you? pointed out repeatedly, in order to get the value of those conferences, we have to consider the entire political picture. At the moment of these negotiations with England, we were concerned only with Danzig and the Corridor and only with that problem. at that moment Hitler was only concerned with Danzig and the Corridor? Do you say that seriously. it was the case solely, otherwise you could not understand any acts by Hitler. for you night take his book "Mein Kampf" as a basis and so refer back to all of his actions through his books.
Q I am interested in the last week of August at the moment. I want you now just to remember two points on what you said, with regard to Dahlerus, during the morning of the 25th. Do you remember, you had a telephone conversation with him at 11.30 on the 24th? On the 25th, were you sufficiently in Hitler's confidence to know that he was going to proffer the note verbale to Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador, on the 25th? Did you know that? was being given to the British Ambassador, the arrangement and crier was that you were going to attack Poland on the morning of the 26th, wasn't it?
THE PRESIDENT: I think there is some mechanical difficulty. Perhaps it would be a god thing to adjourn now for a few minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
Poland on the morning of the 26th were changed on the evening of the 25th. Before I come to that, I will ask you one or two......
A No, I didn't do that.
Q Wait a minute. I'm sorry, but that is what I understood you to say.
A No. I said explicitly that already, on the evening of the 25th, the attack had been cancelled. That is, the attack for the morning of the 26th. Technically, militarilly, it is impossible that a large attack of the whole armed force should be cancelled on the evening before the attack. The fastest time possible for such a change to be made would be 24 hours, or even 68 hours. the 24th. It was still the plan that the attack would take place on the 26th. Was not your object in sending Dahlerus to have the British Government discussing their next next when the attack took place, in order to make it more difficult for the British Government? have the document to recollect it -- that when I sent Dahlerus at that time and when, at that time, Sir Neville had been handed a note on behalf of the Fuehrer, the attack on the 26th had been cancelled . . . of August. "On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland, it was 5:30 on the 25th of August. The Fuehrer called to me on the phone and told me he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether it was just temporary or for good. He said 'No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.' I asked him 'Do you think that it will be definite within four or five days?' Isn't that right? curred on the 25th. I said that when the Fuehrer was clear about the Guarantee it would be given.
I emphasized that once more.
Q That was what I was quoting to you. When the official guarantee was given, the treaty was signed at 5:30 on the evening of the 25th of August. am putting your own words to you. It was after that that the Fuehrer rang you up and told you the invasion was off. Do you wish to withdraw your statement that it was after the official guarantee was given to Poland?
A I emphasize once more. After we knew that the guarantee would be given -- it is necessarily clear to you too that if the signing took place at 5:30 P.M. on the 25th the Fuehrer would then have to call a conference and at the earliest, it was possible to cancel it during the night. Every military expert must know that that is an absolute impossibility. was clear about the fact that the guarantee would be given, and I emphasize once more that I have not seen the record. . .
Q I admit that I don't know anything about that. I don't know whether you were still in Hitler's confidence at the time or not. But, wasn't it a fact that Signer Atolico came on the 25th and told Hitler that the Italian Army and Airforce were not ready for a campaign? Were you told that? on the 26th, wasn't it? when the Italian assistance came into play, it was the fact that a number of people doubted its value. During all the days of proceeding tension, it was becoming obvious because of certain demands made by the Italians which we found impossible to fulfil, that Hitler was trying to evade the whole situation. The Fuehrer was convinced that the British Government had, in the meantime, heard about.Italy's attitude and their resolve to become our ally.
said.
"I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention." Isn't it correct that you tried, through Mr. Dahlerus, in every way, to try and eliminate British intervention?
A Not at any time did I attempt that. It was my entire intention to avoid the war with England. If it was possible to avoid that war on the strength of an agreement with Poland, then that would have been accepted. If the war with England could be avoided in site of a war with Poland, then that was my task also.
It was clearly apparent, even after the beginning of the Polish campaign on the 5th of September, that I still made every attempt to avoid a war with England. In other words, to avoid a spreading of the war. was to get England to try and agree and help the Reich in the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, wasn't that right?
Q Now, you remember the interview with Mr. Dahlerus. It was the interview in which you colored the portions on the map. I only want you to have it in your mind. If I say 11:30 on the 29th of August it won't mean anything to you. I want you to see it so that I can ask you one or two questions about it. hadtaken place when Hitler handed Henderson the German reply and there had been the remark about the ultimatum. Do you remember that?
A Yes, of course I was upset, since that completely disturbed my whole position.
Q And is this correct? Mr. Dahlerus says on page 72 of his book that you came out with a tirade, strong words against the roles. Do you remember that he quotes you as saying, "Wirkennen die Polen"? Do you remember that ?
A Yes, of course. You must consider the situation at the time. I had heard about the excesses and I wouldn't stand and tell a neutral man, Dahlerus, I considered Germany guilty and the Poles completely innocent. The whole situation was like that, and it is correct that I did say that.
Q Are you still an admire of Bismarck? Bismarck.
Q No, I am not suggesting that. I thought you might have in mind his remark about the Poles. Do you remember, "Haut doch die Polen, dass sie am Leben verzagen", "Let us strike the Poles until they lose the courage to live"? Is that what was in your mind at the time? aware of the fact I had the friendship of Poland. not going to take time on it,but I just want to put one or two subsidiary points You remember the passage that I read from Mr. Dahlerus' book about the airplane and the sabotage, that he said that you had said to him, mentioning the defendant Ribbentrop -- you remember that passage? You have given your explanation and I just want to -concern that his airplane should not be shot down in making his journey. That is putting your explanation fairly, isn't it? You are saying that Herr Dahlerus was confused. What you were saying was your concern that his airplane should not be shot down. Isn't that right? That is as I understood it.
A No, I think I have expressed it very clear. Would you like me to give it again? I will repeat it.
Dalherus, who stood in the witness box here used the words, "I must correct myself," when he was asked about Ribbentrop, I am quoting Dalherus, He said, " I connected it with Ribbentrop since shortly beforehand the name was mentioned in some other connection."
I explained consequently that my anxiety was regarding what might happen. I have explained that very clearly and I needn't repeat it. that your anxiety was about his plane, and the point that I want to make clear to you now is that that incident did not occur on this day when Dalherus was preparing for his third visit, but occured when he was in E ngland and rang you up during his second visit. He rang you up on the evening of the 27th of August, and on page 59 of his book he says;
"Before leaving the Foreign Office, I telphoned to Goering to confirm that I was leaving for Berlin by plane at 7:00 p.m. He seemed to think this was rather late. It would be dark and he was worried lest my plane be shot at by the British or over German territory. He asked me to hold the line and a minute later came back and gave me a concise description of the route the plane must follow over Germany to avoid being shot at. He also assured me that the antiaircraft stations along our course would be informed that we were coming." confused it with this earlier incident to which Mr. Dalherus speaks, and that Mr. Dahlerus is perfectly accurate when he speaks about the second incident which occurred two days later.
A That is not at all contradictory. The first flight was concerned with the flight in darkness which brought increased danger, and I emphasize that in connection with the second journey, preparedness for war on the part of all countries had reached such a degree that this would raise certain objections. ed by my defense counsel, and that I did not tell him that Ribbentrop had planned an attack a against him. I emphasize for the last time that von Ribbentrop knew nothing about my negotiations with Dalherus.
Mar-21-M-RT-7-3
Q Do you really say that? Do you remember that on the 29th of August -first of all, on the 28th of August, at 10:30 p.m., when Henderson and Hitler had an interview. That was before the difficulties arose. It was the interview when Hitler was considering direct negotiations with the Poles. He said, "We must summon Field Marshal Goering to discuss it with him". That is in our Blue Book and as far as I know it has never been denied.
You were summoned to the interview that Hitler and Ribbentrop were having with Sir Neville Henderson.
A. No, I must interrupt you. The Fuehrer said, "We will have to have him fetched", but I was not brought in and that isn't said in the Blue Book either.
Q. But according to Mr. Dahlerus, he says:
"During out conversation, Goering described how he had been summoned to Hitler immediately after Henderson's departure, how Hitler, Goering and Ribbentrop had discussed the conference that had taken place with Henderson, and how satisfied all three of them were with the result. In this connection, Hitler had turned to Ribbentrop and siad mockingly, "'Do you still believe that Dahlerus is a British Agent?' Somewhat acidly Ribbentrop replied that perhaps it was not the case".
You say that is not true, either?
A. Herr Dahlerus is describing the events without having been present. From that description, too, it becomes clear that I arrived after Honderson. The description is a little colorful. Ribbentrop had no idea about what I negotiated with Dahlerus, and the Fuehrer did not inform him about these negotiations either. He merely know that I used Dahlerus as a negotiator, and he was, of course, opposed to him because of that very reason becauase he, as Foreign Minister, was against any other channels being used.
Q. That was exactly the point, you know, that I put to you about seven minutes ago, that Ribbentrop did not know you were using Dahlerus, so I will leave it.
A. No, I beg your pardon. I still say -- please don't distort my words -- that Ribbentrop did not know what I was negotiating with Dahlerus about and that he had not even heard that through the Fuehrer.
Q. You said "distort my words". I especially did not say to you that he know what you were negotiating about. I said to you that he know you were using Dahlerus and that, you agree, is right. I limited it to that, didn't I, and that is right, isn't it?
A. He didn't know either that I was having negotiations through Dahlerus with England at that time.
He didn't knew about that either.
Q. Well now, I want you just to help no on one or two matters. the German Government gave the strongest assurances as to the inviobility and neutrality of Belgium and Holland. Do you remember that ?
A. I don't remember it in detail, but it has been Mentioned here in Court.
Q. And do you remember that on the 25th of August 1938 the Air Staff put in a memorandum on the assumption that France and Great Britain -- oh no, that France would declare war during the case of Fall G ruen, and that Great Britain would come in? Do you remember that? It is PS-375, U.S. Exhibit 84. I want you to have it generally in wind because I an going to put a passage to you.
A, May I ask if the signature is Welter? W-e-l-t-e-r?
Q. I'll let you know. Yes, that is right.
A. In that case I remember the document exactly. It has been given to me here.
Q. That's right. I only want to recall your recollection to one sentence:
"Belgium and The Netherlands in German hands represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore, it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out, and how long it would take".
Do you remember that? It is pretty obvious air strategy, but you remember it?
A. That is absolutely correct. This is the job of a captain in one General Staff, First Department, who, in an intelligence department, would of course have to suggest the best position in his memoranda.
Q. Then, after that, on the 28th of April 1939, you remember that Hitler said that he had given binding declarations to a number of states, and this applied, to Holland and Belgium?
I think it was the time when he made a speech in the Reichstaf and mentioned a number of small states as well as that, but he said it included Holland and Belgium.
A Yes. Well, of course it has been mentioned quite a let in here. ment that I have already put to you, at the meeting at the Reichschancellory Hitler said this. "The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declaration of neutrality must be ignored."
Do you remember saying that? in Chief, which is 798-PS, US-29, he said:
"Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as well as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries."
Do you remember his saying that?
changed his opinion so that even the previous one from May may be quite different.
Q They are perfectly consistent in my estimation. He is saying that they must be occupied; that declarations of neutrality must be ignored and he is emphasizing that by saying that England and France will not violate the neutrality so it is perfectly easy for Germany to do it. necessity of that kind of reasoning. I merely want to point out that situations, politically speaking, were always different and that we, during the interrogations and during this trial, must regard the world political background of the whole story.
Q That was on the 22nd. You have agreed as to what was said. Immediately after that, on the 26th, four days later, Hitler gave another assurance. Do you remember that, just before the war he gave another assurance? the 7th of October, the day after that last assurance, the order, which is 2329-PS (G.B.105) was issued.
"Army Group B has to make all preparations according to special orders for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands."
And on the 9th of October, there is a directive from Hitler:
"Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon as forcibly as possible."
Isn't quite clear from that that all along you knew, as Hitler stated on the 22nd of August, that England and France would not violate the neutrality of the low countries and you were prepared to violate them whenever it suited your strategical and tactical interests? Isn't that quite clear?
A Not quite completely. If the political situation made it necessary and in the meantime the British opinion of the neutrality had been obtained.
Q You say not completely. That is asnear agreement with me as you are probably prepared to go.
Now I want to ask you quite shortly again in Yugoslavia. You remember that you have told us in your evidence in chief that Germany before the war, before the beginning of the war, had the very best relations with the Yugoslav people and that you yourself had contributed to it. I am putting it quite shortly. June, 1939 by a speech of Hitler at a dinner with Prince Paul. defendant Ribbentrop, Hitler and Ciano had a meeting and just lot me recall to you what Hitler said at that meeting to Count Ciano.
"Generally speaking --"
A I beg your pardon, what is the number of the document?
Q I am sorry, it was my fault -- T.C. 77 (GB 48). It is the memorandum of a conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August. Ciano's Diary?
Q Oh no, not from Ciano's Diary, it is a memorandum. This is the official report.
"Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other, while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind." towards Yugoslavia and the Fuehrer's statement to Prince Paul, wasn't it? in which connection that statement was made. As it was presented now it certainly would not fit into that.
document has been read at least twice during the trial and any further matter perhaps you will consider. But you will agree that unless I have wrenched it out of its context, which I hope I have not, that is quite inconsistent with friendly intentions, is it not? gave an assurance to Yugoslavia and he said:
"Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one and that we only desired to live in peace and friendship with her." the German Government announced that it confirmed its determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times. this, there was the Simovitch Putch in Yugoslavia. But I think you said, I want to get it quite clear, you said quite frankly in your evidence that Hitler and yourself never took the trouble or thought of taking the trouble of inquiring whether the Simovitch Government would preserve the neutrality or not. That is right, is it not?
A I did not put it like that. we were convinced that they were using these declarations to mislead. We know that this Putch was first of all directed from Moscow and, as we learned later, that it had been financially supported to a considerable extent by Britain. From that we recognized the hostile intentions and there was also the mobilization of the Yugoslav Army, which made the matter quite clear and we did not want to be deceived by Simovitch declarations. moment. But on the 27th of March, that was two days after the signing of the pact I have just referred to, there was a conference in Berlin of Hitler with the German High Command, at which you were present and do you remember the Fuehrer saying:
"The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit.
No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future, will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as means and troops suitable for it are ready. Politically it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning like undertaking. The plan assumes that we speed up the schedules of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest possible time." diplomatic negotiations, not give them a chance of assurance or coming to terms with you and to strike with unmerciful harshness, was it? completely clear about the situation and that the maneuvers on the part of Yugoslavia could only be regarded as a camouflage and deception. After the Putsch Yugoslavia had been included in the hostile front and it was therefore for us also to carry out decisive maneuvers so that we could line up our troops as quickly as possible, since our forces at that time were fairly weak. inspired by Moscow. I am not going to argue that point with you at all. But I do point out to you that this was three months before you were at war with the Soviet Union. You realize that, do you?
A Yes, that is correct. That Simovitch Putsch in particular removed the last objections of the Fuehrer regarding the fact that Russia's attitude toward Germany was hostile and that Putsch was the very last cause for him to decide as soon as possible preventative measures against that danger should be taken and secondly -
Q Just one moment. Do you know that it appears in the documents quite clearly, that the attack on the Soviet Union was postponed for six weeks because of this trouble in the Balkans? That is quite inconsistent with what you are saying now, isn't it?