Austria. And I would like to close with this statement, that here, not as much the Fuehrer, but I personally an prepared to take the full and entire responsibility for everything that has happened. had a conversation with Dr. Massny, the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia. On this occasion you are supposed to have made a statement. What about that conversation?
A I am grateful that I finally can say something about this "word of honor" that I supposedly gave, which was mentioned during the last month, so that I can finally speak about it frankly. After I had spoken to Sir Neville Henderson and returned to the rest of the party, the Czechoslovakian Ambassador, Dr. Massny, came to me, very excited, shaking, and he asked me, what had happened that night and whether we intended also to march into Czechoslovakia. I gave him a short explanation and said, "No, it is only the question of the annexation of Austria; it has absolutely nothing to do with your country, especially so if you keep away from it entirely." time he came back even more excited, and I had the impression that in his excitement he could not even understand me clearly any more. I told him then, in presence of others, "Your Excellency, listen carefully now. I give you my personal word of honor that this is a question of the annexation of Austria only and that not a single German soldier will come anywhere near the Czechoslovakian border. You take care now that on the side of Czechoslovakia there be no mobilization which might tend to create any disturbance."
At no time did I tell him, "I give my word of honor that for all time we will never have anything to do with Czechoslovakia." particular event. I gave him the explanation, because I had already expressed, before that, that the solution of the Sudeten problem would be necessary at some time. I would never have given my word of honor for a final solution, and it would not have been possible for me, because before that I had already made the statement in a different direction. At that time and in connection with the Austrian events, I only assured him that Czechoslovakia at that time would not be touched. I could give him my word of honor on my best conscience, because at that time no decisions had been taken about the Czechoslovakian or the Sudeten problems. Hitler and President Hacha. Were you present during that conversation? And what was your part in it? Czechoslovakia. After Munich -- that is to say, after the agreement of Munich and the solution of the Sudeten German problem, between the Fuehrer and some of his collaborators -- a decision had been taken to mean that if there should be renewed difficulties after the agreement of Munich or from the occupation of these zones, certain measures of precaution had to be taken by military authorities, because after the occupation of the zones the troops who had been in readiness for the "Case Gruen" had been dembobilized. But a development could take place which at any moment could become extremely dangerous for Germany. by the Russian press, for instance, the Russian broadcasts, to the agreement of Munich and to the occupation of the Sudeten areas. One could not use stronger words. A connection between Prague and Moscow had existed for a long time. Prague, disappointed by the agreement of Munich, could not strengthen its ties with Moscow. We saw signs of that, particularly in the Czech officers' corps. We received information about that. And since there were possibilities of danger from that side, directives had been issued to the various military instances to take precautions.
That order has nothing to do with an intention to occupy, after a short time, all the rest of Czechoslovakia.
for him to let things go on. There was an increasing menace for During that time I had met many Englishmen.
I had recognized I sent a letter back by courier.
Maybe it is among the many tons of documents that have been captured.
I would understand if it would not be submitted.
In this letter I explained to the that he could stand it.
Then probably Mr. Churchill would come in, and the Fuehrer knew Churchill's attitude toward Germany.
Thirdly, I thought I could tell him the following. I believed would excite Czechoslovakia as well as other countries.
I was penetration of Czechoslovakia would only be a matter of tine.
That and sovereignty, we should not counteract that in any way.
On the
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time for us to break off?
(A recess was taken.)
DR. STAHMER: Will you continue, please?
THE WITNESS: Yes. I had to go to Berlin at very short notice.
of the same day. I reported verbally to the Fuehrer what I had emphasized earlier in my letter.
The Fuehrer pointed out that he had things were not in keeping with the Pact of Munich.
He said that he from Czechoslovakia:
Czechoslovakia would now be utilized for Russian air bases.
So he said he was determined to do away with that present at the Reich Chancellory too.
President Hacha arrived and first of all talked with the Reich Foreign Minister.
Later on he went to see the Fuehrer, who greeted him briefly.
First of all, the two of them conversed alone; then we were called in.
Subsequently I possible.
I told him it wouldn't help us at all to object. The was quite impossible.
And in that connection I made the statement that I was sorry if I had to bomb beautiful Prague.
The intention to bomb Prague did not exist, nor was there an order of that kind.
Even if all times have been broken without that bombing.
But such a pointer
BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Did you accompany the Fuehrer to Prague?
A No, I did not accompany him to Prague. I was a little angry.
Q Why were you angry?
Q Did other powers join the occupation of Czechoslovakia?
A Yes. Poland occupied the Olsa territory.
anti German demonstrations in Prague, was to take place. It has What is more, I remember what the facts really were.
It wasn't discussed in that sense and couldn't have been done in that way, as solution of that problem.
But the possibility which could lead to necessitate immediate action on Germany's part under all circumstances, arms to them; so threatening was the situation.
On the strength of understood here.
It wasn't us who wanted to have the Ambassador assassinated.
We said that the possibility of such an assassination in the sense that economic goods were taken away; to the contrary armament potential in Germany.
That means orders were sent there to a considerable degree.
Over and above that we even created Germany.
I believe that this is a complete error. The traffic system for Germany.
The entire south-eastern traffic from the Balkans went Odeberg and Berlin.
And since the canal had not been completed the outside but took the shortest way.
We would have been crazy if we had weakened that traffic system.
I can assume only one reason, and that government report as being old.
But that we dismantled new for old is were taken over by the German state is incorrect.
It is naturally a justified.
For that country German currency was introduced, and that "by me" means that on the one hand we acquired shares which gave us a holding in private economic enterprise; and furthermore, by the In that connection the Reich Works Hermann Goering appeared on the scene there too, since they took over a considerable share of the Skoda Works so as to utilize that and their industrial power in their own program just as any of the other industries of Germany.
Protectorate, the total economic capacity of the then Protectorate must have been included in the total economic potential of Germany. Chancellory, of which one Colonel Hoszbach prepared a protocol, a record, and that has been referred to as the last will. It has been the subject of this trial repeatedly, and may I ask you for a short explanation on what significance that conference had. I am going to have that document shown to you for you to have a brief glance at it. It is 386-PS.
A This document has already been shown to me here, yes. I know it approximately as far as contents are concerned. This document plays an important part in the Indictment, since it has appeared under the heading "Last will of the Fuehrer." This word is, in fact, used in one part of this last record, and it is used by Hoszbach. this. Hoszbach was the adjutant of the Fuehrer. He was the chief adjutant. As such, he was present during that conference, and he took notes. Five days later, as I have since ascertained, he then prepared this record on the strength of those notes he made. This is, therefore, a record which contains all the mistakes which are bound to occur during such a record which is made without a stenographer, and which under certain circumstances can represent opinions of the person concerned or opinions or conceptions of his. It contains a number of expressions, as I have said before, which I will take exactly were what the Fuehrer has said repeatedly, but there are other points which I can say do not represent the Fuehrer's way of expressing himself. of which had nothing to do with or even had the hint of what has been stated, that I must point out the sources of mistakes in this connection.
As far as the word "testament" is concerned, this contradicts completely what conceptions the Fuehrer had.
If anybody knows anything about this conceptions, then it is I. 1939, but as early as the late autumn 1934. I have had opportunities quite often to discuss the question of a political last will with the Fuehrer, and he turned it down, giving us a reason that one could never appoint a successor by means of a political last will, that the developments in political events should give complete freedom of action at all times. Quite possibly someone could state political wishes and conceptions, but never binding statements in the shape of a last will. That was then, and as long as I have ever had his confidence, always his conception.
Now, what was he aiming at with the contents of this document? People were called together with the Minister of War, the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme Commander of the Navy, the Air Force, and the then Reichs Foreign Minister. Shortly before that the Fuehrer had informed me that he was going to call that meeting, mostly to put pressure behind General von Fritsch, since he was dissatisfied with the rearmament of the Army. He said it wouldn't do any damage if von Blomberg would also exercise a certain pressure on von Fritsch. didn't want the thing to look too military. It probably wasn't necessary but he wanted to make it very clear to Fritsch that the foreign political situation required a forced speed of armament and that for that reason he had asked the Foreign Minister to come along, who know nothing about the details. in such connections. He went to great length to picture the political situation, and he talked about the whole world situation from all angles; and anybody who knew him as well as I did knew the purpose he pursued. He was quite clearly aiming at saying that he had considerable plans, and that this and that was the political situation.
The final result was the creation of a strong armament program. I would like to say that if the Fuehrer, one or two hours later, had talked to another group, for instance, diplomats, or the Foreign Office, or shall we say, officers of the Party, then he probably would have represented matters quite differently.
attitudes of the Furher , but the extent of significance which is being attached to that document today, that I can hardly attach to this document, not to the best of my ability.
Q You said you had been appointed the successor of the Fuehrer. Were you in that capacity led into all political problems by the Fuehrer? until long into the war. Of course he kept me informed of all important political and military problems. I was included, and this mostly occurred during many and long discussions, which would take place for many hours, day after day. Occasionally about foreign political questions I was sometimes surprised, but whenever possible I would include myself. On one occasion he did say, in fact, that I had my own foreign political opinions, and that he didn't always find it easy to agree with me, but I want to emphasize that in all important political questions I was included. about which, during the interrogation or examination of the witness Milch, statements were made.
A record of that has also been made, and it is Document L-79. According to the wording of that record, you participated in this meeting, and the Witness Milch stated that you were not present.
A I was, in fact, not present. Milch went there at the last moment to represent me, but of course if the witness Milch says that he had not had the Fuehrer's permission to inform me, then you must understand that in that way the Fuehrer would not have such a point communicated to me by my Secretary of State, but that he wished to communicate it to me personally.
No, I am sorry, I have actually been present at that meeting. I just now see that from another clue, but even if I hadn't been present I think Milch must be talking about another meeting. Then that wouldn't be of any importance. It is out of the question that the Fuehrer would have had a conference with such gentlemen without notifying me either before or afterwards if I myself was absent. It is, therefore, not at all important. informed previously, or, if I wasn't present, afterwards in great detail by the Fuehrer. But I gather that Milch must have made a mistake here, and he is probably referring to another meeting, since right at the end I asked questions about the armament program, which I now recollect exactly.
Q What was the significance of that meeting? views, told us about the situation, and described the position of the Army which arose from that situation. Once more the point he had in mind was that the Army, from the point of view of armament and preparedness, should be aware that he expected all sorts of political developments, and that he reserved for himself complete freedom of decision. time -- and I needn't emphasize how easily matters which are regarded retrospectively are regarded in a different light of development and represented in that way than compared with what they have in fact been before. It is easy to say afterwards, "I wanted that at that time, this and that." I have achieved it in the meantime, and it is of course so easy to say "That has always been my intention," although one knows perfectly well that originally a number of other factors were important regarding whether developments would be just like that, and that in fact his intentions may have been completely different under different circumstances.
on the part of the adjutant have arisen, but, on the whole, it is one of those typical conferences which the Fuehrer used to hold when he had one particular purpose in mind which he wanted to achieve, and he wanted to lend the necessary emphasis to that aim.
visits to Poland. What was the purpose of these visits? atmosphere. He requested me to take on that task and that for the reason he believed that I would find it easy to make contact with these Polish gentlemen, which was indeed the case.
The president of the Polish State invited me. This was in 1935, 1936, 1937 -- in fact every year -- and I spent one or two weeks in Poland on each occasion. I had discussions with the then Marshal Pilsudski and later on always with the Foreign Minister. a serious task -- that apart from a continuing improvement of relations I should tell Poland that we were interested in a strong Poland, because a strong Poland would be an excellent barrier between Germany and Russia. The solution of the Danzig and Corridor question was emphasized at that time by the Fuehrer, and it had to be expected that until then he was hoping that some opportunity would arise to come to a solution with Poland about that problem. The Lithuanian problem came into that, and what is the decisive factor is that he did not say, "You must hoodwink Poland. I am going to fall upon them afterwards." It was never the case, as it has been put here, that we used to get together and conspire for the attack to come, referring to every point of our intention. In fact, the whole situation arose out of the political developments as it does in the whole world, and always has.
Anyway, I was given that task. I conscientiously took it seriously and I carried it out in the honest belief that it was true. Consequently, when the clash occurred and Poland was invaded this was a situation that was very unpleasant for me. question?
A It was always quite clear. It was that Danzig and the Free State, as purely German territory, should at some date in the near future be returned to Germany. On the other hand,we certainly recognized that Poland should have access to the sea and a port.
Consequently, our first thought has always been that the Free State and Danzig should be returned to us and that through the Polish Corridor a German traffic lane should be created. That was a most modest demand which for a long time was considered to be an absolutely necessary demand, and appeared as such. We considered that a perfectly bearable demand. November 1939. The record of that conference is the Document 789-PS, which will be presented to the Tribunal. I ask you to identify the document and tell me, briefly, what your attitude toward that conference is.
AAbout that I can be comparatively brief. This is an address before the supreme commanders of those formations and armies which were to be used for the attack in the West after Poland had been dealt with. It was a matter of course and required no discussion when the supreme commander of an armed force who is actively leading that force decides to carry out a strategic and considerable tactical operation. In this case it meant that after the end of the Polish Campaign the Fuehrer wished definitely -- and that was perfectly correct -- as early as that autumn to change his troops over and carry out the blew against France, so that as early as the autumn and winter of 1939 the end of that campaign could be achieved.
What prevented was the weather, since without using an airforce, and particularly the penetration of the Maginot Line, that could not be carried out. We needed good weather for at least four or five days, what be call flying weather, only week after week it was impossible to promise him that and the ratter dragged on until the winter and was eventually postponed until the beginning of the following spring. But here he was of the opinion that he could still carry it through in the near future. whom he was giving orders for that attack. It was one of the speeches that were customary in such cases. Naturally, since the Fuehrer was not only a military man but in the first place a politician, it always arose that these military speeches, which a military person would have confined to the military and strategical problems, always ended in his stating his political conceptions, et cetera. It must never be forgotten that he gave such speeches not only as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, but as the head of the state in Germany, and that is why so frequently even during military speeches such a strong political momentum crept into the speeches. of the principal tendencies of the policy. Why, during such speeches he wasn't even asked whether he approved of the military plans or not. That appeared at another time. If a matter was finished and when he discussed the strategic attack of the plan with the commander, then, in the way of summing up, which was added to the political discussion, the generals were then told the final great thought of the Fuehrer; and if -- and this I emphasize since it has crept in so often in the trial -- if a general had been able to say, "My Fuehrer, I consider your statements wrong and I don't agree with the pact we have made" or "This is not the policy of which we can approve," it would be impossible to understand. Not because that particular general would have been shot, but I world have doubted the sanity of that man, because how can one imagine that a state can be led if during war or before a war the political leaders have decided, whether wrong or right, what they are going to do and the individual general would then vote whether he was going to follow or not, whether his army corps was going to enter into the battle "but not until I have asked a division."
Perhaps one would help and one would stay at hone. That right in that case would have to be reserved for the simple people too. Perhaps this is the way to avoid wars in the future, if you ask every general and every soldier whether he wants to go hone or not; but not only in the leadership of this state but in any state of the world the military formula is clearly defined. When there is a war or when the leader decides that there is a war, then the military leaders receive their military task. On that they can made comment. They can comment whether they prefer an attack on the left or the right or in the center, but anything else, whether he will march through a neutral state or not, is not the business of the military leaders. That is entirely the responsibility of the political loaders of the state. In this case the possibility of general discussion, arguments between right or wrong, could not possibly follow. When the general received the order that the supreme war lord had decided, that finished all argument for a soldier, and that refers to the Fieldmarshal just as to the ordinary soldier.
Q A Fuehrer Decree of October 7, 1939, bears your signature. In that decree, Himmler was given the task to Germanize -- That decree is Document 686-Ps -- Toil me of what significance that decree is? paign had ended. Poland at that time had been conquered and the Polish State as such had ceased to exist. I draw your attention to the note of the People's Commission, of Moletov, who defines his attitude in that connection and in consequence, that in justice that Germany had felt, when in the Treaty of Versailles German provinces had been detached and given to Poland, that injustice had been eliminated from tie victory of Britain. There is therefore a matter, of course, for us that that part of Poland which, until 1918, had been German, would once more go back to Germany and Germanize, that is to say, included in the fatherland, but in that territory, in the course of years, more than one million Germans who lived there originally or had property there, particularly agriculture property, territory, farms, and so forth, these Germans had been thrown out and disappropriated. That is quite clear from numerous complaints which, during the years after 1919 had been sent to the League of Nations about that subject -- a study of all these complaints and all the events which had been reported as to that and still may be in the archives at Geneva, would prove and confirm to what enormous degree the decolonization of that German territory was carried out. That decree was aiming at the retracting of those steps so that these territories would become German once more, which means that those farms from which Germans had been driven, should once more come into the hands of Germans. The fact that this task was given to Himmier, did not meet with full agreement from ma and up until that tine, that was not of decisive importance. He was given the task not in his capacity as the Chief of the Police but -- as is known -- that he was always particularly and keenly interested in the questions of reincarnation of German men and time, that department -- just a moment -- after all, it is immaterial anyway -- that new department was formed and he was issued the new tasks. The Fuehrer published the order. I cooperated, of course, since I was the Chairman of the Ministerial Council at the time and, then also signed by the Chief of the Chancellery Lammers. My attitude was positive. It simply met with my approval. I know the Germans had been driven out; I knew they were German territories and I wanted them to come back to us, but I want to draw your attention to the fact that I am here talking about the former German province.
Q You mean the Western Polish Provinces?
A Yes. The Government, for instance, was not designated for the Germanization, if Germans were settled there later on, and I am not certain of that -- then that does not, was not done on the basis of this decree. You asked about my attitude regarding the Memel problem. Danzig and the Polish Corridor, I have dealt with. Memel was a comparatively small matter. In Memel, according to the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations there was, shortly before that the Lithuanians who occupied Memel and the neighboring territory to prevent the plebiscite. Compalints of the government did not bring any results just as none of the others. It was regretted, it was considered wrong, and it was not considered right what was done but as far as returning of the country or the carrying out of that plebiscite was concerned, that was out of the question. After the Lithuanian rule which was at the time it had occupies Memel, it was naturally our absolute national right to rectify that thing and to occupy Memel this time ourselves. removal of economic goods from Poland, That is the document we see 418 and has been presently to the Tribunal and I should like you to explain that decree to us. economic procedure should be adopted in all the Polish territories occupied by us. It regulates the obtaining of administration of the Polish State within the territories occupied by German troops and it gives a ruling on the money and credit system. It orders certain economic measures, preparation for arguments which would arise with foreign creditors, and so forth; confiscation can only be carried out by the trustee department, and so forth. It is not so much the taking away of economic goods, and that was in fact not done -- to the contrary. In the Genral Government, too, the economic system which existed there and particularly that which was there, being the war purposes of that period, was strengthened and extended. That economic factor, which was not absolutely essential, was cut down just as much as it was in the remainder of Germany and would have been in any other State in the event of war.