This document consists of the defendant von Papen's own notes on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on February 26, 1938. I quote the last two paragraphs of these notes. This is von Papen speaking, in his own notes:
"I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion that he "--that is, Schuschnigg--" had acted under 'brutal pressure' in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable more pressure, he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: 'To be honest, no.'" And then von Papen says:
"It appears to me of importance to record this statement.
"In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria could ever maintain her status with the help of Non-German, European combinations. This question would be decided only according to the interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same conviction and would act accordingly."
Thus we have, through the words of von Papen, Schuschnigg's contemporary statement to Papen of the pressure which had been exerted upon him, as recorded by von Papen in an original, contemporaneous entry. up the pretense that there had been no pressure applied. in his diary, was much more candid. We are fortunate in having General Jodl's handwritten diary, in German script, which I can't read. It is our document 1780-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-72. this is his genuine diary in his handwriting. also the fact that for some days thereafter defendant Keitel and Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure in order, obviously, to coerce President Miklas of Austria into ratifying the agreement.
It started from Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. It will be noted that the approval of President Miklas was needed to ratify the Berchtesgaden agreement; that is, with respect to naming Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security. threats of invasion for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference in order to produce the desired effect on President Miklas.
I quote from General Jodl's diary, the entries for 11 February, 13 February, and 14 February, 1938.
The entry of 11 February; "In the evening and on 12 February General K "--Keitel--" with General von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg, together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.
"13 February: In the afternoon General K "--Keitel--"asks Admiral C"-Canaris--" and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.
"14 February: At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and initiates the different measures.
"The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the military p reparations."
The proposals for deceptive maneuver's reported on by approved the proposal.
In the original document that note of Austria make very interesting reading.
I quote the first three paragraphs of the suggested order:
"1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe.
No troop movements or redeployments.
"2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may "(a) Through C-men in A ustria.
"(b) Through our customs personnel (staff) at the "(c) Through travelling agents.
"3. Such news could be:
"(a) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the sector of the VII A.K."(b) Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, "(c) Major General Muff, the Military Attache in Vienna, has been called for a conference to Berlin.
(As a matter of fact, this is the case.)
" up by saying, "and, incidentally, it is the truth"."(d) The police stations located at the frontier of "(e) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade (Gebirgsbrigade) in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and Berchtesgaden".Mr. President, would this be a convenient moment for a recess?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.
(Whereupon at 1130 hours a short recess was taken.)
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had reached the subject of the events culminating in the German invasion of Austria on 12 March 1938, and first under that, the plebiscite the preparations for both German and Austrian national socialist. Austria, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. I invite the court to take judicial notice of the official German communique covering that visit of Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, as it appeared in the "Documents der Deutschen Politik, Volum 6-1, page 128, Number 21c, a copy of which will be found in our document 2484-PS. in charge of the police of Austria and was in a position to direct their handling of the National Socialists in Austria - three weeks after the Nazis began to exploit their new prestige and position with its quota of further victories - Schuschnigg made an important announcement. plebiscite throughout Austria, the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. The question to be submitted in the plebiscite was: "Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German and united Austria?" A "Eys" answer to this question was certainly compatible with the agreement made by the German government on 11 July 1936 and who have February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of Anschluss, but the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a strong "Yes" vote on the question put by Schuschnigg in the plebiscite and they could not tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg government. the Austrian government. Although the plebiscite was not announced until the evening of 9 March, the Nazi's organization received word about it earlier in that day. It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the situation, (that is, the Austrian Nazis), and that they would prepare a letter of protest against the plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and that, pending Hitler's approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details of the plebiscite.
Reiner to Rechscommissioner Buerckel, transmitted, as I have already pointed out, to Seyss-Inquart, and which has already been received in evidence - our document 812-PS, U.S.A. 61.
beginning on page 11 of the German original:
"The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks, he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and SeyssInquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.
"Negotiations with the government were not successful. Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Fuehrer. On the 10th March, all preparations for future revolutionary actions had already been made, and the necessary orders given to all unit leaders. During the night of the 10th and 11th, Globocnik returned from the Fuehrer with the announcement that the Fuehrer gave the party freedom of action, and that he would back it in everything it did."
Next, Germany's actual preparations for the invasion and the use of force.
tremendous amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria. indicating why he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the defendant Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), the defendant Von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.
The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl's diary give a vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from the entry of 10th March.
"By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring a strong majority for the legitimate party in the absence of plan or preparation. The Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it.
"This same night, March 9 to 10 he called for Goering. General Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee. General Von Neubauer is ordered to come as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, Gauleiter Buerckel, in the Platnik. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at ten o'clock. I follow at 10;15, according to the wish of General Von Wiemann, to give him the orderly draft "Prepare Case Otto."
"1300 hours, General K, which I think plainly means Keitel, informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris, Ribbentrop is being detailed in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office. Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini, and the reasons are developed which afforded the Fuehrer to take action. 1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the commander of the VIII Army, Corp Area 3, 7th and 13th Army Corps, without reserve army.
"Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this critcal hour acting as foreign minister. The previous February the defendant Ribbentrop had become foreign minister, and Von Neurath had become president of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in this critical hour of foreign policy the defendant Ribbentrop was in London handling the diplomatic consequences of the Austrian transaction. As foreign minister in this hour of aggression, involving mobilization and movement of troops, use of force, and threats to eliminate the independence of a neighboring country, the defendant Von Neurath resumed his former position in the Nazi conspiracy." That is the end of the quote.
I now offer in evidence our document C-102 as Exhibit U.S.A. 74, captured German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme Command of the armed forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialled by the defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated, "Hitler mixed political and military intentions."
I quote paragraphs one, four, and five of the directive. First the caption: "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.", with some initials, referring to "Operation Otto." Thirty copies. This is the eleventh copy. Top secret.
"1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade Austria with armed force to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.
"4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th of March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right to give persmission for crossing and flying over the frontier and to decide the actual moment for invasion.
"5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms." USA 75, special instruction number one, directive, 11 March 1938. This was an implementing directive issued by the defendant Jodl and it provided asffollows:
"Top Secret. General. Forty copies, of which this is the sixth. Special instruction number one to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No 427/38 with some symbols. Directive. Our policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian troops or militia units on Austrian soil.
"1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile.
"2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends, especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order of Jodl."
Next, the actual events of 11 March in Austria. The events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available to us in two separate documents.
Although these accounts differ in some minor details, such as precise words used and precise times when they were used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. We think it appropriate for this Tribunal to have before it a relatively full account of the way in which the German Government on 11 March 1933 deprived Austria of its sovereignty. First I shall give the report of the day's events in Austria as given by the Austrian Nazis. I refer to document 312-PS, U.S.A. 61, a report from Gauleiter R her to Reich Commissioner Buerckel, and I shall read from page eight of the English version.
For the purpose of the German interpreter I am starting following a tabulation: First case; second case; third case; and following the sentence: "Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with Gauleiters."
"On Friday, 11 March, the minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the 'Landesleitung' had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, GlaiseHerstenau, Fishboeck, and Muhlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers.
"In regard to Rainer's proposal, von Klausner ordered that the government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political 'front' men, including both ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.
"On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help were prepared.
"Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for two p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer and the statement to the population at three p.m. and at the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the ministers' council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared. At two-thirty Seyss-Inquart phoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered 'No.' Rainer informed the 'Reichskanzlie' through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign.
Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Muhlmann. Talks were had between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures the party wished taken. Rainer's answer: 'Re-establishment of the government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquart premised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas, the president. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission for the legion (that is the Austrian Legion in Germany) to return, all within the specified time of seven-thirty p.m.; otherwise German troops would cross the border at eight p.m. At five p.m. Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Muhlmann, went to the Chancellor's office to carry out this errand.
"Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government which included blacks, reds, and National Socialists, and proposed the post of vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette, Director of the cabinet Huber, Guide Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the 'Gruppenfuehrer' Keppler (whose name I told you would reappear significantly) who had arrived in the meantime, were already negotiating. At seven p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation at seven-thirty p.m.: stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.
"Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at three o'clock.
Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After eight p.m. the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At eight-thirty p.m. Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of Austria to take over power in all eight 'gaus' of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all government representatives who try to resist should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
"With this the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking over of all important posts by the party.
"The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the Fuehrer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of power by the party on one hand, and the political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in the relation to the Fuehrer's decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Fuehrer." again through the events of March 11, 1938, and to live through them in most lively and interesting fashion. Thanks to the efficiency of the defendant Goering and his Luftwaffe organization we have a highly interesting document, obviously an official document from the Luftwaffe headquarters headed "Geheime Reichsache," top secret. The letterhead is stamped Reichsluft Fahrtministerium Forschungsamt. If I can get the significance of the German "Forschungsampt" means the "Research Department" of Goering's ministry. The document is in a characteristic German folder, and on the back it says "Gespraeche Fall Oesterreich," "Conversations about the Case on Austria," and the paper cover on the inside has German script writing. In time I will ask the interpreter to read it, but it looks to me as if it is "Privat, Geheime Archive," which is "Secret Archive," Berlin, Gespraeche Fall Oesterreich (Case About Austria). I offer that set of documents in the original file as they were found in the Air Ministry, identified as our 2949-PS. I offer them as Exhibit U.S.A. 76, and I am, in offering them, reminded of Job's outcry: "Oh, that mine enemy would write a book." search organization within the Air Ministry, and addressed to the defendant Goering, states in substance--well, I will read the English translation. It starts: "To the General Fieldmarshal. Fieldmarshal. Enclosed I submit, as ordered, the copies of your telephone conversations." Evidently the defendant wanted to keep a record of important telephone conversations which he had with important persons regarding the "Case Austria," and had the transcriptions provided by his research department.
Most of the conver-
sations transcribed and recorded in the volume I have offered were conducted by the defendant Goering, although at least one interesting one was conducted by Hitler. For purposes of convenience our staff has marked these telephone calls in pencil with an identifying letter running from "A" through "Z" and then to "AA". Eleven of these conversations have been determined by a screening process to be relevant to the evidence of this particular time. All the conversations which have been translated have been mimeographed and are included in the document book handed to the defendants. The original binder contains, of course, the original set of conversations. A very extensive and interesting account of events with which we are very much concerned can be developed from quotations from these translated conversations. I turn now to copies of the telephone conversations. The first group in part "A" of the binder took place between Field Marshal Goering, who was identified by the letter "F" for field marshal, and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as "S". The transcript prepared by the research institute of the Air Ministry is in part in the language of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual conversations.
I quote from part "A" of this binder, and because of the corroborated nature of this transcript and its obvious authenticity I propose to quote this conversation in full.
"F--(hereafter I shall use Goering and Seyss-Inquart)--F. How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law; is he with you?
"Seyss-Inquart: No.
"Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:
"F: How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have any news?
"Seyss-Inquart: The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S(Seyss-Inquart) and the other gentlemen in a different situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at eight p.m.
"F: Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. Goering will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been broughtabout by the behaviour of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.
"Thereafter a conversation took place between Goering and the Fuehrer. Afterwards Goering phoned again Seyss-Inquart. This conversation was held at 1505.
"Goering told Seyss-Inquart that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our government because he had broken the Berchtesgaden agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently the National Minister, Seyss-Inquart, and the others are being requested to immediately hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. Goering added that if after a period of one hour no report had come through the assumption would be made that Seyss-Inquart would no more be in a position to phone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. Seyss-Inquart was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon.
As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for Seyss-Inquart to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg's resignation."
Thus you see that at 2:45 p.m. Goering told Seyss-Inquart over the phone that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the elections; and twenty minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. That is your second ultimatum. When informed that about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the cabinet.
MR. ALDERMAN: Shall I go into another one?
THE PRESIDENT: I guess we better adjourn now until two o'clock.
(Recess taken from 1235 to 1400).
Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, a hour later, following the conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart, with which I dealt this morning, the defendant Goering telephoned to Dombrowski in the German Embassy in Vienna. I refer to the telephone conversation marked TT on page 2, Part C, of Document 2949-PS. In that conversation, in the first place, the defendant Goering showed concern that the Nazi Party and all of its organizations should be definitely leagalized promptly. I quote from page 2 of the transcript:
"Goering: Now to go on, the Party has definitely been leagalized?
Dombrowski: But that is...it isn't necessary to even discuss that.
Goering: With all of its organizations.
Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country.
Goering: In uniform?
Dombrowski: In uniform.
Goering: Good.
Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have everything is all right."
must be formed by 7:30 p.m., and he transmitted instructions to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart as to who should, be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote from page 3 of the English text of the transcript of the conversation:
"Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer, and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names.
One thing I have forgotten.
Fishbeck must have the Department Dombrowski:
That is understood.
Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the armed forces.
The Austrian Army is Dombrowski:
Yes, yes.
Goering: Give me the name.
Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law, isn't that right?"
"Goering: Yes.
Dombrowski: Yes.
Goering: That's right, and then also Fishbeck."
And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Goering was given the news that Miklas, the president, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the folder, the part marked with capital R, pages 1 and 2 of Part E. I'm sorry. I thought the interpreters had the letter marked.
They do not, I understand.
"Goering: Now remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please do inform us immediately about Miklas' position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before, action was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship." There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken up. "M," - I suppose that means Lt. General Muff -- "does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations". There is again an interruption in the transcript. "And then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets; so remember report must be given by 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in four hours, we shall make him understand it now in four minutes."