"The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowance for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contribution depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so, that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldier naturally ranks high above the American.
"In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would got involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first got involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently. Therefore Germany would strike,as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.
"Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at thedisposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.
"As regards Japanese - American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America?
Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.
"The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces. He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.
"Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.
"The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
"The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.
give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear pisture of the real at*ude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign minister regarding his plans. This would **use him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule to always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have a study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.
"Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of convistion, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.
"On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.
"Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.
"The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.
"Matsouka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.
"The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.
"Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.
"signed; SCHMIDT."
This completes the presentation of what I have called the "handful of selected documents," offered not as a detailed treatment of any of these wars of aggression but merely to prove the deliberate planning, the deliberate premeditation with which each of these aggressions was carried out. the various stages of the aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until ten o'clock tomorrow.
(Whereupon, at 1645 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 27 November 1945, at 1000 hours.)
Military Tribunal, in the matter of; The
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States. Mr Alderman, before you begin, I think it would be better, for the purpose of the Tribunal, in citing documents if you would refer to them not only by the United States Exhibit Number and the Peer Exhibit Number, but also by the document book identification. Each document book, as I understand it, has either a letter or a number.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Court please, I am not familiar with the identification numbers of the document book. I suppose the clerk can give them to me.
THE PRESIDENT: They are numbered alphabetically, I think.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: If that is not done, when we have a great number of document books before us, it is very difficult to find where the particular exhibit is.
MR. ALDERMAN: I can see that, yes. which I presented on yesterday constitute a cross section of the aggressive war case as a whole. They do not purport to cover the details of any of the phases of the aggressive war case. In effect they do amount to a running account of the entire matter. be helpful to pause at this point to present to the Tribunal a chart. This chart presents visually some of the key points in the development of the Nazi aggression. The Tribunal may find it helpful as a kind of visual summary of some of the evidence received yesterday and also as a background for some of the evidence which remains to be introduced. I am quite certain that as your minds go back to those days, you remember the maps that appeared from time to time in the public press as these tremendous movements developed in Europe. I am quite certain that you must have formed the concept, as I did, in those days of the gradually developing head of a wolf.
In that first chart (indicating) you only have an incipient wolf. He lacks a lower jaw, the port shown in red, but when that wolf moved forward and took over Austria, the Anschluss, that red portion became solid black. It became the jaw of the wolf, and when that lower jaw was acquired, Czechoslovakia was already with its head and the main part of its body in the mouth of the wolf.
Then on chart two you see the mountainous-.portions, the fortified portions, of Czechoslovakia. In rod you see the Sudetenland territories which were first taken over by the Pact of Munich, whereupon Czechoslovakia's head became diminished in the month of the wolf. practically broken, and all that was necessary was the taking over of Bohemia and Moravia and the wolf's head became a solid, black blot on the map of Europe, with arrows indicating incipient further aggressions, which, of course, occurred. of my mind, because it seems to demonstrate the inevitability of everything that went along after the taking over of Austria." aggressive war case will be divided into seven distinct sections. The first section is that concerning preparation for aggression during the period of 1933 to 1936, roughly. The second section deals with aggression against Austria. The third section deals with aggression against Czechslovakia. The fourth section deals with aggression against Poland and the initiation of actual, war. For reasons of convenience, the details of the Polish section will be presented after the British Chief Prosecutor presents his opening statement to the Tribunal. The fifth section deals with the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression by invasions into Scandinavia, the Lowlands and the Balkans. The details on this section of the case will be presented by the British Chief Prosecutor. The sixth section deals with aggression against the Soviet Union, which we shall expect to present.
For reasons of convenience again, the details on this section, like the details on aggression against Poland, will be presented after the British Prosecutor has made his opening statement to the Tribunal. The seventh section will deal with collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggression against the United States. concerning preparation for aggression during the period 1933 to 1936. The particular section of the indictment to which this discussion addresses itself is Paragraph IV (F) and sub-paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c),(d) (e), and (f), which I need not read at a glance, as the Tribunal will recall the allegation.
It will be necessary as I proceed to make reference to certain provisions of the Charter and to certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty between the United States and Germany restoring friendly relations, 25 August 1921, which incorporates certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and certain provisions of the Rhine Treaty of Locarno of 16 Ocotber 1925.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr.Alderman, is it notintended that this document book should have some identifying letter or number?
MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose it should have, sir. Yes. I don't know what the proper letter is.
THE PRESIDENT: Doesn't anybody know?
MR. ALDERMAN: "M", I am informed.
THE PRESIDENT: "M"?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. I do not offer those treaties in evidence at this time, because the British will offer all the pertinent treaties in their aspect of the case. World War I. Their modest origin and rather fantastic nature and the fact that they could have been interrupted at numerous points do not detract from the continuity of the planning. The focus of this part of the indictment on the theory that it was from 1933 to 1945 does not disassociate these events from what occurred in the entire preceding period. Thus the ascendency of Hitler and the Nazis to political power in 1933 was already a well advanced milestone on the German road of progress. stantial proportions. At that time their plans called for the acquisition of political control of Germany. This was indispensable for the consolidation within the country of all the internal resources and potentialities.
progress along this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing international limitations and obligations. The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the fields necessary if one were to make war. Although there had been an increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that Versailles came into effect, such operations under disguise and subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which they had to have for their purposes. Similarly, as part of the same plan and for the sane reason, Germany withdrew from the disarmament conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible to carry out their plan on the basis of existing international obligations or of the orthodox kind of future commitments.
The points mentioned in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the indictment are now historical facts of which we expect the Tribunal to take judicial notice. operation was preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all participating forces. At the same time each point was part of a long prepared plan of aggression. Each represents a necessary step in the direction of the specific aggression which was subsequently committed. unnecessary laboring of the obvious. What I intend to say is largely the bring to light of information disclosed in illustrative documents which were hitherto unavailable.
referred to in this paragraph IV (F) 2 of the indictment are, first, the withdrawal from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations; second, the institution of compulsary military service; and, third, the reoccupation of the demiliterized zone of the Rhineland. Each of these stops was progressively more serious that the matter of international relations. In each of those steps Germany anticipated the possibility of sanction being applied by other countries, and, particularly, a strong military action from France with the possibl assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less than a preventative war would stop them, and they also estimated correctly that no one or combination of big powers would undertake the responsibility for such a war. The withdrawal from the disarmament conference and from the League of Nations was, of course, action that did not violate any international obligation. The League Covenant provided the procedure for withdrawal. However, in this case end as part of the bigger plan the significance of these actions can not be disassociated from the general conspiracy and the plan for aggression. The announcement of the institution of universal military service was a more daring action with a mere significance.
It was a violation of Versaille, but they got away with it. Then came the outright military defiance, the occupation of the demiliterized zone of the Rhineland.
Still in indictment paragraph IV (F) 2, which alleges that the determination of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of Versailles, the fact that the Nazi plans in this respect started very early is not only confirmed by their own statement, but they boasted about their long planning and careful execution. USA 23, Hitler's speech to All Supreme Commanders of 23 November 1939, I need not read it again. He stated there that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles. After four years of actual war, the Defendabt Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an address to the Reich and to the Gauleiters in which he traced the development of German strength. The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty, including consription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armour and air forces.
I have, if the Tribunal please, our document Number L-172. It is photostat of a microfilm of a speech by General Jodl, and I offer that photostat as Exhibit USA 34. I shall read, if the Tribunal please, only a part of that, but beginning with the beginning.
The speech is entitled "The Stategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of War." It is a kind of retrospective summary by the defendant, General Jodl. "A lecture delivered by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (West) on the 7th November, 1943 at Munich to the Reich and Gau Leaders."
THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading from the document now?
MR ALDERMAN: I am reading from the English translation.
THE PRESIDENT: But in my copy of L-172, as far as I can see, it begins with the word "Introduction".
MR ALDERMAN: Yes, sir, I was just coming to the Introduction. On my copy-
THE PRESIDENT: There is another heading, too?
MR ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't got that.
MR ALDERMAN: You have an index, I think. I don't have that on my copy. Page 3
THE PRESCIENT: Yes, but the Index doesn't give the heading; that is all.
MR ALDERMAN: I see, I am sorry.
THE PRESIDENT: It doesn't matter.
MR ALDERMAN: (Reading) "Introduction: ReichLeiter BORMANN has requested me to give you a review today of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.
"I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say openly what is. No-one-- the FUEHRER has ordered-- may know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your GAUS, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours concentrate that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or--as they call it-- a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people, that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to knew the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncoloured account of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by the force of arms but by the will of the whole people.
Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has :been not the peace she expected but --through the cowardice of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will tr eat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people.
"The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both fro from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scand inavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and in that of Russia -these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were sucessful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not under taken more tan we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:
"I A review of the most important development up to the present "II Consideration of the present situation.
"III The foundation of our morale and our confidence in victory.
"In view of my position as military :advisor to the Fuehrer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way be giving expression only to one side of events.
"I Review "1. The fact that the National - Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge i this circle.
I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National - Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight -- "WEHRWILLEN"--; in nurturing fighting strength -- WEHRKRAFT"-and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent init, the numerically small REICHSWEIR would never have been able to cope wit this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at -- and has so happily been successful in bringing about -- was the fusion of these two forces.
"The seizure of power--" I invite the Tribunal's attention to the frequency with which that expression occurs in all of these documents.
"2" The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty." That is the German word "Wehrhoheit" a kind of euphemism there -- the "High-ness of defense ". I think it really means "Fighting sovere ignty".
"2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first place restoration of fighting sovereignty -- WEHEHOHEIT"--(conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and re-armament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.
"3. The Austrian "Anschlus'-- "Anschlus" means a locking onto I think. They latched onto Austria " -- in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected ina most menacing war right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers." worm-like form of Czechoslaovkia, which General Jodl calls a "wasp waist in the direction of France", and then he very accurately described what happened when Austria was taken by the Anschluss; the wasp waist was "now enclosed by pincers".
I am now resuming the reading:
"Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.
"This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the WEST WALL, which, in contra-distinction to the MAGINOT Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the EAST.
"4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939--" That was the two phases on Czechoslovakia. "--and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises." chart to see what those favorable strategic premises were.
"This brings me," said General Jodl, "to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland--in itself--unavoidable--was favorably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponent--after all, not inconsiderable in himself--collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course of the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means; that is, the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Great Germany." this document. I can read on with interest and some enthusiasm, but I believe I have read enough to show that General Jodl by this document identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. This document shows that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, it identifies the military with the political, and the immediate point on which I had offered the document was to show the deliberation with which the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified.
In one of Adolph Hitler's reviews of the six year period between his ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range planning. I bring up again, if the Tribunal please, L-79, which was offered in evidence yesterday, USA-Exhibit 27. That is the minutes of conference of the Fuehrer by Schmundt, his adjutant. In as large a staff as ours, we inevitably fall into a kind of patois or lingo, as Americans say. We also refer to this as Little Schmundt. The large file that I offered yesterday we call Big Schmundt. of that document which we call Little Schmundt. One sentence on Page 1. It is down below the middle of the page: (Reading) "In the period 1933 - 1939 progress was made in all fields. Our military system improved enormously." Then, just above the middle of the second page of the English translation: "The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims." is found in the Secret Document Reich Defense Law of May 21, 1935, which I offered in evidence yesterday, as Exhibit USA 24 and commented on sufficiently. I need not repeat that comment. The law went into effect upon its passage. It stated at its outset that it was to be made public instanter, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree ordering that it be kept secret. I commented on that sufficiently yesterday. and for sometime a high ranking member of the German High Counsel, refers to this law as the cornerstone of war preparations. He points that, although the law was not made public until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as a program for preparations.
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of General Thomas' work, "A History of the German War and Armament Economy, 1923-1944," Page 25.
We have the volume here, in German, so that anyone may examine it that wishes to do so. I don't care to offer the entire volume in evidence unless the Court thinks I should. We do give it an exhibit number, Exhibit USA 36, but I simply should like to place it in the files as a reference work implementing judicial notice, if that is practicable.