THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make any observation?
MR. BARRINGTON: Yes, I do, my Lord. precedent the decision on von Schuschnigg's affidavit. I think I am correct in saying that von Schuschnigg's affidavit was excluded as an exception to the general rule on affidavits which the Tribunal laid down earlier the same day when Mr. Messersmith's affidavit was accepted. Perhaps your Lordship will allow me to read from the transcript the Tribunal's decision on the affidavit of Messersmith.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Messersmith was in Mexico, was he not?
MR. BARRINGTON: This is so, My Lord, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: So that the difference between him and Schuschnigg in that regard was very considerable.
MR. BARRINGTON: In that regard, but what I was going to say was this, My Lord: In ruling on Messersmith's affidavit your Lordship said:
"In view of those provisions -- that is Article 19 of the Charter -- the Tribunal holds that affidavits can be presented, and that in the present case it is a proper course. The question of the probative value of the affidavit as compared with the witness who has been cross-examined would, of course, be considered by the Tribunal, and if at a later stage the Tribunal thinks the presence of a witness is of extreme importance, the matter can be reconsidered.
And your Lordship added: "If the defense wish to put interrogatories to the witness, they will be at liberty to do so."
Now, in the afternoon of that day, when Schuschnigg's affidavit came up -
THE PRESIDENT: (interposing): Which day was this?
MR. BARRINGTON: This was the 28th of November, My Lord. It is on page 473 of the transcript, the Messersmith affidavit, and 523 is the Schuschnigg affidavit:
objection was put in these words:
"Today when the resolution was announced in respect of the use to be made of the written affidavit of Mr. Messersmith, the Court was of the opinion that in a case of very great importance possibly it would take a different view of the matter"; and then defense counsel went on to say: "As it is a cast of such an important witness, the principle of direct evidence must be adjered to."
THE PRESIDENT: Have you a reference to a subsequent occasion on which we heard Mr. Justice Jackson upon this subject, when Mr. Justice Jackson submitted to us that on the strict interpretation of Article 19 we were bound to admit any evidence which we deemed to have probative value?
MR. BARRINGTON: Mr Lord, I haven't got that reference.
THE PRESIDENT: Why don't you call this witness?
MR. BARRINGTON: I say, quite frankly, I was coming on to that. I don't make any secret of the fact that for obvious reasons the Prosecution wouldn't desire to call him as a witness, and I put this affidavit forward as an admission by a co-conspirator. I admit that it is not an admission made in pursuance of the conspiracy, but I submit that the Tribunal, not being bound by technical rules of evidence, may take this.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes?
MR. BARRINGTON: I submit that as the Tribunal is not bound by technical rules of evidence, this affidavit may be accpeted in evidence as an admission by a co-conspirator; and as I said before, there will be no objection to administering interrogatories on the subject matter of this affidavit, and indeed, the witness would be available to be called as a defense witness if required.
THE PRESIDENT: There would be no objection to bringing the witness here for the purpose of cross-examination upon the affidavit?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I don't think there could be any objection if it were confined to the subject matter of the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: How could you object, for instance, to the defendant himself applying to call the witness?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: As I said, I don't think there could be any objection to that, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: The result would be the same, wouldn't it? If the witness were called for the purpose of cross-examination, then he could be asked other questions which were not arising out of the matter in the affidavit. If the defendant can call him as his own witness, there can be no objection to the cross-examination going outside the matter of the affidavit.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Of course he couldn't be cross-examined by the Prosecution in that event, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean you would ask him questions in the examination, but they would not take the form of cross-examination?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is what I mean, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that you would prefer that he should be called for the defendants rather than be cross-examined outside the subject matter of the affidavit?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything you wish to add or not?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: There is nothing I wish to add.
THE PRESIDENT: It is time for us to adjourn. We will consider the matter.
(Whereupon at 1250 hours the Court adjourned to 1400 hours).
Military Tribunal, in the matter of: The
DR. HORN (Counsel for Defendant Ribbentrop): In the place of Dr. von Rorhscheidt, defense counsel for Hess, I would like to make the following declaration.
Dr. von Rohrscheidt has been the victim of an accident. He has broken his ankle. The accused Hess has asked me to notify the Tribunal that from now on until the end of the trial, he will take advantage of his right under the statute to defend himself. The reason that he wants to do it for the whole length of the trial is to be found in the fact that his counsel will not be kept informed of the proceedings of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the oral application which has just been made to it on behalf of the Defendant Hess. morning by counsel for the Defendant von Papen, the Tribunal does not propose to lay down any general rule about the admission of affidavit evidence. But in the particular circumstances of this case, the Tribunal will admit the affidavit in question, but will direct that if the affidavit is put in evidence, the man who made the affidavit, von Schroeder, must be presented, brought here immediately for cross-examination by the defendant's counsel. When I say immediately I mean as soon as possible.
MR. BARRINGTON: My Lord, I will not introduce this affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Barrington.
MR. BARRINGTON: My Lord, before coming on to that affidavit, I last read a passage from the biography about the meeting at von Schroeder's house, and I asked the Tribunal to deduce from that extract from the biography that it was at that meeting that a discussion took place between von Papen and Hitler, which led up to the Government of Hitler in which von Papen served as Vice Chancellor.
So that now at that point the defendant von Papen was completely committed to going along with the Nazi Party, and with his eyes open and of hiw own initiative he had helped materially to bring them into power. ticipated in the consolidation of Nazi control over Germany. In the first critical year and a half of the Nazi consolidation von Papen, as Vice Chancellor, was second only to Hitler in the cabinet which carried out the Nazi program. has been fully dealt with earlier in this trial. The high position of von Papen must have associated him closely and directly with such legislation. the coordination of the Government of the National Revolution. That will appear in Document 2799-PS. In fact, although I shall read from that document in a minute, the document has been introduced to the Court by Mr. Alderman. signature of von Papen. First, the decree relating to the formation of special courts, dated the 21st of March 1933 for the trial of all cases involving political matters. The Tribunal has already taken judicial notice of this decree. The reference to the transcript is Page 30 of the 22nd of November, afternoon session. In all political cases it abolished fundamental rights, including the right of appeal, which had previously characterized the administration of German criminal justice. amnesty decree liberating all persons who had committed murder or any other crime between the 30th of January and the 21st of March 1933 in the National Revolution of the German people. That document is 2059-PS, and is on Page 30 of the English document book. I read Section 1.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you need read the decrees if you will summarize them.
MR. BARRINGTON: If your Lordship pleases, I will ask you to take judicial notice of that decree.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. BARRINGTON: As a member of the Reich Cabinet, von Papen was, in my submission, responsible for the legislation carried through even when the decrees did not actually bear his signature. I shall mention as examples two categories of legislation in particular in order to show by reference to his own previous and contemporaneous statements that they were not matters of which he could say that as a respectable politican he took no interest in them.
First, the civil service. As a public servant himself, von Papen must have had a hard but apparently successful struggle with his conscience when associating himself with the sweeping series of decrees for attaining Nazi control of the civil service. This has been dealt with on Page 30 of the transcript of the 22nd of November in the afternoon session, and page 257. In this connection I refer the Tribunal to Document 351-PS, which is on Page 1 of the document book. It is US Exhibit 378, and it is the minutes of Hitler's first cabinet meeting on the 30th of January 1933, and I read from the last paragraph of the minutes on Page 5 of the document book in the middle of the paragraph:
"The Deputy of the Reichs Chancellor and the Reich Kommissar for the State of Prussia suggested that the Reich Chancellor in an interview should state at the earliest opportunity that the rumors about the danger of inflation and the rumors about the danger to the rights of civil servants are untrue." at the best he emphasizes the indifference with which von Papen later saw the civil servants betrayed. the Reich. These again have been dealt with earlier in the Trial, page 29 of the transcript of 22 November, afternoon session. put an end to federalism and any possible retarding influence which it might have upon the centralization of power in the Reich cabinet. The importance of this setp, as well as the role played by Papen, is reflected in the exchange of letters between Hindenburg, von Papen, in his capacity as Reich Commissar for Prussia, and Hitler, in connection with the recall of the Reich Commissar and the appointment of Goering to the position of Minister President of Prussia.
I refer to Document 3557-PS, which is on Page 52 of the English document book, and I now put it in as GB-239. to Hitler, and I read from the document:
"With the draft of the law for the coordination of the States with the Reich, passed today by the Reich Chancellor, legislative work has begun which will be of historical significance for the political development of the German state. The step taken by the Reich Government, which I headed at the time, is now crowned by this new interlocking of the Reich. You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able to coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of German states with that of the Reich. Now that the new law enables you to appoint a Prussian Prime Minister, I ask you to inform the Reich President that I return to his hands my post of Reich Commissar for Prussia." transmitting this resignation. Hitler wrote:
"Vice-chancellor von Papen has sent a letter to me which I enclose for your information. Herr von Papen already informed me within the last few days that he agreed with Minister Goering to resign on his own volition, as soon as the unified conduct of the governmental affairs in the Reich and in Prussia would be assured by the new law on coordination of policy in the Reich and the States.
"On the eve of the day when the new law on the institution of Reich governors was adopted, Herr von Papen considered this aim as having been attained and he requested of me to undertake the appointment of the Prussian Prime Minister, when at the same time he would offer his full time services in the Reich Government.
"Herr von Papen, in accepting the commission for the Government of Prussia, in these difficult times since 30 January, has rendered a very meritorious service to the realization of the idea of coordinating the policy in the Reich and the States. His collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he now offers all his strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him is such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the great help I shall thus receive."
von Papen had warned the electorate at Stuttgart against abolishing federalism. document book, and which I now introduce as GB-240, about the middle of the third paragraph. This is an extract from von Papen's speech at Stuttgart. He said:
"In addition, federalism will protect us from centralism, that organizational form which focuses all living strength of a nation like a burning mirror on to one point. No nation is less adaptable to being governed centralistically than the German nation." as Chancellor, visited Munich. The Frankfurter Zeitung of the 12th of October 1932, commented on his policy. I refer to Document 3318-PS on page 15 of the English document book, which I introduce as GB-241. The Frankfurter Zeitung commented:
"Von Papen claimed that it had been his aim from the very beginning of his tenure in office to build a new Reich for and with the various States. The Reich Government is taking a definite federalist attitude. Its slogan is not a dreary centralism or unitarianism."
That was in October 1932. All that was now thrown overboard in deference to his new master.
I now come to the Jews. In March 1933 the entire cabinet approved a systematic state policy of persecution of the Jews. This has already been described to the Tribunal. The reference to the transcript is pages 1442 and 2940.
THE PRESIDENT: What did you say about 2940?
MR. BARRINGTON: Page 2940 of the transcript.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.
MR. BARRINGTON: Only four days before the boycott was timed to begin, with all ferocity, to borrow the words of Dr. Goebbels, von Papen wrote a radiogram of reassurance to the Board of Trade for German-American Commerce in New York, who had expressed their anxiety to the German Government about the situation.
His assurance -- which I now put in as Document D-635, and it will be GB-242, on page 73 of the English document book -- his assurance was published in the New York Times on the 28th of March 1933, and it contained the following sentence which I read from about the middle of the page. This document is the last but one in the German document book.
"Reports circulated in America and received here with indignation about alleged tortures of political prisoners and mistreatment of Jews deserve strongest repudiation. Hundreds of thousands of Jews, irrespective of nationality, who have not taken part in political activities, are living here entirely unmolested."
DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for von Papen): The article in the New York Times goes back to a telegram of the accused von Papen, which is contained in the document book one page ahead. The English translation has a date of the 27th of March. This date is an error. The German text which I received shows that it is a question of a weekend letter, which according to the figures on the German document, was sent on the 25th of March. This difference in time is of particular importance for the following reason: Jewish boycott, which Goebbels then announced for the first of April. The accused von Papen could, therefore, on the 25th of March, not point out these smaller incidents as he does in the telegram. In any case, the conclusion of the indictment follows that the contents of the telegram were a lie.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Barrington, have you got the original of that?
MR. BARRINGTON: The original is here, My Lord, yes. It is quite correct that there are some figures at the top, which, though I hadn't recognized it, might indicate that it was dispatched on the 25th.
THE PRESIDENT: And when was the meeting of the cabinet which approved the policy of persecution of the Jews?
MR. BARRINGTON: Well, My Lord, I can't say. It was some time within the last few days of March, but it might have been on the 26th. I can have that checked up.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I clarify that matter by saying that the cabinet meeting in which the Jewish question was discussed took place at a much later date, and that in this cabinet meeting, cabinet members, among others the accused von Papen, condemned the Jewish boycott. I shall submit the minutes of the meeting as soon as my motion has been granted.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know what you mean by your motion being granted. Does the counsel for prosecution say whether he persists in his allegation or whether he withdraws it?
MR. BARRINGTON: I will say this. Subject to a checking up of the date when the cabinet meeting took place-
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can do that at the adjournment and let us know in the morning.
MR. BARRINGTON: If your Lordship pleases.
At this point I will just say this: That it was, as the Tribunal has already heard, common knowledge at the time that the Nazi policy was antiJewish, and Jews were already in concentration camps, so I will leave it to the Tribunal to infer that at the time when that radiogram was sent, which I am prepared to accept as being the 25th of March, that von Papen did know of this policy of boycotting. Papen was indeed himself a supporter of the anti-Jewish policy, and as evidence of this I will put in Document 2830-PS, which is on page 37A of the Document book, which I now introduce as GB-243. This is the last document in the German document book. I will read at Paragraph 4 in the English text. I think it is paragraph 5 in the German text. It begins:
"The following" -- this is a letter, My Lord, written by von Papen from Vienna on the 12th of May 1936 to Hitler on the subject of the Freiheitsbund. Paragraph 4 of the English text is as follows:
"The following incident is interesting. The Czech Legation secretary Dohalsky has made to Mr. Staud, leader of the Freedom Union, the offer, to make available to the Freedom Union every desired amount from the Czech Government, which he would need for the strengthening of his fight against the Heimwehr.
His only condition is that the Freedom Union would guarantee to take a stand directed against Germany. Mr. Staud has simply refused this offer. It is shown by that how one even in the enemy's camp already evaluates the new grouping of Forces. From that the further necessity results for us, to support as before this movement financially, and namely mostly in reference to the continuation of its fight against Jewry."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I must point out here a difficulty which has apparently been caused by the translation. In the German text of the original concerning the forwarding it is said "concerning the fight against the Jewish race." This word "Mit Bezug" means that the money should be sent, concerning the sending of money, but that that should not be the real object, but that the Freedom League was not a league which forfeited Jews, but was a professional organization , and actually a member of that league had been Dollfuss. The words "Mit Bezug" means only that the sending of the money should get the certain designation because the money was sent to a legal organization. Money could not be sent from abroad to such an organization which is shown by the refusal of the checks. I would like to point out here that the words "in reference" could give the wrong impression and should preferably be translated by "referring." In any case I would like to point out that this was a camouflage in transferring the money.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know which word you are referring to, but as I understand it the only purpose of referring to this letter was to show that von Papen was suggesting that a certain organization should be financially assisted in its fight against Jewry. That is the only purpose of referring to the letter. I don't know what you mean about some word being wrongly translated.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: That is exactly how the error originated. Not to combat the Jewish movement, the money was sent because that was not the object of this Christian Trade Union, but it was necessary to give a certain term in translating this in order to give that idea. The purpose was not to fight Jewry but elimination of another foreign influence, that means Czechoslovakia.
THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought myself that the point which might have been taken against you was that the letter was after the time with which you were then dealing.
MR. BARRINGTON: That is so, My Lord; it was not at the time of the previous one.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the previous one was marked 1933, and this was 193
MR. BARRINGTON: Oh yes. I only put it in, My Lord, to show it was by then, at any rate. If Your Lordship has any doubt as to the translation I would suggest that it might now be translated by the interpreter. We have the German original, a photostat.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you can have it translated again tomorrow; if necessary, you can have it gone into again then.
MR. BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord.
I come now to the Catholic Church. The Nazi treatment of the church has been fully dealt with by the United States prosecution. In this particular field von Papen, the prominent Catholic, helps to consolidate the Nazi position both at home and abroad as perhaps nobody else could have done. the Tribunal Hitler's assurance given to the church on the 23rd of March, 1933, in Hitler's speech on the Enabling Act, an assurance which resulted in the well-known Fulda Declaration of the German bishops. That was document 3387-PS, which was U.S. Exhibit 566. This deceitful assurance of Hitler's appears to have been made at the suggestion of von Papen eight days earlier at the Reich cabinet at which the Enabling Act was discussed, on the 15th of March, 1933. I refer to document 2962-PS, which is U.S. Exhibit 578, and it is on page 40 of the English document book. I read from page 44. That is at the bottom of page 6 of the German text, and the minutes say:
"The Vice-chancellor and Reich Commissar for Prussia stated that it was of decisive importance to coordinate into the new state the masses standing behind the Parties.
The question of the incorporation of political Catholicism into the new State was of particular importance." That was a statement made by von Papen at the meeting at which the Enabling Act was discussed prior to Hitler's speech on the Enabling Act, in which he gave his assurance to the church.
THE PRESIDENT: Which page is that on in the document book?
MR. BARRINGTON: It is page 44, My Lord, about the middle.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. BARRINGTON: On the 20th of July, 1933, Papen signed the Reich Concordat negotiated by him with the Vatican. The Tribunal has already taken judicial notice of this as document 3260-A-PS. The signing of the Concordat, like Hitler's upon an inspired speech on the Enabling Act, was only an interlude in the church policy of the Nazi conspirators. The policy of re-assurances was followed by a long series of violations which eventually resulted in Papal denunciation in the Encyclical "Mit brennender Sorge," which is 3476-PS, U.S. Exhibit 567. he has asserted during interrogations that it was Hitler who sabotaged the Concordat. If von Papen really believed in the very solemn undertakings given by him on behalf of the Reich to the Vatican, I submit it is strange that he, himself a Catholic, should have continued to serve Hitler after all those violations and even after the Papal Encyclical itself. I will go furt*---* I will say that Papen was himself involved in what was virtually, if not technically, a violation of the Concordat. The Tribunal will recollect the elocution of the Pope, dated the 2nd of June 1945, which is 3268-PS, U.S. Exhibit 356, from which on page 1647 of the transcript Colonel Storey read the Pope's own summary of the Nazis' bitter struggle against the church. The very first item the pope mentioned is the dissolution of Catholic organizations and, if the Tribunal will look at document 3376-PS, on page 56 of the English document book which I now put in as GB-244 and which is an extract from "Das Archiv," they will see that in September 1934 von Papen ordered -- and I say "ordered" advisedly -- the dissolution of the Union of Catholic Germans, of which he was at the time the leader. The text of "Das Archiv" reads as follows:
"The Reich Leadership Party announces the seal of dissolution of the Union of Catholic Germans.
"Since the Reich Party Leadership, through its department for spiritual peace, increasingly and immediately administers all cultural problems and those concerning the relationship of State and Churches, the tasks at first delegated to the Union of Catholic Germans are now included in those of the Reich Party Leadership in the interest of a stronger coordination.
"Vice-chancellor von Papen, up to now the Leader of the Union of Catholic Germans, declared about the dissolution of this organization that it was done upon his suggestion, since the attitude of the national socialist State toward the Christian and Catholic Church had been explained often and unequivocally through the Leader and Chancellor himself." said it was a seal of dissolution on his suggestion, but I submit that such a suggestion from one in Papen's position was equivalent to an order, since by that date it was common knowledge that the Nazis were dropping all pretense that rival organizations might be permitted to exist.
After nine months' service under Hitler, spent in consolidating the Nazi control, von Papen was evidently well content with his choice. I refer to document 3375-PS, page 54 of the English document book, which I put in as GB-245. On the 2nd of November 1933, speaking at Essen from the same platform as Hitler and Gauleiter Terboven, in the course of the campaign for the Reichstag election and the referendum concerning Germans leaving the League of Nations , von Papen declared:
"Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have tried to support with all my strength the work of the national socialist movement and its leader; and just as I at the time of taking over the Chancellorship" -- that was in 1932 -- "have advocated to pave the way to power for the young fighting liberation movement, just as I on January 30 was selected by a gracious fate to put the hands of our Chancellor and Fuehrer into the hand of our beloved Field Marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say to the German people and all those who have kept confidence in me:
"The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep distres a leader who will lead it, through all distresses and weaknesses, through all crises and moments of danger, with the sure instinct of the statesman into a happy future."
And then the last sentence of the whole text on page 55:
"Let us in this hour say to the Fuehrer of the new German, that we believe in him and his work." he had given all his strength had abolished the civil liberties; had sanctioned political murder committed in aid of Naziism's seizure of power, had destroyed all rival political parties; had enacted the basic laws for abolition of the political influence of the Federal states; had provided the legislative basis for purging the Civil Service and judiciary of anti-Nazi elements; and had embarked upon a state policy of persecution of the Jews.
Papen's words are words of hollow mockery:
"The kind Lord has blessed Germany--" preparations for war. Knowing as he did the basic program of the Nazi Party, it is inconceivable that as Vice-chancellor for a year and a half he could have been dissociated from the conspirators' warlike preparations; he, whom Hitler wrote to Hindenburg on the 10th of April 1933, his collaboration in the Reich Cabinet for which he now offers all his strength is infinitely valuable. political planning and preparations for wars of aggression in violation of international treaties. In Papen's case this allegation is really thestory of the Anschluss. His part in that was a preparation for wars of aggression in two senses: First, that the Anschluss was the necessary preliminary step to all the subsequent armed aggressions; secondly, that even if it can be contended that the Anschluss was in fact achieved without aggression, it was planned in such a way that it would have been achieved byaggression if that had been necessary.
I need do no more than summarize Papen's Austrian activities since the whole story of the Anschluss has been described to the Tribunal already, though with the Tribunal's permission I would like to read again two short passages of a particularly personal nature regarding Papen. But, before I deal with Papen's activitiesin Austria, there is one matter that I feel I ought not to omit to mention to the Tribunal. University. I do not propose to put it in evidence, nor is it in the document book because it is a matter of history, and in what I say I do not intend to commit myself in regard to the motives and consequences of his speech which are not free from mystery, but I will say this: That as far as concerns the subject matter of Papen's Marburg speech, it was an outspoken criticism of the Nazis. One must imagine that the Nazis were justly angry and, although he escaped death in the blood purge twelve days later, he was put under arrest for three days. Whether this arrest originally intended to end in execution or whether it was to protect him from the purge as one too valuable to be lost, I do not now inquire. After his release from arrest he, not unnaturally, resigned the Reich Chancellorship. Now the question that arises -- and this is why I mention thematter at this point -- is why after these barbaric events did he ever go back into the service of the Nazis again? What an opportunity missed. If he had stopped then he might have saved the world much suffering. Suppose that Hitler's own Vice-Chancellor, just released fromarrest, had defied the Nazis and told the world the truth; there might never have been a reoccupation of the Rhineland; there might never have been a war. But I must not speculate. The lamentable fact is that he slipped back; he succumbed again to the fascination of Hitler. 25th of July 1934, the situation was such as to call for the removal of the German Minister Rieth, and for the prompt substitution of a man who was an enthusiast for Anschluss with Germany, who could be tolerant of Nazi objectives and methods, but who could lend an aura of respectability to official German representation in Vienna.
This situation is described in the transcript at pages 478 and 489. Hitler's reaction to the murder of Dolfuss was immediate. He chose his man as soon as he heard the news. The very next day, the 26th of July, he sent von Papen a letter of appointment. This is on page 37 of the English document book; it is 2799-PS and it has already been judicially noticed by the Tribunal. Mr. Alderman read the letter, and I only wish now to refer to the personal remarks towards the end.
Hitler in this letter, after reciting his version of the Dolfuss affair and expressing his desire that Austrian-German relations should be brought again into normal and friendly channels, says in the third paragraph:
"For this reason I request you, Dear von Papen, to take over this important and unlimited confidence ever since we have worked together in the cabinet." And the last paragraph of the letter:
"Thanking you once more for all that you once did for the coordination of the Government of the National Revolution and since then together with us for Germany."
THE PRESIDENT: This might be the time we might break off for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken from 1530 to 1540 hours.) sent to von Papen on the 26 July 1934, the letter of appointment as Minister in Vienna. This letter, which, of course, was made public, naturally did not disclose the realintent of von Papen's appointment. The actual mission of von Papen was stated frankly shortly after his arrival in Vienna in the course of a private conversation he had with the American Minister, Mr. Messersmith. I quote from Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, which is 1760-PS, USA Exhibit No.57, and it is on page 22 of the Document Book, just about half way through the second paragraph: Mr. Messersmith said:
"When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with 'Now you are in my Legation and I can control the conversation.
' that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany's for Germany.
He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step.
He definitely stated that he was in the South and Southeast.
He said that he intended to use his reputation Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end."
Throughout the earlier period of his mission to Austria, von Papen's activity was characterized by the assiduous avoidance of any appearance of intervention. His true mission was re-affirmed with clarity several months after its commencement, when he was instructed by Berlin that during the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political difficulties, and that every appearance of German intervention in Austrian affairs must be avoided, and, von Papen himself said to BergerWaldenegg, an Austrian Foreign Minister: "Yes, you have your French and English friends now, and you can have your independence a little longer." All of that was told in detail by Mr. Alderman, again quoting from Mr. Messe rsmith's affidavit, and which is in the transcript at pages 492, 506 and 507. Austria without openly admitted German intervention, and Germany needed more time to consolidate its diplomatic position. These reasons for German policy were frankly expressed by the German Foreign Minister von Neurath in conversation with the American Ambassador to France, and, this was read into the transcript at page 520 by Mr. Alderman from Document L-150, USA Exhibit No. 65. to the normal ambassadorial function of cultivating all respectable elements in Austria, and ingratiating himself in these circles. Despite his facade of strict non-intervention, von Papen remained in contact with subversive elements in Austria. Thus in his report to Hitler dated 17 May 1935, he advised concerning Austrian-Nazi strategy as proposed by Captain Leopold, Leader of the illegal Austrian Nazis, the object of which was to trick Dr. Schuschnigg into establishing an Austrian coalition government with the NSDAP. This is Document No. 2247-PS, USA Exhibit No. 64, and it is in the transcript at pages 516 to 518. It is on page 34 of the English Document Book. I don't want to read this letter again, but I would like to call attention of the Tribunal to the first line of what is called the second paragraph in the English Text, where von Papen talking about this strategy of Captain Leopold says, "I suggest that we take an active part in this game."
Document No. 812-PS, USA No. 61, which the Tribunal will remember was a report from Rainer to Buerckel, and which is dealt with in the transcript at pages 498 to 505. negotiated by von Papen. This is already in evidence as TC-22, GB-Exhibit No. 20. The Public form of this agreement provides that while Austria in her policy should regard herself as a German state, yet, Germany would recognize the full sovereignty of Austria, and would not exercise direct or indirect influence on the inner political order of Austria. More interesting was the secret part of the agreement, revealed by Mr. Messersmith, which ensured the Nazis an influence in the Austrian cabinet, and participation in the political life of Austria. This has already been read into the transcript at page 522 by Mr. Alderman. policy by maintaining contact with the illegal Nazis by trying to influence appointments to strategic cabinet positions, and by attempting to secure official recognition of Nazi front organizations. Reporting to Hitler shortly after the agreement of 11 July 1936, he summarized his program for normalizing Austrian-German relations in pursuant of the agreement of 11 July. This is Document 2246-PS, USA Exhibit No. 67, on page 33 of the English Document Book. extract, he recommended as a guiding principle continued, patient psychological manipulations, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime, and then he mentioned his discussion with the government officials. is aiming at the corporative representation of the movement in the Fatherland Front, but nevertheless refraining from putting National Socialists in important positions for the time being. of Schuschnigg with Hitler in February 1939, which von Papen arranged and which he attended, and to the final invasion of Austria in March 1938. It is enough to quote from the Biography again on Page 66 of the document book. It is about two-thirds of the way down the page:
"After the events of March 1938 which caused Austria's incorporation into the German Reich, von Papen had the satisfaction to be present at the Fuehrer's side when the entry into Vienna took place, having just been admitted on 14 February 1938 into the Party in recognition of his valuable collaboration and having received the Golden Party Badge from the Fuehrer."