Now, those two were key conferences. At many, many others Raeder was also present to place his knowledge and professional skill at the service of the Nazi war machine. the Polish campaign is by now well-known to the Tribunal and I am not proposing to reiterate that evidence again. Once the war did start, however, the Defendant Raeder showed himself to be a master of the most typical of the conspirators' techniques, namely that of deceit on the grand scale. There are few better examples of this allegation than that of his handling of the case of the "Athenia," The "Athenia", as the Tribunal will be aware, was a passenger liner, which was sunk in the evening of the 3rd of September, 1939, when she was outward bound to America, about one hundred lives being lost.
On the 23rd of October, 1939, the Nazi Party paper, the "Voelkischer Beobachter", published, in screaming headlines the story, "Churchill sank the Athenia." I would refer the Court to Exhibit 3260-PS, at page 97 of the Document Book, which will be Exhibit G.B. 218, and I would like the Tribunal to look for a moment at the copy of the Voelkischer Beobachter here, and see the scale with which this deliberate lie was perpetrated, I have a photostat of the relevant page of the Veolkischer Beobachter for that day. This is the third page and the Tribunal will see on this front page, with the big red underlining, there are the words: "Now we indict Churchill." of the Document Book, reads as follows:
"Churchill sank the 'Athenia'.
"The above picture" -- and the Tribunal will see it is a fine picture of this fine ship -- "-- shows the proud 'Athenia', the ocean giant, which was sunk by Churchill's crime.
One can clearly see the big radio equipment on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship. Why was the 'Athenia' silent? Because her captain was not allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink the ship, through the explosion of an infernal machine. He knew it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly fifteen hundred people would have lost their lives if Churchill's original plan had resulted as the criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped that the one hundred Americans on board the ship would find death in the waves so that the anger of the American people, who were deceived by him, should be directed against Germany, as the presumed author of the deed. It was fortunate that the majority escaped the fate intended for them by Churchill. Our picture on the right shows two wounded passengers. They were rescued by the freighter City of Flint', and as can be seen here, turned over to the American coast guard boat 'Gibb' for further medical treatment. They are an unspoken accusation against the criminal Churchill. Both they and the shades of these who lost their lives call him before the Tribunal of the world and ask the British people, 'How long will the office, one of the richest in tradition known to Britain's history, be held by a murderer?'" Now, in view of the maliciousness of this "Voelkischer Beobachter" announcement and in fairness to the men of the British Merchant Navy, I think it is proper that I should say, that contrary to the allegation in this Nazi sheet, the "Athenia" of course, made repeated wireless distress signals which were in fact intercepted and answered by His Majesty's ship "Electra", in escort, as well as by the Norwegian steamship "Knut Nelson" and the yacht "Southern Cross."
the "Athenia" was sunk by the German U-boat 30. So unjustifiable was the torpedoing of the "Athenia", however, that the German Navy embarked on a course of falsification of their records and on other dishonest measures, in the hope of hiding their guilty secret. And for their part, the Tribunal has seen, the Nazi propagandists indulged in their favorite falsehood of seeking to shift the responsibility to the British.
in action, but some of the original crew of the U-30 have survived to tell the tale and they are now prisoners of war. And so that the truth of this episode may be placed beyond a peradventure, I place before the Tribunal an affidavit by a member of the crew of the U-30, as to the sinking of the "Athenia" and as to one aspect of the attempt to conceal the true facts.
I refer to Document C-654, Exhibit G.B.219, at page 106 of the Document Book. The affidavit reads:
"I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043 -33T, "Do solemnly declare that.
:
"I am now confined to Camp No 133, Lethbridge, Alberta.
"That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship of approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the evening by the U-30.
"That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again, approximately half an hour after the explosion, the Commandant called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship.
"That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that I do not think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on account of the position of the moon.
"That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go to the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.
"That, apart from myself, Oberleutenant Hinsch was in the tower when I saw the steamer after the attack.
"That I observed that the ship was listing.
"That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was launched.
"That I myself observed much commotion on board of the torpedoed ship.
"That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack.
"That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes were fired which did not explode but that I myself heard the explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer.
"That Oberleutenant Lemp waited until darkness before surfacing.
"That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September, 1939.
"That Oberleutenant Lemp shortly before my disembarkation in Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the Pety Officers quarters where I was lying severely wounded.
"That Oberleutnant Lemp then had the Petty Officers' quarters cleared in order to be alone with me.
"That Oberleutnant Lemp then showed me a declaration under oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30.
"That this declaration under oath had approximately the following wording: 'I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30, regardless whether foe or friend, and that I shall erase from my memory all happenings of this day.'
"That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was drawn up by the Commandant in his own handwriting, with my left hand very illegibly.
"That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of the Athenia, the idea came into my mind that the U-30 on the 3 September 1939 might have sunk the Athenia, especially since the Captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration.
"That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning these events.
"That due to the termination of the war I consider myself freed from my oaths."
Doenitz's part in the Athenia episode is described in an affidavit which he has sworn, which is Exhibit D-368, Exhibit GB-220, at page 102 of the Document Bock. The affidavit was sworn in English, and I invite the Tribunal to look at it and observe the addition in Doenitz's handwriting of four words at the end of the affidavit, the significance of which will be seen in a moment.
The Defendant Doenitz states:
"U-30 returned to harbor about Mid-September. I met the captain, Oberleutnant Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshafen, as the boat was entering harbor, and he asked permission to speak to me in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was responsible for the sinking of the Athenia in the North Channel area. In accordance with my previous, instructions he had been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the Athenia from wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an armed merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I despatched Lemp at once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I ordered complete secrecy as a provisional measure. Later the same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal order from Kapitan zur See Fricke" -- who is head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff -- "that:
"1. The affair was to be kept a total secret.
"2. The OKM considered that a courtmartial was not necessary as they were satisfied that the captain had acted in good faith.
"3. Political explanations would be handled by the OKM.
"I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which the Fuehrer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the Athenia.
"After Lemp returned to Wilhemshafen from Berlin, I interrogated him thoroughly on thesinking and formed the impression that although he had taken reasonable care, he had still not taken sufficient precautions to establish fully the identity of the ship before attacking; I had previously given very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were to be treated according to naval prize law, before the occurrence of this incident. I accordingly placed him under cabin arrest, as I felt certain that a court-martial could only acquit him and would entail unnecessary publicity" -- and then Doenitz has added the words "and too much time."
It is right, I think, that I should add that Doenitz's suggestion that the captain of the U-30 sank the Athenia in mistake for a merchant cruiser must be considered in the light of a document which Colonel Phillimore submitte Document C-191, Exhibit GB-193, dated 22 September 1939, which contained Doenitz's order that "the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser."
Now, the U-30 returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939. I submit another fraudulent naval document, Exhibit D-659, page 110 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GE-221, which is an extract from the War Diary of the Chief of U-boats, and it is an extract for the 27th of September, 1939. The Tribunal will see that it reads:
"U-30 comes in.
"She had sunk:
"s.s. Blairlogie "s.s. Fanad Head."
was the forgery of the log book of the U-30, which was responsible for sinking the Athenia, and I now submit that original log book to the Tribunal as Document D-662, which will be GB-22, and an extract from the first and relevant page of it is found at page 111 of the document book. I would like the Tribunal to examine the original, if you will be good enough to do so, because the Prosecution's submission is that the first page of that log book is a forgery, but a forgery which shows a curiously un-German carelessness about detail. The Tribunal will see that the first page of the text is a clear substitute for pages that have been removed. The dates in the fist column of that page are in Arabic numerals. On the second and more authentic looking page, and throughout the other pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals. sinking of the Athenia on the 3rd of September is omitted. The entries are translated on page 111 of the document book for the Court's assistance.
3rd of September, is given as AL o278, which the Tribunal will notice is one of the very few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which was, in fact, some 200 miles west of the position where the Athenia was sunk. The course due south, which is recorded in the log book, and the speed of 10 knots -those entries are obviously designed to suggest that the U-30 was well clear of the Athenia's position on the 3rd of September.
Finally, and most curiously, the Tribunal will observe that Lemp's own signature upon the page dealing with the 3rd of September differs from the other signatures in the text. Page 1 shows Lemp's signature with a Roman "p" as the final letter of his name. On the other signatures, there is a script "p", and the inference I submit is that either the signature is a forgery or it was made up by Lemp at some other, and probably considerably later date. that the German Navy under Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before receiving Lemp's reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly denied the possibility that a German U-Boat could be in the area concerned. The charts which showed the disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the Athenia, which Colonel Phillimore introduced, have shown the utter dishonesty of these announcements, and my submission upon this matter is this: Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and information control in Nazi Germany were so complete that Raeder, as head of the Navy, must have been party to the falsification published in the Voelkischer Beobachter, which was a wholly dishonorable attempt by the Nazi conspirators to save their faces with their own people and to uphold the myth of an infallible Fuehrer backed by an impeccable war machine. and it would appear that Raeder's camouflage was not confined to painting his ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking Norway or Denmark. With regard to that last matter, the invasion of Norway and Denmark, I think it is hardly necessary that I should remind the Tribunal of Raeder's leading partin that perfidious Nazi assault, the evidence as to which has already been presented.
I think I need only add Raeder's proud comment upon those brutal invasions, which is contained in his letter in Document C-155 at page 25 of the document book, which is already before the Tribunal as GB-214. That document, which is a letter of Raeder's to the Navy, part of which I have already read, states:
"The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to this war."
completed, the Tribunal has seen that Hitler turned his eyes towards Russia. Now, in fairness to Raeder, it is right that I should, say that Raeder himself was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. The documents show, however, that Raeder approached the problem with complete cynicism. He didn't object to the aggressive war on Russia because of its illegality, its immorality, its humanity. His only objection to it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going further afield.
The story of Raider's part in the deliberations upon the war against Russia is told in the document C-170, at page 37 of the document book, and which has already been submitted as US-136. That document consists of extracts from a German compilation of official naval notes by the German Naval War Staff. date of 26 September 1940, which is at page 11 of C-170, showed that Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy in which, of course, the Navy would play a paramount role, as opposed to a continental land policy. The entry reads:
"Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander presents his opinion about the situation: the Suez Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable whether action against Russia from the North will then be still necessary." November:
"Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour. On the one side England has gained strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support, on the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking effect.
What is being done for submarine and naval air force construction is much too little.
Our entire war potential must work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for Navy and air force every fissure of strength prolongs the war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of England." is the entry:
'"Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of Malta even before 'Barbarossa'". entry:
"Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that seizure of Malta is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the execution of 'Barbarossa' -- which the Tribunal may think is a sublime example of wishful thinking. the document book, shows that by March of 1941 Raeder had begun to consider what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to offer. There is the entry:
"In case of 'Barbarossa', Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute necessity for the Navy Chief of the Supreme Command Armed Forces, considers compliance very difficult." the flunky of Naziism, was crying out for a more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. I refer the Court to page 57 of the document book, the entry for the 30th of May. The word "Duce" is missing from the first line, and the entry should read:
"Duce demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall 1943 12 division is needed for that; 'This stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London'; Chief Naval Operations agrees completely." views of Raeder and the German Navy at this stage, reads as follows: It is at page 58 of the document book:
"Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: memorandum of the Chief, Naval Operations.
Observation on the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war."
A few sentences below:
"The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive aims of the war in the Near East. Their advancement has moved into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area, and the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the present factorable situation must take place with the greatest acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened her position in the Near East with help from the United States of America. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly, demands, however, that the undertaking 'Barbarossa' which because of the magnitude of its aims naturally stands in the foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces leadership, must under no circumstances lead to an abandonment, diminishing delay of the conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean." in his Nazi war plans. for the Navy in the campaign against Russia, and the first naval operational plan against Russia was a particularly perfidious one. I refer the Tribunal to the document C-170 which I have just been reading from, at page 59 of the document book. There the Tribunal will see an entry for the 15th of June, 1941;
"On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations, use of arms against Russian submarines, south of the northern boundary of the Poland warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is to be aimed at." for this action in his letter, Document C-38, which is at page 11 of the document book and which will be GB-223. The Tribunal sees that Keitel's letter is dated the 15th of June, 1941:
"Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the Baltic Sea.
"To:
"High Command of the Navy - OKM (SKL) "Offensive action against submarine south of the line Memel-southern tip of Oeland is authorized if the boats cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German naval forces.
"The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines." that the Nazi attack of Russia did not take place until the 22nd of June of 1941. In the meantime, Raeder was urging Hitler, as early as the 18th of March, 1941, to enlarge the scope of the world war by inducing Japan to seize Singapore. The relevant document is C-152, GB-122, at page 23 of the document book. There is just one paragraph which I would like to be permitted to read. The document describes the audience of Raeder with Hitler on the 18th of March and the entries in it, in fact, represent Raeder's own views:
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
"Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible." this proposition of Raeder's of inducing the Japanese to take offensive action against Singapore. I refer the Tribunal again to Document C-170 and to an entry at page 56 of the document book, for the 20th of April, 1941.
And a few sentences from that read:
"Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme Commander asks about result of Matsuoka's visit, and evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact. Fuehrer has informed Matsuoka, 'that Russia will not be touched if she behaves friendly according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself.' Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany, and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladisvostok, and to cause her to attack Singapore." C-66, at page 13 of the document book. The document C-66 has already been exhibited as GB-81. I will refer the court to paragraph 3 at page 13 of the document book. At that time the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing, and "there follows this interesting sentence:
"The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise." is typical of the kind of jungle diplomacy with which Raeder associated himself.
I now, with the Tribunal's permission turn from the field of diplomacy to the final aspect of the case against Raeder, namely, crimes at sea.
The prosecution's summation is that Raeder throughout his career showed a complete disregard for any international rule or usage of war which conflicted in the slightest with his intention of carrying through the Nazi program of conquest. I propose to submit to the Tribunal a few examples of Raeder's flouting of the law and customs of civilized states. in the document U.K.65, which the Tribunal will find at page 98 of the document book, and which will be Exhibit GB-224. Now that document, U K 65, is a very long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German Naval War Staff on the 15th of October 1939: that is to say, only a few weeks after the war started.
And it is a memorandum on the subject of the intensification of the war at sea, and I desire to draw the Tribunal's attention to the bottom paragraph at page 98 of the document book. It is headed: "Possibilities of future naval warfare."
"I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain.
"Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea-communications wherever they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law; however measure's which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law. In principle therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used on some legal conception," -- the nature of which is not specified, -- "even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare.
"The supreme "war Council will have to decide what measures of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare; in its most ruthless form, in fulfillment of military requirements this decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances and under no circumstances may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats of further countries, including the U.S. coming into the war which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked union. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earliest will it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate re-orientation of German war economy and the re-drafting of the respective agreements with neutral state; for this, strong political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary."
of the prosecution is that as an active member of the inner councils of the Nazi state right up to 1943, Raeder must share responsibility for the many war crimes committed by his confederates and underlings in the course of their wars.
are certain crime which the prosecution submits were essentially initiated and passed down the naval chain of command by Raeder himself. will be GB-225. Those are minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Raeder on the 30th of December 1939. I read with the Court's approval the second paragraph beginning:
"The chief of naval war staff requests that full power be given to the naval war staff in making any intensification suited to the situation and to the means of war. The Fuehrer fundamentally agrees to to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine danger can be upheld, e.g., the Bristol Channel." Neutral. I submit that this is another demonstration of the fact that Raeder was a man without principle. effort, because in the document C-12, which is at page 1 of the document book, the Tribunal will see that a directive to the effect of those naval views was issued on the 30th of December 1939 by the OKW, being signed by the defendant Yodl. And that document C-12 will be GB-226. It is an interesting document. It is dated the 30th December 1939, and it reads:
"On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of Ob.d.M., the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided that:
"(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared by U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels, "(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be attached without warning - where the impression of a mining incident can be created.
"Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately." it was under Raeder's command, towards neutral shipping, is found in an entry in Yodl's Diary-
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you should read the pencil note, had'nt you?
MR. ELWYN JONES: The pencil note on the document C-12 reads:
"Add to (1) Attack must be carried out without being seen. the denial of the sinking of these steamships in case the expected protests are made must be possible." of Raeder's navy towards neutral shipping is found in an entry in Yodl's diary for the 16th of June 1942, at page 112 of the document book, which is Exhibit 1807-PS, will be GB-227. This extract from Yodl's diary is dated the 16th of June 1942 and it reads:
"The operational staff of the Navy (Skl), applied on the 29th May for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The Skl considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defense measures are still incomplete; (b) because there is th possibility of achieving surprise; and (c) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea."
This, the Tribunal will see, was a plan of a kind of Brazilian "Pearl Harbor" because the Tribunal will recollect that the war did not in effect break out between Germany and Brazil until the 22nd of August 1942. Raeder himself also caused the Navy to participate in war crimes ordered by other conspirators, and I shall give one example only of that. of the document book shows, the head of the operations division of the naval war staff promulgated to naval commands Hitler's notorious order of the 18th of October 1942 with regard to the shooting of commandos which in my summation amounted to denying the protection of the Geneva Convention to captured commandos. 1942, and it reads:
"Enclosed please find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units.
"This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.
"After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order over to the next highest section which is responsible for its confiscation and destruction." What clearer indication can there be than the nature of these instructions as to the naval commander's appreciation of the wrongfulness of the murders Hitler ordered.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for ten minutes?
(A recess was taken from 19520 to 1530 hours.)
MR. JONES: I have drawn the Tribunal's attention to the circulation of Hitler's order to shoot the commandos. I now draw the Tribunal's attention to an example of the execution of that order by the German Navy during the period when Raeder was its Commander.
My learned friend Mr. Roberts has already given the Tribunal an account of a commando operation of December, 1942, which had as its objective an attack on shipping in Bordeaux harbour. The Tribunal will recollect that the Wehrmacht account he quoted, UK 57, Exhibit GB 164, stated that six of the ten ;articipants in that commando raid were arrested and that all were shot on the 23 March 1943.
In connection with that episode the Prosecution has a further document throwing some light on this Bordeaux incident and showing how much more expediously the navy under Raeder had implemented Hitler's order on this particular occasion. I draw the Court's attention to Document C 176, at page 61 of the document book, GB Exhibit 228. Bachmann, who was the German Flag Officer in charge of Western France, The first entry, at page 61, is dated 10 December 1942 and reads:
"About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the Officer-in-charge of the Security Service in Paris, SS-Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schmidt to Flag Officer in charge's Flat Lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as interrogation had not been concluded.
"After consultation with the Chief of Operations Staff the Security Service had been directed to get approval direct from Headquarters.
"1820. Security Service, Bordeaux, requested Security Service authorities at Fuehrer's headquarters to postpone the shooting for three days. Interrogations continued for the time being."
The next day, the 11 December 1942:
"Shooting of the two prisoners was carried out by a unit (strength 1/16) belonging to the naval officer in charge Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the Security Service, Bordeaux, on order of the Fuehrer," entry: "Security Service should have done this. Phone Flag Officer in Charge in future cases"; and as the Tribunal knows, "in future cases" was in fact an order that commandos should be handed over to the Security Service to be shot. first two gallant men to be shot from the Bordeaux operation were actually put to death by a naval firing party on the 11th of December, 1942. They were Sergeant Wallace and Marine Ewart, who had the misfortune to be captured on the 8th of December in the preliminary stages of the operation. which is found in Document D 658.
THE PRESIDENT: What do the last two lines about the operation being particularly favored mean?
MR. JONES: "The operation was particularly favored by the weather conditions and the dark night"--that presumably, My Lord, is a reference to the operation of the marine commandos in successfully blowing up a number of German ships in Bordeaux harbour.
Alternately, I am advised by the naval officer who is assisting me, that it probably is a reference to the conditions prevailing at the time of the shooting of the two men.
THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought so.
MR, JONES: I stand corrected by the British Navy upon my interpretation of the matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Doesn't it indicate that naval men had done it?
MR. JONES: The shooting was in fact, as the entry on 11 December 15th Jan - A - O'B - 1