but the type of order that he was issuing. My Lord, if I might just sum up, the Defendant was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service officer, loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day; he was an extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincident that it was he who was chosen to succeed Hitler; not Goering, not Ribbentrop, not Goebbels, not Himmler. He played a bigger part in fashioning the U-boat fleet, one of the most deadly weapons of aggressive war. He helped to plan and execute aggressive war, and we cannot doubt that he knew well that these wars were in deliberate violation of treaties. He was ready to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would not be found out. Preaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality, were you might hope to maintain that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally. for men of the merchant navies whose destruction was due to the careless brutality with which, at the orders of this man, the German U-boats did their work.
My Lord, my learned friend, Mr. Elwyn Jones, now deals with the Defendant Raeder.
MR. ELWYN JONES: May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present to the Tribunal the evidence against the creator of the Nazi Navy, the Defendant Raeder. The allegations against him are set out in Appendix A of the Indictment at pages thirty-three and thirty-four, and the Tribunal will see the the Defendant Raeder is charged with promoting and participating in the planning of the Nazi wars of aggression; with executing those plans; and with authorizing, directing, and participating in Nazi war crimes, particularly war crimes arising out of sea warfare. 299-PS, which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit U.S. 13, which the Tribunal will find at page ninety-six of the document book.
That is a document which sets out the offices and positions held by the Defendant Raeder. The Tribunal will see that he was born in 1876 and joined the German Navy in 1896. By 1915 he had become commander of the Cruiser Koeln. In 1928 he became an admiral, chief of naval command, and head of the German Navy. In 1935 he became commander-in-chief of the Navy. In 1936 he became general admiral, a creation of Hitler's, on his forty-seventh birthday. In 1937 he received the high Nazi honor of golden badge of honor of the Nazi Party. In 1938 he became a member of the secret cabinet council. And in 1939 he reached the Empyrean of Grand Admiral, a rank created by Hitler, who presented Raeder with a marshal's baton. In 1943 he became admiral inspector of the German Navy, which as the Tribunal will shortly see was a kind of retirement into oblivion, because from January 1943 on, as the Tribunal has heard, Doenitz was the effective commander of the German Navy.
In these eventful years of Raeder's command of the German Navy from 1928 to 1943 he played a vital role. And I would like in the first instance to draw the Tribunal's attention to Raeder's part in building up the German Navy as an instrument of war to implement the Nazis general plan of aggression.
navy permitted to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles was enormously expanded under the guidance of Raeder. I will do no more than to remind the Tribunal of some of the milestones upon Raeder's road to Nazi mastery of the seas, which mercifully he was unable to attain.
With regard to the story of Germany's secret rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, I would refer the Court to the Document C-156, which is already before the Court as U.S. 41, and which the Tribunal will find at page twenty-six of the document book. That document, as the Tribunal will remember, was a history of the fight of the German Navy against Versailles, 1919 to 1935, which was published secretly by the German Admiralty in 1937. And the Tribunal will remember that that history shows that before the Nazis came to power the German Admiralty was deceiving not only the governments of other countries, but its own legislature and at one stage its own governments. Their secret measures of rearmament, ranging from experimental U-Boat and E-Boat building to the creation of secret intelligence and finance organizations. I only propose to trouble the Tribunal with a reference to the last paragraph at page thirty-three of the document book, which refers to the role of Raeder in this development. It is an extract from page seventy-five of this document C-156, and it reads:
"The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, had received hereby a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty."
As an illustration of Raeder's concealment of rearmament, I would remind the Tribunal of the document C-141, U.S. Exhibit 47, which is at page twenty-two of the document book. In that document Raeder states that, "In view of Germany's treaty obligations and the disarmament conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first E-Boat-Half-Flotilla from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not intended to count these E-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed them."
is at page twenty of the document book, is of unusual interest because it suggests that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to attack Poland was already current in German military circles. This document is an extract from the history of war organization and of the scheme for moblization. The German text of this document is headed "828500/38", which suggests that the document was written in the year 1938. The extracts read:
"Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for mobilization were forbidden, these were at first confined to a very small body of collaborators and were at first only of a theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time an "Establishment Order," Instructions for Establishment, the forerunners of the present-day scheme for Mobilization.
"An establishment organization and adaptable instructions for establishment were drawn up for each A-year, cover name for moblization year.
"As stated, the "Establishment Organization" of that time were to be judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive basis in the form of men and materials. They provided nevertheless a valuable foundation for the establishment of a War Organization as our ultimate aim."
Paragraph two. "The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making theoretical preparations for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a purely German-Polish conflict.
"The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of Gydnia was made a basis, and the fleet on active serve was to be reinforced by the auxilliary forces which would be indispensable to attain this strategic end, and the essential coastal and flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and Swinemuende were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the Reinforcement Plan was evolved." second paragraph, Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him in five years, that is to say, by the 1st of April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power.
power in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to go full speed ahead on rearmament. The detailed story of this development has already been told by my American colleague, Mr. Alderman, and I would simply refer the Court in the first place to the document C-189, exhibit U.S.44, which is at page sixty-six of the document book. In that document Raeder tells Hitler in June 1934 that the German fleet must be developed to oppose England, and that therefore from 1936 on the big ships must be armed with big guns to match the British King George class of battleship. It further, in the last paragraph, refers to Hitler's demand that the construction of U-Boats should be kept completely secret, especially in view of the Saar plebescite. In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with Hitler on the financing of naval rearmament, and on that occasion Hitler told him that in case of need he would get Doctor Ley to put 120 to 150,000,000 from the labor front at the disposal of the navy. The reference to that is the document C-190, exhibit U.S. 45, at page sixty-seven of the document book. The Tribunal may think that that proposed fraud upon the German working people was a characteristic Nazi manifestation.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
MR. ELWYN JONES: If Your Lordship please.
(Whereupon at 1245 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1400 hours).
Military Tribunal, in the matter of: The
MR. ELWYN JONES: May I say to the Tribunal, the next document I desire to draw to the Tribunal's attention is Document C 23, Exhibit U.S. 49, at page 3 of the Document Book, which states that the true displacement of certain German battleships exceeded by twenty per cent the displacement reported to the British, and that, I submit, is typical of Raeder's use of deceit.
The next document to which I refer to briefly, is C-166, Exhibit U.S. 48, page 36 of the Document Book, is another such deceitful document, which orders that auxiliary cruisers, which were being secretly constructed, should be referred to as "transport ships 0."
Then there is the Document C-29, U.S. Exhibit 46, at page 8 of the Document Book, which is signed by Raeder, and deals with the support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry, and I submit, is an illustration of Raeder's concern with the broader aspects of Nazi policy and of the close link between Nazi politicians, German Service Chiefs and German armament manufacturers.
THE PRESIDENT: Has that been put in before?
MR. ELWYN JONES: It has been put in before, My Lord, as U.S. Exhibit 46. at page 24 of the Document Book, which is a new document and will be .Exhibit G.B. 214, and is a letter from Raeder to the German Navy, dated the 11 of June, 1940 and the original, which has been submitted to the Tribunal, shows the very widest distribution of this letter. There is provision in the distribution list for 467 copies. This letter of Raeder's is a letter both of self-justification and of apology. The extracts read:
"The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in the Officer Corps are the Torpedo positions and the problem whether the naval building program, up to Autumn 1939, envisaged the possibility of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or whether the emphasis ought not to have been laid, from the first, on the construction of U-boats.
"If the opinion is voiced in the Officer Corps that the entire naval building program has been wrongly directed, and if, from the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat weapon and after its consolidation on the large ships, I must emphasize the following matters:
"The building up of the Fleet was directed according to the political demands, which were decided by the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer hoped, until the last moment, to be able to put off the threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that time the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards strength in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for warfare on the high seas.
"The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to the expectation even of the Fuehrer, into a war, which it had to accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis should have been laid, from the start, on the building of the U-boat arm, appear to be right. I leave undiscussed, how far this development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel, training and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and necessary creation of an effective Air Force slowed down the desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I indicate, however, with pride the admirable and, in spite of the political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic, far-reaching preparation for U-boat construction, which made the immensely rapid construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the assumption of power." Nazi program. On the contrary, the evidence points to the fact that Raeder welcomed and became one of the pillars of Nazi power, and now it will be my purpose to develop the relationship between Raeder, the Navy and the Nazi Party.
The Prosecution's submission is that Raeder, more than anyone else, was responsible for securing the unquestioned allegience of the German Navy to the Nazi movement, an allegience which Doenitz was to make even more firm and fanatical.
Raeder's approval of Hitler was shown particularly clearly on the 2nd of August, 1934, the day of Hindenburg's death, when he and all the men under him, swore a new oath of loyalty with considerable ceremony, this time to Adolf Hitler and no longer to the Fatherland. The oath is found in Document 481, at page 101 of the Document Book. That will be Exhibit G.B. 215, and it may be of interest to the Court to see what the new oath was.
The last paragraph reads:
"I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath." Fuehrer.
I am not proposing to take the Tribunal's time with reiterating the steps by which the German Navy was progressively drawn into the closest alliance with the Nazi Party. I would remind the Court of facts of history, like the incorporation of the swastika into the ensign, under which the German Fleet sailed and the wearing of the swastika on the uniform of naval officers and men, which are facts which speak for themselves.
The Nazis for their part, were not ungrateful for Raeder's obeisance and collaboration. His services in rebuilding the German Navywere widely recognized by Nazi propagandists and by the Nazi press. On his 66th birthday, the Chief Party Organ, the "Voelkischer Beobachter", published a special article about him, to which I desire to draw the Tribunal's attention. It is at page 100 of the document book; it is document D-448, Exhibit G.B. 216. It is a valuable summing up of Raeder's contribution to Nazi development.
"It was to Raeder's credit" --writes the Voelkischer Beobachter -to have already built up by that time a powerful striking force from the numerically small fleet, despite the fetters of Versailles.
"With the assumption of power through National Socialism, began too, the most fruitful period in the reconstruction of the German Fleet.
"The Fuehrer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder's faithful services and unstinted cooperation, by appointing him General-Admiral on the 20th of April, 1936".
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it necessary to read the entire document?
MR. ELWYN JONES: I was going to turn to the last paragraph but one, My Lord, which I think is helpful.
"As a soldier and a seaman, the General-Admiral has proved himself to be the Fuehrer's first and foremost naval collaborator." Germany.
I now propose to deal with Reader's personal part in the Nazi conspiracy. The evidence indicates that Raeder, from the time of the Nazi seizure of power, became increasingly involved in responsibility for the general policies of the Nazi State. a member of the very secret Reich Defense Council, joining it when it was founded on the 4th of April, 1933. And thus, at an early date, he was involved, both militarily and politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. The relevant document upon that is Document EC-177, U.S. Exhibit 390, at page 68 of the Document Book, which I would remind the Tribunal contains the classic Nazi directive:
"Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be denied by us in Geneva." of a newly formed secret advisory council for foreign affairs, and the authority for the statement is Exhibit 2031-PS, at page 88 of the Document Book, which will be Exhibit G.B. 217.
Three weeks after this, a decree of Hitler's stated that, as well as being equal in rank with a Cabinet Minister, Raeder was also to take part in the sessions of the Cabinet. That has already been established in Document 2098-PS, which was submitted as G.B. 206.
In my submission, therefore, it is thus clear that Raeder's responsibility for the political decisions of the Nazi State was steadily developed from 1933 to 1938 and that in the course of time he had become a member of all the main political advisory bodies. He was, indeed, very much a member of the inner councils of the conspirators, and, I submit, must carry with them the responsibility for the acts that led to the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the outbreak of the war. present at two of the key meetings at which Hitler openly declared his intention of attacking neighboring countries. They are the Document 386-PS, which is U.S. Exhibit 25 and is found at page 81 of the Document Book, which the Tribunal will remember is the record of Hitler's conference at the Reichs Chancellory on the 5th of November, 1937, about matters which were said to be too important to discuss in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, and a document which Mr. Alderman submitted, establishing conclusively that the Nazis premeditated their crimes against peace.
Then there was the other conference of Hitler's on the 23rd of May, 1939, the Minutes of which are found in the Document L-79, U.S. Exhibit 27, at page 74 of the Document Book. That, the Tribunal will remember, was the conference at which Hitler confirmed his intention to make a deliberate attack upon Poland at the first opportunity, well knowing that this must cause widespread war in Europe.
Now, those two were key conferences. At many, many others Raeder was also present to place his knowledge and professional skill at the service of the Nazi war machine. the Polish campaign is by now well-known to the Tribunal and I am not proposing to reiterate that evidence again. Once the war did start, however, the Defendant Raeder showed himself to be a master of the most typical of the conspirators' techniques, namely that of deceit on the grand scale. There are few better examples of this allegation than that of his handling of the case of the "Athenia," The "Athenia", as the Tribunal will be aware, was a passenger liner, which was sunk in the evening of the 3rd of September, 1939, when she was outward bound to America, about one hundred lives being lost.
On the 23rd of October, 1939, the Nazi Party paper, the "Voelkischer Beobachter", published, in screaming headlines the story, "Churchill sank the Athenia." I would refer the Court to Exhibit 3260-PS, at page 97 of the Document Book, which will be Exhibit G.B. 218, and I would like the Tribunal to look for a moment at the copy of the Voelkischer Beobachter here, and see the scale with which this deliberate lie was perpetrated, I have a photostat of the relevant page of the Veolkischer Beobachter for that day. This is the third page and the Tribunal will see on this front page, with the big red underlining, there are the words: "Now we indict Churchill." of the Document Book, reads as follows:
"Churchill sank the 'Athenia'.
"The above picture" -- and the Tribunal will see it is a fine picture of this fine ship -- "-- shows the proud 'Athenia', the ocean giant, which was sunk by Churchill's crime.
One can clearly see the big radio equipment on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship. Why was the 'Athenia' silent? Because her captain was not allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink the ship, through the explosion of an infernal machine. He knew it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly fifteen hundred people would have lost their lives if Churchill's original plan had resulted as the criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped that the one hundred Americans on board the ship would find death in the waves so that the anger of the American people, who were deceived by him, should be directed against Germany, as the presumed author of the deed. It was fortunate that the majority escaped the fate intended for them by Churchill. Our picture on the right shows two wounded passengers. They were rescued by the freighter City of Flint', and as can be seen here, turned over to the American coast guard boat 'Gibb' for further medical treatment. They are an unspoken accusation against the criminal Churchill. Both they and the shades of these who lost their lives call him before the Tribunal of the world and ask the British people, 'How long will the office, one of the richest in tradition known to Britain's history, be held by a murderer?'" Now, in view of the maliciousness of this "Voelkischer Beobachter" announcement and in fairness to the men of the British Merchant Navy, I think it is proper that I should say, that contrary to the allegation in this Nazi sheet, the "Athenia" of course, made repeated wireless distress signals which were in fact intercepted and answered by His Majesty's ship "Electra", in escort, as well as by the Norwegian steamship "Knut Nelson" and the yacht "Southern Cross."
the "Athenia" was sunk by the German U-boat 30. So unjustifiable was the torpedoing of the "Athenia", however, that the German Navy embarked on a course of falsification of their records and on other dishonest measures, in the hope of hiding their guilty secret. And for their part, the Tribunal has seen, the Nazi propagandists indulged in their favorite falsehood of seeking to shift the responsibility to the British.
in action, but some of the original crew of the U-30 have survived to tell the tale and they are now prisoners of war. And so that the truth of this episode may be placed beyond a peradventure, I place before the Tribunal an affidavit by a member of the crew of the U-30, as to the sinking of the "Athenia" and as to one aspect of the attempt to conceal the true facts.
I refer to Document C-654, Exhibit G.B.219, at page 106 of the Document Book. The affidavit reads:
"I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043 -33T, "Do solemnly declare that.
:
"I am now confined to Camp No 133, Lethbridge, Alberta.
"That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship of approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the evening by the U-30.
"That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again, approximately half an hour after the explosion, the Commandant called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship.
"That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that I do not think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on account of the position of the moon.
"That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go to the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.
"That, apart from myself, Oberleutenant Hinsch was in the tower when I saw the steamer after the attack.
"That I observed that the ship was listing.
"That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was launched.
"That I myself observed much commotion on board of the torpedoed ship.
"That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack.
"That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes were fired which did not explode but that I myself heard the explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer.
"That Oberleutenant Lemp waited until darkness before surfacing.
"That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September, 1939.
"That Oberleutenant Lemp shortly before my disembarkation in Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the Pety Officers quarters where I was lying severely wounded.
"That Oberleutnant Lemp then had the Petty Officers' quarters cleared in order to be alone with me.
"That Oberleutnant Lemp then showed me a declaration under oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30.
"That this declaration under oath had approximately the following wording: 'I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on board the U-30, regardless whether foe or friend, and that I shall erase from my memory all happenings of this day.'
"That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was drawn up by the Commandant in his own handwriting, with my left hand very illegibly.
"That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of the Athenia, the idea came into my mind that the U-30 on the 3 September 1939 might have sunk the Athenia, especially since the Captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration.
"That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning these events.
"That due to the termination of the war I consider myself freed from my oaths."
Doenitz's part in the Athenia episode is described in an affidavit which he has sworn, which is Exhibit D-368, Exhibit GB-220, at page 102 of the Document Bock. The affidavit was sworn in English, and I invite the Tribunal to look at it and observe the addition in Doenitz's handwriting of four words at the end of the affidavit, the significance of which will be seen in a moment.
The Defendant Doenitz states:
"U-30 returned to harbor about Mid-September. I met the captain, Oberleutnant Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshafen, as the boat was entering harbor, and he asked permission to speak to me in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was responsible for the sinking of the Athenia in the North Channel area. In accordance with my previous, instructions he had been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the Athenia from wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an armed merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I despatched Lemp at once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I ordered complete secrecy as a provisional measure. Later the same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal order from Kapitan zur See Fricke" -- who is head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff -- "that:
"1. The affair was to be kept a total secret.
"2. The OKM considered that a courtmartial was not necessary as they were satisfied that the captain had acted in good faith.
"3. Political explanations would be handled by the OKM.
"I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which the Fuehrer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the Athenia.
"After Lemp returned to Wilhemshafen from Berlin, I interrogated him thoroughly on thesinking and formed the impression that although he had taken reasonable care, he had still not taken sufficient precautions to establish fully the identity of the ship before attacking; I had previously given very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were to be treated according to naval prize law, before the occurrence of this incident. I accordingly placed him under cabin arrest, as I felt certain that a court-martial could only acquit him and would entail unnecessary publicity" -- and then Doenitz has added the words "and too much time."
It is right, I think, that I should add that Doenitz's suggestion that the captain of the U-30 sank the Athenia in mistake for a merchant cruiser must be considered in the light of a document which Colonel Phillimore submitte Document C-191, Exhibit GB-193, dated 22 September 1939, which contained Doenitz's order that "the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser."
Now, the U-30 returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939. I submit another fraudulent naval document, Exhibit D-659, page 110 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GE-221, which is an extract from the War Diary of the Chief of U-boats, and it is an extract for the 27th of September, 1939. The Tribunal will see that it reads:
"U-30 comes in.
"She had sunk:
"s.s. Blairlogie "s.s. Fanad Head."
was the forgery of the log book of the U-30, which was responsible for sinking the Athenia, and I now submit that original log book to the Tribunal as Document D-662, which will be GB-22, and an extract from the first and relevant page of it is found at page 111 of the document book. I would like the Tribunal to examine the original, if you will be good enough to do so, because the Prosecution's submission is that the first page of that log book is a forgery, but a forgery which shows a curiously un-German carelessness about detail. The Tribunal will see that the first page of the text is a clear substitute for pages that have been removed. The dates in the fist column of that page are in Arabic numerals. On the second and more authentic looking page, and throughout the other pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals. sinking of the Athenia on the 3rd of September is omitted. The entries are translated on page 111 of the document book for the Court's assistance.
3rd of September, is given as AL o278, which the Tribunal will notice is one of the very few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which was, in fact, some 200 miles west of the position where the Athenia was sunk. The course due south, which is recorded in the log book, and the speed of 10 knots -those entries are obviously designed to suggest that the U-30 was well clear of the Athenia's position on the 3rd of September.
Finally, and most curiously, the Tribunal will observe that Lemp's own signature upon the page dealing with the 3rd of September differs from the other signatures in the text. Page 1 shows Lemp's signature with a Roman "p" as the final letter of his name. On the other signatures, there is a script "p", and the inference I submit is that either the signature is a forgery or it was made up by Lemp at some other, and probably considerably later date. that the German Navy under Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before receiving Lemp's reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly denied the possibility that a German U-Boat could be in the area concerned. The charts which showed the disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the Athenia, which Colonel Phillimore introduced, have shown the utter dishonesty of these announcements, and my submission upon this matter is this: Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and information control in Nazi Germany were so complete that Raeder, as head of the Navy, must have been party to the falsification published in the Voelkischer Beobachter, which was a wholly dishonorable attempt by the Nazi conspirators to save their faces with their own people and to uphold the myth of an infallible Fuehrer backed by an impeccable war machine. and it would appear that Raeder's camouflage was not confined to painting his ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking Norway or Denmark. With regard to that last matter, the invasion of Norway and Denmark, I think it is hardly necessary that I should remind the Tribunal of Raeder's leading partin that perfidious Nazi assault, the evidence as to which has already been presented.
I think I need only add Raeder's proud comment upon those brutal invasions, which is contained in his letter in Document C-155 at page 25 of the document book, which is already before the Tribunal as GB-214. That document, which is a letter of Raeder's to the Navy, part of which I have already read, states:
"The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to this war."
completed, the Tribunal has seen that Hitler turned his eyes towards Russia. Now, in fairness to Raeder, it is right that I should, say that Raeder himself was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. The documents show, however, that Raeder approached the problem with complete cynicism. He didn't object to the aggressive war on Russia because of its illegality, its immorality, its humanity. His only objection to it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going further afield.
The story of Raider's part in the deliberations upon the war against Russia is told in the document C-170, at page 37 of the document book, and which has already been submitted as US-136. That document consists of extracts from a German compilation of official naval notes by the German Naval War Staff. date of 26 September 1940, which is at page 11 of C-170, showed that Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy in which, of course, the Navy would play a paramount role, as opposed to a continental land policy. The entry reads:
"Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander presents his opinion about the situation: the Suez Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable whether action against Russia from the North will then be still necessary." November:
"Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour. On the one side England has gained strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support, on the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking effect.
What is being done for submarine and naval air force construction is much too little.
Our entire war potential must work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for Navy and air force every fissure of strength prolongs the war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of England." is the entry:
'"Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of Malta even before 'Barbarossa'". entry:
"Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that seizure of Malta is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the execution of 'Barbarossa' -- which the Tribunal may think is a sublime example of wishful thinking. the document book, shows that by March of 1941 Raeder had begun to consider what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to offer. There is the entry:
"In case of 'Barbarossa', Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute necessity for the Navy Chief of the Supreme Command Armed Forces, considers compliance very difficult." the flunky of Naziism, was crying out for a more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. I refer the Court to page 57 of the document book, the entry for the 30th of May. The word "Duce" is missing from the first line, and the entry should read:
"Duce demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall 1943 12 division is needed for that; 'This stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London'; Chief Naval Operations agrees completely." views of Raeder and the German Navy at this stage, reads as follows: It is at page 58 of the document book: