The last paragraph on that page:
"Whilst on board the 'Lady Madeleine' the Second Engineer and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the Second Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 21/2 inches long embedded in his body." And there is a sentence on which I don't rely, and the last sentence:
"I had 14 shrapnel wounds."
My Lord, and then the last two paragraphs of the affidavit:
"This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the whalers 'Sylvester' (mined) and 'New Seville' (torpedoed), and the Trawler 'Ocean Tide', which ran ashore.
"As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six killed, two missing, two injured."
My Lord, the next document, D-647, I put in as GB-204. My Lord, this is an extract from a statement given by the Second Officer of the ship "Antonico", torpedoed, set afire, and sunk, on the 28th of September 1942, on the coast of French Guiana. The Tribunal will observe that the date of the incident is some eleven days after the issue of the order. My Lord, I would read from the words "that the witness saw the dead", slightly more than halfway down on the first page. An account has been given of the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire:
"That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the 'Antonico' as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the 'Antonico' in order to avoid being dragged down by the same 'Antonico' and also because she was the aggressor's target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the 'Antonico' lit up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in No.2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves overboard to save themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked.
At that time the witness and his companions were about 20 metres in distance from the submarine."
My Lord, I haven't got the U-boat's log in that case, but you may think that, in view of the order with regard to entries in logs, namely that anything compromising should not be put in, it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident.
My Lord, the next document, D-646/a, I put in as GB-205. It is a monitored account of a talk by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland. The broadcast was in English, and the date is the 11th of March, 1943. It is, if I may quote:
"Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters - dangerous' for the British and Americans and for all the colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage. Lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for Britain and America."
My Lord, the next page of the document I don't propose to read. It is an extract from the log of the U-boat believed to have sunk this ship. It was, in fact, the U-105. policy of the enemy at the start to seek to terrorize crews, and it is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of steamers.
do not complain of rescue ships being attacked. They are not entitled to protection. The point of the order was that they were to be given priority in attack, and the order, therefore, is closely allied with the order of the 17th of September 1942. In view of the Allied building program, it had become imperative to prevent the ships being manned.
defendant Raeder. My Lord, the next document is 2098-PS. It has been referred to but not, I think, put in. I put it in formally as GB-206. My Lord, I won't read it. It merely sets out that the defendant Raeder should have the equivalent rank of a minister of the Reich, and I ask the Tribunal to infer that on succeeding Raeder the defendant Doenitz would presumably have succeeded to that right.
THE PRESIDENT: This is from 1938 onward?
COL. PHILLIMORE: From 1938 onward.
The next document, D-648, I put in as GB-207. It is an affidavit by an official, or rather it is an official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty. The certificate is on the last page, and it sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings, and those present, on the occasion of meetings between the defendant Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end. The certificate states:
"I have compiled from them"--that is, from captured documents--"the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract from the collective documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession of the British admiralty, London," My Lord, I won't go through the list.
I would merely call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of these meetings; and that amongst those who were also constantly there were the defendants Speer, Keitel and Jodl, Ribbentrop and Goering, and also Himmler or his Leutnants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. is that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, this defendant was one of the rules of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all decisions, major decisions of policy.
My Lord, I pass to the next document, C-178. That has already been put in as United States Exhibit 544. It is an internal memorandum of the Naval War Staff, written by the division dealing with international law to another division, and the subject is the order with regard to the shooting of Commandos, of the 18th of October, 1942, with which the Tribunal are, I think, familiar. some quarters with regard to the understanding of the order, and in the last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested, "As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen Whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of commando units," My Lord, whether that conference took place or not I do not know.
The document is dated some 11 days after this defendant had taken over from the defendant Raeder. instance of the Navy in July of that year, July 1943, handing over to the SD for shooting Norwegian and British Navy personnel, whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order. My Lord, it is an affidavit by a British Barrister-at-Law who served as judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order. Paragraph 1 sets out that the deponent was judge advocate at the trial of ten members of the SD by a military court held at the Law Courts, Oslow, Norway, which sat on Thursday, 29 November 1945, and concluded its sitting on Tuesday, 4 December 1945. of the prosecuting and defending counsel, and the third paragraph states:
"The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of"--and then there follows the names of six Norwegian personnel of the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one leading telegraphist of the Royal Navy, prisoners of war, I might read from paragraph 4: "There was evidence before the Court which was not challenged by the Defense 3 that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area.
The persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo' Boat."
Paragraph 5: "The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they Were wearing uniform at all times after their capture."
Paragraph 6: "On 27th July, 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus where they had Arrived by 11 p.m. on 28th July. The crew were there interrogated by Leut. H.P.W.W.Fanger, a Naval Leutnant of the Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitan Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the west coast. Leut. Fanger reported to the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west coast.
"7. The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SD, Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuehrer order of the 18th October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this Torpedo Boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuehrer order, to the SD.
"9. The SD then conducted their own interrogation -
THE PRESIDENT: You can summarize the rest, can't you?
COL. PHILLIMORE: If your Lordship pleases. SD, and that these officials took the same view as the Naval Intelligence officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war; that despite this they were taken out and shot by an execution squad composed of members of the SD. the case against the defendant Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, read it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I should read it.
"11. It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an order from the Fuehrer headquarters, signed by Keitel, was transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance of the order was that members of the crew of commando raids who fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. This order referred specifically to the Fuehrer order referred to above."
The members of the Tribunal will of course have noted date; it was time to put their affairs in order.
My Lord, the next document, C-158, I put in as GB-209. It consists of two extracts from minutes of conferences on the 19th and 20th of February 1945, conferences between the defendant Doenitz and Hitler. If I might read the first and last sentence of the first extract:
"The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention." That is of course the 1929 prisoners of war convention. And the last sentence:
"The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Wavy to consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his opinion as soon as possible," in the presence of the defendant Jodl and the representative of the defendant Ribbentrop. It is the last two sentences on which I rely;
"On the contrary, the disadvantages" -- that is, tie disadvantages of renouncing the convention--"outweigh the advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the outer world." it was to that convention that we owe the fact that upwards of 165,000 British and 65,000 to 70,000 American prisoners of war were duly recovered at the end of the war. And to advocate breaching that convention, preferably without saying so, is not a matter to be treated lightly.
My Lord, the next document, C-171, I put in as GB-210. It is another extract from the minutes of a meeting between the defendant Doenitz and Hitler, the 1st of July 1944. The extract is signed by the defendant:
"Regarding the General Strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court martial proceedings create martyrs, .History shows, that the names of such men are on everybody's lips, whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court martial proceedings".
"My Lord, the next document, C-195, I put in as GB-211. It is a memorandum signed by the defendant, dated late in 1944. There is no specific date on the document, but it is late in 1944, in December, I think, of 1944.
The distribution on the third page includes Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Speer and the Supreme Command of the Air Force.
My Lord, if I might read the second paragraph. He is dealing with the review of German shipping loses.
"Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties by prisoners from the concentration camps and as a special measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths, especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert coppersmiths from the construction of locomotives to shipbuilding". that page are:
"Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration".
THE PRESIDENT: Do you need to read any more than that?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, no. The last sentence of the document in the next page is:
"Item 2 of the summing-up reads: '12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor (security service agrees to this!" That is the SD. that document alone is sufficient to condemn him. It was not for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his Leutnants, Fegelein and Kaltenbrunner, were present.
My Lord, they were not there to discuss U-boats for the use of battleships. It is clear, in my submission, from this document that this defendant knew all about concentration camps and concentration camp labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he must bear his full share of that responsibility.
My Lord, this contains the orders issued by the defendant in April. The document, in my submission, shows the defendant's fanatical adherence to the Nazi creed, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a hopeless war at the expense of human life and with the certainty of increased destruction and misery to the men, women and children of his country. I read the last paragraph on the second page:
"I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy: That they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty, whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger the following of this path."
Then he refers to an order. "I demand Senior Commanders that they should take just as ruthless action against any commander who does not do' his military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not burdened with any tasks as a leader." 19th of April, he gives an example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted.
"An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser "Cormorau', in Australia, a petty officer acting as camp senior officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a way that the guards did not notice. This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown that he is fitted to be a leader."
but the type of order that he was issuing. My Lord, if I might just sum up, the Defendant was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service officer, loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day; he was an extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincident that it was he who was chosen to succeed Hitler; not Goering, not Ribbentrop, not Goebbels, not Himmler. He played a bigger part in fashioning the U-boat fleet, one of the most deadly weapons of aggressive war. He helped to plan and execute aggressive war, and we cannot doubt that he knew well that these wars were in deliberate violation of treaties. He was ready to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would not be found out. Preaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality, were you might hope to maintain that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally. for men of the merchant navies whose destruction was due to the careless brutality with which, at the orders of this man, the German U-boats did their work.
My Lord, my learned friend, Mr. Elwyn Jones, now deals with the Defendant Raeder.
MR. ELWYN JONES: May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present to the Tribunal the evidence against the creator of the Nazi Navy, the Defendant Raeder. The allegations against him are set out in Appendix A of the Indictment at pages thirty-three and thirty-four, and the Tribunal will see the the Defendant Raeder is charged with promoting and participating in the planning of the Nazi wars of aggression; with executing those plans; and with authorizing, directing, and participating in Nazi war crimes, particularly war crimes arising out of sea warfare. 299-PS, which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit U.S. 13, which the Tribunal will find at page ninety-six of the document book.
That is a document which sets out the offices and positions held by the Defendant Raeder. The Tribunal will see that he was born in 1876 and joined the German Navy in 1896. By 1915 he had become commander of the Cruiser Koeln. In 1928 he became an admiral, chief of naval command, and head of the German Navy. In 1935 he became commander-in-chief of the Navy. In 1936 he became general admiral, a creation of Hitler's, on his forty-seventh birthday. In 1937 he received the high Nazi honor of golden badge of honor of the Nazi Party. In 1938 he became a member of the secret cabinet council. And in 1939 he reached the Empyrean of Grand Admiral, a rank created by Hitler, who presented Raeder with a marshal's baton. In 1943 he became admiral inspector of the German Navy, which as the Tribunal will shortly see was a kind of retirement into oblivion, because from January 1943 on, as the Tribunal has heard, Doenitz was the effective commander of the German Navy.
In these eventful years of Raeder's command of the German Navy from 1928 to 1943 he played a vital role. And I would like in the first instance to draw the Tribunal's attention to Raeder's part in building up the German Navy as an instrument of war to implement the Nazis general plan of aggression.
navy permitted to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles was enormously expanded under the guidance of Raeder. I will do no more than to remind the Tribunal of some of the milestones upon Raeder's road to Nazi mastery of the seas, which mercifully he was unable to attain.
With regard to the story of Germany's secret rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, I would refer the Court to the Document C-156, which is already before the Court as U.S. 41, and which the Tribunal will find at page twenty-six of the document book. That document, as the Tribunal will remember, was a history of the fight of the German Navy against Versailles, 1919 to 1935, which was published secretly by the German Admiralty in 1937. And the Tribunal will remember that that history shows that before the Nazis came to power the German Admiralty was deceiving not only the governments of other countries, but its own legislature and at one stage its own governments. Their secret measures of rearmament, ranging from experimental U-Boat and E-Boat building to the creation of secret intelligence and finance organizations. I only propose to trouble the Tribunal with a reference to the last paragraph at page thirty-three of the document book, which refers to the role of Raeder in this development. It is an extract from page seventy-five of this document C-156, and it reads:
"The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, had received hereby a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty."
As an illustration of Raeder's concealment of rearmament, I would remind the Tribunal of the document C-141, U.S. Exhibit 47, which is at page twenty-two of the document book. In that document Raeder states that, "In view of Germany's treaty obligations and the disarmament conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first E-Boat-Half-Flotilla from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not intended to count these E-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed them."
is at page twenty of the document book, is of unusual interest because it suggests that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to attack Poland was already current in German military circles. This document is an extract from the history of war organization and of the scheme for moblization. The German text of this document is headed "828500/38", which suggests that the document was written in the year 1938. The extracts read:
"Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for mobilization were forbidden, these were at first confined to a very small body of collaborators and were at first only of a theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time an "Establishment Order," Instructions for Establishment, the forerunners of the present-day scheme for Mobilization.
"An establishment organization and adaptable instructions for establishment were drawn up for each A-year, cover name for moblization year.
"As stated, the "Establishment Organization" of that time were to be judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive basis in the form of men and materials. They provided nevertheless a valuable foundation for the establishment of a War Organization as our ultimate aim."
Paragraph two. "The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making theoretical preparations for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a purely German-Polish conflict.
"The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of Gydnia was made a basis, and the fleet on active serve was to be reinforced by the auxilliary forces which would be indispensable to attain this strategic end, and the essential coastal and flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and Swinemuende were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the Reinforcement Plan was evolved." second paragraph, Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him in five years, that is to say, by the 1st of April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power.
power in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to go full speed ahead on rearmament. The detailed story of this development has already been told by my American colleague, Mr. Alderman, and I would simply refer the Court in the first place to the document C-189, exhibit U.S.44, which is at page sixty-six of the document book. In that document Raeder tells Hitler in June 1934 that the German fleet must be developed to oppose England, and that therefore from 1936 on the big ships must be armed with big guns to match the British King George class of battleship. It further, in the last paragraph, refers to Hitler's demand that the construction of U-Boats should be kept completely secret, especially in view of the Saar plebescite. In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with Hitler on the financing of naval rearmament, and on that occasion Hitler told him that in case of need he would get Doctor Ley to put 120 to 150,000,000 from the labor front at the disposal of the navy. The reference to that is the document C-190, exhibit U.S. 45, at page sixty-seven of the document book. The Tribunal may think that that proposed fraud upon the German working people was a characteristic Nazi manifestation.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
MR. ELWYN JONES: If Your Lordship please.
(Whereupon at 1245 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1400 hours).
Military Tribunal, in the matter of: The
MR. ELWYN JONES: May I say to the Tribunal, the next document I desire to draw to the Tribunal's attention is Document C 23, Exhibit U.S. 49, at page 3 of the Document Book, which states that the true displacement of certain German battleships exceeded by twenty per cent the displacement reported to the British, and that, I submit, is typical of Raeder's use of deceit.
The next document to which I refer to briefly, is C-166, Exhibit U.S. 48, page 36 of the Document Book, is another such deceitful document, which orders that auxiliary cruisers, which were being secretly constructed, should be referred to as "transport ships 0."
Then there is the Document C-29, U.S. Exhibit 46, at page 8 of the Document Book, which is signed by Raeder, and deals with the support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry, and I submit, is an illustration of Raeder's concern with the broader aspects of Nazi policy and of the close link between Nazi politicians, German Service Chiefs and German armament manufacturers.
THE PRESIDENT: Has that been put in before?
MR. ELWYN JONES: It has been put in before, My Lord, as U.S. Exhibit 46. at page 24 of the Document Book, which is a new document and will be .Exhibit G.B. 214, and is a letter from Raeder to the German Navy, dated the 11 of June, 1940 and the original, which has been submitted to the Tribunal, shows the very widest distribution of this letter. There is provision in the distribution list for 467 copies. This letter of Raeder's is a letter both of self-justification and of apology. The extracts read:
"The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in the Officer Corps are the Torpedo positions and the problem whether the naval building program, up to Autumn 1939, envisaged the possibility of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or whether the emphasis ought not to have been laid, from the first, on the construction of U-boats.
"If the opinion is voiced in the Officer Corps that the entire naval building program has been wrongly directed, and if, from the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat weapon and after its consolidation on the large ships, I must emphasize the following matters:
"The building up of the Fleet was directed according to the political demands, which were decided by the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer hoped, until the last moment, to be able to put off the threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that time the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards strength in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for warfare on the high seas.
"The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to the expectation even of the Fuehrer, into a war, which it had to accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis should have been laid, from the start, on the building of the U-boat arm, appear to be right. I leave undiscussed, how far this development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel, training and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and necessary creation of an effective Air Force slowed down the desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I indicate, however, with pride the admirable and, in spite of the political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic, far-reaching preparation for U-boat construction, which made the immensely rapid construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the assumption of power." Nazi program. On the contrary, the evidence points to the fact that Raeder welcomed and became one of the pillars of Nazi power, and now it will be my purpose to develop the relationship between Raeder, the Navy and the Nazi Party.
The Prosecution's submission is that Raeder, more than anyone else, was responsible for securing the unquestioned allegience of the German Navy to the Nazi movement, an allegience which Doenitz was to make even more firm and fanatical.
Raeder's approval of Hitler was shown particularly clearly on the 2nd of August, 1934, the day of Hindenburg's death, when he and all the men under him, swore a new oath of loyalty with considerable ceremony, this time to Adolf Hitler and no longer to the Fatherland. The oath is found in Document 481, at page 101 of the Document Book. That will be Exhibit G.B. 215, and it may be of interest to the Court to see what the new oath was.
The last paragraph reads:
"I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath." Fuehrer.
I am not proposing to take the Tribunal's time with reiterating the steps by which the German Navy was progressively drawn into the closest alliance with the Nazi Party. I would remind the Court of facts of history, like the incorporation of the swastika into the ensign, under which the German Fleet sailed and the wearing of the swastika on the uniform of naval officers and men, which are facts which speak for themselves.
The Nazis for their part, were not ungrateful for Raeder's obeisance and collaboration. His services in rebuilding the German Navywere widely recognized by Nazi propagandists and by the Nazi press. On his 66th birthday, the Chief Party Organ, the "Voelkischer Beobachter", published a special article about him, to which I desire to draw the Tribunal's attention. It is at page 100 of the document book; it is document D-448, Exhibit G.B. 216. It is a valuable summing up of Raeder's contribution to Nazi development.
"It was to Raeder's credit" --writes the Voelkischer Beobachter -to have already built up by that time a powerful striking force from the numerically small fleet, despite the fetters of Versailles.
"With the assumption of power through National Socialism, began too, the most fruitful period in the reconstruction of the German Fleet.
"The Fuehrer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder's faithful services and unstinted cooperation, by appointing him General-Admiral on the 20th of April, 1936".
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it necessary to read the entire document?
MR. ELWYN JONES: I was going to turn to the last paragraph but one, My Lord, which I think is helpful.
"As a soldier and a seaman, the General-Admiral has proved himself to be the Fuehrer's first and foremost naval collaborator." Germany.
I now propose to deal with Reader's personal part in the Nazi conspiracy. The evidence indicates that Raeder, from the time of the Nazi seizure of power, became increasingly involved in responsibility for the general policies of the Nazi State. a member of the very secret Reich Defense Council, joining it when it was founded on the 4th of April, 1933. And thus, at an early date, he was involved, both militarily and politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. The relevant document upon that is Document EC-177, U.S. Exhibit 390, at page 68 of the Document Book, which I would remind the Tribunal contains the classic Nazi directive:
"Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be denied by us in Geneva." of a newly formed secret advisory council for foreign affairs, and the authority for the statement is Exhibit 2031-PS, at page 88 of the Document Book, which will be Exhibit G.B. 217.
Three weeks after this, a decree of Hitler's stated that, as well as being equal in rank with a Cabinet Minister, Raeder was also to take part in the sessions of the Cabinet. That has already been established in Document 2098-PS, which was submitted as G.B. 206.
In my submission, therefore, it is thus clear that Raeder's responsibility for the political decisions of the Nazi State was steadily developed from 1933 to 1938 and that in the course of time he had become a member of all the main political advisory bodies. He was, indeed, very much a member of the inner councils of the conspirators, and, I submit, must carry with them the responsibility for the acts that led to the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the outbreak of the war. present at two of the key meetings at which Hitler openly declared his intention of attacking neighboring countries. They are the Document 386-PS, which is U.S. Exhibit 25 and is found at page 81 of the Document Book, which the Tribunal will remember is the record of Hitler's conference at the Reichs Chancellory on the 5th of November, 1937, about matters which were said to be too important to discuss in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, and a document which Mr. Alderman submitted, establishing conclusively that the Nazis premeditated their crimes against peace.
Then there was the other conference of Hitler's on the 23rd of May, 1939, the Minutes of which are found in the Document L-79, U.S. Exhibit 27, at page 74 of the Document Book. That, the Tribunal will remember, was the conference at which Hitler confirmed his intention to make a deliberate attack upon Poland at the first opportunity, well knowing that this must cause widespread war in Europe.