Then it was referred to Admiral Goth.
Q. Didn't you know that the affair with these flyers in the Bay of Biscay had really been just the opposite?
A. I don't understand it.
Q. I continue: that the commander had been reproached because he didn't bring home these flyers after terminating his mission and coming back?
A. No, I don't remember that.
Q. In that first example which you gave or which you mentioned, were you told by Corvette Captain Kuppisch that the shipwreck and rescue facilities should be destroyed near the American coast?
A. No, he only said it was regrettable that the crews had been rescued.
Q. And you concluded from that that it was desirable that the shipwrecked should be killed?
A. I didn't draw any conclusions since I passed on these examples without any commentary.
Q. Do you know the standing orders of the Flag Officer U-boats? Do they contain "the general principles of U-boat warfare?
A. Yes.
Q. Are there to be found in the standing orders any orders in which the killing of shipwrecked sailors or the destruction of rescue facilities is ordered or recommended?
A. As far as I know, no.
Q. What kind of secrecy was attached to these standing orders?
A. As far as I remember, "Geheime Kommandosache" -- Top Secret.
Q. Do you remember that in Standing Order 511, the following was ordered:
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I read from an order which I shall submit in evidence later on. I cannot do it yet beacuse I have not as yet the original in hand.
Q. (Reading) "Standing Order of Flag Officer U-boats No. 511, 20th of May, 1943. Taking on board of officers of subken ships.
"1. As far as conditions of accomodation allow on board, Captains and Chief Engineers of sunk ships are to be brought in. The enemy tries to contravene this intention and has issued the following order: 'a. Masters are not allowed to make themselves known if questioned, but should if possible push on other sailors selected especially for this purpose, b. Crew has to state that Masters and Chief Engineers remained on board in spite of energetic questioning. If it is not possible to find out the Masters or the Chief Engineers, then other ship officers should be taken aboard.'" I skip No. 2 and pass on to No. 3 -- no, I am going to read No. 2. as well.
"No bringing in is allowed of masters and officers of neutral ships, which, according to Standing Order No. 101, can be sunk (e.g., Swedish ships outside Goeteborg traffic), because internment of these officers would contravene international law.
"3. Ship officers cannot be taken prisoners. Otherwise, members of the crew should be taken along as far as accommodation facilities and further operations pernit. The purpose is interrogation of prisoners for military and propagandistic purposes.
"4. In the case of sinking single cruising destroyer, corvette, or trawler, try in all events to take prisoners, if that can be done without endangering the boat. Interrogation, at interrogation camp, can produce valuable hints as to anti-submarine tactics and weapons of the enemy; and the same applies to air crews of shot down planes." BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. Do you know that order?
A. The order seems familiar to me.
Q. Do you know the order 513?
"Standing order of Flag Officer, U-Boats, 1 June 1944, Bringing in of Prisoners.
"1. Statements of prisoners are most certain best source for interrogation regarding enemy tactics, weapons, location sets and location methods.
Prisoners from planes and destroyers can be put to use of the greatest importance. Therefore, as far as possible, without endangering the boat, do the utmost to take such prisoners.
"2. As prisoners are extremely willing to talk under the impression of being captured, interrogate them at once on board. This is of special interest: In which manner the location of U-Boats is done by aircraft, whether by radar or by passive location; for instance, by ascertaining, through electricity or heat, the location of the boat. Report prisoners taken in order to hand them over to returning boats."
Do you know that order? Have you noticed and tried to clarify a contradiction between these orders concerning the rescue of air crews in each instance and the passing on of your story about the construction of air crews?
A No, not in that. In the order of September 1942 it was also said that the order remains valid as to the taking of prisoners the master and the chief engineer. masters and chief engineers but has killed the rest of the crew? given -- that is, that part of the crew should be rescued under orders and the rest of the crew should be killed?
A No, sir. Such an order cannot be given. gave, any commander has destroyed rescue facilities or has killed shipwrecked sailors? blockade region? orders concerning neutral ships?
on that subject. martial if they did not obey the orders which had been given for the protection of neutrals?
A Yes; I remember one case which happened in the Caribbean Sea ships for investigation was ordered?
A Yes, but I do not remember the date. It was ordered that in particular Spanish and Portugese ships in the North Atlantic should be stopped and searched.
Q Have you passed on that order to the commanders? contained in one of the official collections of orders. I have passed on orders to commanders only in such instances where they were not contained in a collection of orders. that order should be executed or not? and the commanders did not know of it yet -- that they should be exceedingly careful, as far as the stepping of neutrals was concerned, since there was always the danger that a neutral ship could, by radio, report the position of the U-Boat. And owing to the air superiority of the enemy in the North Atlantic, it was always safer or better if the U-Boat was not forced to such stopping.
Q Had you orders as far as that addition was concerned?
A No. As far as I remember, one of the members of the staff -- I think it was Captain Hessler -- told me that he emphasized that all stopping of ships, also neutrals, involved a considerable endangering of the boat.
Q Because of the air superiority? ships. You remember that?
as hospital ships, with special markings?
Q Which orders had been issued concerning hospital ships? in writing or not; I only remember that "the flag office, U-Boat, very often called the attention of the commanders to the fact that hospital ships should be respected under all circumstances. by U-Boats?
A No; I don't know of such a case. law to destroy helpless human beings, would, in such a case, the destruction of hospital ships have been an excellent measure?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to cross-examine this witness?
(No response.)
BY THE TRIBUNAL (Judge Biddle):
that you torpedoed?
A No, sir. I have not been in a position to do that owing
Q You mean it was dangerous to your boat to do it?
A Not only that. A great part of the sinkings which I did took THE TRIBUNAL (Judge Biddle): That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, do you wish to re-examine?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have about three questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
orders with regard to rescue?
should not be endangered by rescue measures. Whether these orders did you take it merely as prohibiting rescue or as going further?
Q You haven't answered my question. Did you take the order measures, or as something further?
you any knowledge of the facts of that incident?
on to commanders?
A I told the commanders, literally the following. "We approach now a very delicate and difficult chapter; it is the question of the treatment of life boats.
The flag officer U-boats has issued the following radio message in September, 1942.
' Thereupon I read the In most instances the chapter was closed thereupon; no commander had any question to ask.
In some few instances the commanders asked, "How should that order be interpreted?"
In that case I gave the two examples as a means of interpretation.
And then I added that officers after they had read the order?
A Yes, sir. Several commanders, following the reading of "That is very clear, but damned hard."
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for ten minutes.
(Whereupon a recess was taken from 11.20 to 11.
30 hours.)
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I would now put before the Tribunal two cases where that order of the 17th of September, 1942, was apparently put into effect. The first case is set out at the next document in the Document Book, which is D-645. My Lord, I put that document in and it becomes GB-203.
THE PRESIDENT: Which document does it follow?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It follows -
THE PRESIDENT: I have got it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is a report of the sinking of a steam trawler, the "Noreen Mary," which was sunk by U-247 on the 5th of July, 1944. The first page of the document contains an extract from the log of the U Boat. The time reference 1943 on the document is followed by an account of the firing of two torpedoes which missed, and then, at 2055, the log reads:
"Surfaced.
"Fishing Vessels: (Bearings given of 3 ships).
"Engaged the nearest. She stops after three minutes." and then, the final entry:
"Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern."
THE PRESIDENT: Why is it entered as 5. 7. 1943 ?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, that is an error.
THE PRESIDENT: An error?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a typing error. I should have pointed it out. the U-Boat command, and the last line reads:
"Recognized success: Fishing vessel "Noreen Mary" sunk by flak." on board the "Noreen Mary" at the time of the sinking. My Lord, reading the last paragraph on the first page of the affidavit. He has dealt earlier with having seen the torpedo tracks which missed the trawler. The last paragraph reads:
"At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath, on a north-westerly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with light airs." and then, if I might read from the second paragraph on page 2.
THE PRESIDENT: Why not read the first?
COL. PHILLIMORE: If your Lordship please:
"When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the conning tower. The skipper thought at first the submarine was British, but when she opened fire he immediately slackened the brake to take the weight off gear, (that is, the trawler), and increased to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine chased us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and had not had time to take cover. The submarine then started using a heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from which burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam and stopping the ship.
"By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the time but did not catch fire.
"The Mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was aft, but the Mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the waterline, for shelter. The ship was listing more and more to port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and the only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do not know where the other three men had taken cover during this time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the water.
"I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun.
As their intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine had been firing her guns for a full hour." and others attempting to rescue themselves and to help each other, and then they were picked up by another trawler.
The last paragraph on that page:
"Whilst on board the 'Lady Madeleine' the Second Engineer and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the Second Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 21/2 inches long embedded in his body." And there is a sentence on which I don't rely, and the last sentence:
"I had 14 shrapnel wounds."
My Lord, and then the last two paragraphs of the affidavit:
"This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the whalers 'Sylvester' (mined) and 'New Seville' (torpedoed), and the Trawler 'Ocean Tide', which ran ashore.
"As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six killed, two missing, two injured."
My Lord, the next document, D-647, I put in as GB-204. My Lord, this is an extract from a statement given by the Second Officer of the ship "Antonico", torpedoed, set afire, and sunk, on the 28th of September 1942, on the coast of French Guiana. The Tribunal will observe that the date of the incident is some eleven days after the issue of the order. My Lord, I would read from the words "that the witness saw the dead", slightly more than halfway down on the first page. An account has been given of the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire:
"That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the 'Antonico' as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the 'Antonico' in order to avoid being dragged down by the same 'Antonico' and also because she was the aggressor's target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the 'Antonico' lit up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in No.2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves overboard to save themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked.
At that time the witness and his companions were about 20 metres in distance from the submarine."
My Lord, I haven't got the U-boat's log in that case, but you may think that, in view of the order with regard to entries in logs, namely that anything compromising should not be put in, it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident.
My Lord, the next document, D-646/a, I put in as GB-205. It is a monitored account of a talk by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland. The broadcast was in English, and the date is the 11th of March, 1943. It is, if I may quote:
"Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters - dangerous' for the British and Americans and for all the colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage. Lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for Britain and America."
My Lord, the next page of the document I don't propose to read. It is an extract from the log of the U-boat believed to have sunk this ship. It was, in fact, the U-105. policy of the enemy at the start to seek to terrorize crews, and it is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of steamers.
do not complain of rescue ships being attacked. They are not entitled to protection. The point of the order was that they were to be given priority in attack, and the order, therefore, is closely allied with the order of the 17th of September 1942. In view of the Allied building program, it had become imperative to prevent the ships being manned.
defendant Raeder. My Lord, the next document is 2098-PS. It has been referred to but not, I think, put in. I put it in formally as GB-206. My Lord, I won't read it. It merely sets out that the defendant Raeder should have the equivalent rank of a minister of the Reich, and I ask the Tribunal to infer that on succeeding Raeder the defendant Doenitz would presumably have succeeded to that right.
THE PRESIDENT: This is from 1938 onward?
COL. PHILLIMORE: From 1938 onward.
The next document, D-648, I put in as GB-207. It is an affidavit by an official, or rather it is an official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty. The certificate is on the last page, and it sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings, and those present, on the occasion of meetings between the defendant Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end. The certificate states:
"I have compiled from them"--that is, from captured documents--"the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract from the collective documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession of the British admiralty, London," My Lord, I won't go through the list.
I would merely call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of these meetings; and that amongst those who were also constantly there were the defendants Speer, Keitel and Jodl, Ribbentrop and Goering, and also Himmler or his Leutnants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. is that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, this defendant was one of the rules of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all decisions, major decisions of policy.
My Lord, I pass to the next document, C-178. That has already been put in as United States Exhibit 544. It is an internal memorandum of the Naval War Staff, written by the division dealing with international law to another division, and the subject is the order with regard to the shooting of Commandos, of the 18th of October, 1942, with which the Tribunal are, I think, familiar. some quarters with regard to the understanding of the order, and in the last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested, "As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen Whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of commando units," My Lord, whether that conference took place or not I do not know.
The document is dated some 11 days after this defendant had taken over from the defendant Raeder. instance of the Navy in July of that year, July 1943, handing over to the SD for shooting Norwegian and British Navy personnel, whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order. My Lord, it is an affidavit by a British Barrister-at-Law who served as judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order. Paragraph 1 sets out that the deponent was judge advocate at the trial of ten members of the SD by a military court held at the Law Courts, Oslow, Norway, which sat on Thursday, 29 November 1945, and concluded its sitting on Tuesday, 4 December 1945. of the prosecuting and defending counsel, and the third paragraph states:
"The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of"--and then there follows the names of six Norwegian personnel of the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one leading telegraphist of the Royal Navy, prisoners of war, I might read from paragraph 4: "There was evidence before the Court which was not challenged by the Defense 3 that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area.
The persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo' Boat."
Paragraph 5: "The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they Were wearing uniform at all times after their capture."
Paragraph 6: "On 27th July, 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus where they had Arrived by 11 p.m. on 28th July. The crew were there interrogated by Leut. H.P.W.W.Fanger, a Naval Leutnant of the Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitan Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the west coast. Leut. Fanger reported to the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west coast.
"7. The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SD, Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuehrer order of the 18th October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this Torpedo Boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuehrer order, to the SD.
"9. The SD then conducted their own interrogation -
THE PRESIDENT: You can summarize the rest, can't you?
COL. PHILLIMORE: If your Lordship pleases. SD, and that these officials took the same view as the Naval Intelligence officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war; that despite this they were taken out and shot by an execution squad composed of members of the SD. the case against the defendant Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, read it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I should read it.
"11. It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an order from the Fuehrer headquarters, signed by Keitel, was transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance of the order was that members of the crew of commando raids who fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. This order referred specifically to the Fuehrer order referred to above."
The members of the Tribunal will of course have noted date; it was time to put their affairs in order.
My Lord, the next document, C-158, I put in as GB-209. It consists of two extracts from minutes of conferences on the 19th and 20th of February 1945, conferences between the defendant Doenitz and Hitler. If I might read the first and last sentence of the first extract:
"The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention." That is of course the 1929 prisoners of war convention. And the last sentence:
"The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Wavy to consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his opinion as soon as possible," in the presence of the defendant Jodl and the representative of the defendant Ribbentrop. It is the last two sentences on which I rely;
"On the contrary, the disadvantages" -- that is, tie disadvantages of renouncing the convention--"outweigh the advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the outer world." it was to that convention that we owe the fact that upwards of 165,000 British and 65,000 to 70,000 American prisoners of war were duly recovered at the end of the war. And to advocate breaching that convention, preferably without saying so, is not a matter to be treated lightly.
My Lord, the next document, C-171, I put in as GB-210. It is another extract from the minutes of a meeting between the defendant Doenitz and Hitler, the 1st of July 1944. The extract is signed by the defendant:
"Regarding the General Strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court martial proceedings create martyrs, .History shows, that the names of such men are on everybody's lips, whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court martial proceedings".
"My Lord, the next document, C-195, I put in as GB-211. It is a memorandum signed by the defendant, dated late in 1944. There is no specific date on the document, but it is late in 1944, in December, I think, of 1944.
The distribution on the third page includes Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Speer and the Supreme Command of the Air Force.
My Lord, if I might read the second paragraph. He is dealing with the review of German shipping loses.
"Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties by prisoners from the concentration camps and as a special measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths, especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert coppersmiths from the construction of locomotives to shipbuilding". that page are:
"Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration".
THE PRESIDENT: Do you need to read any more than that?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, no. The last sentence of the document in the next page is:
"Item 2 of the summing-up reads: '12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor (security service agrees to this!" That is the SD. that document alone is sufficient to condemn him. It was not for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his Leutnants, Fegelein and Kaltenbrunner, were present.
My Lord, they were not there to discuss U-boats for the use of battleships. It is clear, in my submission, from this document that this defendant knew all about concentration camps and concentration camp labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he must bear his full share of that responsibility.
My Lord, this contains the orders issued by the defendant in April. The document, in my submission, shows the defendant's fanatical adherence to the Nazi creed, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a hopeless war at the expense of human life and with the certainty of increased destruction and misery to the men, women and children of his country. I read the last paragraph on the second page:
"I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy: That they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty, whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger the following of this path."
Then he refers to an order. "I demand Senior Commanders that they should take just as ruthless action against any commander who does not do' his military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not burdened with any tasks as a leader." 19th of April, he gives an example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted.
"An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser "Cormorau', in Australia, a petty officer acting as camp senior officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a way that the guards did not notice. This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown that he is fitted to be a leader."