evidence, the defendant was awarded the following decorations: On the 18th of September 1939 the Cluster of the Iron Cross, first class, for the U-boat successes in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. This award was followed on the 21st of April 1940 by the high award of the Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross, whilst on the 7th of April 1943 he received personally from Hitler the Oak Leaf to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross as the 223 recipient for his services in building up the German Navy and in particular the offensive U-boat arm for the coming war, which were outstanding. And on that I put in the next document in the document book, D-436, which becomes GB-183. That is an extract from the official publication "Das Archiv" on the defendant's promotion to vice-admiral. It is dated the 27th of September 1940, and I read the last two sentences:
"In four years of untiring and in the fullest sense of the word uninterrupted work of training, he succeeds in developing the young U-boat armed personnel and material till it is a weapon of a striking power unexpected even by the experts. More than three million gross tons of sunken enemy shipping in only one year achieved with only few boats speak better than words of the service of this man." GB-164, is an extract from the diary for the German Navy, 1944 edition, and it serves to emphasize the contents of that last document. My Lord, I won't read from it. The relevant passage is on page two, and if I might summarize that it describes in detail the Defendant's work in building up the U-boat arm, his ceaseless work in training night and day to close the gap of seventeen years during which no training had taken place, his responsibility for new improvements, and for devising the "pack" tactics which were later to become so famous. And then his position is summarized further at the top of page three. If I might read the last two sentences of the first paragraph on that page:
"In spite of the fact that his duties bock on unmeasurable proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction program, the chief was what he always was and always will be, leader and inspiration to all the forces under him."
And then the last sentence of that paragraph:
"In spite of all his duties he never lost touch with his men and he showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war." the defendant these high honors: his promotion to succeed the Defendant Raeder as commander-in-chief of the Navy, the personal position he acquired as one of Hitler's principal advisers, and finally, earlier candidates such as Goering having betrayed Hitler's trust, or finding the position less attractive than they had anticipated, the doubtful honor of becoming his successor. These he owed to his fanatical adherence to Hitler and to the Party, to his belief in the Nazi ideology with which he sought to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people, and to his masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war, referred to in the diary and which the Tribunal may think, when I have referred them to the document, may be regarded as synonymous with the capacity for utter ruthlessness. His attitude to the Nazi Party and its creed is shown by his public utterances. to become GB-185. It is an extract from a speech made by the defendant at a meeting of commanders of the Navy in Weimar on the 17th of December 1943. It was subsequently circulated by the defendant as a top-secret document for senior officers only and by the hand of officers only. My Lord, if I might read:
"I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological education. For what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a matter of course for the solder. But the whole important, the whole weight of duty done, are only present when the heart and spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. The result of duty done is then quite different to what it would be if I only carried out my task literally, obediently, and faithfully. It is therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of his duty with all his mental, all his spiritual energy, and for this his conviction, his ideology are indispensable.
It is therefore necessary for us to train the soldier uniformly, comprehensively, that he may be adjusted ideologically to our Germany. Every dualism, every dissension in this connection, or every divergence or unpreparedness imply a weakness in all circumstances.
He in whom this grows and thrives in unison is superior to the other. Then indeed the whole importance, the whole weight of his conviction comes into play. It is also nonsense to say that the soldier or the officer must have no politics." My Lord, the word "perhaps" there is a mistranslation. The sense does not require it. "The soldier embodies the state in which he lives, he is the representative, the articulate exponent of this state. He must therefore stand with his whole weight behind this state.
We must travel this road from our deepest conviction. The Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this war if we take part in it with holy zeal, with all our fanaticism. who holds the production of Europe in his hand, with Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the Navy as possible so as to be able to fight and to strike. It does not matter to me who builds them." My Lord, that last sentence is of importance in connection with a latter document. The Tribunal will see when I come to this that the Defendant was not above employing concentration camp labor for this purpose. GB-186. It is an extract from a speech on the same subject by the Defendant as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the Commanders in Chief on the 15th of February 1944. My Lord, it is cumulative except that I think the last two sentences add, if I might read then: indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the exponent of the state, the idle chatter that the officer is non-political is sheer nonsense." It consists of three extracts from speeches. The first is from a speech made by the Defendant to the German Navy and the German people on Heroes' Day, the 12th of March, 1944.
"German men and women.
".... What would have become of our country today, if the Fuehrer had not united us under National-Socialism. Split into parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable to it, and lacking, as a defense, our present uncompromising world outlook, we would long since have succumbed to the burdens of this war and been subject to the merciless destruction of our adversaries.
..." July, 1944. It again shows the Defendant's fanaticism. It is perhaps worth reading the first sentence:
"Men of the Navy. Holy wrath and unlimited anger fill our hearts because of the criminal attempt which shouldhave cost the life of our beloved Fuehrer. Providence wished it otherwise -- watched over and protected our Fuehrer, and did not abandon our German fatherland in the fight for its destiny." these traitors. the armed forces. I don't think I need read it, but as the members of the Tribunal will see, it was the Defendant Keitel and this Defendant who were responsible for the alteration of the salute in the German forces and the adoption of the Nazi salute -- together with Goering, I should have said, the Defendants Goering, Keitel andDoenitz. wireless by this Defendant, announcing the death of Hitler and his own succession. It is D-444. I put it in to become GB-188, and I read a portion of it. The time is 22.26 marked on the document. I read therefrom:
"It has been reported fromthe Fuehrer's Headquarters that our Fuehrer Adolph Hitler has died this afternoon in his battle headquarters at the Reichschancellory fighting to the last breath for Germany against Bolshevism.
"On the 30th April the Fuehrer nominated Grand Admiral Doenitz to be his successor. The Grand Admiral and Fuehrer's successor will speak to the German nation."
And then, the first paragraph of the speech:
"German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed Forces. Our Fuehrer Adolph Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against it. Hig fight having ended, he died a hero's death in the capital of the German Reich, after having led an unmistakably straight and steady life."
My Lord, I am afraid there is an error in the translation. It should read "an unmistakably straight...." Defendant, which is very much to the same effect. evidence that the Defendant, as Officer Commanding U-boats, took part in the planning and execution of aggressive war against Poland, Norway, and Denmark. The next document in the document book, C-126/C, has already been put in as GB-45. It is a memorandum by the Defendant Raeder, dated the 16th of May, 1939, and I will call the attention of the Tribunal to the distribution. The sixth copy went to the Fuehrer der Unterseeboote, that is to say, to the Defendant Doenitz. It is a directive for the invasion of Poland, Fall Weiss, and I won't read it. It has already been read.
The next document, C-126/E, on the second page of that same document, has also been put in as GB-45. It again is a memorandum from the Defendant Raeder's headquarters, dated the 2nd of August, 1939. It is addressed to the fleet, and then Flag Officer, U-boats -- that is, of course, the Defendant -and it is merely a covering letter for operational directions for the employment of U-boats to be sent out to the Atlantic by way of precaution in the event of the intention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining unchanged. The second sentence is important:
"Flag Officer, U-boats, is handing in his operational orders to Slk." -that is the Seekriegsleitung, the German Admiralty -- "by 12 August. A decision on the sailings of U-boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August."
The next document, C-172, I put in as GB-189. It consists of the Defendant's own operational instructions to his U-boats for the operation "Fall Weiss". It is signed by him. It is not dated, but it is clear from the subject matter that its date must be before the 16th of July, 1939. I don't think the substance of the document adds. It is purely an operational instruction, giving effect to the document already put in, CO126/c, the directive by Raeder. It is an extract from the War Diary of the Naval War Staff of the German Admiralty, dated the 3rd of October, 1939, and records the fact that the Chief of the Naval War Staff has called for views on the possibility of taking operational bases in Norway. It has already been read and I would merely call the Tribunal's attention to the passage in brackets, in the paragraph marked "d".
"Flat Office U-boats already considers such habors extremely useful as equipment - and supply - bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily."
The next document. C-5, has already been put in as GB-83. This is from the Defendant, as Flag Office U-boats, addressed to the Supreme Command of the Navy, the Naval War Staff. It is dated the 9th of October, 1939, and it sets out the Defendant's views on the advantages of Trondheim and Narvik as bases. The document proposes the establishment of a base at Trondheim with Narvik as an atlernative. It is the Defendant's operation order to his U-boats for the occupation of Denmark and Norway, and the operation order, which is top secret, dated the 30th of Marvh, 1940, is termed "Hartmut". The members of the Tribunal will remember that the document, in the last paragraph, said:
"The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvick." the disposition of the U-boats under his command on the 3rd of September, 1939, when war broke out between Germany and the Western Allies. The locations of the sinkings in the following week, including that of the Athenia which will be dealt with by my learned friend Mr. Elwin Jones, provide corroboration.
On that, I would put in two charts, I put them in as D-652, and they become GB-190.
My Lord, I have copies here for the members of the Tribunal. They have been prepared by the admiralty. There are two charts. The first sets out the disposition of the submarines on the 3rd of September, 1939. There is a note attached to the chart, the top left--hand corner, which I should read:
"This chart has been constructed from a study of the orders issued by Doenitz between 21 August 1939 and 3 September 1939, and subsequently captured. The chart shows the approximate disposition of submarines ordered for the third of September 1939, and cannot be guaranteed accurate in every detail, as the file of captured orders are clearly not complete and some of the submarines show apparently had received orders at sea on or about September 3 to move to new operational areas. The documents from which this chart was constructed are held by the British Admiralty in London". First, it will be apparent to members of the Tribunal that U-boats which were in thos positions on the 3rd of September of 1939 had left Kiel some considerable time before. The other point which I would make is important in connection with my learned friend Mr. Elwyn Jones' case against the Defendant Raeder, and that is the location of the U-boat U-30. The members of the Tribunal may care to bear it in mind while looking at the charts now. the war, and the location of the sinking of the Athenia will be noted. There is a short certification in the left-hand corner of the Tribunal's copies:
"This chart has been constructed from the official records of the British Admiralty in London. It shows the position and sinkings of the British merchant vessels lost by enemy action in the seven days subsequent to 3 September 1939."
My Lord, I turn to the Defendant's participation in war crimes and crimes against humanity. shipping by the U-boats followed under the Defendant's direction, a course of consistently increasing ruthlessness. The Defendant displayed his masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war. From the very early days, merchant ships, both allied and neutral, were sunk without warning, and when operational danger zones had been announced by the German Admiralty, these sinkings continued to take place both within and without those zones. With some exceptions in the early days of the war, no regard was taken for the safety of the cews or passengers of sunk merchant ships, and the announcement claiming a total blockade of the British Isles merely served to confirm the established situation under which U-boat warfare was being conducted without regard to the established rules of international warfare or the requirements of humanity.
The course of the war at sea during the first eighteen months is summarized by two official British reports made at a time when those who compiled them were ignorant of some of the actual orders issued which have since come to hand.
My Lord, I turn to the next document in the document book. It is D-641(a), which I put in to become GB-191. It is an extract from an official report of the British Foreign Office concerning German attacks on merchant shipping during the period 3 September 1939 to September 1940, that is to say, the first year of the war, and it was made shortly after September 1940. page:
"During the first twelve months of the war, 2,081,062 tons of Allied shipping comprising 508 ships have been lost by enemy action. In addition, 769,213 tons of neutral shipping, comprising 253 ships, have also been lost. Nearly all these merchant ships have been sunk by submarine, mine, aircraft or surface craft, and the great majority of them sunk while engaged on their lawful trading occasions. 2,836 Allied merchant seamen have lost their lives in these ships.
"In the last war the practice of the central powers was so remote from the recognized procedure that it was thought necessary to set forth once again the rules of warfare in particular as applied to submarines. This was done in the Treaty of London 1930, and in 1936 Germany acceded to these rules. The rules laid down:
"(1) In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subjected.
"(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being summoned, or of active resistance to visit and search, a war ship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ships' papers in a place of safety. For this purpose, the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board."
Then, the next paragraph:
"At the beginning of the present war, Germany issued a Prize Ordinance for the regulation of sea warfare, and the guidance of her naval officers. Article 74 of this ordinance embodies the submarine rules of the London Treaty. Article 72, however, provides that captured enemy vessels may be destroyed if it seems inexpedient or unsafe to bring them into part, and Article 73 (i) (ii) makes the same provision with regard to neutral vessels which are captured for sailing under enemy convoy, for forcible resistance, or for giving assistance to the enemy. These provisions are certainly not in accordance with the traditional British view but the important point is that, even in these cases, the Prize Ordinance envisages the capture of the merchantman before its destruction. In other words, if the Germans adhered to the rules set out in their own Prize Ordinance, we might have argued the rather fine legal point with them, but we should have no quarrel with them, either on the broader legal issue or on the humanitarian one. In the event, however, it is only too clear that almost from the beginning of the war the Germans abandoned their own principles and waged war with steadily increasing disregard for international law, and for what is, after all, the ultimate sanction of all law, the protection of human life and property from arbitrary and ruthless attacks." two instances:
"On the 30th of September, 1939, came the first sinking of a neutral ship by a submarine without warning and with loss of life. This was the Danish ship 'Vendia' bound for the Clyde in ballast. The submarine fired two shots and shortly after torpedoed the ship. The torpedo was fired when the master had already signalled that he would submit to the submarine orders and before there had been an opportunity to abandon ship.
By November submarines were beginning to sink neutral vessels without warning as a regular thing. On the 12th November the Norwegian 'Arne Kjode' was torpedoed in the North Sea without any warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral port to another. The master and four of the crew lost their lives and the remainder werepicked up after many hours in open boats. Henceforward, in addition to the failure to establish the nature of the cargo, another element is noticeable, namely an increasing recklessness as to the fate of the crew."
are given.
Ships sunk...........241 Recorded attacks.
.....221 Illegal attacks.
......112 At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They were not illegally sunk, however?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, sir.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): According to this, the Germans have been given the benefit of the doubt.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, yes, I should have read that sentence; I am obliged to your Honor.
I pass to the second report, 641/b. It is part of the same document and is put in as GB 191. It is a report covering the next six months from September 1, 1940-
THE PRESIDENT (interposing): Are you not reading page 3?
COL. PHILLIMORE: If your Lordship please, I have read a great deal of the report and there are passages that I had not considered important.
THE PRESIDENT: I haven't myself read it, but I think--
COL. PHILLIMORE: If I might read the first two paragraphs on page 3:
"By the middle of October submarines were sinking merchant vessels without any regard to the safety of the crews. Yet four months later the Germans were still officially claiming that they were acting in accordance with Prize Ordinance. Their own semi-official commentators however, had made the position clearer. As regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in February stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily or under compulsion bound for an enemy port - including contraband control harbours - thereby loses its neutrality and must be considered hostile. At the end of February the cat was let out of the bag by a statement that a neutral ship which obtained a avicert from a British Consul in order to avoid putting into a British contraband control base was liable to be sunk by German submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral port to another.
As regards Allied ships, in the middle of November 1939, a Berlin warning was issued against the arming of British vessels. By that date a score of British merchantmen had been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedo from submarines, and after that date some fifteen more unarmed Allied vessels were torpedoed without warning. It is clear, therefore, that not only was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure, but also that neither before nor after this German threat did the German submarines discriminate between armed and unarmed vessels."
The last paragraph is merely a summing up; it does not add.
Turning to 641/b, which is a similar report covering the next six months, if I might read the first five paragraphs of page 1:
"On the 30th January, 1941, Hitler proclaimed that 'every ship, with or without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes is going to be torpedoed." On the face of it, this announcement appears to be uncompromising; and the only qualification provided by the context is that the threats immediately preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the American Continent. German commentators, however, subsequently tried to water it down by contending that Hitler was referring only to ships which attempted to enter the area within which the German 'total blockade' is alleged to be in force.
"From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly was Hitler's meaning, since the only conclusion that can be reached after a study of the facts of enemy warfare on merchant shipping is that enemy action in this field is never limited by the principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but solely by the opportunities or lack of them which exist at any given time".
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, isn't this document you are now reading really legal argument?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, sime of it is. The difficulty is to leave those parts and take in the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The third paragraph, if I might leave the rest of the second, is as follows:
"The effect of the German total blockade is to prohibit neutral ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea round Britain (the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, and from the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), upon pain of having their ships sink without warning and their crews killed.
As a matter of fact, at least thirty-two neutral ships, exclusive of those sailing in British conveys have been sunk by enemy action since the declaration of the 'total blockade'". of merchant ships without warning:
"Yet, though information is lacking in very many cases, details are available to prove that, during the period under review, at least thirty-eight Allied merchant ships, exclusive of those in convoys, have been torpedoed without warning in or near the 'total blockade' area, "That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard for the area is proved by the fact that of the thirty-eight ships referred to at least sixteen were torpedoed outside the limits of the war-zone."
"My Lord, the next page deals with a specific case illustrating the matter set out above. It is in the first paragraph of that page, the third sentence:
"The sinking of the CITY OF BENARES on the 17th September 1940 is a good example of this. The CITY OF BENARES was an 11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on board, including nearly 100 children. She was torpedoed without warning just outside the 'war zone," with the loss of 258 lives, including 77 children. It was blowing a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very rough sea when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p.m. In the darkness and owing to the prevailing weather conditions, at least four of the twelve boats lowered were capsized. Others were swamped and many people were washed right out of them. In one boat alone sixteen people, including 11 children, died from exposure; in another 22 died, including 15 children:
in a third 21 died. The point to be emphasized is not the unusual brutality of this attack but rather that such results are inevitable when a belligerent disregards the rules of sea warfare as the Germans have done and are doing," I turn to the next document, 641/c, which is part of GB 191.
THE PRESIDENT: It is clear, I suppose, from that statement of facts that there was no warning whatever given?
COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord,
THE PRESIDENT: We think that you should read the next paragraph too.
COL. PHILLIMORE: If your Lordship pleases.
"There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of voyages for days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men in the water clinging for hours to a raft and gradually dropping off one by one, of crews being machine-gunned as they tried to lower their boats or as they drifted away in them, of seamen being blown to pieces by shells and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know that such things are the inevitable result of the type of warfare he has chosen to employ." The next document, 641/c, is merely a certificate giving the total sinkings by U-boats during the war (1939 to 1945) as 2,775 British, Allied and Neutral ships totalling 14,572,435 gross tons. My Lord, it is perhaps worth considering one example not quoted in the above reports of the ruthless nature of the actions conducted by the defendants' U-boat commanders, particularly as both British and German versions of the sinkings are available. I turn to the next document, "The Sinking of S.S. SHEAF MEAD," That is D.644, which I put in as GB 192. If I might read the opening paragraph:
"The British s/s SHEAF DEAD was torpedoed without warning on 27 May 1940"-
THE PRESIDENT: This is the German account, is it not?
COL. PHILLIMORE: This is actually in the form of a British report. It includes the German account in the shape of a complete extract from the log,
THE PRESIDENT: In other words, Top Secret?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord, this was at the time a top secret document. That was some while ago.
"The B ritish s/s SHEAF MEAD was torpedoed without warning on 27 May 1940 with the loss of 31 of the crew. The commander of the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an exceptionally callous manner towards the men cl inging to upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man was kapitaenleutnant Oehrn of U 37: the following extract from his diary for 27 May 1940 leaves no doubt on the matter and speaks for itself as to his behaviour." the time is marked on the document as 1554.
"Surface. Stern is underwater," referring to the ship which has been torpedoed. "Stern is underwater. Bowe rise higher. The boats are new on the water. Lucky for them. A picture of complete order. They lie at some distance. The bows rear up quite high. Two men appear from somewhere in the forward part of the ship. They leap and rush with ground bounds along the deck down to the stern. The stern disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a boiler explosion. Two men fly through the air, limbs outstretched. Bursting and crashing. Then all is over. A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved them. We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He says, hardly turning his head Nix Name. A young boy in the water calls 'Help, help, please." The others are very composed. They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of cold hatred is on their faces. On to the old course. After washing the paint off the buoy, the name comes to light: Greatafield, Glasgow. 5006 gross registered tons."
"Under the old course" means merely that the U-boat makes off. of the Chief Engineer of the SHEAF MEAD. The relevant paragraphs are the first and the last:
"When I came to the surface I found myself on the pert side, that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about five yards away. The submarine Captain asked the steward the name of the ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our lifebuoys, but this had the name GRETASTON on it, as this was the name of our ship before it was changed to SHEAF MEAD last January."
In the last paragraph:
"She had cut-away, bows, but I did not notice a net cutter. Two men stood at the side with boat hocks to keep us off.
"They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing. Then she submerged and Trent off, without offering us any assistance whatever."
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any suggestion in the German report that any warning was given?
COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord. It is quite clear, indeed, that it was not. ship and the difficulty in identifying, and then at the top of the page:
"The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in quickly, but the position is still 40-50. I cannot see the stern yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The gunnery crews are also prepared. On the ship's side a yellow cross in a small, square, dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an ack-ack gun or something similar. Fire: I cannot miss"; and then the sinking. the defendant and his fellow conspirators issued their orders in disregard of international law, you may think the compilers of the above reporters understated the case. These orders cover not only the period referred to in the reports, but also the subsequent course of the war. It is interesting to note in them the steps by which the defendants progressed. At first they were content with breaching the rules of international law to the extent of sinking merchant ships, including neutral ships, without warning where there was a reasonable prospect of being able to do so without discovery. The facts already quoted show that the question of whether whips were defensively armed or outside the declared operational areas was in practice immaterial. GB 193. That is a memorandum by the German Naval War Staff, dated 22 September 1939. It sets out:
"Flag Officer. U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights." Reading from the third sentence:
"In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters where French and English Naval forces or merchant ships may be situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected, the measures desired by F. O. U-boats can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the Naval War Staff. U-boat commanders would be informed by word of mouth and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.
In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without lights."
Now I go to the next document, C 21, which I put in as GB 194. My Lord, this document consists of a series of extracts from the war diary of the German Naval War Staff of the German Admiralty. The second extract, at page 5, recites a conference with the head of the Naval War Staff. "Report on the 2 January 1940," and then reading:
"1) Report by Ia"--That is the Staff Operations Officer on the War Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Shouldn't you read above that, Paragraph 1(b)?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, if your Lordship pleases. It is important. The others are much to the same effect. If I might read it:
"Report on Ia." This is one report by Ia on Directive of Armed Forces High command of 30 December. "According to this, the Fuehrer, on report of Commanderin-Chief in Navy, has decided:
"(a) Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain.
"Both measures may be taken with immediate effect." the Naval War Staff on Directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30 December, "referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with 'Fall Gelb'.
"In consequence of this Directive, the Navy will authorize, simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the sinking of U-boats, without any warning, of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, pretence should be made that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose."
And then the third extract, dated 6 January 1940:
"...the Fuehrer has in principle agreed (see minutes of report of C. in C. Navy of 30 December) to authorize firing without warning whilst maintaining the pretence of mine hits in certain parts of the American blockaded zone."