THE PRESIDENT: I was not speaking of the defense counsel so much as of the members of the Tribunal.
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: We have the Russian translation in process now and it was delayed and we were unable to get it here at this time but the delay will be very short and the document is of critical importance to our case.
THE PRESIDENT: How long will it be before it is ready?
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: I wouldn't like to say precisely, sir, but perhaps within four, five days.
THE PRESIDENT: What did you propose to do new because it is a very complicated and long document, is it not?
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: It is and it shows ---
THE PRESIDENT: Were you proposing to summarize it?
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: I was proposing to summarize it, sir, new.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would summarize it now and only be permitted to put it in at the stage when you have the translation ready, you may summarize it now.
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: I will summarize it now, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Will it take long to summarize?
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: Not very long, sir, no.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, it is five o'clock.
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: I think there will be time to summarize it and then we will stop. worked out in amazing detail, his plans and preparations for the management of the economy in the forthcoming war. For example, 180,000 industrial plants in 300 industries had been surveyed with respect to usefullness for war purposes; economic plans for the production of 200 basic materials had been worked out; a system for the letting of war contracts had been devised; allocations of coal, motor fuel, and power had been determined; 248 million Reichsmarks had been spent on storage facilities alone; evacuation plans for war materials and skilled workers from military zones had been worked out; 80 million wartime ration cards had already been printed and distributed to local areas; and a card-index on the skills of some 22 million workers had been prepared.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(Whereupon at 1703 the Tribunal adjourned until the following day at 1000). Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, before picking up our line of proof against the Defendant Schacht, I would like to supply a point of information. EC-457, U.S. Exhibit 619. The question raised by the Tribunal was with respect to the words "in retirement" in the letterhead used by Schacht in writing to Hitler in 1932. This is the letter in which Schacht expressed his belief in the truth of the Nazi movement, and in which he said that Hitler could always count upon him as a reliable assistant.
The letterhead has printed upon it, "The President of the Reichsbank" and after that phrase there is typed the letters "A.D", and I understand that those letters are an abbreviation for a German phrase meaning "in retirement" and that it is customary, or it was customary in Germany for retired officials to continue to use their titles with the letters "A.D."
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
LT. BRYSON: Yesterday we had just about completed our proof with respect to the contribution of the Defendant Schacht to the preparation for war, and I wish to submit one more document on this point. This is EC-451, U.S. Exhibit 626. It consists of a statement by George S. Messersmith, United States Consul General in Berlin 1930 to 1934. I will quote therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the fourth paragraph:
"It was his (Schacht's) financial ability that enabled the Nazi regime in the early days to find the financial basis for the tremendous armament program and which made it possible to carry it through. If it had not been for his efforts, and this is not a personal observation of mine only but I believe was shared and is shared by every observer at the time, the Nazi regime would have been unable to maintain itself in power and to establish its control over Germany, much less to create the enormous war machine which was necessary for its objectives in Europe and later throughout the world.
"The increased industrial activity in Germany incident to rearmament made great imports of raw materials necessary while at the same time exports were decreasing. Yet by Schacht's resourcefulness, his complete financial ruthlessness, and his absolute cynicism, Schacht was able to maintain and to establish the situation for the Nazis. Unquestionably without this complete lending of his capacities to the Nazi Government and all of its ambitions, it would have been impossible for Hitler and the Nazis to develop an Armed Force sufficient to permit Germany to launch an aggressive war."
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Well, Lt. Bryson, I am not sure that gives a full or quite fair recapitulation of the document. Don't you think perhaps you ought to read the paragraph before?
LT. BRYSON: The preceding paragraph, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: "Dr. Schacht always attempted to play both sides of the fence. He told me, and I know he told both other American representatives in Berlin and various British representatives, that he disapproved of practically everything the Nazis were doing. I recall on several occasions his saying after the Nazi Party came into power, that if the Nazis were not stopped they were going to ruin Germany and the rest of the world with it. I recall distinctly that he emphasized to me that the Nazis were inevitably going to plunge Europe into war." paragraph:
"In my opinion, Schacht was in no sense a captive of the Nazis, He was not compelled to devote his time and his capacities to their interest. His situation was such that he would most likely have been able either to work on a much less restrained scale or to abstain from activity entirely He continued to lend his services to the Nazi Government at every opportunity."
We turn now to the third part of our case against Schacht. The evidence is clear that he willingly contributed his efforts to the Nazi conspiracy, knowing full well its aggressive designs. The Tribunal will recall our proof that Schacht was converted to the Nazi Philosophy in 1931 and helped Hitler come to power in 1933. We will now prove first that Schacht personally favored, aggression, and second, that in any event he knew Hitler's aggressive intentions. rearmed Germany in order to see fulfilled his strong belief in aggressive expansion as an instrument of German national policy. Schacht had long been a German nationalist and expansionist. He spoke against the Treaty of Versailles at Stuttgart as early as 1927. I offer in evidence EC-415, U.S. Exhibit 627, consisting of a collection of excerpts from speeches by Schacht. I quote from the top of page 2:
"The Versailles Dictate cannot be an eternal document, because not only its economic but also its spiritual and moral premises are wrong," colonial territory by Germany. However, he also favored acquisition of continguous territory in Europe. On 16 April 1929, at the Paris Conference, in connection with reparations -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Are you going to read the passage that follows that at a later stage?
LT. BRYSON: At a later stage, if you please, sir, in connection with another point.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on.
LT. BRYSON: On 16 April 1929, at the Paris Conference in connection with reparations, he said:
"Germany can generally only pay if the Corridor and Upper Silesia will be handed back to Germany from Polish possession, and if besides somewhere on the earth colonial territory will be made available to Germany."
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What are you talking from?
LT. BRYSON: I offer in evidence U.S. Exhibit No. 628, consisting of excerpts from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 24 August 1945.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle) : Where is it here?
LT. BRYSON: You will find it in the document book at the back, labeled "Interrogation of 24 August." It is at the top of the first page of the interrogation. This statement was quoted to Schacht, and his reply contains an admission of having made the statement. In his reply he said:
"That Germany could not pay at the time after I made the statement has been proved, and that Germany will not be able to pay after this war will be proved in the future."
subject of armed aggression in September, 1939. quire colonies by force. I offer in evidence EC-450, designated as U. S. Exhibit No. 629. This document consists of an affidavit of S. R. Fuller, Jr., Together with a transcript of his conversation with Schacht at the American Embassy in Berlin on 23 September 1935. I wish to read from page 6 of the document where there appears a statement by Schacht in the lower half of the page.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the conversation?
LT. BRYSON: The conversation occurred on 23 September 1935. The page numbers of this document are at the bottom, and I quote from page 6:
"Schacht. Colonies are necessary to Germany. We shall get them through negotiation, if possible, but if not, we shall take them."
THE PRESIDENT: It is on page 6, is it?
LT. BRYSON: If your Honor please, the page numbers are at the bottom of the page and not at the top.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. There are two pages.
LT. BRYSON: Shall I repeat it again, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: I guess I have got it.
LT. BRYSON: In July 1936, when the rearmament program was well under way, Schacht again publicly spoke of the Versailles Treaty. This time his language contained an explicit threat of war. I refer the Tribunal again to EC-415, which was previously introduced, in evidence as U. S. Exhibit 627, consisting of a collection of speeches by Schacht. I wish . to read from the paragraph beginning in the middle of the first page:
"But the memory of warweighs undiminished upon the people's minds. That is because deeper than material wounds, moral wounds are smarting, inflicted by the so-called peace treaties. Material loss can be made up through renewed labor, but the moral wrong which has been inflicted upon the conquered peoples, in the peace dictates, leaves a burning scar on the people's conscience.
The spirit of the Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war, and there will not be a true peace, progress or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit.
The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning." "lebensraum" for the German people. I quote again from EC-415, U. S. Exhibit No. 627, being an excerpt from Schacht's speech at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, on the second page, the last paragraph:
"Germany has too little living space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other nation, to extract from her own existing small space whatever is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite of all these efforts, the space does not suffice." at least by inference threatened a breach of the peace in demanding a colonial cession. I offer in evidence L-111, being U. S. Exhibit 630, and consisting of excerpts from a report under date of 20 January 1937, by Ambassador Davies to the Secretary of State. I wish to read therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the second paragraph:
"He (meaning Schacht) stated the following; that the present condition of the German people was intolerable, desperate and unendurable; that he had been authorized by his Government to submit proposals to France and England which would "(1) Guarantee European peace;"(2) Secure present European international boundaries;"(3) Reduce armaments;"(4) Establish a new form of a workable League of Nations;"(5) Abolish sanctions with new machinery for joint administration; all based upon a colonial cession that would provide Germany an outlet for population, source for food stuffs, fats and raw materials."
would be willing to risk war for the sake of new territory in Europe. I refer the Tribunal to EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd's diary.
THE PRESIDENT: The proposal contained in Document 111 was for cession of colonies, wasn't it?
LT. BRYSON: It was, sir.
I turn now to EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd's Diary. The entire diary has previously been received in evidence as U.S. Exhibit No. 53. beginning near the bottom of the second page of Ec. 461, in the last paragraph:
"Schacht meant what the army chiefs of 1914 meant when they invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in six weeks; that is, domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, especially North and East. Much as he dislikes Hitler's dictatorship he, as most other eminent Germans, wishes annexation without war if possible; with war if the United States will keep hands off."
THE PRESIDENT: There is another passage in that book, that diary. I don't know if it is the same date. I am not sure; it probably isn't the same date, but it is on the first page of the Exhibit, I think, the third paragraph. Is it at a different time?
LT. BRYSON: It is a different time, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: September the 19th of what year?
LT. BRYSON: We will check that in the complete volume here, and I think in a minute I will be able to supply the date. In the meantime, would you like me to read, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think you had better read it.
LT. BRYSON: (quoting) "He then acknowledged that the Hitler Party is absolutely committed to war and the people, too, are ready and willing. Only a few government officials are aware of the dangers and are opposed."
He concluded: "But we shall, postpone it ten years. Then it may be we can avoid war."
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think you should read the next paragraph, too.
LT. BRYSON: And to continue: "I reminded him of his Bad Eilsen speech some two weeks ago and said, 'I agree with you about commercial and financial matters in the main, but why do you not, when you speak before the public, tell the German people they must abandon a war attitude?' He replied, 'I dare not say that. I can only speak on my special subjects.'"
THE PRESIDENT: And the next one.
LT. BRYSON: And the next one: "How then can German people ever learn the real dangers of war, if nobody ever presents that side of the question? He once more emphasized his opposition to war and added that he had used his influence with Hitler--'a very great man', he interjected--to prevent war. I said, 'The German papers printed what I said at Bremen.'"
THE PRESIDENT: Too fast.
LT. BRYSON: I beg your pardon. "'The German papers printed what I said at Bremen about commercial relations between our countries, but net a word about the terrible effects and barbarism of war. He acknowledged that and talked very disapprovingly of the propaganda Ministry, which supresses everything it dislikes. He added as I was leaving. 'You know, a party comes into office by propaganda, and then cannot disavow it or stop it.'"
THE PRESIDENT: 1934?
LT. BRYSON: 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that those years are not stated in the document. It is rather misleading as it is.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, the Exhibit which is in evidence will show the dates.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I am not blaming you, but it is misleading, because it looks like September the 19th and December the 21st, and there were three years' interval between. It makes a difference. That is right, isn't it?
LT. BRYSON: Yes. That is not three years, sir. Yes, that's right. But I am sorry the excerpt simply shows the page numbers from the Exhibit, and not the dates. Wehrmacht which would provide Hitler with an instrument for realization of his desire for lebensraum.
In this connection, I offer in evidence EC 369, US Exhibit No. 631, consisting of a memorandum from the Reichsbank Directorate, signed by Schacht, to Hitler, dated 7 January 1939. I wish to read the last paragraph of the first page:
"From the beginning the Reichsbank had been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German aremd forces. It (the Reichsbank) therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility to finance the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible."
It is clear that the quote "successful foreign policy", which Schacht thus attributed to rearmament, included the Austrian and Czechoslovakian acquisitions. I offer in evidence EC 297A, US Exhibit 632, being a speech of Schacht's in Vienna after the Anschluss in March, 1939. I quote from the third page and the second full paragraph:
"Thank God, these things could after all not hinder the great German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a communion of German will and German thought. He bolstered it up with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht, and he then finally gave the external form to the internal union between Germany and Austria." in evidence, as US Exhibit No. 622, being a speech by Schacht.
THE PRESIDENT: EC --?
LT. BRYSON:EC 611. But I mil not read it sir--being a speech by Schacht on 29 November 1938, shortly after the Munich settlement. I have earlier read the pertinent remark attributing Hitler's success at that conference to the rearmament made possible by Schacht's financial and economic measures. with respect to territorial expansion, and justifies the conclusion that he allied himself with Hitler because of their common viewpoint.
knew Hitler planned military aggression, for which he was creating the means. He had numerous discussions with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. He knew that Hitler was intent upon expansion to the east, which would mean war, and that Hitler felt he must present the German people with a military victory. I offer in evidence US Exhibit 633, consisting of an excerpt from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 13 October 1934, and I read from the second page at the end of the second question:
"Q. What was there in what he (meaning Hitler) said that led you to believe he was intending to move towards the east?
"A. That is in 'Mein Kampf'. He never spoke to me about that, but it was in 'Mein Kampf'. "
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this is meant for the 13th of October?
LT. BRYSON: This is the 13th of October, the second page, and at the end of the -
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have it.
LT. BRYSON: (quoting) "What was there in what he (meaning Hitler) said that led you to believe he was intending to move towards the east?
"A. That is in 'Mein Kampf'. He never spoke to me about that, but it was in 'Mein Kampf'.
"Q. In other words, as a man who read it, you understood that Hitler's expansion policy was directed to theeast?
"A. To the east."
I also offer in evidence EC 458. To continue from the interrogation of 13 October:
"Q. And you thought that it would be better to try to divert Hitler from any such intention and to urge upon him a colonial policy instead?
"A". Quite." affidavit of Major Edmund Tilley under date of 21 November 1945, with respect to an interview of Schacht on 9 July 1945. I read the second paragraph:
"During the course of the discussion Schacht stated to me that he had had numerous talks with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. Schacht stated that from these talks he had formed the impression that in order to make his hold and government secure, the Fuehrer felt that he must present the German people with a military victory." war to Europe. I refer the Tribunal to EC 451, which I have already submitted in evidence as US Exhibit 626, consisting of an affidavit under date of 15 November 1945, by Messersmith, American Consul General in Berlin 1930 to 1934. I wish to read from the first page, third paragraph, last sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: You have read it already.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, there is a little more there which we have not read, which I should like to read.
THE PRESIDENT: You read the whole paragraph. At our invitation you read from the third paragraph down to the bottom of the page.
LT. BRYSON: I should like to read the first sentence of the fourth paragraph on page 1.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
LT. BRYSON: (quoting) "while making these protestations, he nevertheless showed by his acts that he was thoroughly an instrument of the whole Nazi program and ambitions, and that he was lending all his extraordinary knowledge and resourcefulness towards the accomplishment of that program."
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, speaking for myself and for some other members of the Tribunal, we think it is a far better way to deal with a document -- to deal with it, if possible, once and for all, and not to be coming back to it. It not only wastes time by the fact that the Tribunal have got to turn back and forth, back and forth, to the document, but you get a much fairer idea of the document if it is dealt with once and for all, although it may cover more than one subject.
I say that, for it may be impossible for you to do that now, in consonance with the preparations that you have made, but these who follow: you may be able to alter their course; if it is possible, when you get a document with a variety or a number of paragraphs in it which you want be quote, that you should quote them all at the same time, if possible. Do you follow what I mean?
LT. BRYSON: I follow you, your Honor. To have so organized our materials that we have directed our evidence to Specific points, and since the points are separated, we have to separate our quotations.
THE PRESIDENT: I realize that it may be difficult for you.
LT. BRYSON : In September of 1934. Ambassador Dodd made a record in his diary of a conversation with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy in Berlin. If the Court please. I will pass over this document, because in response to a question from the Tribunal, I read an excerpt from the document which covers the same point that I was about to direct myself toward. in September, 1954, his knowledge of the war purposes of the Nazi Party, and we had already shown that in 1935 Schacht had stated that Germany would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. He must then have known to what length Hitler was prepared to go. Berlin, Schacht must have known that Hitler was contemplating war. Your Honors may recall, as has been earlier shown, that at this meeting the Defendant Goering, who was very close to Hitler, stated that all measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war, and that waiting for new methods is no longer appropriate. I refer the Tribunal to 1301-PS, from which I will not read, as the quotation is already in evidence in US Exhibit No. 123.
of von Blomberg's letter to the Defendant Goering. I refer the Tribunal again to 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as US Exhibit 123, and read from the middle of page 19 of the document. The page numbers, if the Court please, on this document are found in the upper left-hand corner.
"According to an order of the Fuehrer, the setting up of all Air Force units is to be completed on 1 April 1937. Therefore considerable expenditures have to be made in 1936 which at the time that the budget for 1936 was made were planned for later years only." Schacht the closeness to war which Hitler must have felt.
I also offer in evidence EC 416, US Exhibit No. 635, consisting of minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 4 September 1936, which Schacht attended. I read the statement by Goering found at the ton of page 2 of this document.
"The Fuehrer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the Colonel General and the Reich bar Minister Which represents a general instruction.
"It starts from the basic thought that the showdown with Russia is inevitable."
Schacht thus knew that Hitler expected war with Russia. He also knew of Hitler's ambition towards the east. It must have been plain to him, therefore, that sucha war would result from Russian opposition to German military expansion in that direction; that is, Schacht must have know that it would be a war of German aggression.
In January, 1937, the Tribunal will recall, Schacht stated to Ambassador Davies in Berlin that he had "been authorized by his government" to submit certain proposals to France and England, which, in fact, amounted to a bid for colonies under threat of war.
If Schacht was acting under instructions from Hitler, he was necessarily familiar with Hitler's aggressive intentions at that time. Austria and at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia and that Hitler also had designs on the Polish Corridor. I refer the Tribunal to L-151, already in evidence as U. S. Exhibit No. 70, this being a letter containing a memorandum of a conversation between Schacht and Ambassador Bullit dated 23 November 1937. I quote the last paragraph on Page 2:
"Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present momen he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor, and in his (Schacht's) opinion it might be possible to maintain the Corridor provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany". as well as for Hitler.
We have seen from his speech of 29 March 1938 in Vienna his enthusiasm for the Anschluss after the event. He was even then working hard for its achievement. In this connection, I refer the Tribunal to Pages 506 to 507 of the transcript for evidence of Schacht's having subsidized the Nazis' preliminary agitation in Austria. take into consideration the fact that to such a man as Schacht the events of the period certainly bespoke Hitler's intention. Schacht was a close collaborator of Hitler and a member of the cabinet during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria, the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the overthrow of the Republican Government of Spain, the ultimate conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of force. During this period the Reichs debt tripled under the stress of mounting armament. The expenditure rose from three-quarters of a billion Reichsmarks in 1932 to eleven billion Reichsmarks in 1937 and fourteen billion Reichsmarks were spent on armaments.
It was a period in which the burning European issue was the satisfaction of Germany's repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy of expansion, was taking great risks in foreign policy and laying the greatest stress upon the utmost speed in preparation for war. fact that he was assisting Hitler and Germany along the road to armed aggression.
We turn now to our last line of proof, with respect to Schacht's loss of power in the Hitler regime. In November 1937 Schacht resigned his offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. At that time he accepted the appointment as Minister without Portfolio, and he also continued as President of the Reichsbank.
Our evidence will show (a) this change in position was no more than a clash between two power-seeking personalities, Goering and Schacht, in which Goering, being the closer to Hitler, won out; (b) their policy differences were concerned only with the method of re-arming and (c) Schacht's loss of power in no sense implies an unwillingness to assist armed aggression. concerned only with the method and not the desirability of war preparations. Schacht emphasized foreign trade as a necessary source of re-armament material during the transitory period until Germany should be ready to strike. Goering was a proponent of complete self-sufficiency. Hitler supported Goering, and Schacht, his pride wounded and bitterly resenting Goering's intrusion in the economic field, finally stepped out. U. S. Exhibit No. 123, containing notes of a conversation between Schacht and Thomas on 2 September 1936. These are found on Page 21 of the document, from which I quote:
"President Schacht called me to him today at 1300 and requested me to forward the following to the Minister of War:
"Schacht returned from the Fuehrer with the greatest anxiety, since he could not agree to the seconmic program planned by the Fuehrer.
"The Fuehrer wants to speak at the Party convention about economic policy and wants to emphasize there that we now want to get free with all our energy from foreign countries by production in Germany.
"Schacht requests urgently the the Reichminister of War warn the Fuehrer from this step."
And three paragraphs down:
"If we now shout out our decision abroad, to make ourselves economically independent, then we cut our own throats, because we can no longer survive the necessary transitory period". few days later in Nurnberg, and, against Schacht's wishes, Goering was named Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. on 16 October 1945, being US Exhibit 636. I wish to read beginning near the bottom of Page 9 of the document:
"Q And the Four-Year Plan came in when?
"A It was announced in September '36, on the Party Day.
"Q Do you say that from the time that the Four Year Plan came in in September 1936, you were allready to rid yourself of your economic duty?
"A No. At that time I thought that I might maintain my position even against Goering.
"A That he would not interfere with affairs which I had to manage in my Ministry.
"Q. As a matter of fact, his appointment was not met with favor by you?
"A I would not have appointed a man like Goering who didn't understand a bit about all these things." jurisdiction. On 26 November 1936 Goering issued a directive regarding raw and synthetic material production. I offer in evidence EC 243, Exhibit No. 637, consisting of a copy of this directive. It shows that Goering's office for raw and synthetic materials pre-empted control over large economic areas previously in the hands of Schacht. As an example, I'll quote from Paragraph 5 on Page 4 of the document:
"The planning and determination of objectives, as well as the control over the execution of the tasks which must be accomplished within the framework of the Four Year Plan, are the responsibility of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, which supersedes the authorities which have heretofore been in charge of these tasks." offices in the Ministry of Economics to accept instructions from him alone. I offer in evidence EC 376, US Exhibit No. 638, consisting of a circular from Schacht to all supervisory offices under date of 11 December 1936, and I quote from the second paragraph:
"The supervisory offices are obliged to accept instructions from me only. They must answer all official inquiries of the Office for German Raw Materials in order to give any information at any time to the fullest extent."
And a little further down:
"I herewith authorise the supervisory offices to take the necessary measures for themselves. In case doubts should result from requests of the above offices, and these doubts cannot be removed by oral negotiations with the specialized workers for that office, I should immediately be informed. I will then order in each case the necessary steps to be taken."
The military sides with Schacht, who had re-armed them so well. I offer in evidence EC 420, US Exhibit 630, consisting of a draft of a memorandum by the Military Economic Staff, dated 19 December 1936. I wish to read from Paragraph No. 1.
"(1) The control of war economy in the civilian sector in case of war is possible only for that person, who, in peace time has made preparations for war under his own responsibility.
"Upon recognizing this fact, a year and a half ago, Reichbank President Dr. Schacht was appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy and an Operations Staff was attached to his Office."
And then from Paragraph No. 2:
"(2) The Military Economy Staff does not deem it compatible with the principle laid down in No. 1, Paragraph 1, if the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is now placed under the Minister President Colonel General Goering's command." praising Schacht's re-armament. Without reading it, I offer in evidence EC 383, US Exhibit 640, containing this article, a pertinent quotation from which already appears in the transcript for 23 November at Page 296. by temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary. I offer in evidence EC 244, US Exhibit 641, consisting of a letter from Von Blomberg, the Minister of War, to Hitler under date of February 22, 1937. I read the second paragraph of this letter as follows:
"The President, Dr. Schacht, has notified me that he is not acting in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the time being since in his opinion there is existing a conflict between the powers conferred upon him and those of Colonel General Goering. Because of this the preparatory mobilization steps in the economic field are delayed." lever.
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, does the defendant Schacht admit in his interrogation that the reason for his giving up his office was the difference of opinion between him and the defendant Goering?
LT. BRYSON: He does, Sir, and the defendant Goering so states in his interrogation.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court will be satisfied that this was the cause of Schacht's resignation-
THE PRESIDENT: If they both say so-