He is one of the few who accepts the Fuehrer's position entirely." allied himself with the cause. Dr. Franz Reuter, whose biography of Schacht was officially published in Germany in 1937, has stated that Schacht refrained from formal membership in order to be of greater sssistance to the Party. I offer in evidence EC 460, US Exhibit No. 617, consisting of an excerpt from Reuter's biography, and I quote the last sentence of the excerpt:
"By not doing so -- at least until the final assertion and victory of the Party -- he was able to assist it (the Party) much better than he would have been able to do had he become an official Party member." 1933 election at a meeting of Hitler with a group of German industrialists in Berlin. Schacht acted as the sponsor or host of this meeting, and a campaign fund of several million Marks was collected. Without reading therefrom, I offer in evidence EC 439, US Exhibit 613, an affidavit of von Schnitzler under date of 10 November 1945, and refer the Tribunal to the Transcript for 23 November, pages 281 to 283, where the text of the affidavit already appears in the record. interrogation of Schacht on 20 July 1945, from which I read a Dart a moment ago. Schacht lent his support to Hitler not only because he was an opportunist, but also because he shared Hitler's ideological principles. Apart from the entry in Goebbel's diary, this may be seen from Schacht's own letter to Hitler, under date of 29 August 1932, pledging continued support to Hitler after the latter's poor showing in the July 1932 elections. I offer this letter in evidence as EC 457, US Exhibit 619, and quote from the middle of the first paragraph and further from the next to the last paragraph:
"But what you could perhaps do with in these days is a word of most sincere sympathy. Your movement is carried internally by so strong a truth and necessity that victory in one form or another cannot elude you for long." was then in the German Government Schacht says:
"Wherever my work may take me in the near future, even if you should see me one day within the fortress, you can always count on me as your reliable assistant."
THE PRESIDENT: What do those words mean at the top "The President of the Reichsbank in retirement"? Are they on the letter?
LT. BRADY O. BRYSON: Yes, they are, sir. Dr. Schacht had previously been a president of the Reichsbank. At this time he was in retirement. You will remember, this is prior to Hitler's accession to power.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course.
LT. BRADY O. BRYSON: And then Hitler reinstated Dr. Schacht as president of the Reichsbank after the Nazis had taken over.
THE PRESIDENT: And he put that at the top of his letter, did he?
LT. BRADY O. BRYSON: That I cannot say. I will also point out that Schacht signed this letter "With a Vigorous Heil."
We turn now to the second part of our proof, relating to Schacht's contribution to preparation for war.
The detailed chronology of Schacht's official career in the Nazi Government, as set forth in 3021-PS, has already been submitted in evidence as US Exhibit No. 11. However, it may be helpful at the outset to remind the Tribunal that Schacht was recalled to the Presidency of the Reichsbank by Hitler on 17 March 1933, which office he continuously held until 20 January 1939; that he was Acting Minister and then Minister of Economics from August 1934 until November 1937; and that he was appointed General Plenipotentiary for War Economy in May 1935. He resigned as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for War Economy inNovember 1937, when he accepted appointment as Minister without Portfolio, which post he held until January 1943.
His position as virtual economic dictator of Germany in the crucial years from early 1933 to the end of 1936 is practically a matter of common knowledge. German credit system for rearmament purposes. From the outset, he recognized that the plan for German military supremacy required huge quantities of public credit. To that end a series of measures was adopted which subverted all credit institutions in Germany to the over-all aim of supplying funds for the military machine. I will briefly mention some of these measures. per cent in gold and foreign exchange required against circulating Reichsbank notes was permanently abandoned. By the Credit Act of 1934, the government assumed jurisdiction of all credit institutions, and control over the entire banking system was centralized in Schacht as Chairman of the Supervisory Board for the Credit System and President of the Reichsbank. This Act not only enabled Schacht to control the quantity of credit but also its use. On 29 March 1934, a system of forced, corporate lending to the Reich was imposed on German business. And on 19 February 1935, the Treasury was authorized to borrow funds in any amounts approved by the Reich Chancellor, that is, by Hitler. the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1933, part 2, page 827; Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934, part 1, page 1203; Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934, part 1, page 295; and Reichsgesetzblatt, 1935, part 1, page 198.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they found here in the document book?
LT. BRADY O. BRYSON: They're not in the document book, sir. I asked only that judicial notice be taken of them as published laws of Germany. has termed a "daring credit policy", including the secret financing of a vast amount of armaments, through the so-called "Mefo" bill, a description of which appears in the transcript for 23 November at page 295.
I offer in evidence EC. 436, US Exhibit No.620, consisting of a statement, dated 2 November 1945, by Emil Puhl, a director of the Reichsbank during Schacht's presidency , and quote the second paragraph thereof as follows:
"In the early part of 1935, the need for financing an accelerated rearmament program arose. Dr. Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, after considering various techniques of financing, proposed the use of 'Mefo' bills, to provide a substantial portion of the funds needed for the rearmament program. This method had as one of its primary advantages the fact that secrecy would be possible during the first years of the rearmament program, and figures indicating the extent of rearmament that would have become public through the use of other methods could be kept secret through the use of 'Mefo' bills."
The extent of the credit expansion, and the importance of "Mefo" financing, may be seen from E.C. No. 419, which I now offer as US Exhibit No.621, and which consists of a letter from Finance Minister von Krosigk to Hitler, under date of 1 September 1938. I quote the following figures from the middle of the first page:
"The development of the Reich debt is as follows:
"As of December 31, 1932, Funded Debt: 10.4 millions of Reichsmarks: Current Debt: 2.1 billions of Reichsmarks: Debt (not subscribed to by public, that is, trade and 'Mefo' bills of exchange): 0."As of June 30, 1938, Funded Debt:
19 billion Reichsmarks; Current Debt: 5 billion Reichsmarks; and Debt (not subscribed to by public, that is, trade and 'Mefo' bills of exchange): 13.3 billion Reichsmarks.
"Total, as of December 31, 1932: 12.5 billion Reichsmarks; as of June 30, 1938: 35.8 billion Reichsmarks."
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the next section, beginning with the words "Previsions were made to cover".
LT. BRADY O. BRYSON: "Provisions were made to cover the armament expenditures forthe year 1938 (the same amount as in 1937) as follows:
"Five billions from the budget, that is, taxes; 4 billions from loans; 2 billions from six months' treasury notes, which means postponement of payment until 1939; total: 11 billions."
The Reich debt thus tripled under Schacht's management. More than one-third of the total was financed secretly and through the instrumentality of the Reichsbank by "Mefo" and trade bills. It is clear that this amount of financing outside the normal public issues represented armament debt. I read further from EC. 436, at the beginning of the last long paragraph:
"These 'Mefo' bills were used exclusively for financing rearmament, and when in March 1938 a new finance program discontinuing the use of 'Mefo' bills was announced by Dr. Schacht, there was a total volume outstanding of. 12 billion marks of 'Mefo' bills which has been issued to finance rearmament."
The character of Schacht's credit policy and the fact that it was ruthlessly dedicated to the creation of armaments plainly appear from his own speech delivered on 29 November 1938.
I offer it in evidence as EC 611, U.S. Exhibit No. 622, and I quote from page 6 at the beginning of the last paragraph:
"It is possible that no bank of issue in peacetimes carried on such a daring credit policy as the Reichsbank since the seizure of power by National Socialism. With the aid of this credit policy, however, Germany created an armament second to none, and this armament in turn made possible the results of our policy."
the German economy generally, in order to marshall it behind the rearmament program. reorganization of German industry along military lines, and in accordance with the sc called "Leadership Principle". On this point I refer the Tribunal to the transcript for 23 November at pp. 287-290; and to RGBl. 1934, Part I, page 1194, of which the Tribunal is asked to take Judicial notice. Council, which was secretly established on 4 April 1933, and the function of which was preparation for war. The Tribunal is referred to the transcript for 23 November, p. 290. I also offer in evidence as EC 128, U.S. Exhibit Now 623, a report under date of 30 September 1934, showing the functions of the Ministry of Economics in this respect. The report reveals concentration upon all the familiar wartime economic problems, including stockpiling, production of scarce goods, removal of industry to secure areas, fuel and power supply for war production, machine tools, control of wartime priorities, rationing, price control, civilian supply, and so on. I wish to read into the record merely an excerpt showing the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economics, beginning near the top of page 2. This is EC.128, and I read from the top of page 2:
"With the establishment of the Reich Defense Council and for the conduct of the warring.
There should really be no preparation for war avengeditself during the world war."
authorized him, as Minister of Economics, to take any measure deemed necessary for the development of the German economy, In this connection reference is made to RGBL. 1934, Part I, page. 565, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice.
The sc-called "New Plan", devised by Schacht, was announced in the fall of 1934 shortly after he became Minister of Economics. In this connection the Tribunal is referred to RGBl. 1934, Part I, page 81.6 and RGBl. 1935, Part I, page 105, with the request that judicial notice be taken thereof. The new Plan was Schacht's basic program for obtaining the necessary foreign-produced raw materials and foreign exchange required to sustain the rearmament program. EC. 437, U.S. Exhibit No. 624, consisting of an affidavit of Emil Puhl, dated 7 November 1945. The entire text is pertinent. Therefore, permission is requested to submit the affidavit without reading therefrom, on condition that French and Russian translations be prepared and filed.
THE PRESIDENT: And German ones supplied too.
LT. BRYSON: The original is in German, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in German?
LT. BRYSON: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: But copies will be supplied too?
LT. BRYSON: We will supply copies. I wish to say that the original is in English, but the affidavit has already been translated into German.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: This affidavit, by a co-worker of Schact, describes in detail the many ingenious and often ruthless devices he used, including negotiating "stand-still" agreements, forcing payment in Reichmarks of interest and amortization on debts incurred in foreign currency, using scrip and funding bonds for the same purpose; suspending service on foreign-held debt; blocking foreign-held marks; freezing foreign claims in Germany; eliminating unessential foreign expenditures ; requisitioning German-held foreign exchange; subsidizing experts; issuing restricted marks; bartering under clearing agreemtns; licensing imports; and controlling all foreign exchange transactions to the end of favoring raw materials for armaments, and for the export industires to obtain further foreign exchange. 1934, page 997; Reichsgesetzblatt 1933, Part I, page 349, and Reichsgesetzblatt 1937, Part I, page 600, relating to the Clearing Bank, the Conversion Bank, and the maturity of Foreign Loans, all of which decrees are mentioned in the affidavit. deposit in German banks in rearmament notes, thus, as he put it, financing rearmament with the assets of his political opponents. Without reading therefrom, I refer your Honors to PS-1168, U.S. Exhibit 37, being a memorandum from Schacht to Hitler, dated 3 May, 1935, which already appears in the transcript on pages 412 and 413. Moreover, Schacht even resorted to capital punishment to prevent the loss of foreign exchange when frightened capital began to flee the country. In this connection reference is made to the Law Against Economic Sabotage, found in 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, page 999, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice.
under the stringent controls which he instituted under his "New Plan". I refer the Tribunal to EC. 611, in evidence as U.S. Exhibit No. 622, consisting of Schacht's speech in Berlin on 29 November 1938. I wish to read into the record an excerpt from the top of page 10:
"If there is anything remarkable about the Now Plan it is again only the fact that German organization under National Socialist leadership succeeded in conjuring up in a very short time the whole apparatus of supervision of imports, direction of exports, and promotion of exports. The success of the New Plan can be proved by means of a few figures. Calculated according to quantity, the import of finished products was throttled by 63 percent between 1934 and 1937. On the ether hand, the import of ores was increased by 132 percent, of petroleum by 116, of grain by 102 and of rubber by 71 percent." acquired still another key position, that of General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. Reich Defense Law, secretly enacted on 21 May 1935. This law is in evidence as 2261-PS, U.S. Exhibit No. 24, consisting of a letter from von Blomberg, dated 24 June 1935, to the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Forces, together with copies of the Reich Defense Law and the Cabinet's memorandum relating thereto. Pertinent comments on and excerpts from this document appear in the transcript for 23 November, at pp.
278 and 292. I will simply state, therefore, that by virtue of this appointment, Schacht was put in complete charge - except for certain direct armament production under control of the War Ministry, in complete change of economic planning and preparation for war in peacetime; and upon the outbreak of war, he was to be the economic czar of Germany, with complete control ever the activities of a number of key Reich ministries. out his directives. In this connection I offer in evidence excerpts from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht under date of 17 October 1945. This document is U.S. Exhibit 616. I wish to read into the record a question and answer found at the bottom of page 40 of the document:
"Q. Let me ask you a general question, then: Do you take the responsibility as Plenipotentiary for the war economy for the writings that were made and the actions that were done by Wohltat and his assistants?
"A. I have to."
I also offer in evidence EC. 258, U.S. Exhibit No. 625, consisting of a status report issued in December 1937 under the signature of Schacht's deputy Wohltat. The report is entitled "The Preparation of the Economic Mobilization by the Plenipotentiary for War Economy". Schacht had withdrawn from office immediately before the preparation of this report, and it plainly is a recapitulation of his accomplishments while in office. Since the entire text is relevant, we ask permission to submit the document without reading therefrom, on condition that translations into French and Russian be later filed with the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think this is consistent with the rule laid down by the Tribunal, which was that the translations in the French and Russian language should be submitted at the same time. You are now suggesting that you can submit translations at a later stage.
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: Well, if your Honor please, in any event I didn't plan to real from the document at this time and defense counsel do have the German original.
THE PRESIDENT: I was not speaking of the defense counsel so much as of the members of the Tribunal.
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: We have the Russian translation in process now and it was delayed and we were unable to get it here at this time but the delay will be very short and the document is of critical importance to our case.
THE PRESIDENT: How long will it be before it is ready?
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: I wouldn't like to say precisely, sir, but perhaps within four, five days.
THE PRESIDENT: What did you propose to do new because it is a very complicated and long document, is it not?
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: It is and it shows ---
THE PRESIDENT: Were you proposing to summarize it?
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: I was proposing to summarize it, sir, new.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would summarize it now and only be permitted to put it in at the stage when you have the translation ready, you may summarize it now.
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: I will summarize it now, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Will it take long to summarize?
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: Not very long, sir, no.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, it is five o'clock.
LIEUTENANT BRYSON: I think there will be time to summarize it and then we will stop. worked out in amazing detail, his plans and preparations for the management of the economy in the forthcoming war. For example, 180,000 industrial plants in 300 industries had been surveyed with respect to usefullness for war purposes; economic plans for the production of 200 basic materials had been worked out; a system for the letting of war contracts had been devised; allocations of coal, motor fuel, and power had been determined; 248 million Reichsmarks had been spent on storage facilities alone; evacuation plans for war materials and skilled workers from military zones had been worked out; 80 million wartime ration cards had already been printed and distributed to local areas; and a card-index on the skills of some 22 million workers had been prepared.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(Whereupon at 1703 the Tribunal adjourned until the following day at 1000). Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, before picking up our line of proof against the Defendant Schacht, I would like to supply a point of information. EC-457, U.S. Exhibit 619. The question raised by the Tribunal was with respect to the words "in retirement" in the letterhead used by Schacht in writing to Hitler in 1932. This is the letter in which Schacht expressed his belief in the truth of the Nazi movement, and in which he said that Hitler could always count upon him as a reliable assistant.
The letterhead has printed upon it, "The President of the Reichsbank" and after that phrase there is typed the letters "A.D", and I understand that those letters are an abbreviation for a German phrase meaning "in retirement" and that it is customary, or it was customary in Germany for retired officials to continue to use their titles with the letters "A.D."
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
LT. BRYSON: Yesterday we had just about completed our proof with respect to the contribution of the Defendant Schacht to the preparation for war, and I wish to submit one more document on this point. This is EC-451, U.S. Exhibit 626. It consists of a statement by George S. Messersmith, United States Consul General in Berlin 1930 to 1934. I will quote therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the fourth paragraph:
"It was his (Schacht's) financial ability that enabled the Nazi regime in the early days to find the financial basis for the tremendous armament program and which made it possible to carry it through. If it had not been for his efforts, and this is not a personal observation of mine only but I believe was shared and is shared by every observer at the time, the Nazi regime would have been unable to maintain itself in power and to establish its control over Germany, much less to create the enormous war machine which was necessary for its objectives in Europe and later throughout the world.
"The increased industrial activity in Germany incident to rearmament made great imports of raw materials necessary while at the same time exports were decreasing. Yet by Schacht's resourcefulness, his complete financial ruthlessness, and his absolute cynicism, Schacht was able to maintain and to establish the situation for the Nazis. Unquestionably without this complete lending of his capacities to the Nazi Government and all of its ambitions, it would have been impossible for Hitler and the Nazis to develop an Armed Force sufficient to permit Germany to launch an aggressive war."
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Well, Lt. Bryson, I am not sure that gives a full or quite fair recapitulation of the document. Don't you think perhaps you ought to read the paragraph before?
LT. BRYSON: The preceding paragraph, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: "Dr. Schacht always attempted to play both sides of the fence. He told me, and I know he told both other American representatives in Berlin and various British representatives, that he disapproved of practically everything the Nazis were doing. I recall on several occasions his saying after the Nazi Party came into power, that if the Nazis were not stopped they were going to ruin Germany and the rest of the world with it. I recall distinctly that he emphasized to me that the Nazis were inevitably going to plunge Europe into war." paragraph:
"In my opinion, Schacht was in no sense a captive of the Nazis, He was not compelled to devote his time and his capacities to their interest. His situation was such that he would most likely have been able either to work on a much less restrained scale or to abstain from activity entirely He continued to lend his services to the Nazi Government at every opportunity."
We turn now to the third part of our case against Schacht. The evidence is clear that he willingly contributed his efforts to the Nazi conspiracy, knowing full well its aggressive designs. The Tribunal will recall our proof that Schacht was converted to the Nazi Philosophy in 1931 and helped Hitler come to power in 1933. We will now prove first that Schacht personally favored, aggression, and second, that in any event he knew Hitler's aggressive intentions. rearmed Germany in order to see fulfilled his strong belief in aggressive expansion as an instrument of German national policy. Schacht had long been a German nationalist and expansionist. He spoke against the Treaty of Versailles at Stuttgart as early as 1927. I offer in evidence EC-415, U.S. Exhibit 627, consisting of a collection of excerpts from speeches by Schacht. I quote from the top of page 2:
"The Versailles Dictate cannot be an eternal document, because not only its economic but also its spiritual and moral premises are wrong," colonial territory by Germany. However, he also favored acquisition of continguous territory in Europe. On 16 April 1929, at the Paris Conference, in connection with reparations -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Are you going to read the passage that follows that at a later stage?
LT. BRYSON: At a later stage, if you please, sir, in connection with another point.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on.
LT. BRYSON: On 16 April 1929, at the Paris Conference in connection with reparations, he said:
"Germany can generally only pay if the Corridor and Upper Silesia will be handed back to Germany from Polish possession, and if besides somewhere on the earth colonial territory will be made available to Germany."
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What are you talking from?
LT. BRYSON: I offer in evidence U.S. Exhibit No. 628, consisting of excerpts from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 24 August 1945.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle) : Where is it here?
LT. BRYSON: You will find it in the document book at the back, labeled "Interrogation of 24 August." It is at the top of the first page of the interrogation. This statement was quoted to Schacht, and his reply contains an admission of having made the statement. In his reply he said:
"That Germany could not pay at the time after I made the statement has been proved, and that Germany will not be able to pay after this war will be proved in the future."
subject of armed aggression in September, 1939. quire colonies by force. I offer in evidence EC-450, designated as U. S. Exhibit No. 629. This document consists of an affidavit of S. R. Fuller, Jr., Together with a transcript of his conversation with Schacht at the American Embassy in Berlin on 23 September 1935. I wish to read from page 6 of the document where there appears a statement by Schacht in the lower half of the page.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the conversation?
LT. BRYSON: The conversation occurred on 23 September 1935. The page numbers of this document are at the bottom, and I quote from page 6:
"Schacht. Colonies are necessary to Germany. We shall get them through negotiation, if possible, but if not, we shall take them."
THE PRESIDENT: It is on page 6, is it?
LT. BRYSON: If your Honor please, the page numbers are at the bottom of the page and not at the top.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. There are two pages.
LT. BRYSON: Shall I repeat it again, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: I guess I have got it.
LT. BRYSON: In July 1936, when the rearmament program was well under way, Schacht again publicly spoke of the Versailles Treaty. This time his language contained an explicit threat of war. I refer the Tribunal again to EC-415, which was previously introduced, in evidence as U. S. Exhibit 627, consisting of a collection of speeches by Schacht. I wish . to read from the paragraph beginning in the middle of the first page:
"But the memory of warweighs undiminished upon the people's minds. That is because deeper than material wounds, moral wounds are smarting, inflicted by the so-called peace treaties. Material loss can be made up through renewed labor, but the moral wrong which has been inflicted upon the conquered peoples, in the peace dictates, leaves a burning scar on the people's conscience.
The spirit of the Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war, and there will not be a true peace, progress or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit.
The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning." "lebensraum" for the German people. I quote again from EC-415, U. S. Exhibit No. 627, being an excerpt from Schacht's speech at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, on the second page, the last paragraph:
"Germany has too little living space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other nation, to extract from her own existing small space whatever is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite of all these efforts, the space does not suffice." at least by inference threatened a breach of the peace in demanding a colonial cession. I offer in evidence L-111, being U. S. Exhibit 630, and consisting of excerpts from a report under date of 20 January 1937, by Ambassador Davies to the Secretary of State. I wish to read therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the second paragraph:
"He (meaning Schacht) stated the following; that the present condition of the German people was intolerable, desperate and unendurable; that he had been authorized by his Government to submit proposals to France and England which would "(1) Guarantee European peace;"(2) Secure present European international boundaries;"(3) Reduce armaments;"(4) Establish a new form of a workable League of Nations;"(5) Abolish sanctions with new machinery for joint administration; all based upon a colonial cession that would provide Germany an outlet for population, source for food stuffs, fats and raw materials."
would be willing to risk war for the sake of new territory in Europe. I refer the Tribunal to EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd's diary.
THE PRESIDENT: The proposal contained in Document 111 was for cession of colonies, wasn't it?
LT. BRYSON: It was, sir.
I turn now to EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd's Diary. The entire diary has previously been received in evidence as U.S. Exhibit No. 53. beginning near the bottom of the second page of Ec. 461, in the last paragraph:
"Schacht meant what the army chiefs of 1914 meant when they invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in six weeks; that is, domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, especially North and East. Much as he dislikes Hitler's dictatorship he, as most other eminent Germans, wishes annexation without war if possible; with war if the United States will keep hands off."
THE PRESIDENT: There is another passage in that book, that diary. I don't know if it is the same date. I am not sure; it probably isn't the same date, but it is on the first page of the Exhibit, I think, the third paragraph. Is it at a different time?
LT. BRYSON: It is a different time, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: September the 19th of what year?
LT. BRYSON: We will check that in the complete volume here, and I think in a minute I will be able to supply the date. In the meantime, would you like me to read, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think you had better read it.
LT. BRYSON: (quoting) "He then acknowledged that the Hitler Party is absolutely committed to war and the people, too, are ready and willing. Only a few government officials are aware of the dangers and are opposed."
He concluded: "But we shall, postpone it ten years. Then it may be we can avoid war."
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think you should read the next paragraph, too.
LT. BRYSON: And to continue: "I reminded him of his Bad Eilsen speech some two weeks ago and said, 'I agree with you about commercial and financial matters in the main, but why do you not, when you speak before the public, tell the German people they must abandon a war attitude?' He replied, 'I dare not say that. I can only speak on my special subjects.'"
THE PRESIDENT: And the next one.
LT. BRYSON: And the next one: "How then can German people ever learn the real dangers of war, if nobody ever presents that side of the question? He once more emphasized his opposition to war and added that he had used his influence with Hitler--'a very great man', he interjected--to prevent war. I said, 'The German papers printed what I said at Bremen.'"
THE PRESIDENT: Too fast.
LT. BRYSON: I beg your pardon. "'The German papers printed what I said at Bremen about commercial relations between our countries, but net a word about the terrible effects and barbarism of war. He acknowledged that and talked very disapprovingly of the propaganda Ministry, which supresses everything it dislikes. He added as I was leaving. 'You know, a party comes into office by propaganda, and then cannot disavow it or stop it.'"
THE PRESIDENT: 1934?
LT. BRYSON: 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that those years are not stated in the document. It is rather misleading as it is.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, the Exhibit which is in evidence will show the dates.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I am not blaming you, but it is misleading, because it looks like September the 19th and December the 21st, and there were three years' interval between. It makes a difference. That is right, isn't it?
LT. BRYSON: Yes. That is not three years, sir. Yes, that's right. But I am sorry the excerpt simply shows the page numbers from the Exhibit, and not the dates. Wehrmacht which would provide Hitler with an instrument for realization of his desire for lebensraum.