That is the next document, C-77, which I now put in as Exhibit GB 146, and it is very short. Therefore, I think I should quote it; it hasn't been read before:
"The Foreign Office has prepared for use in Barbarossa the attached draft of a declaration of operational zones. The Foreign Office has, however, reserved its decision as to the date when the declaration will be issued as well as discussion of particulars." was again well in the preparation for this act of aggression. Then on the 22nd of June 1941 this defendant announced to the world that the German armies were invading the USSR, as was seen by the Tribunal in the film shown on the 11th of December. own Ambassador in Moscow who said that everything was being done to avoid a conflict. The Tribunal will find the reference to that in my learned friend the Attorney General's speech, the transcript at Page 888. against the United States of America. There the initial document is 2508-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB 147. That shows that on the 25th of November, 1936, as a result of negotiations of this Defendant as Ambassador-at-Large, Germany and Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. I don't think that has been read, but if I may, I will just read the introduction, the recital that gives the purpose of the agreement:
"The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist Internationale known as the Comintern is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist Internationale in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating in the defense against Communist subversive activities; having agreed as follows."
which they will act together for five years. It is signed by this Defendant. signed the tripartite pact with Japan and Italy, thereby bringing about a full-scale military and economic alliance for the creation of a new order in Europe and East Asia. That is 2643-PS, United States Exhibit 149, and it has been read. later -- this Defendant was urging the Japanese to attack British possessions in the Far East. And that is shown in Document 1834-PS, which is US Exhibit 129, and which has already been read by my friend Mr. Alderman. That was in February. representing Japan, at which this Defendant was present, Hitler promised that Germany would declare war on the United States in the event of war occurring between Japan and the United States as a result of Japanese aggression in the Pacific. That is shown in Document 1881-PS, United States Exhibit 33, which has already been read and which I did not intend to read again. which is United States Exhibit 153. If I might trouble the Tribunal with just two short paragraphs of that, it is interesting, showing the psychological development of this Defendant and his views at that time. It is the first two paragraphs in the document that are quoted, under the heading "pages 2 and 3"; it is on the first page of the document:
"Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.
"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, some of whom are parasites, anyway."
THE PRESIDENT: It is "most", according to my document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg Your Lordship's pardon, it is completely my fault, it should be "most"-"most of whom are parasites, anyway". A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty."
Then it continues along the usual lines. That was on the 5th of April.
Then, the next stage; Within a month after the German armies invaded the Soviet Union, the 22nd of June, 1941, Ribbentrop was urging his ambassador in Tokyo to do his utmost to cause the Japanese Government to attack the Soviet in Siberia, and that is proved by two documents which have already been put in, 2896-PS, which is United States Exhibit 155, a telegram to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, one Ott; and 2897-PS, No. 156, which is the reply from Ambassador Ott.
Both of these were read by my friend Mr. Alderman, and I won't trouble the Tribunal again. as GB 148 . That was captured from the Japanese, and it is a message, intercepted, which was sent by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin just before the attack on the United States. If I might just read one short extract from this Defendant's speech -- on the 29th of November, 1941, that is, roughly, a week before Pearl Habor, this Defendant was saying this. It is in paragraph 1, and I will read it all because it is new:
"Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-United States negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.
"Ribbentrop: 'It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan.
"'As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-United States negotiations being concluded successfully because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front, "'If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan and herself.
'" Then the Ambassador replied:
"I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?"
The Defendant Ribbentrop: "Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do."
Then: "Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops, and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech, as well as that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary." of the war against the Soviet Union. I don't think, in view of the date in which we are reading it, that I need trouble the Tribunal with that. against England, which I shall not read at this time. national attitude of mind of this Defendant -- at the foot of page 2, part 3, and I am quoting:
"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African Colonies. Germany desires, above all else, to control European Russia."
And, after hearing this Defendant, the Ambassador said, and I quote:
"I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only great Britain as an actual enemy, but also having all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well.
Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?"
The Defendant Ribbentrop: "We would like to end this war during next year." That is, 1942. "However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have to be continued on to the following year.
"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States"-
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): You are going a little bit too fast.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Too fast?
THE PRESIDENT: Apparently.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, I an sorry. I will go back to the paragraph I have just finished.
"We would like to end this war during next year. However, under certain circumstances it is possible that it will have to be continued on into the following year.
"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point." Japan against the United States in the closest possible way. message, is the next one, D-657, which I put in as Exhibit GB-149. If I might read the first two sentences, they show what it is--and I quote.
The Japanese Ambassador says, "At 1 p.m. today--the 8th of December--I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th"--that is, before the declaration of war--"Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them.
"It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information."
11th of December, 1941, the Defendant Ribbentrop, in the name of the German Government, announced a state of war between Germany and the United States. Soviet Union.
In Ribbentrop's conversations with Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, in July 1942 and in March and April 1943, he continued to urge Japanese participation and aggression against the Soviet Union. This is shown in document 2911-PS, which has been put in as United States Exhibit 157 and already read, and document 2954-PS, which I now put in as GB-150. That is a new document, and if I may I will just indicate the effect of it by a very short quotation. This is a discussion between the Defendant Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima. It begins:
"Ambassador Oshima declared that he has received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report, by order of his Government, to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following:
"The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the object of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia and completely understands the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question." returned to the attack. The third sentence--it begins on the fourth line--says:
"However, it would be more correct that all powers, allied in the Three Power Pact, would combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together. It is not good when one part must fight alone." the next document, 2929-PS, which was put in as United States Exhibit 159. And, in closing this part of the case if I may I will read that. It is very short.
"The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment"--the moment being 18 April 1943. second allegation dealing with aggressive war, and I submit that that allegation in the Indictment is more than amply proved. directed and participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity. planning these crimes only. The execution of the crimes will be dealt with by my friends, my Soviet colleagues, but it is relevant to show how this Defendant participated in the planning of such crimes.
I deal, first, with the killing of allied aviators; secondly, with the destruction of peoples in Europe; and thirdly, with the persecution of the Jew First, the killing of allied aviators:
Air Forces, the German Government proposed to undertake a plan to deter Anglo-American fliers from further raids on the Reich cities. In a report of a meeting at which a definite policy was to be established, there is stated what was the point of view that this Defendant Ribbentrop had been urging. That is in Document 735-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-151. That is a discussion of a meeting at the Fuehrer's headquarters on the 6th of June, 1944. If I may, I will read the first paragraph:
"Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy Chief of West in Klessheim, on the afternoon of the 6th of June, that a conference on this question had been held shortly before between the Reich Marshal, the Defendant Goering; the Reich Foreign Minister, the Defendant Ribbentrop; and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler. Contrary to the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister, who wished to include every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks carried out with aircraft armament, aimed directly at the civilian population and their property should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to be the rule. On the contrary, there has been no question of court martial sentence or handing over to the police." on a German city, the air men should be handed over to be lynched by the crowd. The others were saying that that should be restricted to cases where there were attacks by machine guns, and the like, on the civilian population.
I don't think we need trouble with paragraph (a) of the statement of the Deputy Chief of WEST. The importance of (a) goes because Kaltenbrunner says that there were no such cases as were mentioned.
If you look at (b): "Deputy Chief of the WEST mentioned that apart from Lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for segregating those enemy received into the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel; if the suspicion aviators who are suspected of criminal action of this kind until they are were confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD for special treatment."
As I understand that, it is that if they weren't lynched under the first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be kept from prisoners of war, where they would, of course, be subject to the protecting powers' intervention. And if the suspicion was confirmed, they would he handed over to the SD to be killed. law. Paragraph 3 says:
"At a cpmferemce with Colonel von Brauchitsch, representing the C-in-C, Air Force, on the 6th of June, it was settled that the following actions were to be regarded as terror actions justifying lynch law:
"Low-level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population, single persons as well as crowds.
"Shooting our own men in the air who had bailed out.
"Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the public service "Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with the Red Cross."
suggested, a case where there was the bombing of a city. curious comment from the Defendant Keitel: "Remarks by the Chief of OKW on the agenda dated 6 June 1944." The number thereon is that of the document at which the Tribunal has just been looking. "Most secret; Staff Offices only."
"If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is difficult to enforce rules.
"Minister Director Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator on the road I am against legal procedure. It doesn't work out."
Then the remarks of the Defendant Jodl appear:
"This conference is insufficient. The following points must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Offices:
"1. What do we consider as murder?
"Is RR in agreement with point 3b?
"2. How should the procedure be carried out?
"a. By the people?
"By the authorities?
"3. How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out against other enemy aviators?
"4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?
Signed Jodl" and the Foreign Office, were fully in on these breaches of the laws and usages of war, and indeed the clarity with which the Foreign Office perceives that there were broaches of laws and usages of war, is furthered by the next document which is 728-PS, which I now put in as GB-152. That is a document from the Foreign Office, approved of by the Defendant Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials called Ritter; and the fact that it is approved by this defendant is specifically stated in the next document 740-PS, which I put in as GB-153. I don't think this document has been read before, and, therefore, again I would like to read just one or two passages in it. It begins:
"In spite of the obvious objections, founded on international law and foreign politics, the Foreign Office is basically in agreement with the proposed measures.
"In the examination of the individual cases, a distinction must be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special treatment by the Security Service, SD.
"1. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the circumstances deserving punishment, according to points 1-4 of the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the German authorities are not directly responsible, since death had occurred, before a German official became concerned with the case.
Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances Will be such, that it will not be difficult to depict the case in an appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of lynching, it will be of primary importance correctly to handle the individual case upon publication.
"2. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the S.D. (Security Service) including subsequent publication, would be tenable only if GERMANY, on this occasion simultaneously would openly repudiate the commitment of International Law, presently in force, and still recognized by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by the Police, and is delivered to the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel, he has received, by this very fact, the legal status of a prisoner of war.
"The Prisoner of War Treaty of 27 July 1929 establishes definite rules on the prosecution and sentencing of the Prisoner of war, and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only three months after the protective power has been notified of the sentence; in Article 63: a prisoner of war will be tried only by the same courts and under the same procedure as members of the German Armed Forces. These rules are so specific, that it would be futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the other hand the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion a formal repudiation of the Prisoner of War Treaty.
"An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected fliers from ever attaining a legal Prisoner of War status, that is, that immediately upon seizure they be told that they are not considered Prisoners of War but criminals, that they would not be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over Prisoners of War; hence not go to a Prisoner of Way Camp; but that they would be delivered to the authorities in charge of the prosecution of criminal acts and that they would be tried in a summary proceeding. If the evidence at the trial should reveal that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status of Prisoner of War by transfer to the Air Forces (P.W.) Reception Camp Oberursel.
"Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility that Germany will be accused of the violation of existing treaties and maybe not even the adoption of reprisals upon German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable us clearly to define our attitude, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly having to renounce the present agreements or of the need of having to use excuses, which no one would believe, upon the publication of each individual case."
I don't want to take this in detail, but I ask the Tribunal to lock at the first sentence of Section 3:
"It follows from the above, that the main weight of the action will have to be placed on lynchings. Should the campaign be carried out to such an extent that the purpose, to wit: 'the deterrence of enemy aviators' is actually achieved, which goal is favored by the Foreign Office, then the strafing attacks by enemy fliers upon the civilian populations must be stressed in a completely different propagandist manner than heretofore."
I don't think I need trouble the Tribunal, but that shows quite clearly the defendant's point of view. If the Tribunal would look at the next document, it is stated at the beginning of the second paragraph:
"Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone on 29 June that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft." is in my suggestion a completely cold-blooded and deliberate adoption of a procedure evading international law. With regard to Poland, again I won't go into details, but I remind the Tribunal of the evidence of the witness Lahousen, which appears in the transcript, pages 618 and 619 on the 30th of November of last year, and on pages 713 to 716, when he was cross-examined on the 1st of December.
Secondly, Bohemia and Moravia: on the 16th of March 1939, there was promulgated the decree of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, signed by Ribbentrop, concerning the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
That is already in as Exhibit GB-8, Document TC-51. The effect of that was to place the Reich protector in a remarkable position of supremacy under the Fuehrer. The only part which I would like the Tribunal to have in mind is Article 5 and sub-article 2:"It shall be the duty of the Reich protector as representative of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor-
THE PRESIDENT: From which document are you reading?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FIFE: Article 5 (2).
THE PRESIDENT: Which document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was reading actually from the file brief. It is Document 51, GB-8, page 2 at the bottom of the page. It begins:
"The Reich protector, as representative of the leader and chancellor of the Reich, and as commissioner of the Reich government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance of the political principles laid down by the leader and chancellor of the Reich.
"3. The members of the government of the protectorate shall be confirmed by the Reich protector. The confirmation may be withdrawn.
"4. The Reich protector is entitled to inform himself of all measures taken by the government of the protectorate and to give advice. He can object to measures caluclated to harm the Reich, and, in case of danger, issue ordinances required for the common interest.
Then the promulgation of laws, etc., and the execution of administrative illegal jusgments shall be annulled if the Reich protector enters an objection. Moravia, and their various deputies, were appointed, and then there were committed the various crimes, which will be detailed by my Soviet colleague. a decree of the Fuehrer was signed by Ribbentrop concerning the exercise of governmental authority in the Netherlands; and that, which is Document 639, which I put in as GB-154, Section 1 says:
"The occupied Netherlands territories shall be administered by the "Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories'....the Reich Commissioner is guardian of the interests of the Reich and vested with supreme civil authority.
"Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is hereby appointed Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories."
On the basis of this decree, the Reich Commissioner (Seyss-Inquart)--
the Defendant Seyss-Inquart -- promulgated such orders as that of the 4th of July, 1940, dealing with the confiscation of property of those who had, or might have furthered activities hostile to the German Reich, and tentative arrangements were made for the resettlement of the Dutch population. This will be dealt with fully by my French colleague. order of the defendant Seyss-Inquart, which is GB-155, the document being 2921-PS. I don't intend to read it. I have summarized the effect of it and it will be dealt with more fully by my French colleagues. Bohemia and the Netherlands, the charge against this defendant is laying the basis and procuring the governmental structure under which the war crimes and crimes against humanity were directed. discussion on the question of the Dutch population, which is contained in Document 1520-PS. Again I have explained it generally and I don't want to occupy time by reading it in full now.
Finally, I come to the persecution of the Jews. In December, 1938, the Defendant Ribbentrop, in a conversation with M. Bonnet, who was then Foreign Minister of France, expressed his opinion of the Jews. That was reported by the United States Ambassador, Mr. Kennedy, to the State Department. The report of Mr. Kennedy is Document L-205, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-157. If I might read to the Tribunal the second paragraph which concerns this point:
"During the day we had a telephone call from Berenger's office in Paris. We were told that the matter of refugees had been raised by Bonnet in his conversation with von Ribbentrop. The result was very bad. Ribbentrop, when pressed, had said to Bonnet that the Jews in Germany without exception were pickpockets, murderers and thieves. The property they possessed had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the population. The property which they had acquired illegally would be taken from them.
They would be forced to live in districts frequented by the criminal classes.
They would be under police observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report to the police as other criminals were obliged to do. The German Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was not, however, willing for them to take the property which had resulted from their illegal operations with them.
There was in fact nothing that it could or would do."
That succinct statement of this defendant's views on Jews is elaborated in a long document which he had sent out by the Foreign Office, which is numbered 3358-PS, which I put in as Exhibit 158. I don't want to read the whole of that document because it is excessively dreary. It is also an excessively clear indication of the defendant's views on the treatment of Jews; but if the Tribunal would look at, first of all, page 3, it is headed, "The Jewish Question As A Factor In German Foreign Policy" in the year 1938".
After the four divisions the document goes on to says:
"It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realization of the 'idea of Greater Germany', since the Jewish policy was both, the basis and consequence of the events of the year 1938."
That is alborated. If the Tribunal will turn over to page 4 at the beginning of the second paragraph, you will see the first sentence:
"The final goal of German-Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews living in Reich territory. pages. If the Tribunal would turn to the foot of page 7, it goes on to say:
"These examples from reports from authorities abroad can, if desired, be amplified. They confirm the correctness of the expectation, that criticism of the measures for excluding Jews from German lebensraum, which were misunderstood in many countries for lack of evidence, would only be temporary and would swing in the other direction the moment the population saw with its own eyes and thus learned, what the Jewish danger was to them. The poorer and therefore the more burdensome the immigrant Jew to the country absorbing him, the stronger this country will react and the more desirable is this effect in the interest of German propaganda. The object of this German action is to be the future international solution of the Jewish question, dictated not by false compassion for the 'United Religious Jewish minority' but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the danger which it represents to the racial composition of the nations.
defendant's ministry, widely circulated to all senior Reich authorities and to numerous people before the war on the 25th of January, 1939, just after the statement to M. Bonnet, Apparently the anti-Semitism of the defendant went from - I was going to say from strength to strength, at any rate from exaggeration to exaggeration, because in June, 1944 the Defendant Rosenberg made arrangements for an international anti-Jewish Congress to be held in Krakow on the 11th of July, 1944. The honorary members were to be von Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels, and Frank - I think the Defendant Frank. The Foreign Office was to take over the mission of inviting prominent foreigners from Italy, France, Hungary, Holland, Arabia, Iraq, Norway etc, in order to give an international aspect to the Congress However, the military events of June, 1944 prompted Hitler to call off the Congress which had lost its significance by virtue of the allied landing in Normandy.
That is contained in Document 1752-PS, GB-159. At the foot of page 1, the Tribunal will see the following had been entered as honorary members - Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. So that there is no doubt that this defendant was behind the program against the Jews, which resulted in the placing of them in concentration camps with anyone else opposed to the Nazi way of life, and it is submitted that he must have, as a minister in special touch with the head of the government, known what was going on in the country and in the camps. One who preached this doctrine, and was in a position of authority, cannot, I submit, to anyone who has had any material experience, suggest that he was ignorant of how the policy was carried out. evidence which I have recapitulated to the Tribunal, the three allegations are proved.
With regard to the second, Hitler's own words were:
"In the historic year of 1938 the Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, was of great help to me, in view of his accurate and audacious judgment and the exceptionally clever treatment of all problems of foreign policy."