of the defendant Goering has been intended to be merely illustrative of the mass of documentary evidence which reveals the leading part played by this conspirator in every phase of the Nazi conspiracy. Thus, we submit that the case against Goering is complete, and that his responsibility for the crimes with which he has been charged under Count One of the Indictment has been established. responsibility of the defendant Goering. We will now proceed with the arrangement had with the British Delegation on the presentation showing the individual responsibility of the defendant von Ribbentrop by Sir David MaxwellFyfe.
SIR DAVID Maxwell FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, if the Tribunal would be good enough to look at Appendix A of the Indictment on page 28 of the English Text, they will find the particulars relating to the defendant - this defendant, and they will find that the Allegations regarding him fall into three divisions. Indictment goes on to say that the defendant Ribbentrop used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators as setforth in Count One of the Indictment, or permitted preparation for war setforth in Count One of the Indictment. and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for war of aggression and wars in vidation of International treaties, agreements and assurances as set forth in Count One and Count Two of the Indictment.
In accordance with the Fuehrer's principle, he executed and assumed responsibility for the execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators, as setforth in Count One of the Indictment. war crimes, as setforth in Count three of the Indictment and crimes against humanity, setforth in Count Four of the Indictment. Including, moreover, the crimes against persons and property in occupied territories; I hope it might be useful to the Tribunal if I follow that order. In these Allegations in the Indictment we collected the evidence for them in each of these in turn, and I, therefore, proceed to put in first of the Allegation that this defendant promoted the accession to power with the Nazi conspirators.
and these are useful collectively in his own certified statement, which has already been put in as USA Exhibit No. 5, document No. 2829-PS. And I think it would be convenient if I very briefly explained the different activities and offices of the defendant, which are dealt with in that list. It will be seen from that list that he became a member of the Nazi Party in 1932, but according to the semi-official statement in the Archives, he had gone to work for that Party before that time. That semi-official statement goes on and says that he succeeded in extending his business connections to political circles, having joined in 1930 the service of the Party at the time of the final struggle for power in the Reich, Ribbentrop played an important, if not strikingly obvious, part in the bringing about of the decisive meetings between the representatives of the President of the Reich and the heads of the Party, who had prepared the entry of Nazis into power on 30 January 1933. Those meetings, as well as those between Hitler and von Papen, took place in Ribbentrop's house in Berlin Dahlen. Nazi securing the power and after that. For that first period he was advisor to the Party on questions of foreign affairs. His title was first, "Collaborator to the Fuehrer on matters of Foreign Policy," and he later became representative in matters of foreign policies of the Staff of the Deputy. This was followed by membership on the Nazi Reichstag in November 1933, and in the Party organizations he became an Oberfuehrer in the SS, and was subsequently promoted to SS Gruppenfuehrer in 1938, and to Obergruppenfuehrer. Thereafter he obtained the official governmental positions. in matters of Disarmament. It was after Germany had left the disarmament conference. In this capacity he visited London, foreign capitals. He was then given a more important, and certainly, a more designing title, the German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, and it was in that capacity that he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935. zone, which had been demilitarized in accordance with the terms of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, and the matter was brought before the Council of the League of Nations, and the defendant addressed the Council in defense of the action of Germany, his next position began on 11 August 1936, when he was appointed Ambassador in London.
He occupied that position for a period of some eighteen months, and his activities there while holding that position are not highly relevant to the matters now before the Tribunal, but in joining that period, in his capacity which he still had as German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, he signed the original Anticomintern Pact with Japan in November 1936, and also the additional pact by which Italy jointed it in 1937. 1938, this defendant was appointed Foreign Minister in place of the defendant von Neurath, and simultaneously was made a member of the Secret Cabinet Council (Geheimer Kabinsttsrat) established by decree of Hitler of that date. That takes us up to the period of his holding the office of Foreign Minister, and his action in that capacity will be dealt with in detail later on. summarized it, to the extract in Das Archiv, which is document D472, which I now put in as Exhibit GB 130; also to the membership extract of the SS, which consist in the examination of the descent of SS leaders, that is inserted as Exhibit GB 131. Again I shall not trouble the Tribunal with the details which shows his rank, which I have already mentioned. There is no question of any honorable rank. It stated the rank of Gruppenfuehrer, and, of course, it gives his ancestry in detail in order to deal with the law relating to that subject. It also deals with the adoption of the "von", to securing the prefix of "von", but the defendant's evidence is now to deal with much more serious thirds than merely controversies with the government. in this part of the case, which is Exhibit GB 129, document 1337-PS, which shows the establishment of the Secret Cabinet Council, and membership in the Foreign Ministry, These are the activities of this defendant in the earlier part of his career, and in submission of the prosecution they show quite clearly that he assisted willing, deliberately, intently, and keenly in the militarily bringing of the Nazis into power, and into the earlier stage of their obtaining control of the German State.
dant participated in political planning and preparation with the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of International Treaties, agreements and assurances, and again it might help the Tribunal if I took this up shortly in order of aggression, and stated briefly the constituent allegation in reference to the matters before the Tribunal, only referring the Tribunal to any new document which I shall now present. remember that the defendant Ribbentrop was present at a meeting at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, at which Hitler and von Papen met the Austrian Chancellor von Schuschnigg and his foreign minister Schmidt, Guido Schmidt. The Tribunal will find the official account on that interview in document 2461-PS, and which I put in as Exhibit GB 132, and the Tribunal will find of what I speak is truthful account of the interview in Exhibit USA 72, document number 1780-PS, which is the diary of the defendant Jodl, and the relevant entries are those for the 11 and 12 February 1938. They are extremely short, and I shall ask if the Tribunal will be kind enough to allow me to have it shown quite clearly his case for the prosecution, with his entries, that was put in on Chancellor Schuschnigg's interview, at the foot of the first page in that document of the book, document 1780-PS is the number.
And the 11th of February the defendant Jodl writes: "In the evening, and on 12 February, General Keitel with General von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzburg. Schuschnigg, together with R.G. Schmidt, are again being put under the heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs, protocol.
"13 February; in the afternoon, General Keitel asks Admiral Canaris and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.
"At 2.40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrived. Canaris went to Munich, to the Counter-intelligence Office VII initiated the different measures.
"The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations." Jodl, to look at the pale words of the official statement which I've also put in. That is the view of the meeting with Schuschnigg, which the prosecution placed before this court. trial brief that this defendant visited Mussolini before the Anschluss as is stated by a member of his staff. At that time it was mistaken by another member. Therefore, I'd rather the Tribunal ruled it out. which took place between the defendant Goering and the defendant Ribbentrop on the 13th of March 1938, when this defendant was still in London. Mr. Alderman. It was passing on what the prosecution submits as a completely false statement that there was no ultimatum. The facts of the ultimatum were explained by the earlier telephone conversations between the defendant Goering in Vienna. Defendant Goering then passed that on to the defendant Ribbentrop in London in order that he might propagate the story of there being no ultimatum in political circles in London. That appears in the telephone conversation which is US Exhibit 76, Document 2949-B , and I say it's fully dealt with in the transcript on page 582.
Although he had been appointed Foreign Minister in February, he had gone back to London to clear up his business at the embassy, and he was still in London until after the Anschluss had actually occurred, but his name appears as a signatory of the law-making Austria, a province of the German Reich. That is Document 2307-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-133, And there is a reference in the Reichsgesetzblatt, which is given. These were the actions of the defendant with regard to Austria. of aggressive work in its various ways. Again I simply remind the Tribunal of the outstanding points with the greatest brevity. First, there is the question of stirring up trouble inside the country against which aggression is going to be set forth. Sudeten Germany under Henlein and the contacts between the foreign office and Henlein are in US Exhibit 93, 94, 95, and 96. These are documents 3060-PS, 2789-PS, and 3059-PS. They have all been read by my friend, Mr. Alderman, but I simply give the Tribunal the effect of them, which is in their documents: Stirring up the Sudeten-German movement in order to act with the Government of the Reich. at the conference of Hitler, at which the latter gave the necessary instructions to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia, That was dealt with previously on page 742 of the transcript. And I want to put before the Tribunal document 2360-PS which is a report of a speechof Hitler's in the Voelkischer Boebachter and, if the Tribunal would be good enough to look at it, it is a useful date to fix with regard to the aggression against Czechoslovakia because that was the day on which Hitler on his own proclamation had decided that aggression was to take place against Czechoslovakia, The extract which I've taken is quite short and, if the Tribunal-would look at the extract which says "Page 1, Columns 5 and 6, bottom", 2360-PS-
THE PRESIDENT: This is out of order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It's extremely short, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: You will read it?
DIR DAVID MAXWELL-FIFE: I'll read it. The important passage is:
"On the basis of this unbearable provocation which was still further emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and terrorizing of our Germans there I have now decided to solve the Sudeten-German question in a final and radical manner."
This was in January 1939. Then he goes on to say:
"On 28 May I gave the order for the preparation of military steps against this state, to be concluded by 2 October."
nut into effect to come to fruition at the beginning of October. That is the second stage:
"To lay well in advance your plans of aggression."
"The third stare is to see that the neighboring states are not likely to cause you trouble."
Czechoslovakia was discussed. That is US Exhibit 5, Document 2008-PS.
I think it's sufficient for me to say to the Tribunal that the to action, although it was ready enough with sympathy.
These are to be found in the documents which I have mentioned.
And, again, unless the Tribunal desires, I shan't read any document that I summarized that way.
Now, I've already mentioned that there had been contact with the Sudeten Germans.
That was the long term grievance that had to be ex ploited.
But the next stage was to have a short grievance and to stir up trouble, preferably at the fountainhead.
And so, between the 16th and 2855-PS, 2854-PS, 2853-PS, and 2856-PS.
I've read them in order of date, And it's interesting, if the Tribunal would look at these.
They ought to "Please inform Deputy Kundt at Conrad Henlein's request to get in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start demands."
crisis. After, as the Tribunal will remember, on the 29th of September, the Munich agreement was signed.
That's GB-23, Document TC-23, which I've already read to the Tribunal.
opinion of the Foreign Office is sought. That, of course,
THE PRESIDENT: Can you give us the number of that document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, C-2, my Lord, US Exhibit 90.
the acquiring of Czechoslovakia. That is, having obtained the On that point, again this Defendant was active.
On the 13th "make a point of not being available if the Czech Government wants to get in touch with you in the next few days."
That is
US Exhibit No. 116, document 2815.
was present. Tiso, one of the heads of the pro-Nazi Slovaks was in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia.
That is US Exhibit 117, 2790-PS, US Exhibit 110.
So that this Defendant was assisting in President of Czechoslovakia, was called to Berlin.
This Defendant usual pressure and threats which resulted in the aged President's permission to hand over the Czechoslovak State to Hitler.
The Hacha that this Defendant attended.
You will also find it dealt That was the end of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia.
The I now put in.
It is document 1439-PS, and I put it in as Czechoslovakia.
That is 1439-PS, which I put in as GB-135. Again, affairs of other countries, even when it didn't seem a very important matter.
The Tribunal will remember that on the 3rd of Memeland.
It would have appeared, as far as the Baltic States were this Defendant acted in close concert with the Conspirator Heydrich;pro-Nazi people called the Woldemaras Supporters.
2953-PS shows
THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, Sir David. Unfortunately these documents aren't in any order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I'm terribly sorry.
THE PRESIDENT: It is very difficult to find them. This follows after 3061 and 1439?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it follows after 3061. The next one is what I referred to.
The treaty with Slovakia, 1439, should
THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read 2953?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, my Lord. That is the one I was going to read.
That is a letter from Heydrich to the Defendant Ribbentrop and it says:
"Dear Party Comrade v. Ribbentrop.
"Enclosed please find a further report about the 'Woldemaras Supporters.
' As already mentioned in the previous report the 'Woldemaras Supporters' are still asking for help from the Reich.
I therefore ask you to examine the question of financial support, brought up again by the 'Woldemaras Supporters' set forth on page 4, paragraph 2 of the enclosed report and to make a definite decision.
"The request of the 'Woldermaras Supporters' for financial support could, in my opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms should not, however, be made under any circumstances." of that there is added in handwriting, "I support small regular payments, e.g. 2,000 to 3,000 marks quarterly." It is signed "W", who I understand to be the Secretary of State. with compartively unimportant countries. has had that fully dealt with by my friend Colonel Griffith Jones, but again it might be useful if I just separated the various periods so that the Tribunal will have these in mind. The first was what one might call the Munich period, up to the end of September 1938, and at that time no language was too good for Poland. The Tribunal will remember the point. which is Document 2357-PS, Hitler's Reichstag speech on the 20th of February, 1938, and then GB-31, Document TC-76, which is the secret Foreign Office memorandum of the 26th of August, 1938, GB 27, Document 73 No. 40.
THE PRESIDENT: What number?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a conversation between M. Lipski
THE PRESIDENT: What was the number?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your Lordship's pardon. The last one was TC-76.
THE PRESIDENTS: Yes, but after that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next one was TC-73, No. 40. Seventythree is the Polish White Book and 40 is the number of the document in the book. It is an extract from the conversation between M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador and this Defendant.
Finally in this group is TC-73, No. 42, Hitler's speech at the Sportpalast on the 26th of September, 1938, in which he said that this was the end of his territorial problems in Europe and expressed an almost violent affection for the Poles.
then the next stage - part of the German stage in Czechoslovakia having been accomplished and parts still remaining to be done - there is a slight change but still a friendly atmosphere. That begins with a conversation between this Defendant and M. Lipski, which is contained in Exhibit GB-27, Document TC-73, No. 44. settlement of the Danzig issue. The Polish reply is in GB-28, TC-7345.
THE PRESIDENT: You didn't rive the date of those, did you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: The first one is 24 October 1938; the Polish reply which says that it is unacceptable that Danzig should return to the Reich, but making suggestions of a bilateral agreement is the 31st of October 1938. Between these dates, the Tribunal will remember, according to Document C-137, Exhibit GB-33, dated the 21st of October, the German Government had made its preparations to occupy Danzig by surprise. But, although these preparations were made, still some two months later, on the 5th of January 1939, while the rape of Prague had not taken place, Hitler was suggesting to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, a new solution. That is contained in Document TC-7348, GB-34, the interview of Hitler and Beck on the 5th of January, 1939.
Then this Defendant saw M. Beck on the next day and said there was no violent solution of Danzig, but a further building up of friendly relations. That is contained in GB-35, Document TC-7349, Not content with that, this Defendant went to Warsaw on the 25th of January and, according to the report of his speech contained in 2530-PS, GB-36, talked of the continued progress and consolidation of friendly relations, and that was capped by Hitler's Reichstag speech on the 30th of January 1939, in the same sort of tones, contained in GB-37, TC-7357. That was the second stage - the mention of Danzig in honored words, because, of course, the rape of Prague had not been attained.
Then one has to remember, as one comes to the Summer, the meeting at the Reichschancellory on the 23rd of May, 1939, which is reported in Document L-79, US Exhibit 27.
It has been read many times to the Tribunal, and I only remind them as to this point: that that is the document where Hitler makes quite clear, and states in his own words, that Danzig has nothing to do with the real Polish question. I have to deal with Poland because I want lebensraum in the East. That is the effect of that portion of the document which has been read so often to the Tribunal--that Danzig was merely an excuse. it, that that meeting was on the 23rd of May, 1939, because there is an interesting corroboration of the attitude of mind--in showing how clearly this Defendant Ribbentrop had adopted the attitude of mind of Hitler, in the introduction to Count Ciano's Diary, which was put in as US Exhibit 166, 2987-PS, but I don't think this part of the Diary, the introduction, has been raised before the Court. It is 2987-PS, and it comes after L-79, which is the Little Schmundt File, just after the Obersalzburg Document. It is set out in the trial brief, if the Tribunal will care to follow it there. Count Ciano says:
"In the Summer of 1939 Germany advanced her claim against Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any intentions of carrying the controversy to extreme. Despite these denials I remained in doubt; I wanted to make sure for myself, and on August 11th I went to Salzburg. It was in his residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were waiting to sit down at the table, of the decision to start the fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. 'Well, Ribbentrop,' I asked him, while we were walking in the garden, 'What do you want? The Corridor, or Danzig?' 'Not any more', and he stared, at me through those cold Musee Greven eyes, 'We want war.'" that Hitler had made at his Chancellory conference on the 23rd of Maythat it was no longer a question of Danzig or the Corridor, it was a question of war to achieve the lebensraum in the East.
"Fall Weiss" for operation against Poland is dated the 3rd and 11th of April, 1939, which certainly shows that preparations were already in hand.
And then there is another reference in Count Ciano's Diary which also his not been read, and which makes this point quite clear. Again, if the Tribunal would take it as set out in the trial brief, I will read it, as it hasn't been read before:
"I have collected in the conference records of verbal transcripts of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. I shall only note some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop is evasive every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming German action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many times about German intentions towards Poland not to feel embarrassment now over what he must tell me and what he is preparing to do.
"The will to fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution which might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain that even if the Germans were given everything they demanded, they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by the demon of destruction.
"Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this doesn't shake him in the least. I realize how little weight this view carries in German opinion.
"The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear conscience. He has not." there cannot be an appreciation of the situation which is more heavily corroborated by supporting documents than his diagnosis of the situation in the Summer of 1939.
Then we come to the next stage in the German plan, which was sharp pressure of the claim for Danzig shown immediately after Czechoslovakia had been formally dealt with on the 15th of March.
It is shown how closely it followed the completion of the rape of Prague. The first sharp raising of the claim was on the 21st of March, as shown in Document GB-38, TC-7361. And that developed, as the Tribunal has heard from Colonel Griffith-Jones. sidelight is that Herr von Buerksen, the German Ambassador at the Court of St. James, returned from London on the 18th of August, 1939; and I put in the extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Ribbentrop, which is Document D-490. I put that in as GB-138.
in this way; that the Defendant Ribbentrop has certainly no recollection of ever having seen the German Ambassador to the Court of St. James after his return.
He thinks he would have remembered him if he had seen him and he accents the probability that he did not see him.
And there is the by Hitler.
In either case, he was completely uninterested in anything the possibility of war.
And I conceive myself speaking with gread the war which we know he wanted.
He did that, well knowing that war with Poland would involve Great Britain and France.
These details were given in full by Col.
Griffith Jones.
M. Lipski summarized all that took place in his report of the 10th of October, 1939, which is Document TC 73 - 147, which is Exhibit G.B.127.
I now come to Norway and Denmark. I remind the Tribunal of the fact, pact with Denmark, which provided that, "The German Reich and the Kingdom other kind against one another."
This is Exhibit G.B.77, Document TC24.
And just to fix the date, the Tribunal will remember that on the 7th of April, 1940, the German armed forces invaded Denmark and at the same time they invaded Norway. defendant was fully in the earlier preparations for that act of aggression. The Tribunal will remember that my friend, Major Elwin Jones, did indicate, with some particularity, the relations between Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg. But Rosenberg in this case also required the help of the Defendant Ribbentrop and, if the Tribunal would he good enough to turn to document 957 PS, which I am putting in as G.B.139, they will see the first of the documents which connect this defendant with the earlier Quisling activities. defendant and it begins:
"Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrop:
"Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed report to Privy Councillor von Gruendherr, who will address you on this subject, We agreed the other day that two to three hundred thousand Reichsmarks would be made immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns out that Gruendherr states that the second instalment can only be made available after eight days. But as it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request you to make it possible that this second instalment is given to him at once. With a longer absence of Reichsamtsleiter P.S. Scheidt also the connection with your representatives would, be broken up, which just now, under certain circumstances, could be very unfavourable.
"Therefore I trust that it is in everybody's interest, if P. M. Scheidt goes back immediately." the Tribunal will good enough to turn to page 4 -- this is on the Quisling activities -- they will find that that passage is sufficient to show how this defendant was connected with it.