The battalion Direwanger especially has a reputation for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000 people suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and children.
"By order of the Chief of Band-Combatting, SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach, units of the armed forces have also participated in the operation. SS Standartenfuehrer Kunze was in command of the armed forces detachments, among whom there were also 90 members from my office and from the District Commissariat Minsk-City. Our men returned from the operation yesterday without losses."
Then I need not read the rest of that. The next paragraph shows again the participation of the armed forces personnel. will be a witness later in the day, and in this connection I want to call the Court's attention to 1919-PS, US 170, which is Himmler's speech on October 4, 1943 to a gathering of SS Generals at Posen. In this speech Himmler mentioned the appointment of von dem Bach to be chief of all anti-partisan units, and I'd like to read one paragraph from page 3 of the document merely for purposes of identification of the witness:
"Chief of the Anti-partisan Units:
"In the meantime I have also set up the department of the Chief of the anti-partisan units. Our comrade SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one.
Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful." I wish to read new material. That is L-180, which is already in evidence as USA 276. This is the report of Einsatzgruppe A covering the period up to 15 October 1941. I think the excerpts which I will read will make clear beyond doubt the participation of the German military leaders and armed forces in the activities of these Einsatzgruppen. I read first from Page 2 of the translation, the top of the page:
"Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June 1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group North, consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4, had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer-Group 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the first days, were cleared up mainly through personal discussions."
That ends that particular extract. I read next a series of extracts of which the first is at the bottom of page 2, beginning with "similarly":
"Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, through this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period."
the middle of the first complete paragraph:
"After the failure of purely military activities such as the placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to look out for new methods. The ActionGroup undertook to search for new methods. Soon, therefore, the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their methods of combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans."
I pass next to Page 6 under "Instigation of self-cleansing actions":
"Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be exptected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they (that is, the population themselves) would render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important in view of the future to extablish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities could not be found out.
"In Lithuania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. Klimatis, the leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advance detachment acting in Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June, the Lithuanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.
"These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-cleansing actionsceased necessarily."
I pass to Page 10 of the translation, toward the bottom under "Other jobs of the Security Police":
"Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police."
Passing to the next paragraph:
"Sometimes authorities of the Armed Forces asked us to clean out in a similar way other institutions which were wanted as billets. However, as interests of the Security Police did not require any intervention, it was left to the authorities of the Armed Forces to take the necessary action with their own forces." page:
"But it was -
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read paragraph 5 (1) on Page 10?
COLONEL TAYLOR: 5 (1) on Page 10. I read the first sentence. If you would like it in full -
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you might go to the end of it.
COLONEL TAYLOR: "Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of the several institutions broke out and became a danger to the general security; therefore, in Aglona, 544 lunatics, in Mariampol, 109 lunatics, and in Magutowo, near Luga, 95 lunatics were liquidated."
Passing back to Page 17, the first paragraph on that page:
"When it was decided to extend the German operations to Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941 to parts of Action Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer-Group 4."
The final quotation from this document is Page 18, last paragraph:
"Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police participated from the beginning in the fight against the nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on." remaining affidavits which are before the Tribunal in Document Book 1. These affidavits have been furnished by responsible officials in both the Wehrmacht and the SS, and fill in much of the background for the documents. the fact that its contents have been covered in Schellenberg's and Ohlendorf's testimony, I do not propose to read. It covers much of the same ground, and I see no reason to take the time of the Tribunal by reading it. I should like to have it considered, subject to the usual rule that Schellenberg can be questioned on any of these matters by the defense.
The affidavit itself is available in French and Russian as well as in German for the defense, so I will pass over that one.
I turn to Affidavit Number 13, which will be US 558. Schellenberg will be 557, and Number 13 becomes 558. This is an affidavit by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German army, who worked in the War History Section of the OKW from 1941 to 1945, and sheds considerable light on the relations between Wehrmacht and the SS at the top with respect to anti-partisan warfare. I will read the affidavit:
"I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.
"Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in the Fuehrer's headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer's appointee for the compilation of the history of the war.
"Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of Reichsfuehrer "In the years 1942 and 1943, however, counter-partisan warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW had to give it special attention.
It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian as well as Jugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport routes that were necessary to support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.
"It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the Army's General Staff. It was further well known that Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as deterrents.
"I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS-Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side". relate to the arrangements which were made between the OKW, OKH, and Himmler's headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that these arrangements were made jointly, and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of but was an active participant in these Turning now to the field.
I would like to read three statements by General Hans Roettiger, which will be affidavits numbers 15 and 16, USA 559 and 560. General Roettiger attained the rank of General of Panzer Troops, the equivalent of a Lieutenant-General in the American Army, and was Chief of Staff of the German Fourth Army, and later of Army Group Center, on the Eastern Front, during the period of which he speaks.
The first statement is as follows:
"As Chief of Staff of the Fourth Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the Ninth Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security battalions.
"At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents were delivered up to the SD.
"The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realise that the order from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the anti-partisan war can have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against the partisans."
The second statement:
"Supplementary to my above declaration, I declare: As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attemps to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans.
"Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there was propaganda directed at the part isans and also at thepopulation with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the women too were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the partisans.
And this propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the area of the Fourth Army was as good as cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the area of the Fourth Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account, on the orders of the Army Group, to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south."
The third statement by Roettiger, number 16:
"During my period of service in 1942-43 as chief of staff of the Fourth Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose of counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the local civilian population, with the result that my commanding officer therefore asked the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The reason for this, first and foremost, was that the excesses of the SD units, by way of execution of Jews and other persons, assumed such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace.
Although in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops." 1786-PS, which will be US 561. That is 1786-PS. This is an extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, dated 14 March 19143. I propose to read the last two paragraphs, which deal with the problem of shipping off suspected partisans to concentration camps in Germany. Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment for suspected partisans without, at the same time, obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied territories.
I will read the last two paragraphs:
"The General Quartermaster, together with the Economic Staff, has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to training centers in their own area, and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.
"In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the 'peaceful population' which has been called upon to work. He recom ends, therefore, transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces in the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader and orders that the difference between 'punitive work' and 'work in Germany' is to be made clear to the population."
that the anti-partisan activities on the Eastern Front were under the command and supported by the Wehrmacht, and that the nature of these activities were fully known to the Wehrmacht.
The first of these is Affidavit No. 17, USA 562, by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Police, and was a member of Himmler's personal command staff from 1943 to 1945:
"I, Ernst Rode, was formerly chief of the Command Staff of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, having taken over this position in the spring of 1943 as successor to former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt Knoblauch. My last rank was Generalmajor of Police and of the Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish the forces necessary for anti-partisan warfare to the higher SS and police leaders and to guarantee the support of army forces. This took place through personal discussions with the leading officers of the Operations Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely, with General Warlimont, General von Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler, General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Koelmannsegg, and Colonel von Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under the sole command of the respective Army Commander-in-Chief in operations areas -- for instance, in the Central Army Group under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch -- and since police troops for the most part could not be spared from the Reichscommissariats, the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in the hands of the army. In the same way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH. SS and police troops transferred to operational areas from the Reichscommissariats to support the army groups were likewise under the latter's command. Such transfers often resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the Reichscommissariats. According to a special agreement between Himmler and the OKH, the direction of individual operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop contingent. It was therefore possible that an army general could have SS and police under him, and, on the other hand, that army troops could be placed under a general of the SS and police. Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it, until 1944, mostly through the intervention of Generalquartiermeister Wagner, or through State Secretary Ganzenmueller.
The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the army groups concerned, for compliance.
"The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had already resulted in Drakonian laws being issued by Hitler for its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops as well as to those of the SS and police. There was absolutely no difference in the manner in which these two components carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as embittered against the enemy as those of the SS and police.
components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with Hitler's desires or As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out by both intentions.
As proof of this, the order of the OKW and OKH can be adduced which directed that all captured partisans, for instance, such as Jews, agents and political commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the above-named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme I know as the result of discussionswith army troop leaders, for instance with General Herzog, Commander of the 38th Army Corps, and with his chief of staff, Colonel Pamberg, in the General Staff, both of whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism."
Your Lordship, I am told that I misread and said "Hitler" instead of "Himmler". Himmler is the Commander of Staff. the SD-Einsatzgruppen were under Wehrmacht command. This is number 18, USA-563:
"As far as I know, the SD Combat Groups with the individual army groups were completely subordinate to them, that is to say tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders-in-chief were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and operational methods of these units. They approved of these missions and operational methods because apparently they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews, agents and commissars who were handed over to the SD underwent the same cruel death as victims of so-called purifications, is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also corresponded with what the highest political and military authorities wanted. Frequent mention of these methods were naturally made in my presence at the OKW and OKH, and they were condemned by most SS and police officers, just as they were condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of the authority of the commanders-in-chief of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have resulted in a change of those missions and methods. If they should ever commanders-in-chief, this, in my opinion, would be a foolish and even assert that they would then have been succeeded by even more ruthless cowardly dodge."
Book One.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, unless you are going to conclude this particular part, I think we had better recess now.
COLONEL TAILOR: I will conclude with two affidavits, Your Honor, but it will take probably ten minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if that will conclude it, go on.
COLONEL TAYLOR: Firstly, Affidavit No. 24, which becomes USA-565. This is by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, who, at the beginning of the Russian campaign, was a staff officer with the 17th Panzer Division:
"At the beginning of the Russian campaign I was the first General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the mission of driving across the Bug north of Brest-Litovsk. Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received, through channels from the OKW, a written order of the Fuehrer. This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon capture, without judicial process, immediately and ruthlessly. This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although the order was supposed to be relayed to companies, the Commanding General of the 37th Panzer Corps -General of Panzer Troops Lemelson -- forbade its being passed on to the troops because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral points of view That brings us to the final affidavit, number 20, USA.
564, which is by Adolf Heusinger.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the number?
COLONEL TAYLOR: It is number 20, Your Honor, USA 564, by Adolf Heusinger General-lieutenant in the German Army, and from 1940 to 1944 Chief of the Operations Section at OKH. I read:
"1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I was I-a of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn 1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.
"When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to the chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of advising him on all operation matters in the Russian theater.
"This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the operational areas, for instance all troops-security units, SS units, police--stationed in the Reichscommissariates.
"All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariates were also subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done by order of the chief of the OKW.
On the other hand, corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"The high SS and police leaders normally had command of operations against partisans. If stronger army units were committed together with the SS and police units within operational areas, a high commander of the army could be designated commander of the operation.
1. "During anti-partisan operations within operational areas all forces committed for these operations were under the command of the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.
2. "Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW-Keitel-- to the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of these orders to army groups, for instance, such orders as those concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the population, as well as those establishing the basic principles governing reprisals against the inhabitants.
"3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was the responsibility of the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.
"4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare in operational areas presented the highest political and military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out their plans, namely, the systematic extermination of Slavism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult."
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until a quarter past 2.
(Whereupon at 1300 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1425 hours.)
Goering, et al., Defendants, sitting at
COLONEL TAYLOR: Fill your Lordship swear the witness?
THE PRESIDENT: What is his name?
COLONEL TAYLOR: Erich Von Dem Bach-Zelewski. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q What is your name?
Q Fill you take this oath? "I swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing." the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
Q Will you spell your name slowly?
Q Is this right -- B-a-c-h-Z-e-l-e-w-s-k-y? BY COLONEL TAYLOR: his answers as short as possible?
Can you hear me?
Q Are you a member of the SS?
Q What was the last rank you held in the SS?
A SS Obergruppenfuehrer. 2nd General der Waffen SS.
Q Did you serve in the 1914-to-1918 war?
A Yes, from 1914 to 1918. I was at the front and was wounded twice and received the Iron Cross, first and second class.
Q Did you remain in the army after the end of the last war?
Q How long did you remain in the army?
Q Did your military activities then stop? until the campaign against Poland I did my exercises with the Wehrmacht.
Q Did you join the Nazi Party?
Q In what year?
Q What branch of the party did you join? the war? and Frankfurt on the Oder, and from 1934 I was Oberabschnittsfuehrer in East Prussia and afterwards in Sicilia.
Q Were you a member of the Reichstag during this period? end. paign against the Soviet Union?
Q That was your rank at the beginning of the war? General.
Q And when were you promoted? and General of the Waffen SS. against the Soviet Union?
A Would you kindly repeat the question; it wasn't quite clear. war against the Soviet Union?
of the Higher SS and I was at the rear zone of the Army Group Center. Group? a leader at that time.
Q Who was the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center? Field Marshal von Bock, and later General Field Marshal Kluge. Group Center? Army Group?
Q Who was your immediate superior in the SS?
Q Who was your immediate superior in the rear zone in the Army Group? Central Russia? Einsatzgruppen of the SD? Russian operations?
Q What was the principal task of the Einsatzgruppen? Jews, gypsies and political commissars. tions? the Order Police, and mainly of the Wehrmacht were used.