The order itself begins on the third page, and that is where I propose to read. The document is entitled "Order concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and procedure in the area 'Barbarossa' and special military measures."
"The application of martial law aims in the first place at maintaining discipline. battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task. any threat from the enemy population. area Barbarossa (Area of operations, army rear area, and area of political administration):
I. Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians.
1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.
2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military, whether they are fighting or in flight.
3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.
4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible; persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot. Battalion Commander, collective despotic measures will be taken without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.
5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts.
6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce military jurisdiction for civilians, in areas which are sufficiently settled. given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
7-M-WAH-5
II. Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants 1. "With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not obligatory even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offence.
2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blodd of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.
3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal measures are necessary. In the case of offences against inhabitants it will order a court martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the Forces call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious offences originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores of other captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a rule be judged no less severely. the signature of the Judicial Authority.
4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.
III. Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are personally responsible for seeing that:
1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under I above.
2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs.
3. Only these court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.
IV. Security Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as "Most Secret". End of Document.
Your Lordship, the next document will be C-148, US 555. Less than three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the instructions which I have just read were amplified and made even more drastic. Document C-148 is an order dated 16 September 1941, signed by Keitel, widely distributed, as is shown on the second sheet where the distribution is listed. This order is of general application in all theaters of war, but from its contents it is clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front. I read beginning at the start of the order:
"Subject: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.
"1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the area occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the armed forces, into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.
"It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed by Moscow, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet.
"In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated that nationalist and other circles will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.
"This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centers of disturbance.
"2. The measures taken up to now to deal with the general insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with the most drastic means in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time.
"Only this course, which has always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can restore order.
"3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following general directions:
"a. It should be inferred, in every case of resistance to the German occupying forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.
" "b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic measures should be taken immediately on the first indication, so that the authority of the occuyping forces may be maintained and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing, and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier's life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect.
"The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not accord with these principles and should not be followed."
End of quote. the very end of the document, paragraph No. 4:
"The commanding officers in the occupied territories are seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay to all military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection." Signed "Keitel." it has been given the number "D" -- "D" as in David -- 411, and it is the last document in Document Book 2. It also has the designation UK 81. It is the last document in Document Book 2. This is a set of documents which includes a directive dated 10 October 1941, by Field Marshal von Reichenau, who was the Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the German 6th Army, then operating on the Eastern Front. Reichenau, who died in 1942, was therefore a member of the group as defined in the Indictment, and here is what he had to say. I begin reading at page 5 of the translation:
"Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories."
"Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.
"Therefore, the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, that is, the annihilation of revolts in the hinterland, which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.
"The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough.
Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war, and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers and sent to prisoner-of-war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the reads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.
"The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the armed forces from army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act, as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the command to the front under great difficulties should not be given to the enemy by the soldier, not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.
"When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise, the disappearance of symbols of the former bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories.
"The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative considering the long and vulnerable lines of communication. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation, the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army, drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous apparently anti-soviet elements which originates from a "Wait-and-see" attitude must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration.
If not, no one can complain about being judges and treated as members of the Soviet system.
"The fear of the German counter-measure must be stronger than the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future the soldier has to fulfill two tasks:
"1. Complete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces.
"2. The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in Russia.
"This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.
"Commander in Chief "Signed von Reichenau, Field Marshal."
The Tribunal will note the sheet immediately preceding Reichenau's order. That is Sheet Number 4 of the translation, which is a memorandum dated 28 October 1941, and which shows that Reichenau's order met with Hitler's approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the Commanderin-Chief of the German Army. sheet in the several ensuing, that Reichenau's order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was received by the 12th Infantry Division on 27 November 1941. military leaders, it is no wonder that the Wehrmacht jointed in the monstrous behavior and activities of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front.
Mr. Storey described to the Tribunal the formation of units known as Einsatzgruppen by the SIPO and SD, which was sent out to operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in order to combat partisans and to cleanse and pacify the civilian population. Major Farr and Colonel Storey both presented to the Tribunal a large amount of evidence showing the manner in which these units operated. order to trace the participation of the armed forces in those circumstances. dated 19 March 1943, which is a directive from the Commanding Officer of one of these groups. This directive praised and justified such activities as the shooting of Hungarian Jews, shooting of children, and the total burning of villages, and directed that in order not to obstruct the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry, "as a rule no more children will be shot." ing the work of the Einsatzgruppen in the German occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October 1941. This report states cynically on page 4: "Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination.
anti-partisan activity became mere code words for extermination of Jews just asmuch as "Weserubung" was the code word for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. German Army received some similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that in the field the Army and the SS worked hand in glove. already in evidence as US 275, which describes the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, and at this time I merely want to call attention to one paragraph of this document appearing at page 6 of the translation, page 6 of 1061-PS, the third paragraph from the bottom of the page, where the author of the document stresses the close cooperation between the SS and the Army. I read that one paragraph:
"The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the Waffen SS, Police and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their stores from abandoned dug-outs and for contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them." report dated 5 June 1943, by the German General Commissioner for Minsk. Major Farr read from this report, describing an anti-partisan operation in which 4500 enemies were killed, 500 suspected partisans, 59 Germans. The cooperation by the German Army is shown in the following excerpt, and I will begin reading at the bottom of page 3 of the translation:
"The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492 rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows that among these enemy dead were were numerous peasants from the country.
The battalion Direwanger especially has a reputation for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000 people suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and children.
"By order of the Chief of Band-Combatting, SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach, units of the armed forces have also participated in the operation. SS Standartenfuehrer Kunze was in command of the armed forces detachments, among whom there were also 90 members from my office and from the District Commissariat Minsk-City. Our men returned from the operation yesterday without losses."
Then I need not read the rest of that. The next paragraph shows again the participation of the armed forces personnel. will be a witness later in the day, and in this connection I want to call the Court's attention to 1919-PS, US 170, which is Himmler's speech on October 4, 1943 to a gathering of SS Generals at Posen. In this speech Himmler mentioned the appointment of von dem Bach to be chief of all anti-partisan units, and I'd like to read one paragraph from page 3 of the document merely for purposes of identification of the witness:
"Chief of the Anti-partisan Units:
"In the meantime I have also set up the department of the Chief of the anti-partisan units. Our comrade SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one.
Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful." I wish to read new material. That is L-180, which is already in evidence as USA 276. This is the report of Einsatzgruppe A covering the period up to 15 October 1941. I think the excerpts which I will read will make clear beyond doubt the participation of the German military leaders and armed forces in the activities of these Einsatzgruppen. I read first from Page 2 of the translation, the top of the page:
"Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June 1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group North, consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4, had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer-Group 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the first days, were cleared up mainly through personal discussions."
That ends that particular extract. I read next a series of extracts of which the first is at the bottom of page 2, beginning with "similarly":
"Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, through this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period."
the middle of the first complete paragraph:
"After the failure of purely military activities such as the placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to look out for new methods. The ActionGroup undertook to search for new methods. Soon, therefore, the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their methods of combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans."
I pass next to Page 6 under "Instigation of self-cleansing actions":
"Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be exptected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they (that is, the population themselves) would render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important in view of the future to extablish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities could not be found out.
"In Lithuania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. Klimatis, the leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advance detachment acting in Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June, the Lithuanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.
"These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-cleansing actionsceased necessarily."
I pass to Page 10 of the translation, toward the bottom under "Other jobs of the Security Police":
"Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police."
Passing to the next paragraph:
"Sometimes authorities of the Armed Forces asked us to clean out in a similar way other institutions which were wanted as billets. However, as interests of the Security Police did not require any intervention, it was left to the authorities of the Armed Forces to take the necessary action with their own forces." page:
"But it was -
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read paragraph 5 (1) on Page 10?
COLONEL TAYLOR: 5 (1) on Page 10. I read the first sentence. If you would like it in full -
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you might go to the end of it.
COLONEL TAYLOR: "Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of the several institutions broke out and became a danger to the general security; therefore, in Aglona, 544 lunatics, in Mariampol, 109 lunatics, and in Magutowo, near Luga, 95 lunatics were liquidated."
Passing back to Page 17, the first paragraph on that page:
"When it was decided to extend the German operations to Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941 to parts of Action Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer-Group 4."
The final quotation from this document is Page 18, last paragraph:
"Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police participated from the beginning in the fight against the nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on." remaining affidavits which are before the Tribunal in Document Book 1. These affidavits have been furnished by responsible officials in both the Wehrmacht and the SS, and fill in much of the background for the documents. the fact that its contents have been covered in Schellenberg's and Ohlendorf's testimony, I do not propose to read. It covers much of the same ground, and I see no reason to take the time of the Tribunal by reading it. I should like to have it considered, subject to the usual rule that Schellenberg can be questioned on any of these matters by the defense.
The affidavit itself is available in French and Russian as well as in German for the defense, so I will pass over that one.
I turn to Affidavit Number 13, which will be US 558. Schellenberg will be 557, and Number 13 becomes 558. This is an affidavit by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German army, who worked in the War History Section of the OKW from 1941 to 1945, and sheds considerable light on the relations between Wehrmacht and the SS at the top with respect to anti-partisan warfare. I will read the affidavit:
"I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.
"Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in the Fuehrer's headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer's appointee for the compilation of the history of the war.
"Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of Reichsfuehrer "In the years 1942 and 1943, however, counter-partisan warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW had to give it special attention.
It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian as well as Jugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport routes that were necessary to support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.
"It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the Army's General Staff. It was further well known that Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as deterrents.
"I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS-Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side". relate to the arrangements which were made between the OKW, OKH, and Himmler's headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that these arrangements were made jointly, and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of but was an active participant in these Turning now to the field.
I would like to read three statements by General Hans Roettiger, which will be affidavits numbers 15 and 16, USA 559 and 560. General Roettiger attained the rank of General of Panzer Troops, the equivalent of a Lieutenant-General in the American Army, and was Chief of Staff of the German Fourth Army, and later of Army Group Center, on the Eastern Front, during the period of which he speaks.
The first statement is as follows:
"As Chief of Staff of the Fourth Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the Ninth Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially with anti-partisan warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security battalions.
"At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents were delivered up to the SD.
"The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realise that the order from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the anti-partisan war can have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against the partisans."
The second statement:
"Supplementary to my above declaration, I declare: As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attemps to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans.
"Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there was propaganda directed at the part isans and also at thepopulation with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the women too were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the partisans.
And this propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the area of the Fourth Army was as good as cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the area of the Fourth Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account, on the orders of the Army Group, to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south."
The third statement by Roettiger, number 16:
"During my period of service in 1942-43 as chief of staff of the Fourth Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose of counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the local civilian population, with the result that my commanding officer therefore asked the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The reason for this, first and foremost, was that the excesses of the SD units, by way of execution of Jews and other persons, assumed such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace.
Although in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops." 1786-PS, which will be US 561. That is 1786-PS. This is an extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, dated 14 March 19143. I propose to read the last two paragraphs, which deal with the problem of shipping off suspected partisans to concentration camps in Germany. Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment for suspected partisans without, at the same time, obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied territories.
I will read the last two paragraphs:
"The General Quartermaster, together with the Economic Staff, has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to training centers in their own area, and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.
"In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the 'peaceful population' which has been called upon to work. He recom ends, therefore, transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces in the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader and orders that the difference between 'punitive work' and 'work in Germany' is to be made clear to the population."