As to the Low Countries, be occupied by armed force.
"Declarations and neutrality will be ignored."
And later in his speech to the Oberbefehlshaber, in Countries and "no one would question that when we have won."
planning in German military circles. The major attack in the west Norway and Denmark had to be planned.
The Defendant Jodl's diary for the period 1 February to 26 May, 1940 (1809-PS, GB-1119), of the entries in it.
I do not find a verbatim quote in any one of them.
The Court will note that on 1 February, 1940, General might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground that Holland alone would offer a tremendous improvement for Germany's aerial warfare.
On 6 February, Jodly conferred with Jeschonnek, Warlimont, and Col. von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a "new idea" was proposed at this meeting: that the Germans should carry out actions H, being Holland, and under Weser exercises, that being Norway and Denmark only, and should guarantee those countries' neutraility for the duration of the war. Holland alone would give them sufficient scope for air bases for attacks on England and that if Belgium's neutraility were preserved the German bases in Holland would be immune from attack by the Frency and British armies in France. If, to meet this situation, the French and British attack through Holland and Belgium, the violation of neutraility would be on the other foot. But whether or not this new idea made sense from a military angle, it appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle. It was a proposal to violate without any excuse the neutraility of three neighboring small countries, and simultaneously to guarantee the neutraility of a fourth; but what value the Belgians might have attributed to a gurantee of neutraility offered under such circumstances it is difficult to imagine, and in fact the "new idea" projected at this meeting seems a most extraodinary combination of cynicism and naivete.
In the meantime, as Jodl's diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the "special staff" for the Norway invasion met for the first time and got its instruction: from Keitel. On 21 February, Hitler put General von Falkenhorst in command of the Norway undertaking and Jodl's diary records that "Falkenhorst accepts gladly". or the Low Countries, but on 3 March, he decided to do Norway first and the Low Countries a short time thereafter. The decision proved final. Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the adventure was certain by the 1st of May. The invasion of the Low Countries took place ten days later.
of Germany, and the African campaign began. In October 1940, Italy attacked Greece.
The Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of Jugoslavia became embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the attack on the Soviet Union was being planned and Germany felt she could not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.
Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to Italy's aid, and the Jugoslavian coup d'etat of 26 March 1940 brought about the final German decision to crush Jugoslavia also. The documents have already been introduced by Colonel Phillimore and there is little that I need to add for my present purposes. The decisions were made the Armed Forces drew up the necessary plans and executed the attacks. The onslaught was particularly unmerciful and ruthless against Jugoslavia for the special purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment instructions were issued by Brauchitsch and appear in a document which has not been read before, that being R-95; GB 127. Two extracts from this are of interest. R-95. These extracts are very short:
"The political situation in the Balkans having changed by reason of the Jugoslav military revolt, Jugoslavia has to be considered as an enemy even should it make declarations of loyalty at first.
"The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to destroy Jugoslavia as quickly as possible."
And turning to paragraph No. 5, the "Timetable for the operations".
"On 5th April as soon as sufficient forces of the Air Forces are available and weather permitting, the Air Forces should attack continuously by day and night the Jugoslav ground organization and Belgrade". All the documents showing the aggressive nature of the attack have been put in ny Mr. Alderman. I suppose it is quite possible that some members of the General Staff and High Command Group opposed "Barbarossa" as unnecessary and unwise from a military standpoint. The Defendant Raeder so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January 1944 (C66; GB 81). C-66 is the translation, the only document I propose to read on this subject, from which a few extracts are of interest.
The quotation starts at the very outset of the Document C-66:
"At this time the Fuehrer had made known his 'unalterable decision' to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situation had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of Naval War Staff, I was never convinced of the 'compelling necessity' for Barbarossa."
And passing to the third paragraph:
"The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this idea."
And passing to the very end of document, paragraph 7, page 4:
"As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and myself" -That, if I may interpolate, is a division of the Naval War Staff having to do with operations. -- "it is perhaps because the arguments the Fuehrer used on such occasion (dinner speech in the middle of July to the Officers in Command) to justify a step he had planned, usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to the 'inner circle', than on those who often heard this type of reasoning.
"Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941, whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very skeptical."
tary chances of a rapid success, but the part last quoted indicates that other members of the group favored "Barbarossa" and Raeder's affidavit says; to wit, that some of the generals lost confidence in the power of Hitler's judgment, but that the generals failed as a group to take any definite stand against him although a few tried and suffered thereby. Certainly the High Command took no stand against Hitler on "Barbarossa" and t the events of 1941 and 1942 do not suggest that the High Command embarked on the Soviet War tentatively or with reservations, but rather with ruthless determination backed by careful planning. The plans themselves have all been read and cited to the Court previously. under Counts One and Two. The documents written by the military leaders, and which I have previously introduced are not the writings of men who were reluctant to plan and execute these manifold wars. Group under Counts One and Two. They are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They are not accused merely for doing the usual things a soldier is expected to do, such as make military plans and command troops. negotiations and conferences; to write notes and aide memoires, to entertain at dinner parties and cultivate good will toward the government he represents. The Defendant Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things. It is the usual function of a politican to draft regulations and decrees, to make speeches. The Defendants Hess and Frick are not indicted for doing those things. none the less a crime, if the locksmith turns his talents to picking the locks of a neighborsand looting their homes. And that is the nature of the charge under Counts One and Two against the General Staff and High Command Group. The charge is that in performing the functions of diplomats, politicans, soldiers, sailors, or whatever they happened to be, they conspired to, and did plan, prepare, initiate and wage illegal wars and thereby committed crimes under Article 6 (a) of the Charter.
practice a particular profession. It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military plans, to meet national contingencies, and such plans may legally be drawn, whether they are offensive or defensive in a military sense. It is even perfectly legal for military leaders to carry cut such plans and engage in war, if in doing so, they do not plan and launch and wage wars which are illegal because they are aggressive and in contravention of the Charter. involving some individual members of this group, where drawing the line between legal and illegal behaviour might not involve some difficulties. That is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But I do not believe that there is any doubt or difficulty here, before this Tribunal, as to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command Group as a Group under Counts One and Two, nor as to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the group.
is voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and war is constant. The same is true of Defendant Raeder, and his individual responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Doenitz is less voluminous for the reason that he was younger and not one of the top group until later in the war. But numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including its other leaders, are shown to have participated knowingly and wilfully in these illegal plans and wars. Staff Halder; Warlimont, the deputy of Jodl; in the nature of things these men knew all that was going on and participated fully, as the documents show. Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau and von Schobert, together with Goering, are immediately sent for by Hitler when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. the field, knowingly preparing for the attack on Poland; Field Marshal List educating the Bulgarians for their role during the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; von Falkenhorst "gladly accepting" the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. attack Norway, Denmark and Holland, and simultaneously assure Belgium that there is nothing to fear. at an early date that German policy is leading to a general European war, and at a later date the attack on Norway and Denmark is his brainchild; Krancke is one of the chief planners of this attack; Schniewindt is in the inner circle for the attack on Poland; Fricke certifies the final orders for Weseruebung and a few months later proposes that Germany annex Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia to vassalage.
members of the Group, as defined, and the few who were not, subsequently became members. At the final conference for Barbarossa seventeen additional members are present and at the two meetings with Hitler, at which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were fully disclosed, the entire group was present. This amounts to saying that military men are a race apart from and different from the ordinary run of human beings -- men above and beyond the moral and legal requirements that apply to others, incapable of exercising moral judgment on their own behalf. aggressive war. It stands to reason that that crime is committed most consciously, deliberately and culpably by a nation's leaders -- the leaders in all the major fields of activity which are necessary to and closely involved in the waging of war. It is committeed by propagandists and publicists. It is committed by political leaders, by diplomats, by the chief ministers, by the principal industrial and financial leaders and it is no less committed by the military leaders. is accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these types of leaders. And if the leaders in any notably important field of activity stand aside or resist or fail to cooperate, then the program will at the very least be seriously obstructed. That is why the principal leaders in all these fields of activity share responsibility for the crime, and the military leaders no less than the others. Leadership in the military field, as well as in other fields, calls for moral wisdom as well as technical astuteness. will be heard to say that their role is that of a mere janitor or custodian, or pilot of the war machine which is under their command and that they bear no responsibility whatsoever for the use to which that machine is put.
The prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate today, when the military leaders control forces infinitely more powerful and destructive than ever before.
Should the military leaders be declared exempt from the declaration in the Charter that planning and waging aggressive war is a crime, it would be a crippling, if not fatal blow, to the efficacy of that declaration.
Such is certainly not the view of the United States. The Prosecution here representing the United States believes that the profession of arms is a distinguished profession. We believe that the practice of that profession by its leaders calls for the highest degree of integrity and moral wisdom, no less than for technical skill. We believe that in consulting and planning with the leaders in other fields of a nation's activities, the military leaders must act in accordance with international law and the dictates of the public conscience. Otherwise the military resources of the nation will be used, not in accordance with the laws of modern society but the law of the jungle. The military leaders share responsibility with other leaders. I use the word "share" advisedly. Obviously the military leaders are not the final and exclusive arbiters and the German military leaders do not bear exclusive responsibility for the criminal holocaust which was committed. But the German military leaders conspired with others to undermine and destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German military leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and, if necessary, to resort to war. statement, "The German military leaders are here before you because they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war." and if this would be a convenient stopping point -
THE PRESIDENT: You have another branch of the argument?
COLONEL TAYLOR: Counts Three and Four, your Honor, which will take considerable time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now. (Whereupon, at 1655 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1000 hours on 7 January 1946) Official Transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
COLONEL TELFORD TAYLOR; May it please the Court, Sir, when the Court rose on Friday I had completed that part of the presentation on Counts 1 and 2. I now turn to that part of the indictment which charges that the General Staff and High Command group had a major responsibility for the war crimes and crimes against humanity involved in the execution of the common plan or conspiracy set forth in Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment. For purposes of brevity I shall refer to these crimes simply as war crimes. should take all or the better part of the morning session. At the conclusion of that, I propose to call a single witness, one witness, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, whose testimony on direct examination should not exceed 20 or 30 minutes. After that, I shall take possibly ten minutes to conclude, and that will be the entire presentation. General Staff and High Command group, including the defendants who are members of the group, ordered and directed the commission of war crimes, and thereby participated in the commission of war crimes in their official capacity as members of the group. I also propose to show in certain instances the actual commission of war crimes by members of the German armed forces as a result of these orders or as a result of other orders and arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command group which controlled the German armed forces. However, I do not propose to make a full showing of war crimes committed by the German armed forces. The full presentation of the evidence under Counts 3 and 4 will be made pursuant to agreement among the chief prosecutors, by the French and Soviet delegations, and a substantial amount of the evidence to be presented by them will be relevant to the charges against the General Staff and High Command group.
High Command became wedded to a policy of terror. In some cases, the evidence of this policy is in documentary form and we will present the activating papers which were signed by, initialed by, and circulated among the members of the group.
In other instances, where the actual crimes were committed by others than members of the German armed forces, where, for example, prisoners of war were handed over to and mistreated by the SS or SD, we will show that in those cases members of this group were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of war crimes. We will show that many crimes committed by the SS and SD were committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff and High Command group. violation of International Law and the rules of war, of allied commandos, paratroopers, and members of military missions, and the first document to which I wish to refer is 498-PS, which will be U.S. 501. is an order issued by Hitler on 18 October 1942, and which Mr. Storey has already mentioned in the presentation of charges against the Sicherheitsdienst. The order begins with a recital that allied commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside the scope of the Geneva Convention, and thereafter proceeds to specify the methods of warfare which German troops should use against allied commandos, and the disposition which should be made of captured commandos.
This order is one of the two basic documents in the story. I will read it in full:
"1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called Commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.
"2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942 that in the future Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, that is, that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.
"3. I therefore order:
"From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and airplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute.
Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.
"4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc, fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories, for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades, for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.
"5. This order doesnot apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities, large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations, are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battle.
"6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed." I order was issued by OKW in 12 copies, and the distribution shown on the second page included the three supreme commands, army, sea, and air, and the principal field commands. Document 503-PS, which will be U.S. 542. This was issued for the purpose of explaining the reasons why the basic order was issued. In this explanation, Hitler gave a rather different set of reasons for the issuance of the order and pointed out that allied commando operations had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear communications, intimidating laborers, and destroying important war plants in occupied areas. This is the other basic document, and while I need not read it in full, I would like to read substantial excerpts, starting with the first paragraph at the top of the page:
"Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops"--then in parentheses was a cross reference to the order which I have just read--"a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.
"This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.
"The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus.
"The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof."
It is signed, "The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, by order of Jodl." order itself, signed by Hitler. I will start reading the first two paragraphs of the supplementary order which appears at the bottom of page 1 of the translation:
"I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers and commanders the reasons for this decree. behind the front, intimidation of the populace working for Germany, as well asthe destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed in this war." on page 2 of the translation:
"The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as bloddy losses of the fighting soldiers.
"Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activities.
"England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worst, all they have to do is to successfully commit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other installations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate.
"If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grevious damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man.
"This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly exterminated.
"The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.
"I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordinated to them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy.
Officers and non-commissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances when there is danger in delay to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure.
"These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree.
"If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to initially spare one man or two, then they are to he shot immediately after interrogation."
Your Lordship, the next is document C-179 which will be US 543. As this document shows, ten days later, on 28 October 1942, and while the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, the Naval War Staff in Berlin transmitted its copy of the basic order of 18 October to the lower naval commands. The copy distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from the Naval War Staff show clearly the secrecy which surrounded the dissemination of this order, and I read the first sheet of this document only, the cover sheet:
"Enclosed please find a Guehrer order regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units. This order must not be distributed in writing by flotilla leaders section commanders or officers of this rank. After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order ever to the next highest section, which is responsible for its *---*tion and destruction." a similar adminition in the notice for distribution at the very end of the document. I read:
"These instruction are not to be distributed over and above the battalions and the corresponding staffs of the other services. After notification those copies distributed over and above the regimental and corresponding staffs of the other services must be withdrawn and destroys This document is dated 11 February, 1943, which was twelve days after the Defendant Doenitz had become Commander in Chief of the German Navy. On that day, this memorandum was circulated within the Naval War Staff in order to clear up certain misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18 October 1942. This document, of which I will read the first four paragraphs, indicates why the earlier order had been treated as such a secret matter and also directs that all naval commanders and officers who failed to carry out the order or to instruct their units concerning the order would run the risk of serious court martial penalties.
I'll read the first four paragraphs only:
"From the notice given by the Naval War Staff on February 1, 1943, it has been discovered that the competent departments of the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff, have a wrong conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone inquiry at the Naval War Staff proved that this naval authority was not correctly informed either.
"In view of this situation, reference is made to paragraph 6 of the Fuehrer's order of October 18, 1942--" and then a cross-reference-- " "according to which all commander and officers who hove neglected their duty in instructing their units about the order referring to treatment of saboteurs are threatened with punishment by court martial.
"The first Fuehrer order concerning this matter of October 18, 1942 was given the protection of Top Secret merely because it stated therein (1) that according to the Fuehrer's views, the spreading of military sabotage organizations in the East and West may have protentious consequence for our whole conduct of the war and (2) that the shooting of uniformed prisoners eacting on military orders must be carried out even after they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon.
"On the other hand the annihilation of sabotage units in battle is no at all to be kept secret but on the contrary, to be currently published in the OKW report. The purpose of these measures to act as a deterrent will not be achieved if those taking pare in enemy commando operations would not learn that certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be annihilated immediately unless their statements are first needed for military reasons, it is necessary that, not only all members of the armed forces must receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even if they are in uniform, are to be annihilated, but also, all departments of the Home Staff dealing with this kind of question must be informed of the course of action which has been ordered."
I'll call the Tribunal's attention to the two reasons given in that quotation showing a clear awareness that public knowledge of the fact that uniformed prisoners would be shot even after they had surrendered and asked for pardon shows a clear awareness that that was in direct contravention of the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read the paragraph beginning "Practical difficulties--"?
COLONEL TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. I'll read that.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should
COLONEL TAYLOR: Continuing the document:
"Practical difficulties may develop because of the definition of the term 'sabotage units'. The annihilation and destruction according to Paragraph 5 of the Fuehrer order of October 18, do not apply to troops participating in large-scale landing operations and large-scale air-borne operations. The criterion is to be found in that in the latter case an open battle takes place, whereas, for instance, ten or more people who land by sea or air or drop by parachute not to fight an open battle but to destroy either a factory, a bridge or a railway installation would fall into the category of those who must be annihilated."