between the military leaders and the Nazis. I need not labor that point further.
show the state of mind and the objectives of the German military leaders during this early period. One document, read from by Mr. Alderman, which reflects the viewpoint of the German Navy on the opportunities which Naziism offered for rearmament so that Germany could achieve its objectives by force or threat of force, is a memorandum published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937, entitled "The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles." That is C 156, U. S. 41. The Tribunal will recall that this memorandum, this official publication of the German Navy, stated that only with the assistance of Hitler had it been possible to create the conditions for rearmament. The defendant Jodl has stated this better than I could possibly put it in his speech to the Gauleiters on 7 November 1943. That is in Document L 172, U.S. 34, from which Mr. Alderman read at length. objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war. I invite the Court's attention to Document C-23, which is already in the record as U.S. 49. This consists of some notes made by Admiral Carls, of the German Navy, in September, 1938. These notes were written by Admiral Carls by way of comment on a "Draft Study of Naval Warfare Against England," and they read in part as follows. That will be found, your Lordship, on page 3 of the translation of Document C-23:
"There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.
"1. If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.
"2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.
"3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a large number of countries overseas:
in fact, against 1/2 to 1/3 of the whole world.
"It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean." was. Parts of the German Airforce during this pre-war period were developing even more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement of the Reich. Document L-43, GB-29, is a study prepared by the Chief of a branch of the General Staff of the Air Force called the "Organization Staff." The study in question is a recommendation for the-organization of the German Air Force in future years up to 1950. The recommendation is based on certain assumptions, and one assumption was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany would be as shown on the map which was attached as an enclosure to this study.
There is only one copy of the map available, your Honor. Hungary, Poland and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included within the borders of the Reich. The Court will also note, at page 2 of the document itself -- that is L-43 -- that the author envisaged the future peace-time organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven group commands, four of which lie within the borders of Germany proper at Berlin, Brunswick, Munich and Koenigsberg, but the three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest and Warsaw. forces, I want to stress once more the basic agreement and harmony between the Nazis and the German military leaders. Without this agreement on objectives there might never have been a war. In this connection I want to direct the Tribunal's attention to an affidavit by von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshal, Reich War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces until February, 1938, I will read the affidavit into the transcript.
"From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr, and Memel.
"I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety per cent of the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty, though a sad necessity. This was one of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was accentuated under Nazi rule.
"Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler, since he produced the results which they desired.
After this time some generals began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of his judgment.
However, they failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their positions.
"Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de bureau. As far as I know, he was never named Commander of the Armed Forces but was always merely a 'Chief of Staff' under Hitler, and in effect conducted the administrative functions of the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself desired and had furthered as Reichswehrminister and Reichskriegminister. To do the opposite would have led to a civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But it is the truth.
"As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler's measures. He became a willing tool in Hitler's hands for every one of his decisions.
"He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him." closely in some respects by an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz. That is affidavit No.5 in Document Book 1 and will be U.S.A. Exhibit 537. Blaskowitz commanded an army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign against France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in southern France and held command of Army Group H, which retreated beyond the Rhine, at the end of the war. The first three paragraphs of his affidavit are substantially identical with the first three paragraphs of von Blomberg's, and since they are available in all languages, for expedition I will start reading with paragraph 4, where the affidavit is on a different subject:
"After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter of fact, we felt that if political negotiations came to naught the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not only with Poland herself but also with the Western Powers.
"When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion was only strengthened by the Fuehrer's speech on 22 August 1939 on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in preparations participated in various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical, strategic and general nature were discussed as had to do with my future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during the planned Polish campaign.
"During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and he, as well as the Fuehrer, visited my headquarters. In fact, it was common practice for commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their recommendations by telephone, teletype or wirless, as well as by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually became advisers to the OKH in their own field, so that the positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the German Armed Forces." those of Halder and Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group as described by the prosecution.
The Tribunal will * *---* - * - *---* - * also note that the von Blomberg affidavit and the first part of the Brauchitsc affidavit make it clear beyond question that the military leaders of Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties.
The objectives they had in mind are obvious from the affidavits and documents to which reference has been made. In these documents and affidavits we see the Nazis and the Generals in agreement upon the basic objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force, and collaborating to build up the armed might of Germany, in order to make possible the subsequent acts of aggression. We turn now to an examination of those particular acts of aggression, which have already been described to the Tribunal in general, with the particular purpose of noting participation in these criminal acts by the General Staff and High Command group. save time I propose to read from very few documents. Accordingly, when I cite them I think there is probably no need for the Tribunal to try to find them in the documents before it. Most of them are in evidence and I propose to cite them for purposes of recapitulation, without reading very much.
The Tribunal will recall that Mr. Alderman read into the transcript portions of a document, 386-PS, U.S. 25, consisting of notes by Colonel Hossbach on a conference which was held in the German Chancellery in Berlin on the 5th of November 1937. Hitler presided at this conference, which was a small and highly secret one, and the only other participants were the four principal military leaders and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the defendant Neurath. The four chief leaders of the Armed Forces--Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister for war, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces, von Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Goering for the Air Force--were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of Germany's diplomatic and military policy, and stated that the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary 'for the improvement of our military position' and 'in order to remove any threat from the flanks.'
The military and political advantages envisaged included the acquisition of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the release of troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new divisions from the population of the conquered territories.
Blomberg and von Fritsch joined in the discussion and von Fritsch stated "that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications. Austria came to fruition. Mr. Alderman has already read into the record portions of the diary kept by the defendant Jodl. The portion here in question, 1780-PS, U.S. 72, of this diary shows the participation of the German military leaders in the *---*tion of Austria. As is shown by Jodl's diary entry for 11 February, 1938, the defendant Keitel and other generals were present at the Obsersalzberg meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler, and the purpose is shown clearly by the entry which recites that "in the evening and on 12 February General Keitel with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol." The General Von Reichenau referred there was at this time the head commander of Wehrkreis 7, one of the military districts into which Germany was divided. He subsequently commanded the Tenth Army in Poland and the Sixth Army in France, and was a member of the group as defined in the indictment. Sperrle who was in Spain during the Civil War and then commanded Luftflotte 3, the Third German Air Fleet, practically throughout the war, was also a member of the group. Two days later Keitel and others were preparing proposals to be submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian Government the impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg agreement was ratified in Vienna. 1775-PS, U.S. 73, and signed by the defendant Keitel. Portions of Keitel's proposals to the Fuehrer are as follows:
"To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troops movements or redeployments. Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria, a) through V-men"--that means agents--"in Austria; b) through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier; c) through travelling agents.
Going down the document to 4, Keitel proposed: "Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin aid Munich; 5) real maneuvers, training flights and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier; 6) Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14 in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW."
As Jodl's diary shows under the entry for 14 February, these deceptive maneuvers were very effective and created in Austria the impression that these threats of force might be expect to create. About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg's decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in accordance with the pre-existing plans for the invasion of Austria, these plans being known as "Case Otto", in order to absorb Austria and stop the plebiscite. Jodl's diary under the entry for 10 March 1938 tells us:
"By surprise and without consulting his ministers Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.
"Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General Von Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schobert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District Leader, Gauleiter, Buerckel in the Palatinate." Commander of Wehrkreis 7 and Commander of the Eleventh Army in Russia, and was a member of the group as defined inthe indictment. in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance. This is is the case simply because the invasion was precipitated by an outside event-Schuschnigg's order for the plebiscite. But, although for this reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the foregoing documents make abundantly clear the participation of the military leaders at all stages.
At the small policy meeting of November, 1937, when Hitler's general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the only others present were the four principal military leaders and the Foreign Secretary. Schuschnigg to the heaviest military pressure. Keitel and others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of military threat and deception to frighten the Austrian Government into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol. When the actual invasion took place, it was, of course, directed by the military leaders and executed by the armed forces and we are indebted to the defendant Jodl for a clear statement of why the German military leaders were only too delighted to join with the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence. in L-172, which is U.S. 34, Jodl explained: (that is at page 5, paragraph 3 of the translation):
"The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it, not only fulfillment of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected, in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the allies, in particular Russia,) Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with vigour before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive."
The foregoing extract from Jodl's speech makes a good transition to the case of Czechoslovakia -- "Case Green", or "Fall Gruen". I propose to treat this very briefly. Mr. Alderman has covered the general story of German aggression against Czechoslovakia very fully and the documents he read from are full of evidence showing the knowing participation in this venture by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the group.
the four principal military leaders (386-PS, U.S. 25) may be called to mind.
Austria and Czechoslovakia were listed as the moxt proximate victims of German aggression. After the absorption of Austria, Hitler, as head of the State, and Keitel, as Chief of all the Armed Forces, lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. From this point on, nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt file (388-PS, U.S. 26) and Jodl's diary, both of which have been read from extensively. These two sources of information go far, I think, to demolish what is urged in defense of the military defendants of the General Staff and High Command Group. They seek to create the impression that the German generals were pure military technicians; that they were not interested in, or not informed about political and diplomatic consideration; that they prepared plans for military attack or defense on a purely hypothetical basis. They say all this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not estimate Hitler's aggressive intentions; that they carried out politicallyconceived orders like military automatons, with no idea whether the wars they Launched were aggressive or not. read the Schmundt file and read General Jodl's diary. They make it abundantly clear that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals; that the military leaders were fully acquainted with the political and diplomatic developments - indeed, German generals had a strange habit of turning up at diplomatic foregatherings, and, indeed, if the documents did not show these things, a moment's thought must show them to be true. It cannot be executed by an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to soldiers alone, and this, is, no doubt, true, but it is equally true that aggressive diplomacy is far toe dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and support and no doubt some of the German Generals had qualms about Hitler's timing and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather interestingly reflected in an entry from Jodl's diary which has not yet been read.
That is 1730-PS again - the entry for 10 August 1938. It appears on page 4 of the translation of 1780-PS.
10 August 1933: "The Army Chiefs and the Chiefs of the Air Force Groups, Lt. Col.
Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof.
hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subseq uent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of Army, are rather unfortunate.
This applies especially to the be held for three weeks.
The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and "I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years". The cause of this First of all, it (the general staff) is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, in stead of obeying and executing its military mission.
That in the genius of the Fuehrer.
One dees perhaps compare him with Charles XII.
And since water flows downhill, this de for the opposition between the Generals' opinion and that of for the morale of the troops.
But I have no doubt that the unexpected way when the right moment comes."
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off now for ten minutes:
(A recess was taken from 1514 hours to 1529 hours.)
COLONEL TAILOR: The extract from the Jodl diary from which at that time were cautious with respect to Germany's ability to take on Poland and the Western Powers simultaneously; but none for conquest.
And there is no evidence in Jodl's diary or else sympathy with Hitler's objectives.
Furthermore, the top military the transcripts, 388-PS, US 26--in which he stated clearly his un-alterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.
The Defendant Jodl was in no doubt what that directive meant. He noted in his diary, the same day, that the Fuehrer had stated his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and had initiated military preparation all along the line. Jodl diary, shows how these military preparations went forward. Numerous examples of discussions, plans, and preparations during the last few weeks before the Munich pact, including discussions with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff, in which General Halder participated, are contained in the Jodl diary and the later items in the Schmundt file. The day the Munich Pact was signed, the 29th of September, Jodl noted in his diary--1780-PS, the entry for 29 September:
"The Munich Fact is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is cut. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October . The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way." made seen after Munich. Ultimately, the absorption of the remainder, was accomplished by diplomatic bullying, in which the Defendant Keitel participated, for the usual purpose of demonstrating that German armed might was ready to enforce the threats--as shown by two documents already in, and which I need not read: 2802-PS, US 107; and 2798-PS, US 118. tells us clearly and in one sentence why the objective of eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of the German military loaders as to the hearts of the Nazis:
"The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and the spring of 1939, and the annexation of Slovakia, rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it then became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises." which I have already read from. "The whole group of German staff and front officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms," they told us. "Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired," they have told us.
I turn not to Poland. The German attack on Poland is a particularly interesting one from the standpoint of the General Staff and High Command. The documents which show the aggressive nature of the attack have already been introduced by Mr. Griffith Jones of the British Delegation.
I propose to approach it from a slightly different angle, one can observe the staff work stop by step.
Mr. Griffith Jones read C-120, GB 41, involving "Fall Weiss", which was the code word for the plan of attack on Poland.
That is a whole series of documents and the series starts--C120-- with a reissuance of a document called "Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed Forces."
diplomatic policies and developments; and secondly, indications of what easier and the chances of success greater.
They constitute, in fact, a Five copies only are distributed by Keitel:
One goes to Brauchitsch, OKH; one to Raeder, OKM; one to Goering at OKL; and two to Warlimont in to.
The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly brought out by a part of one of those documents which has not previously been read; * Jan-A-GES-2 The subheading is:
"Political Requirements and Aims."
"German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principal of avoiding any quarrels.
Should Poland, however, change her policy to "The aim, then, will be to destroy Polish military strength, and al decense.
The free state of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the "The political leadership considers it its task in this case to "The development of increasing internal crises in France and the "Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.
"The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by "On the German side, Hungary cannot be considered a certain ally.
Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis."
Sub-heading 2: "Military Conclusions."
"The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed Froces 'Fall Weiss' constitutes only a precautiouary complement to these pre parations.
It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the "The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.
"The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them". General Staff and High Command Group did not know what was in prospect. The plans show on their face that they are no war game. But, to clinch this point, let us refer briefly to Mr. Alderman's pin-up document on Polant, L-79, US 27. These are Schmundt's notes on the conference in Hitler's study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May, 1939, when Hitler announced -- and I quote just one sentence -- "There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity."
Note who was present besides Hitler and a few military aides:
the Defendant Goering, C-in-C of the Luftwaffe; the Defendant Raeder, Navy; the Defendant Keitel, OKW; von Brauchitsch, C-in-C, Army;and Inspector General of the Luftwaffe; General Bodenschatz, Goering's personal assistant; Rear Admiral Schniewindt, Chief of the Naval War Staff; Colonel Jeschonnek, Chief of the Air Staff;Colonel Warlimont, Planning Staff.
All of them, except Milch, planning of the attack on Poland.
These general plans, however, I offer document C-142, which will be US-538.
This document This is from page 1 of the translation, and I quote:
"The object of the operation is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces.
High policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results.
The intention of expected to be west of the Vistula-Narve Line."
"The Army Group Commands and the Army Commands will make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the enemy.
There will be These will have to be developed simply and quickly on the same basis;an order from the Army High Command they can be carried out quickly."
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that document?
COLONEL TAYLOR: The date of that document is the middle of June, 1939; I believe it is the 15th or 14th of 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say June?
COLONEL TAYLOR: Yes, your Honor. The date is on the original.
Blaskowitz. It is dated 14 June, 1939, and it shows us an Oberbefehlshaber at work in the field planning an attack.
Blaskowitz, Polish campaign.
I read some extracts from this document--found on "The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has ordered the working out "The order of deployment by the High Command, known as 'Fall Weiss,' authorizes the Third Army Group--in Fall Weiss Eighth Army subordinated to it for 'Fall Weiss.
'" "The whole correspondence on 'Fall Weiss' has to be conducted under the classification 'Top Secret.
' This is to be disregarded "For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on the execution will be discussed.
Time and place will be ordered later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army Group before 10 July."
That is signed: "The Commander in Chief of Army Area Command 3, F. Blaskowitz." the top of page 2 of the translation - "Aims of Operation 'Fall Weiss'":
"The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with forces which are, for the most part, armored and motorized, placed on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the Army as well as to counteract the marching up of the Polish Army.
"Accordingly, all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by quick acting and ruthless attacks." the military plans are laid, we find the Group as definited in the Indictment all in one place, in fact, all in one room. On August 23 the Oberfehlshaber assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler's explanation of the timing of the attack and for political and diplomatic orientation from the head of the State. This speech has already been read from at length. It is found in 798-PS, US 29, and I pass over it except to note and emphasize that it is addressed to the very group defined in the Indictment as the General Staff and High Command Group. It is, incidentally, the second of the two examples referred to in the affidavits by Halder and Brauchitsch, numbers 1 and 2 which I read previously. war. Within a few weeks, and before any important action on the Western Front, Poland was over-run and conquered; German losses were insignificant.