February, 1938 was selected as the opening end of the war.
Indictment includes, as members of the group, all commanders in chief in the field who had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in the Army, Navy or Air Force. The term Oberbefehlshaber rather defies literal translation into English. Literally, the components of the word mean "over-command-holder", and we can perhaps best translate it as "commander in chief". had the status and title of oberbefehlshaber, although they didn't get the formal designation until 1944. In the Navy, officers holding the senior regional commands and, therefore, in control of all naval operations in a given sector, had the status of oberbefehlshaber. the Army, Navy or Air Force during the period in question. All but approximately a dozen of them are still alive. The entire General Staff and High Command group, as defined in the Indictment, comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed to be still living. Those figures, of course, are the cumulative total of all officers who at any time belonged to the group, during the seven years and three months, from February 1938 to May 1945. much smaller. That was about 20 at the outbreak of the war, and it rose to about 50 in 1944 and 1945. That is to say, that at any one moment of time in 1944, the group, the active group, would have consisted of the nine individuals occupying the nine staff positions and about 41 naval, air force or army commanders in chief. Command group has been described in a series of affidavits by some of the principal German field marshals and generals. These affidavits are included in Document Book 1. I want to state briefly how these statements were obtained.
ability and experience in interviewing high ranking German prisoners of war were briefed by an Intelligence Officer and by the trial Counsel on the particular problems presented by this part of the case, the organizational side of the German Armed Forces.
These officers were already well versed in military intelligence and were fluent in German. It was emphasized that the function of these interrogating officers was merely to inquire into and establish the facts with respect to the organization of the Armed Forces, to establish facts on which the Prosectuion wanted to be accurately informed. special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of the positions which they had held in the past. After each interview, the interrogator prepared a report, and from this report such facts as appeared relevant to the issues before the Tribunal were extracted and a statement embodying them was prepared. This statement was then presented to the German officer at a later interview in the form of a draft, and the German officer was asked whether it truly reproduced what he had said and was invited to alter it in any way he saw fit. The object was to procure the most accurate testimony on organizational matters that we could. Tribunal will see that they fully support the Prosecutions description of the group and conclusively establish that this group of officers was, in fact, the group which had the major responsibility for planning and for directing the operations of the German Armed Forces. Defense has copies in German. of Generaloberst, or Colonel General--the equivalent of a four-star general in the American Army. His affidavit will be US Exhibit 531. Halder was Chief of the General Staff of OKH. That would be the box second from the bottom on the left hand side. He was Chief of the General Staff of the OKH from September, 1938 to September,1942. He is,accordingly, a member of the group and well qualified by his position to testify as to the organization. His statement is short, and I will read it in full:
"Ultimate authority and responsibilityfor military affairs in Germany Armed Forces (at the same time head of the State), that is to say, the Army, Navy and the Air Corce.
In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high ranking officers.
Thes members of this group according to the instructions of the OK* in the nam Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (at the sane time the Head of the State.)
"The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of "Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and gi appropriate directions by the Head of the State.
Examples of such meetin on 14 June, 1941, prior to the first Russian campaign.
The composition *---* shown in the attached chart.
This was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.
/Signed/Halder."
room and which was attached to the affidavit. The two meetings referred which will be Exhibit USA 532.
Von Brauchitsch held the rank of Field also and was Commander in Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941; therefor also a member of the group.
I need, not read his statement, since it is forth in full in the transcript at this point.
The only difference betwe the two statements is in the last sentence of each.
Halder states that t group described in the indictment "was, in effect, the General Staff and Rich Command of the German Armed Forces", whereas Von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying, "In the hands of those who filled the posi tions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces."
(The document referred to above is set forth herewith as follows.)
"Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germa "Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three Armed Forces (at the some time Head of State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high ranking officers.
Thes members of this group according to the instructions of the OK* in the na* Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State.)
"The members of this group were charged with the responsibility "Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and given appropriate directions by the Head of State.
Examples of such Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.
The other were as shown in the attached chart.
In the hands of those who Armed Forces."
COLONEL TAYLOR (Continuing) Now, the Tribunal will see from these affidavits that the chart which is on display at the front of the Court and which is contained in the short expository statement has been laid before von Brauchitsch and Halder and that these two officers have vouched for it under oath as an accurate picture of the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The statements by von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the Prosecution's statement that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters. forth some of the matters of detail to which I adverted in describing the group. It is quite short. Affidavit Number 6, which becomes Exhibit USA 533, and I'll read it in full into the transcripts:
"The most important department in the OKW was the Operations Staff, in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl but in the planning and conduct of military affairs they and their departments were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl's staff.
"The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was chief. It was called the National Defense Section, and it was primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards, Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.
"There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.
"Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out by the group of high ranking officers described in my statement of 7 November (in the Army, General Staff of the Army, and in the Air Forces, the General Staff of the Air Force).
"Operational matters of the Navy were, even in World War I, not worked out by the Great General Staff but by the Naval Staff. Signed: Halder."
with the functions of the General Staffs of the four commands of OKW, OKL, OKH, and OKM and fully supports the inclusion in the group of the Chiefs of Staff of the four Services, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW staff because of his strategic planning responsibilities. The Tribunal will remember that the highest fighting formation in the German Air Force was known as an air fleet or Luftflotte and that all commanders in chief of their fleets are included in this group. That is the box in the lower right hand corner. the commanders of air fleets always had the status of oberbefehlshaber, but they were not formally so designated until 1944. These facts are set forth in an affidavit by the son of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. His son had the rank of oberst, or colonel, in the German Air Force and was personal aide to the Defendant Goering as Commander in Chief of the Air Force. His affidavit is Number 9 and becomes US 534. It reads as fallows:
"Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the oberbefehlshaber of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and, accordingly, exercised no territorial, jurisdiction.
"They were the highest troop commanders of the Air Force units sub ordinate to them and were directly under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.
"Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation befehlshaber and from then on that of oberbefehlshaber. This change of designation carried with it no change in the functions and responsibilities that they previously had.# group and the personnel of it. The staff of the Tribunal have referred to me two inquiries which have been addressed to the Tribunal by Counsel for the group and it seemed to me it might be appropriate if I disposed of those inquiries now as to the composition of the group. The letters were turned over to me two days ago.
group, as defined in the Indictment, is contingent upon rank, whether it includes officers, including a definite rank such as field marshal or generaloberst.
The answer to that is clearly, No. As has been pointed out, the criterion of membership in the group is whether one held one of the positions on the chart up there, and one would be in the group if one held one of the positions, no matter what one's rank. Rank is no criterion. In point of fact, I suppose, everybody in the group held at least the rank of general in the German Army, which is the equivalent of lieutenant general in ours.
"general staff corps". The answer to that is "No". There was in the German Army a war academy, and graduates of the war academy were given the branch of Service described as the general staff corps. They signed themselves "Colonel im Generalstab." They functioned largely as adjutants and assistants to staff officers. I suppose there were some thousands of them-- two or three thousand. But they are not included in the group. Many of them were officers of junior rank. They are not named in the Indictment, and there is no reason and no respect in which they are comprehended within the group as defined.
The other letter of inquiry is from Dr. Exner, who states that he is in doubt as to the meaning of "Oberbefehlshaber", and goes on to state that he believes that Oberbefehlshaber includes commanders-in-chief in theaters of war, the commanders-in-chief of army groups, and the commanders-in-chief of armies. That is quite right. Those are the positions as shown in the chart.
Let us now spend a few minutes examining the way this group works. In many respects, of course, the German military leaders functioned in the same general manner as obtained in the military establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants In collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest level, and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions, as well as purely military considerations. When, for example, the decision was made to attack Poland, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the commanders of the army groups and armies who would be in charge of the actual campaign, and then there would follow consultation between the top field commanders and the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, in order to revise and perfect and refine the plans. of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers at OKW and OKH on the one hand, and the principal field commanders on the other hand, is graphically described in two affidavits by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch.
That is Affidavit No. 4, which will be USA 535. I invite the Tribunal's attention to these and will read them into the transcript. The statement of 7 November 1945:
"In April, 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him, as amended by a change which he desired. After the operational and deployment orders had been given to the two commanders of the army groups and the five commanders of the armies, conferences took place with them about details, in order to hear their desires and recommendations. After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch with the commanders-in-chief of army groups end of armies by personal visits to their headquarters, as well as bytelephone, teletype, or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact, it was the accepted policy and common practice for the commanderin-chief of the army to consult his subordinate commanders-in-chief and maintain a constant exchange of ideas with them.
"The commander-in-chief of the army and his chief of staff communicated with army groups and through them, as well as directly, with the armies-through army groups on strategic and tactical matters; directly on question affecting supply and administration of conquered territory occupied by the armies. An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a relativel small staff, which was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the commander-in-chief of the army, and not of the army group, who exercised jurisdiction.
"Signed, von Brauchitsch."
"There follows a supplement to my statement of 7 November:
"When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of his politic objectives through military pressure or through the application of military force, the commander-in-chief of the army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.
Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the OKH. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a written order from the OKW to the three branches of the armed forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies involved.
THE PRESIDENT: In my copy it is OKW.
COL. TAYLOR: That is an error, sir; it should be OKH.
"Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed by the OKH with the commanders-in-chief of the army groups and armies and with the chiefs of staff of these commanders. During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio, and courier. The commander-in-chief of the army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies, and lower echelons, by means of personal visits to them.
"In the war against Russia the commanders of army groups and armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation. Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army groups, and for all matters concerning supply and territorial jurisdiction from the OKH directly to the armies.
"Signed, von Brauchitsch." the army that means the commanders-in-chief of army groups and armies -participated in planning and directing the evolution of the plans, as those affidavits show. The Oberbefehlshabers were also the repositories of general executive powers in the areas in which their army groups and armies were operating. In this connection, I invite the Court's attention to 447-PS, which is already in evidence as US 135; 447-PS, this being a directive of 13 March 1941, signed by Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. This directive sets out various regulations for the operations against the Soviet Union which were actually begun a few months later, on 22 June. Under paragraph Roman I of this document
THE PRESIDENT: Is this in the first book?
COL. TAYLOR: The third book, Book No. 3, your Honor. The documents, your Honor, are in numerical order in Document Books 2 and 3. Document Book 2 contains C and L; Document Book 3 contains PS: and this, being 447-PS, will be in Document Book 3 in numerical order within the PS's. And within that document, under paragraph Roman I, the paragraph entitled "Area of Operations and Executive Power " (Vollziehende Gewalt), the Tribunal will find sub-paragraph 1, in which the following appears. That is page I of the translation, paragraph 2:
"It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General Government an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the commander-in-chie of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority on to the commanders-in-chief" -- that, in the original German, is Oberbefehlshaber -- "of the army groups and armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies." civilian agencies, was vested in the commander-in-chief of the army, with authority to transfer it to commanders-in-chief of army groups or armies -to the group as defined in the Indictment. states -- that is the 4th paragraph, on page 1 of the document:
"The area of operations created through the advance of the army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The commander-in-chief of the army has the right to exercise the executive power (Vollziehende Gewalt) in this area, and may transfer his authority on to the commanders-in-chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the army groups and armies."
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.
(Whereupon at 1245 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1400 hours) Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in closed session to consider matters of procedure, and there will therefore be no public session tomorrow.
COLONEL TAYLOR: Your Lordship, I have just one more document dealing with this subject of the structure of the Group before passing on to the substantive charges of criminality. That will be found in document Book 2. This document is the official command invitation to participate in the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941, eight days prior to the attack on the Soviet Union. This is one of the meetings that was referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits by Halder and von Brauchitsch, which were read into the record this morning. It is signed by Colonel Schmundt, the Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant to Hitler, and is dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941. It begins:
"Re Conference 'Barbarossa'" -- that being the code word for the attack on the Soviet Union -- "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on 'Barbarossa' by the Commanders of Army Groups, Armies and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank." in the bottom line of the chart on the wall, Army Groups, Armies and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank. conference, and I would just like in closing on this subject to run through that list to find out who the participants in this conference were and how closely they parallel the structure of the group as we find it in the Indictment. The Tribunal will see that the list of participants begins at the foot of Page 1 of the translation:
General Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, who was then commander-in-
chief of the Army, and a member of the group. General Halder, who was chief of the Army Staff, and a member of the group. Then three subordinates who were not members of the group, Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt. Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, not a member of the group.
On the air side: General Milch, State Secretary and Inspector of the Air Force, again not a member of the group. General Jeschonnek, chief of the General Staff of the Air Force and a member of the group; and two of his assistants. we find Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group, were present, with an assistant from the General Staff. members of the group.
Then we pass to the officers from the Field Commands: General von Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway, member of the group. General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5, member of the group. Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stuelpnagel, Schobert, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the group.
Air Force: General Loehr, Air Fleet 4, member of the group.
General Fromm and General Udet were not members. One was director of the Home Forces, commander of the Home Forces, and the other the Director General of Equipment and Supply.
The Navy: Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the Naval War Staff, and a member of the group, and, of course, an assistant who was not a member. Carls, Navy Group North, member of the group; likewise Schmundt. as Oberbefehlshaber. Keller, a member of the group. the group.
And it will accordingly be seen that except for a few assisting officers of relatively junior rank, all the participants in these consultations were members of the group as defined in the Indictment, and that in fact the participants included almost all the members of the group who were concerned in the impending operations against the Soviet Union.
the description of the General Staff and High Command Group and its composition and structure and general manner of functioning. I turn now to the charges levelled against this group in the Indictment. the planning, preparation, initiating and waging of the illegal wars set forth in counts 1 and 2, and for the war crimes and crimes against humanity detailed in counts 3 and 4. keep in mind that under the Charter the group may be declared criminal in connection with any acts of which an individual defendant who was a member of the group may be convicted. the individual defendants in this case. Five of the individual defendants, or one-quarter of the individuals here, are members of the group. Defendant Goering. Goering is a defendant in this case in numerous capacities. He is a member of the General Staff and High Command group by reason of having been a commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, from the time when the Air Force first came into the open and was officially established, until about one month prior to the end of the war.
During the last month of the war he was replaced in this capacity by von Greim, who committed suicide shortly after his capture at the end of the war. Goering is charged with crimes under all counts of the Indictment.
The next listed defendant who is a member of the group is Keitel. He and the remaining three defendants are all four of them in this case primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all four of them are professional soldiers or sailors, or OKW, when the OKW was first set up in 1938, and remained in that capacity throughout the period in question. We held the rank of Field Marshal throughout most of this period, and in addition to being the Chief of the OKW, he was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich. Keitel is charged with crimes under all four counts.
The Defendant Jodl was a career soldier. He was an Oberstleutnant, or Lieutenant Colonel, when the Nazis came to power, and ultimately attained the rank of Generaloberst or Colonel General. He became the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht and continued in that capacity throughout the war. He also is charged with crimes under all four counts. side. The defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior member of the entire group, having been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy as early as 1928. He attained the highest rank in the German Navy, Grossadmiral. He retired from the Supreme Command of the Navy in 1943, in January, and was replaced by Doenitz. Raeder is charged under counts 1, 2 and 3 of the Indictment. when the Nazi came to power. During the early years of the Nazi regime, he specialized in submarine activities and was in command of the U-boat arm when the war broke out.
He rose steadily in the Navy, and was chosen to succeed Raeder when the latter retired in 1943, then became C in C of the Navy and attained the rank of Grossadmiral.
When the German Armed Forces collapsed near the end of the war Doenitz succeeded Hitler as head of the German Government. He is charged under Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the Indictment. whole. We must except the Defendant Goering, who is primarily a Nazi party politician nourishing a hobby for aviation as a result of his career in 1914-18. But the others made soldiering or sailoring their life work. They collaborated with and joined in the most important adventures of the Nazis, but they were not among the early party members. They differ in no essential respects from the other 125 members of the group. They are, no doubt, abler men in certain respects. They rose to the highest positions in the German Armed Forces, and all but Jodl attained the highest rank. group, and we can examine their ideas as they have expressed them in these documents and their actions, with fair assurance that these ideas and actions are characteristic of the other group members. Command group under counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment, their activities in planning and conspiring to wage aggressive and illegal wars. Here my task is largely one of recapitulation. The general body of proof relating to aggresive war has already been laid before the Tribunal by my colleague, Mr. Alderman, and the distinguished members of the British delegation.
Many of the documents to which they drew the Tribunal's attention showed that the defendants here who were members of the General Staff and High Command group participated knowingly and willfully in crimes under counts 1 and 2. I propose to avoid referring again to that evidence so far as I possibly can, but I must refer to one or two of them again to focus the Tribunal's attention on the part which the General Staff and High Command group played in aggressive war crimes. prepare military plans. In peace time military staffs customarily concern themselves with the preparation of plans for attack or defense based on hypo-thetical contingencies.
There is nothing criminal about carrying of these exercises or preparing these plans. That is not what the defendants and this group are charged with. Germany by threat of force or force itself, and they joined knowingly and enthusiastically in developing German armed might for this purpose. They were advised in advance of the Nazi plans to launch aggressive wars. They laid the military plans and directed the initiation and carrying on of the wars. These things we believe to be criminal under Article 6 of the Charter. part of all branches of the Armed Forces, and particularly by the high-ranking fficers who control these forces. To the extent, therefore, that German preparation for and the waging of aggressive war are historical facts of common knowledge, already proved, it necessarily follows that the General Staff and High Command group, and the German Armed Forces, participated therein.
leaders to insist that until the troops marched they lived in an ivory tower unwilling to see the direction to which their work went. some of these men now fully admit they participated gladly with the Nazis because the Nazi aims coincided closely with their own.
I think that the documents which Mr. Alderman read into the transcript already adequately reflect the purposes and objectives of the German General Staff and High Command group during the period prior to the absorption of Austria. During this period occurred, as is charged in the Indictment, firstly, secret rearmament, including the training of military personnel, the production of war munitions and building of an air force. Secondly, the Goering announcement on 10 March 1935 that Germany was building a military air force. Third, the law for compulsory military service of 16 March 1935, fixing the peace time strength of the German Army at 500,000. And, finally, and fourth, the reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and the refortification of that area.
Those particular facts do not require judicial proof. They are historical facts, and likewise, the fact that it would have been impossible for the Nazis to achieve these things without cooperation by the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things.
Mr. Alderman described to the Tribunal and read from numerous documents which illustrate these events. He included numerous documents concerning the secret expansion of the German Navy in violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance of the defendant Raeder. as US 24, which was adopted on the same day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provision of the Versailles Treaty. He read von Blomberg's plan, dated 2 May 1935, for the reoccupation of the Rhineland. That is C-159, US 54; and Blomberg's orders under which the reoccupation was actually carried out.