THE PRESIDENT: Are you leaving that document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I was, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: What about the last paragraph?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, I will certainly deal with that.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 134.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If your Lordship pleases. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. It goes on to say:
"It appears hopeless and also impractical to us to strive to influence Austrian legitimism or the Heimwer movement. There are, on the one hadn, comparitively strong elements in Austrian Catholicism who could, with certain reservations, be called democratic. These elements, which are gradually grouping themselves round the Freiheitsbund (Freedom Union) and which are inclined basically to work for an agreement with the Social Democrats, represent, in our opinion, that group which would under certain circumstances, be inclined to bring about a revolution in internal politics in Austria."
Did you put that forward as also representing your view?
A. Sir David, I explained very carefully to the Court yesterday the aims and the character of the Freiheitsbund and the Court knows from the report that the Czech government endeavoured to exert political influence on this Freiheitsbund. That is quite clear in thie connection. This is all the Czech report.
Q. Then you were putting it forward, were you not, as your view to Hitler that, to speak loosely, the Catholic left might be used as a means of approach by you. That is really what you are saying.
A. But, Sir David, you want to accuse me of submitting a Czech report to Hitler and to identify my views with this report.
Q. Yes, that is what I am accusing you of. If you write to the head of the state, "to throw light on the present position in Austria, I append an extract from a report --'' then what I am suggesting is that that means this report accurately represents the position, as I see it.
That is what I am putting to you.
A. No, another report which you also submitted to the Court shows that I asked Hitler to work against these efforts of the Czech government to exert influence on the Freitheitsbund.
Q. Defendant, you asked Hitler to give one hundred thousand Reichsmarks to the Freitheits bund. Tha is exactly what you are following out in what you have suggested here, that they might be a body who would be a useful point d'appin for you in order to gain an influence with mother section of Austrian opinion. I am suggesting to you the two things are quite consistent. You tell Hitler that they are useful.
A. Yes.
Q. And you support them with one hundred thousand Reichsmarks. That is what I am putting to you.
A. Yes.
Q. That you were all the time burrowing under one section of Austrian opinion after another in order to work towards the suppression of the freedom of Austria. That is what I am putting to you. I do not think there is any doubt about it.
A. Sir David, that this report shows anything clearly it is the fact that, aside from the National Socialists in Austria there were other groups. There were the Christian Union and the Freiheitsbund who were for the union of the two countries and worked for it politically, and you cannot accuse me as a diplomat, who wants to bring about such an aim in an evolutionary way, if I surest that we assure the cooperation of these groups.
Q. There was not anything very evolutionary about the Trojan Horse, was there? However, that may be comment. Let us go on to another point.
Did you know Baron Gudemus?
A. No, I did not know him.
Q. You know that he was the closest confidant of the Archduke Otto. Do you remember?
A. Yes, that is shown in my report.
Q. Yes. Well now, let us just look and see what Baron Gudemus had to say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Your Lordship will find that on page 39 and it is 72 to 75 of the German version, document 387 which will become GB 507. It is paragraph 2 (b) and it appears on page 74, defendant.
"Baron Gudemus, the closes confidant of the Archduke Otto writes--'' There is a mistake there, my Lord.
The "me" should be "one".
"--one of my acquaintances on the 30 of March.
'..I took many a cheerful impression back with me from Austria about the progress of our movement, but I cannot deny that in some respects the policy of our government worries me greatly. Of what use is it that the ringleaders of February and July 1934, insofar as they got caught, are being sentences, whilst the government is too weak, too slovenly or intentionally too tolerant, to prevent brown and rod propaganda being carried on in the cinema, in the press and on the radio and mainly by state officials or organs of the Fatherland Front supported and paid by the financial and other means which are pouring in in plenty from Germany. What is that learned idealist Schuschnigg actually doing? Does he not Notice that Papen and the other brown agents in his own country continually spit into the hand he so consistently offers them? He must not imagine that he can thus maintain and save Austria, whilst Hitler rules in a Germany which is painted brown on the inside and the outside. The methods ever there have, it is true, become more clever and more careful--" this is about seven months after your arrive "--but this makes them all the more danger us.
Terrible also are the continuous diferrences between Schuschnigg and Stahremburg--" and so on. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. Now, is it not correct, defendant, that anyone, that everyone, even a visiting manoarchist agent, knew that these activities were going on with you on the top and the Austrian National Socialist Party working underneath? comment on that.
"The difficulties of the internal Austrian situation could hardly be described more clearly than in this letter."
Why did you not say to Hitler, if it was a fact "--Baron Gudemus is talking nonsense. I am carrying out a perfectly fours quare moral assignment, to normalize Austrian relations." Why did you not deny it, if it was not true?
complete franknessI passed on allthese reports which I received to Hitler, even though it spoke of the adherents of the Hapsburg Restoration. were true; you adopted them and passed them on to Hitler because they were true reports; that that was a true picture of the situation. That is what I am suggesting to you. You just tell the Tribunal, were they true or were they not? If they were not true, why did you pass them on without saying they were not true? That is what I am asking you . speaks of internal conditions in Austria, and speaks of the existing difference between Schuschnigg and Starhemberg, the competition of their guards, and the remaining underground republican influences still existing.
Q Yes, that is three lines out of twenty. There is a lot more before you come to that part. That is what I am asking you about; the other seventeen lines of that report. the internal weaknesses of the Austrian government which I am reporting on. If you want to say that I should have explained to Hitler that I was no Brown agent, on 26th July we established very clearly under what conditions I had to carry out my work in Austria. I did not have to explain that to Hitler in a report. I sent this report merely for his information. your letter. It shows in another way how you were working. Paragraph 3:
" The film 'The Old and the Young King'" -- The Tribunal may not remember, but you correct my recollection. That is a film, if I remember right, dealing with Friederich -- the relations of Friederich Wilhelm I and Friederich the Great. Am I right?
Q "The film 'The Old and the Young King' was shown here for the first time a few days ago in the presence of Mr. Jannings."
"It provoked enthusiastic demonstrations. Particularly the scene where the king stresses the fact that 'French trash and Roman books do not mean anything to Prussia', led to vociferous demonstrations.
The police wanted to resort to a ban. Together with Mr. Jannings, we explained to then that, should this film be prohibited, we would resort to the complete exclusion of the whole Austrian film production from Germany. This worked. The film -- except for the above mentioned part which was expunged -- is being shown now and will be shown on the screen at Klagenfurt and Graz within the next few days. Yesterday I received Jannings together with a number of Tutors from the Burg Theater as my guests. He said he was very satisfied with his success, and we discussed in detail the plan of afilm of Bismarck for the production of which recommended Bemelburg to him as the writer of the script." be shown in Austria on the threat of excluding "Freulein Wessly" and "Maskerade", and the other Austrian films of that time from the German market; you were forcing your propaganda on the threat of excluding Austrian films; is that right?
A Yes, and I will tell you why. I must enlarge your historical knowledge of those things, Sir David. Friederich the Great, in relations between Germany and Austria, played a very important role. At that time we were trying in the relationship between our two countries to clear up the historical inaccuracies which had existed since the time of Friederich the Great For this purpose, the famous Austrian historian, Professor Schubeck, had written a big work, and the film which is mentioned here served the purpose of showing that we had a great mutual German history which belonged to both peoples. For the cultural rapprochement of the two countries, I insisted that this film should be shown, and this was done. to be shown, defendant, but what I am asking you is, why you pressed it against the wish of the Austrian authorities by throat of excluding Austrian film production from the German market? Why did you threaten the Austrian authoriti in that way? certain films; that they might be used for demonstrations, but after we had discussed this with the police and that certain parts should be eliminated from this film, they were quite read to admit the film, and of course, I also told them that if we did not reach an agreement, the consequences would be that Germany would not send any more films at all to Austria.
Q Well, again I put the point. Do you remember telling the Tribunal that you did not keep up contact with the NSDAP in Austria? Is that correct?
Q You did keep up contacts?
Q Close contacts?
Q Intimate contact? Were your contacts close?
Q Well, if they were not, will you just turn a page back. It is probably page 72 of your report. It is the some report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is page 93 of Your Lordship's book. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q You began that report by saying:
"I have first to report on the development of the local NSDAP:
"On 23rd March, a complete agreement was reached in Krems between Captain Leopold, (Retd.) and Generaldirektor Neubacher. In accordance therewith, Neubacher subordinated himself to Leopold in every way and recognized him as Fuehrer for Austria. As soon as Schattenfreh is released from the concentration camp, he is to become deputy Fuehrer, while Neubacher, as the closest confident of Leopold, will be consulted on all important questions." deputy, while:
"Major General Klupp, (Retd.) will be taken into consultation in strict confidence. Furthermore, Leopold expressed the desire the at long last, the continuous intrigues against him on the part of emigrees living in the Reich -of the type of Frauenfeld and his ilk -- be stopped." wasn't it?
A Yes, Sir David. May I call to your attention the fact that this report is dated 4 April 1935, at a time before the July agreement when my interest in those Party affairs can still be readily understood. of 1 September 1936, which is on page 33 of Document Book 11, page 26 of the German book. You remember this is the report which you referred to, and you said:
"As a guiding principle (Marschroute) I recommend on the tactical side continued, patient psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime."
of the Ministry of the Interior. I am not going to trouble about a statement like that, but just go on for a moment:
"The proposed conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the realisation of some of our projects In discussion with government officials us well as with leaders of the illegal party (Leopold and Schattenfreh) who conform completely with the agreement of July 11. I am trying to direct the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the Fatherland Front." after the agreement, having discussions with the leaders of the illegal party, Leopold and Schattenfreh, so may we take it -- I don't want to spend time on it -- that throughout your time in Austria, you were in close and constant touch with the leaders of the Austrian National Socialist Party? justified by the July agreement. I have already explained that to the Court yesterday. In the July agreement Chancellor Schuschnigg promised that members of the national opposition would be called upon for cooperation. As a result, it was of course my duty to be interested in whether and to what extent the cooperation of such forces was actually sought after by Schuschnigg. That was the subject of this talk with the Fuehrer, and I might state expressly that my contact with the Austrian Party, after the July agreement, was only in this connection.
Q I see. Well, I am not going to go into that further. I have referred the Tribunal to two documents, and there are other references which I need not worry about.
I want you to come now to November 1937. Could you fix as carefully and as closely as you can the date of your meeting with the defendant Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch? out pre-arrangement -- at the Olympic Winter Games at Garmisch-Partenkirchen in January 1938.
Q January 1938. I just want to collate these dates. You had become very friendly with the Foreign minister Guido Schmidt, who gave evidence here, had you not?
Q Yes, you gave him the "du", although you were twenty years his senior; you had given him the "du" for sometime? You had been on intimate relations? Is that right?
A I don't think that 20 years is a standard for a friendship. I regarded Mr. Schmidt as an upright and very sensible diplomat and man. to be such terms with a Foreign Minister, especially one twenty years his junior ... not his contemporary -- on such terms that he used the familiar "du" to him Won't you agree with me that it is a quite unusual form of intimacy between an ambassador and a foreign minister? that in Austria almost all the people say "du" to each other, and to clear up this incident, may I add the following. Schmidt, of whom I am very fond, "Dear friend, we have worked together so much, now we can say "du" to each other."
Q Now, what I am interested in is this: It was in November 1937 that you and Dr. Guido Schmidt first began to discuss the question of Herr von Schuschnigg meeting Hitler, was it not? Schuschnigg himself at that time.
Q Just a moment; will you answer my question? You discussed with Schmidt -- you heard Dr. Schmidt give his evidence that the defendant Goering had told him with great frankness, as the defendant Goering said he told everybody else and has told this Court, that he was out for the union of Germany and Austria by any means and at all costs. You heard Dr. Schmidt say that Goering had told him that that was his view, and I say, in all fairness, it is perfectly consistent. It is the view he has expressed here and apparently to a lot of other people. Do you remember Dr. Schmidt said that? You can take that from me.
Schmidt, but to Mussolini and to the High Tribunal, and I think to several other people. Had he never said it to you?
Q Did you know that it was his view?
Q You didn't know that was Goering's view?
A Please let me speak a minute. Of course, I knew that it was Goering's wish to bring about a union of these two states, and I myself was present at the talk with Mussolini.
Please consider, however, that Mr. Goering at that time was not competent for foreign policy. The question of what policy should be carried on in Austria had been agreed upon exclusively between Hitler and me, and I do not recall that, in these years between 1936 and 1938, I discussed it with Marshal Goering.
Q. I am dealing with November of 1937 at the moment, and three months later the defendant Goering was very competent in foreign politics in the Austrian question, as you, who listened to the accounts of his telephone conversations, must know.
I just want you to take the dates as we have got them now. Goering had told Schmidt his views; you and Schmidt were discussing this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. In January you had a political discussion with Dr. Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch.
I am one date out of order. On the 11th of November, as Mr. Dodd put to Dr. Seyss-Inquart, he had written a letter to Dr. Jury saying "I don't think anything will happen this year, but the developments will take place in the spring." Then, after that letter, he sees you at Garmisch in January, and in February you finally arrange this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler.
A. Yes.
Q. Didn't you know very well that the whole object of the meeting was to get Herr von Schuschnigg to agree to the Reich's wishes, the appointment of Seyss-Inquart, a general political amnesty which would release all the members of the Nazi Party in Austria and put them at the disposal of their leaders, and a declaration of equal rights for the Party? Didn't you know that the whole object of the meeting was to get Herr von Schuschnigg to agree to these terms so that you would have the Austrian National Socialist Party unfettered and free to work for Germany's interests in Austria?
A. In my talks with Dr. Seyss-Inquart in Garmisch-Patenkirchen we discussed the necessity of making the Austrian Nazi Party indepentend, that is, under all circumstances removing it from the influence of the Reich, in the form agreed upon in the treaty of July and in the intention that a union of our two countries would be suggested and urged from the Austrian side, so far as foreign policy was concerned, and not by the Reich.
ing between Hitler and Schuschnigg. I personally could not know at all at this time whether such a talk would ever take place. That was decided only on the 5th of February, as you will recall. would go on.
You may further recall to your memory that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had been officially assigned by the Chancellor to investigate all ways which would be possible to incorporate the national opposition -- that is, the Austrian National Socialist Party -- into Schuschnigg's work. That was his official mission, and thus I had a right to discuss these things with him.
Q. Wasn't Dr. Reiner -- the witness that the Tribunal has seen -- wasn't he present at the Garnisch meeting too?
A. Please?
Q. Dr. Reiner?
A. It seems that that was the case, Sir David; I don't recall. SeyssInquart told me that it was possible that Dr. Reiner joined us on a walk. I personally do not remember. I did not carry on any political discussion with Reiner.
Q. Well now, you have given your explanation as of the turn of the year. I just want to remind you of one other point. You were very well aware of the von Blomberg and von Fritsch crisis in the Army, were you not? I don't want to go into disagreeable details again, because it is not at present before the Tribunal, but you knew that that crisis had arisen?
A. Yes.
Q. I am sure you will see the importance of this. General von Fritsch had been at the War Academy with you, had he not?
A. Yes.
Q. He was an old friend, and you knew -- as I think everyone who has mentioned his name in this court has said -- that General von Fritsch was a man of the highest character and that the sort of charge that was brought against him was one which anyone who knew him would regard with ridicule, if it wasn't so tragic and they would regard it with contempt?
That was your view?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And you had a pretty good idea, had you not, apart from the treatment of Field Marshal von Blomberg, that von Fritsch had been the subject of a trumped-up charge in order to prevent him becoming head of the Wehrmacht? You knew that, didn't you?
A. In any case, I learned of it later.
Q. No, no, that is not the important thing, defendant; your state of mind on the 5th of February, 1938. You knew by then that the Nazi clique had brought a framed-up charge against a man whom you regarded as the soul of honor, did you not?
you tell him about the fact that von Schuschnigg may come, and he jumps to it at once. He says, "go and got Schuschnigg", doesn't he? He was quite bored, if I may put it that way, with what you had to say up to that point. As soon as you say there is a chance of a meeting with Schuschnigg Hitler seizes it like a trout to a May fly doesn't he, or rather, like a lion to the kill; that is right, isn't it?
A Yes, Sir David. I told the Court what impression the events in Berlin and my own dismissal on the 4th of February had made on me. It cannot be conwould be taken--to bring about this discussion of the two Chiefs of State which had long been desired, because I hoped to clear up the differences and avoid a radical course. I told Foreign Minister Schmidt and Chancellor Schuschnigg that, when I asked both of them, if at all possible, to take part in such a clearing-up discussion. meeting of the 12th of February because I went through them with the defendant von Ribbentrop and the Court are very well seized with them. fully because the question of your own veracity may depend on it. at that interview? my report; I myself said that pressure was exerted. because the Court have heard the evidence of your friend Dr. Schmidt and a lot of other evidence. I only want to ask you the one question, and please get it clear. Schuschnigg to make him agree to the terms of the 12th of February? That is the one question I want to ask you, and I give you the chance of answering. What do you say today? Was or was it not pressure put on Herr von Schuschnigg?
A Yes; I never denied it. I don't understand why you ask me that. I never denied it.
Q The defendant Ribbentrop denied it quite strongly, but we won't go into that.
Did you arrange a meeting between Hitler and Cardinal Innitzer? apart from the French and British representatives, should be present at Hitler's entry into Vienna? at parades, and I certainly did not suggest it.
Q Did you arrange for the diplomatic corps to be present? could attend this celebration, and I told them "of course, why not?"
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, I have now finished with Austria. I have three very minor matters which I hope will take a short time, but this might be a convenient period in which to recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(A recess was taken.)
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE :
the anti-Semitic movement and propaganda ? action and propaganda ?
A On the contrary. It was my aim and my wish, and was the entire program of my work to have a union brought about between the two countries and to contribute as much as possible, for it was the wish of the German nation.
Q I do not think you can have understood my question. Let me repeat it I am now coming to the Jews.
A Oh, to the Jews ?
Q Yes, Now, let me repeat it again. Are the Tribunal to take it that broadly you were against anti-Semitic action and propaganda ?
A Yes; I have already told the High Tribunal just what my basic opinion was towards the racial question and towards the question of the elimination of foreign influences in certain cultural aspects of public life. They are two entirely different questions, however.
Q Yes, I appreciate that. Now, will you look at Document 3319 PS,which is Exhibit GB 287 ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE : My lord, it begins at Page 48 of Document Book 11-A. It is on pages 44 and 45 of the German book.
Q The part I want you to refer to is on Pages 58 and 59. This, defendant, is from a confidential report of the work session of the consultants on Jewish questions of the German missions in Europe, on the 3rd and 4th of April, 1944. I want you just to look at Page 44, I think, of the German version; Page 58 of the English, at the contribution to this discussion of a certain Herr Posemann, from Turkey. Was he from your staff ? If you would not mind, just say yes or no.
A Perhaps I may be permitted to tell you just who Mr. Posemann was. and if not, what was he, that is what I want to know.
A No, not at all. Not at all. Mr. Posemann was the keeper of a book shop, a German who had settled in Ankara. But he was in no way connected with my embassy staff.
Q I see. Well, at any rate, he was a consultant of the German Foreign Office for this discussion.
Now, just listen to what he says :
"Early last year the Turkish Government carried out a blow against the Jews in connection with an attempt to solve the problem of minorities. Very vigorous procedures were used in the carrying out of this action. Suspicions of Allied circles that anti-Jewish measures alone were concerned were countered by Turkey with References to simultaneous measures against the minority. At any rate, Turkey abandoned further measures towards a solution of the problem of minorities and therewith of the Jewish problem. For this reason, no anti-Jewish propaganda can be carried on under our direction at the present moment, since it is not desired and would be a burden on Turkey's present foreign policy. There are no anti-Jewish publications in Turkey, aside from caricatures and comic books about Jews. A dawning realization of the extent of International Jewish domination can be seen in the translation of the "Protocol of the Elders of Zion" and of Ford's book,"The International Jew". The marketing of these brochures and their distribution has been promoted by the Embassy. For the time being, only work within this narrow range is possible, since, as already has been emphasized, anti-Jewish propaganda that was obviously German-inspired might give rise to unfavorable political complications for us."
Now, do you believe in the " Protocol of the Elders of Zion " ? Do you believe it is a correct and authentic work ?
Q Then why was the marketing of these brochures promoted by the embassy ? High Tribunal regarding the entire matter of this meeting. This meeting had been called by the Foreign Office, and to participate with the experts of the embassies and legations that had been specifically hired for dealing with the Jewish problem, or to concern themselves with the treatment of the Jewish problem. In my embassy there was no such expert for dealing with this problem, for I always refused to have a man like that. the book-shop, Mr. Posemann, and had delegated him to attend this conference.
If Mr. Posemann here set forth that the embassy disseminated the propaganda brochures which are mentioned here, then he is gravely mistaken.
For, first of all, the Turkish Government would never have tolerated a dissemination of material like that, and secondly, you, Sir David, can convince yourself today that all of these brochures are to be found in the basement of my embassy at Ankara.
You can make sure for yourself. is wrong ?
Q You say that you are not a subject of that; that is your answer ?
I want to ask you one or two things about the Catholic Church. You remember the Fulda declaration of the bishops ?
Q That is right, is it not ? That was made and based on an assurance which Hitler gave to the Church of his good intentions, on the 23rd of March, 1933 ? Do you remember Hitler's making a statement like that ?
A Yes; not only on the 23rd of March. But with this declaration Hitler very specifically took the point of view that both Christian denominations would be the basis of any and all policy. yours at a cabinet meeting on the 15th of March, 1933, when you stressed the importance of incorporating political Catholicism into the new state; that is a correct and factual statement, is it not ? That is the way the thing works out ? basis of his policy, set forth in solemn statements, and I believe that I explained to the High Tribunal that I did everything possible, really, in order to establish this program.
Page 96; Page 78 of the German version, which is Document 2248 PS. It is your report to Hitler of the 20th July, 1935. Now in that report you use these words: "the clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is on Page 99 of the English text and it is Page 86 of the German text. My Lord, it is the first paragraph, Page 99: "Cultural problems assume particular importance. The way in which Germany deals with political religious difficulties, the clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany will not only have a decisive effect on England or Catholic Poland, one can rather say that the solution of the German-Austrian question stands or falls with it." Now what I want you to bear in mind, this is your account to Hitler in July, 1935, over two years after the Concordate: "the clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany --". Now your counsel quoted one passage of His Holiness the Pope's allocution, and I would just like you to look and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with the next passage, which occurs after the bit quoted by Dr. Kubuschok.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, this is a now document -- no, My Lord, I am sorry. It is an old exhibit. It is Document 3268 PS, which is U.S.A. Exhibit 356. Your Lordship remembers that Dr. Kubuschok quoted a portion, in his document book, of the Pope's allocution. My Lord, I have some extra copies. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Now after the bit which Dr. Kubuschok quoted as to the Concordate having prevented worse evils, His Holiness goes on to say: "The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become over more bitter: there was the dissolution of Catholic organizations; the gradual suppression of the flourishing Catholic schools, both public and private; the enforced weaning of youth from family and Church; the pressure brought to bear on the conscience of citizens, and especially of civil servants; the systematic defamation, by means of a clever, closely- organized propaganda, of the Church, the clergy, the faithful, the Church's institutions, teaching and history; the closing, dissolution, confiscation of religious houses and other ecclesiastical institutions; the complete suppression of the Catholic press and publishing houses."