He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other states to the South and Southeast. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a Good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which could stop it, and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic."
Then Mr. Messersmith says that he told you that he was shocked, and that you merely smiled and said that of course this conversation was between you and Mr. Messersmith, and you would not talk so clearly to other people.
Then he says: "I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives." Mr. Messersmith. Apart from whether you said to Mr. Messersmith or not, do you deny that these were your aims and intentions?
A Yes; I absolutely deny that my purposes and aims had been those which Mr. Messersmith is describing in his affidavit here.
Q. Now I just want to take these quickly. Would you just refer back to the document you were looking at a short time ago, which is document 2248-PS.
That is page 96, My Lord. It starts there, in 11-A, and I want to pass on to page 97. That is page 81 of the German book. beginning of page 81 of the German text.
"The great historical speech of the Fuehrer on the 21st of May of this year, and later the Naval Treaty, caused a strong detente in the field of foreign policy with regard to England. But the clear and final definition of the attitude of National Socialism to the Soviet Russian doctrine of the State naturally redoubled France-Russian attempts to cripple us in the East and Souteast without at the same time achieving a detente in the other direction by clearly renouncing the annexation or incorporation of Austria.
"Any attempt at a commercial and, even more so, at a political offensive by the newly formed Third Reich in the direction of Southeastern Europe must inevitably come up against a front formed bythe whole of Europe" offensive in the direction of Southeastern Europe? Had you discussed that with the defendant von Neurath?
Q Do you think you spoke for yourself?
A Yes, of course. I am making a negative assertion, Sir David, namely that a crippling in the Far Eastern theater would have a considerable effect on the entire Far Eastern situation. at the moment. I can merely draw your attention to matters. All that I am asking you is whether you had gotten that idea from, say, the foreign minister, or whether it was your own idea. You say it is your own idea.
Q Page 28. There is a paragraph -- My Lord, it is the same Page, 97, in the English version -- you go on to say.
"This realistic survey of the European constellation shows immediately that the German-Austrian problem cannot, at least in the near future, be successfully approached from the direction of foreign politics. We must for the time being be content with not allowing Austria's international status to deteriorate for a later solution. In this connection the danger of a non-intervention pact with bi-lateral treaty of assurance seems to be successfully avoided. The maturing of a solution was and still regains dependent on nothing but the state of German-Austrian relations". that there should only be a revolutionary solution of Austria based on Austria's will? Why were you afraid of a non-intervention pact which would bind the Reich to not interfering in Austria?
A For a very simple reason. All political combinations which the political opponents were making at the time had only one end, that Austria should remain within the constellation, a situation which made it impossible to advance the thought of the Anschluss. For that reason, it had to be our natural political aim, and remain it, that the international status of Austria should not deteriorate, as I have expressed it here.
Q Yes. That is the answer which I thought you would have to give. Now, just look at Page 83, which is in the very next paragraph:
"The German nation has for centuries had to pursue a real path of suffering, to secure its unity. With the dawn of National-Socialism and the founding of the Third Reich by the final overthrew of all State Particularism, a unique and never to be repeated opportunity seemed to be given to complete Bismarck's work and to bring the problem of the relations between Germany and Austria nearer to a solution, as a dynamic result of internal events in Germany". of this man's work, because I hope we shall not disagree about ancient history, whatever we do about the ether. As I understand your view is that this Bismarck's setting up the German Empire in 1881 was merely an attempt at a solution which left the Hapsburg empire separated from Germany, and the final completion of his were was that the old Hapsburg dominions should be brought back with the spates which had been in the Holy Roman Empire Is that roughly the truth?
A Quite right; not allthe Hapsburg dominions, but the German share of Austria.
Q The original Hapsburg domains?
QQuite right. I hope I am putting it objectively enough. of the relations between Germany and Austria should be brought about by a "dynamic result of internal events in Germany"? What did you mean by that?
By that I mean the following. Never in Germany's history had it happened that a large party which Germany united had also gained support in Austria. That was a unique historical event, And I wish to state that the type of movement in the two countries which was urging unity showed promise for a solution.
Q You see, Defendant, the difficulty that I want you to explain is thi* How do you square an approval of centralizing in Germany with a Nazi government whose unscrupulous message you then know them after the affairs from the 30th of June, 1934 -- how do you square an unscrupulous centralized Germany with an evolutionary solution of the Austrian problem?
That is what that paragraph is saying, you know. What I am suggesting is that it means a much simpler thing than you have told us. It means that you were out to get an annexation of Austria at the earliest opportunity under the National Socialist Reich.
A Yes. Of course, I had to reckon with the existing circumstances, and I did reckon with them, as any realistic politician would. I wanted to attempt with the help of the factors which were available, to come to a solution in the national system in both countries. But I see no contradiction, Sir David. You are saying, how could I achieve my centralizing. But if you would be good enough to lock at the end of this report, then you will find that Hitler pronounced this as a decentralization. what you meant by the expression "dynamic result of internal events in Germany". In short, I want you to realize, defendant -- I am not going to argue with you, because I ought not to -- the first point of Mr. Messersmith was a question of this action in Southeastern Europe. The second point is that Austria was the first line, the first thing to be dealt with. Now, I wonder if you will be good enough to take the same bundle and turn over to Page 106 which is a report of your own, dated the 18th of October, 1935. I want you to deal with Mr. Messersmith's third suggestion against you, which you deny, that you were going to work in Austria by a weakening of the Regime. into your mind. The report that I am dealing with is on the 18th of October 1935. You are dealing with the Austrian government re-shuffle, and you are saying -- My Lord, this is a now document. It is BG 502. It is in 11-A, Page 106. It begins:
"Yesterday's cabinet re-shuffle resembles a bloodless insurrection by Prince Starhemberg and the Heimwehr. It becomes clear that Minister Fey heard early of his intended dismissal and that already yesterday afternoon he had the public buildings in Vienna occupied by the Viennese Heimwehr, which is loyal to him. The government countered this measure by simultaneously reinforcing the occupation by police."
Now you go on to discuss the matter. That is at the beginning of the report. Then, if you turn to the next page, and refer about half way down the page, you say this:
"In spite of the Vice-Chancellor's clear victory and of the diligent efforts of the Austria Press to make it appear plausible that the cabinet re-shuffle was carried out for reasons of internal consolidation, the feeling of moving towards completely uncertain developments prevails among the Austrian public, including the Heimwehr circles.
"From our point of viewthe change of affairs is only too welcome. Every now weakening of the system is of advantages, even if it at first seems in fact to be directed against us. The fronts are starting to move and it will have to be our task to keep them moving." that so long as there is political uncertainty or political trouble in the Austrian state, it does not matter whether the move may be an anti-German one so long as the struggle grows with distrust spreading. That was an advantage to Germany, and that is what you want ? That is what these lines mean , is it not ?
Q Not quite ?
A If I may, I should like to give you an explanation. Here in this report we are concerned with the Austrian government and the influence of Prince Starhemberg and the Home Guard. Here Starhemberg and the Home Guard had allied with Mussolini against the German Reich. A loosening up of that inner-political front which was working against the interests of a joining together could only be advantageous, in the light of my policy.
Q But what I do not understand as this. You see, you have said, "In spite of the Vice-Chancellor's clear victory and of the diligent efforts of the Austrian Press ..." And you go on to say, "Every now weakening of the system is of advantages". You see, Prince Starhemberg and the Italian party, according to you, had von, because you say "In spite of"... this... "clear victory".
Then you say, "Every now weakening of the system". That could not be Starhemberg's alliance because that had been successful.
By "the system" you mean the government's of Austria, do you not ? You cannot mean anything else.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, perhaps I should not continue the argument. But it is a somewhat complicated subject.
THE WITNESS: Yes, it is.
THE PRESIDENT: I was thinking that you should perhaps draw attention to the few remaining sentences.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Yes, I think you should perhaps draw his attention to the remaining sentences.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, My Lord, certainly I will read on: "The continuation of negotiations for compensation which had renounced since the Geneva declaration seems to be entirely superfluous for the time being. It will be a good thing to strengthen the increasingly excited public feeling against the Italian trend by clever and tactful handling via the press without, however, giving the Government justifiable cause for having recourse to the desperate measure of starting a new propaganda campaign against us. I would be very grateful if the Reich Minister for Propaganda were to put a few experienced journalists into this work. For the rest, we can confidentially leave further developments to sort themselves out in the near future and I am convinced that the shifting of powers on the European chess board will permit us in the not too distant future to take up actively the question of influencing the southeastern areas."
Extraordinary -- if I may say so -- extraordinary how Mr. Messersmith had got your ideas if you had never had this conversation with him, wasn't it?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this ti me.
THE WITNESS: But may we come back to that question tomorrow?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 19 June 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that defendant von Neurath is absent. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE:
Q Just before we leave Mr. Messersmith, defendant, I want to ask you thre questions about the other countries in Southeastern Europe that Mr. Messersmith mentioned. Did you know that the German Foreign Office financed and directed the Henlein movement among the Sudetendeutsche?
A I do not believe that I learned of that at that time. In 1935 when thi report was written, the Sudeten German question was not an actual problem.
Q When did you larn about it?
Q I see. Did you know that the Reich was supporting M. Codrianu and the Iron Guard in Rumania?
Q You learned that sometime later than 1935, did you? when did you learn that?
A I cannot say; but I believe that these events of the Iron Guard in Rumania were about in 1937. I could be mistaken, but I believe so.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think perhaps you have the microphone a little too near you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: If your Lordship please, I am sorry. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: ited by the defendant Kaltenbrunner as being a possible person to do the same thing in Hungary, to arrange for Hungary's acquisition by the Reich, doing the internal work inside Hungary in order that Hungary should be acquired: did you know that?
A No. In the first place, I did not know it, and in the second place, may I say this? This is such an impossible idea. I was a close friend of the regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy.
In my interrogatory to Admiral Horty I asked him a question which he unfortunately did not answer because he did not remember. It says that in the fall of 1943 the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, KerestyFischer; handed in a document which showed that German or German Hungarian for wanted to bring about an incorporation of Hungary through a revolt. At the wis of Horty, I turned this document over to Mr von Ribbentrop and asked him to ta the necessary measures against it. That is all set down in the document, and the Hungarian minister of the interior will be able to confirm it.
Q You See my point. I do not mind whether you would have taken it or not The point that I am putting is that you were the choice. Don't you know that? You know the document I am referring to, D-679, with many comments by Kaltenbr in which you were discussed as being the possible person to do the internal we in Hungary.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, it is Page 78 of Document Book 11-A,GB BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: submitted it here.
Q I will not trouble you with it if you only learned it here. The only point I want to know is this. Did you know in 1944 that you were being suggest in a German state document as being the person who might do the internal work Hungary in order that Hungary might be acquired by the Reich. If you say you d not know, I shall not trouble you with it any further. Yuo say you only knew t* since the day before yesterday? opposed these efforts in Hungary which attempted in anyway to lead to occupati or to make Hungary a part of the German Reich. I considered that the most mist and most inconceivable policy possible. will come to another point.
You remember Gauleiter Reiner, the gentleman with whom you had the fortit* tous, and I am sure very interesting talk, on the eve of the Anschluss, Dr. Reiner, the witness? I would just like you to look at Dr. Reiner's view of the position when you took over, and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is Page 6 of Document Book 11; the document is 812 PS. It starts on Page 6 and the passage which I am going to refer to is on Page 8. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Have you got the passage that begins: "Thus the first state of battle commenced which ended with the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, the execution of it was faulty. The result was complete destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the 'Alt-Reich'; and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria, a formal acknowledgement of the existence of the Austrian State by the German government. With the telgram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two states, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first stage of the battle; and a now method of political penetration was to begin." Would you agree that that is a correct description of your work, "a new method of political penetration"?
A No, Sir David. That is a very mistaken description of my activity.
Q Well, if you don't agree with Dr. Reiner, tell me-you know the witness; you must know very well the witness, Dr. Paul Schmidt. You know him?
Q Very well. Now I think you will agree with me that he is one of the personalities against whom nobody had said a word during this trial. Do you agree? I haven't heard a word of criticism of Paul Schmidt. Don't you agree with me? the Foreign Minister Schmidt?
Q. Paul Schmidt, the interpreter. not? Do you say that he is not a trustworthy person?
AAs to the human qualities of Mr. Schmidt, I have no objections, but I have a great deal of objection to the fact that Mr. Schmidt, in an affidavit, permits himself to judge my diplomatic activity in Austria. You will find Dr. Paul Schmidt's affidavit on Page 41 of Document Book 11-A; that is Page 37 of the German Document Book, Document 3308 PS. Now just listen to Dr. Paul Schmidt's view, Paragraph 8: "Plans for annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of Dollfuss temporarily forced a more careful approach to this problem, but the application of sanctions against Italy by the League, plus the rapid increase of German military strength, made safer the resumption of the Austrian program. When Goering visited Rome early in 1937, he declared that union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and could be expected sooner or later. Mussolini, hearing these words in German, remained silent, and protested only mildly when I translated them into French. The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a party matter, in which von Papen's role was to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move." a mistake and it is a speech of Hitler's on the 18th of February to which, unfortunately, the translator has put your name. I am not relying on that. But what I do want to know whether you agree with is that it was your role" to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways--". Do you agree with that as a correct description of your program, your mission in Austria? case. My task in Austria I explained very clearly to the Tribunal.
continuation of the policy of the growing together of the two states in an evolutionary way. And now may I say a few words more concerning this affidavit of Mr. Schmidt? At the time when the witness sat here in this chair we noted that this affidavit was placed before him when he was in the hospital after a severe illness, and this document was given him for his signature -it. We have heard all about it and Dr. Schmidt has been cross examined and I think you may take it that the Tribunal know every thing about the circumstances of the affidavit. If you have anything to comment on the contents of it, I am sure the Tribunal would willingly let you, but you need not comment on the circumstances. That is all before the Tribunal.
A Very well. I will speak about the contents. I will state that Minister Schmidt, who later played an influential role with von Ribbentrop, in the years which are under discussion here had a completely subordinate position in the foreign Office which did not make it possible for him to have any complete insight into conditions in Austria and into my policy and my reports. von Neurath.
Q Well, we won't argue that any further. The Tribunal has the whole of Dr. Schmidt's record before them and the affidavit. Now you said you told the Tribunal about your conception of your mission in Austria. If that was your conception of your mission in Austria. If that was your conception, why was it necessary for you to get hold of the position of the explosive chambers in Austrian strategic roads? That was rather going back to the development of the "top hat" idea to which you objected so strongly, wasn't it? --Well, if you don't remember, let me remind you. It is Document D 689, Page 101.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The Tribunal will find the passage actually on Page 102, and it is 90 and 91 in the German version of Document Book 11 A, becoming GB 504.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: as you know, is a road of some strategic importance going from Salzburg to Corinthia. Do you remember that, after your description about the people being in Salzburg and singing everything except the Horst-Wessel song, and then the German drivers competing, and in the third and next paragraph you say: "The building of this road is without doubt a first class work of culture, in which Reich German constructional firms took the main and decisiv part. The Chief engineer of the Reich German firm which built the tunnel at the highest point offered to inform me of the position of the explosives chambers in this tunnel. I sent him to the military attache." That was your combining culture and showing the excellence of German road construction with obtaining the position of the explosives of the tunnel at the important strate gic portion of the road. Why did you consider that of sufficien importance to send it to Hitler with three copies to the Foreign Office? and the inauguration of this road.
Q I don't really want that. The Tribunal can get that. What I am asking you is why you were sending to Hitler the fact that the Reich German engineer was disclosing to you the explosiv chambers on the important part of this road where this road could be blocked? Why were you sending that to Hitler? That is what I want you to tell the Tribunal. proached me and told me, there and there, this tunnel could be blown up. You know that at that time we had very tense relations with Italy and that Italy had mobilized on the Brenner border, an for that reason it seemed of interest to me that this now connection between Italy and Germany could be broken at any given time. Moreover, I referred the matter to my military attache because it did not interest me personally.
Q. No, you had then moved out of the calss of doing that sort of thing yourself. You were the head of the mission and it was a matter for the military attache. Kultur, as showing the road making, at the same time you were getting the strategic information which you could pass on to your government, undermining the Austrian Government's strategic plans to use the road?
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant said, did he not, that it was a road which joined Germany to Italy?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, my Lord. The road actually goes from Salzburg, which is practically on the German border, to Corinthia in South Austria, so it was a new highway, taking traffic north and wouth in Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Did it actually connect Germany with Italy, or did it connect Austria with Italy?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Austria. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. Well, let's take something else in which you were interested. You were also reporting as to where the Austrian supply of munitions and manufacture of munitions were going to be situated, were you not?
A. I do not recall.
Q. All right, if you don't recall it, look at it yourself. It is Document D-694. You will find it a few pages on. book. It will become GB-505. Its date is the 26th of November 1935. It is page 110 and the passage that I am going to read is page 111. version. You are dealing with the influence of Herr Mandel, whose Jewish extraction you referred to, and they you go on to Price Starhemberg. It reads "After the manufacture of munitions for Italy had to be stopped in Hirtenberg because of Italian protests, he, Mandel, had loaded the entire factory on to the railway, in order to continue work in Italy."
Then, note the next words in brackets:
"Incidentally, an interesting situation for Austria's supply of munitions should report on the movements in the Austrian munitions manufacture?
A. No, that was not my task proper, but this report shows, Sir David, that I had a talk with the Polish Minister Gavronski who told me that this single munitions factory which existed in Austria was being moved to Italy, and I wrote that that was a remarkable circumstance, that a country was to get its munitions supplies from a foreign country. You must admit that that is a peculiar situation that one can write that in a report.
Q. That is your explanation. I won't waste time on it.
THE PRESIDENT: You gave us the date, but where does it come from?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it came from Document D-694. That is a report of the defendant to Hitler, made on the 26th of November 1935. It is page 110 in Document Book 11A.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we have got that, but the date isn't on it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No, my Lord, that is why I gave you the date.
THE PRESIDENT: How did you pet the date?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I looked it up in the original. Major Barrington did, that is. Your Lordship will see the date was left off. It came between one on the 11th of November and one in January.
THE PRESIDENT: Miscopied?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. Now, I want to pass -- and again I want to deal with it very quickly-to your own personal experiences in Austria. had been there about a year -- do your remember? I don't know because you probably went every year.
The point that I want to remind you of is this. Do you remember when you went there that 500 National Socialists greeted you with music and made such a demonstration that some other guests in the hotel wanted to telephone or telegraph to the Federal Chancellery to say that the German Ambassador had casued a great Nazi demonstration?
Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, the reference to that is at page 102, Document B-689, which I have already referred to, page 102 of Document Book 11 A. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. Well now, let me take another example. Do you remember the meeting of the Comrades of the First World War at Wells?
A. Yes.
Q. That was, if my recollection is right, in 1937, was it not?
A. Quite right, yes.
Q. And all the preparations had been made for a non-political meeting, reunion, of the Austrian regiments and old comrades from the German regiments, and after the meeting they were to have a sort of dinner or lunch together, and the evening was to finish in jollity and song. That was the program, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. That meeting was addressed by General Glaise Horstenau and yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. General Glaise Horstenau -- without any disrespect to him -- I think you will agree made a not very powerful speech. That was your impression, wasn't it, a not very powerful speech? Interesting but not dynamic? Believe me, I am not being offensive to the general. I am merely trying to get the point.
A. No.
Q. You made a speech which lasted for quite a short time, didn't you. Do you remember?
A. Yes.
Q. After your speech, there was beating and shooting through the streets of wells, wasn't there? There was a riot there, wasn't there?
A. Yes. May I tell you how that happened?
Q. Well, if you can. I wanted to establish the fact. You are perfectly entitled now to give your explanation.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there a document on this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: There is no document on this.
A. A meeting had been arranged in Wells, a meeting of organizations of the old German army from the First World War, the so-called Warrior's Society, Kriege*---*erein, and the veterans' associations of Austria. It was absolutely legal and in the spirit of our joint policy that the mutual experiences from First World War should be renewed between these formations. of the Austrian Government, was to have a completely non-political character, the following resulted: When I arrived, the place where this meeting of veterans' associations took place, was surrounded by about 5,000 to 10,000 people. The Austrian Government, to receive its German guests, brought an honor guard company of the army, and when the Austrian band played the Austrian national anthem on my arrival, these 10,000 people who surrounded the place sang the German national anthem, for the melody is the same. out that these thousands of people kept interrupting me. Of course, I immediately realized that the Austrian National Socialist planned a big political demonstration here, and for that reason I broke off my speech, and shortly afterwards I left the place and left Wells. and the Austrian police wanted to proceed against the thousands of persons who were demonstrating, very unfortunate incidents occurrred.
Q. Now, if that is your explanation, I have put the facts of the inciden your activities in Austria. remember the phrase "the Trojan horse technique" being referred to with regard to Austria?
A. Yes. Seyss-Inquart himself did not want to lead the Trojan horse.
Q. Yes, but before that, you know, you had referred to the Trojan horse technique.
My Lord, it is Document Book 11A page 133. The passage I am referring to is from page 134. The document is D-706, which will become GB-506. It is page 163, Sergeant Major.
Q. That is your report on 21 August, 1936, where you quote an instruction of the Prague Secret Service to the Vienna branch, which says:
"It has unfortunately to be noted that the wild National Socialist excesses of Jul y 29 of this year have not had the result we expected. Austria's reapproachment to the Third Reich in the field of foreign politics is making further progress, as well as the process of the cultural collaboration of the two sister nations. One can also assume from your most recent reports that the Trojan Horse of National Socialism is bringing ever greater confusion into the ranks of the Fatherland Front and particularly into the ranks of the Heimatsschutz (Hone Guard). Opposition to the normalization of German-Austrian relations which is extremely dangerous to Austrian independence, appears neverthless to be relatively very great; it obviously only lacks good organization". going on, the superficial normalization of relations and the Trojan Horse moevment working inside the country?
A. Sir Davis, that is the opinion of the Czech Secret Service and perhaps of the Czech government.
Q. May I remind you, defendant, tha it is the opinion quoted by you in your report to the Fuehrer and not contradicted. There is not a word in your report suggesting that it is not the truth. In fact you say you introduce it -"lastly to throw light on the present position in Austria". Fuehrer, so you cannot, I suggest, write it off by saying it is merely a Czech report.
A. Yes. Let me point out that this report of of the 21 August 1936. That is one month after the conclusion of our July agreement, of which you asserted it was a treacherous maneuver and of which we and the Austrian Foreign Minister thought it was a very seriously intended agreement. We are not on a completely different basis with Austria and for that reason I quoted this peculiar Czech report as an interesting document as to how, in spite of our efforts for normalization, the Czechs regard matters in Austria.