A report of this conference is contained in our Document No. 872-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 134. gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with their own strength, and the general overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. Page 5 of the German original, there is an interesting extract, which although written in semi-shorthand, is at least sufficiently clear to inform us that elaborate time-tables had already been set up for the deployment of troops as well as for industrial operations. I quote:
"The intended time period was discussed with a plan: 1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) transfer now, Front Germany - East; 2nd Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) from the middle of March will give UP 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila"-- I might state here parenthetically that this was the code word for the operation for the occupation of unoccupied France"can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained." "Felix" was the name for the proposed operation against Gibraltar.
"In industry the full capacity timetable is in force. No more camouflage.
"From 25.IV - 15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from theWest. (Seelowe, or Sea Lion,--was a code word for the planned operation against England and Marita, which we shall see a little later in the quotation, was the code word for the action against Greece.) Seelowe can no longer be carried out. The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognisable.
"The full capacity time-table remains. 8 Marita divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.
"C-in-C Army requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.
"Fuehrer: 'When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and made no comment.'" I shall read in a moment, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far along with their preparations even as early as February of 1941 - almost five months prior to 22 June, the date the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected Barbarossa, as follows. I am now reading from Page 6 of the English translation. which is on Page 8 of the German:
"Conclusions:
"1). Barbarossa.
"a). The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan.
When it is being carried out, it "b). The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the "c). Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking any necessity for camouflage.
The exception is "d). It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out "e). The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be measure Marita," supplement to Fuehrer Order #21, which was issued in the form of "Directives for Special Areas". This detailed operational order is No. 447-PS in our numbered series, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA No. 135.
the attack, indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed "Area of Operations and Executive Power," and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. It states that while the campaign is in progress in territory through which the army is advancing, the Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power. During this period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is entrusted with "special tasks". This assignment is discussed in paragraph 2b, which appears on page 1 of the English transla tion, and reads as follows:
"b) In the area of operations, the Reichfuehrer SS is, on out between two opposing political systems.
Within the independently and under his own responsibility.
The Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this.
It is the responsibility of the Reich military operations shall not be disturbed.
Details shall SS". set up under Commissioners of the Reich, and discusses the relationship of these officials to the army.
This is contained in paragraph 2c and paragraph 3, parts of which I should like to read:
"c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear.
The newly occupied given its own political administration.
For the present, it the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In "3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in "The commanding officer is the supreme representative of of the military sovereign rights.
He has the tasks of a Commander or a Commanding General.
In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:
"a) Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the "b) Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry."
of economy in the conquered territory, a subject I will develop more fully later in my presentation. This provision is also in Section I, paragraph 4, which I shall read:
"4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the admini who has delegated the Chief of the 'Wi Rue Amt' with the execution of the task.
Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you tell us at sometime who these people are? Who is the Reich Marshal?
MR. ALDERMAN: The Reich Marshal is the Defendant Goering.
THE PRESIDENT: And who was the Reichsfuehrer SS at that time?
MR. ALDERMAN: Himmler.
THE PRESIDENT: Himmler?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. cation traffic, and I shall not read it here. countries, and states in part as follows -- I am reading from page 3 of the English translation:
"III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and "9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall commands.
In case it should become necessary during the OKW."
on page 3 of the English translation.
"IV. Directives regarding Sweden.
"12) Since Sweden can only become a transient area for commander of the German troops.
However, he is "The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.
signed: KEITEL" As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive No. 21 which I discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941.
In the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans, and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a document, which bears our Number C-170. This document has been identified by the Defendant Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files, and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry.
I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 136.
present to read only an item which appears in the 2nd paragraph of item 142, on page 19 of the English translation, and which is in the text and in a footnote on page 26 in the German original. This item is dated 3 April 1941, and reads as follows:
"Balkan Operations delayed 'Barbarossa' at first for about five weeks.
All measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order."
out to permit the Fuehrer to definitely set "D" Day as the 22nd of June more than seven seeks away. Document No. 873-PS, in our series, is a "Top Secret" report of a conference with the Chief of the Section Landsverteideigung of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab on 30 April, 1941.
I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA No. 137. this report:
"1) Timetable Barbarossa:
The Fuehrer has decided:
Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May, maximal troop movements performance schedule.
At the beginning "2) Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa:
Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately Sector Middle:
Great German superiority for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate timetable, showing in great detail the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
This timetable is Document No. C-39 in our series, and I offer it now as Exhibit USA 138. was the third copy which was given to the High Command of the Navy. Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as follows:
"Top Military Secret Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/abt.
L (I op) Fuehrer's Headquarters (no date) Top Secret (Chef Sache) 21 copies Only through officer 1 op.
00845/41 Enclosures:
-
a foundation for further preparations for 'Barbarossa'.
signed: Keitel" where the 21 copies went. lining the state of preparations as of the 1st of June, 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal does not think it necessary that you should read all those preliminary matters ahead of these documents, "Top Secret," "Only through officer," and then the various reference numbers and file information, when you give identification of a document.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir. lining the state of preparations as of the 1st of June, 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: General, Negotiations with Friendly States, Army, Navy, Air Force and Camouflage. material. The remainder of the paper is in tabular form with six columns headed from left to right at the top of each page - Date, Serial Number, Army, Navy, OKW, Remarks. Most interesting among the items appearing on this Chart -
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, willyou read the first paragraph, for that seems to be important.
There are two lines there.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The heading "General" on page 2.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.
"1. General.
"The time table for the maximum massing of troops in the East was put into operation on the 22nd of May."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: (Continuing) Most interesting among the items appearing on this Chart, in my opinion, are those appearing on pages 9 and 10. These are at page 8 of the German version. At the bottom of Page 9, it is provided in the columns for Army, Navy and Air Force that, and I quote:
"Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled."
quote:
"Cancelled by code word 'Altona' or further confirmation of start of attack by code word:
'Dortmund.'" In the Remarks column appears the statement that:
"Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point with."
serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Navy and OKW, and provides as follows, under the heading:
"Invasion Day "H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces.
0330 hours."
In the Remarks column, it states that:
"Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting quoted, and give, as I have said, great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.
On 9 June, 1941, the order of the Fuehrer went out for final re-
ports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June, 1941, which was just 8 days before "D-Day". This order is signed by Hitler's Adjutant, Schmundt, and is C-78 in our numbered series of documents.
I read from page one the matter under the heading "Conference 'Barbarossa.'" "1. The fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have ordered reports on 'Barbarossa' by the commanders "2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June, 1941, at "3. Time Table.
a) 11.00 hrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Silver Fox"
b) 12.00 hrs - 14 hrs . . . . . . . . . . Army Group South
c) 14.00 hrs. - 15.30 hrs. . . . . . . . . Lunch party for
d) From 15.30 hrs. . . . . . . . . . . . . Baltic, Army Group "Center" in this order."
will report, which I shall not read. The list includes, however, a large number of the members of the Defendant High Command and General Staff Group, as of that date. Among those to participate were, of course, the Defendants, Goering, Keitel, Jodl and Raeder. more than sufficient to establish conclusively the premeditation and coldblooded calculation which marked the military preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Starting almost a full year before the commission of the crime, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union with all of that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the German character. Although several of these defendants played specific parts in this military phase of the planning and preparation for the attack, it is natural enough that the leading roles were performed, as we have seen, by the military figures - the Defendants Goering, Keitel, Jodl and Raeder. and spoliation of the Soviet Union. military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning and preparation was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to insure that their aggression would prove economically profitable.
motives which led these conspirators to attack, with provocation, a neighboring power. I shall, at that time, show that the crime was motivated by both political and economic considerations. The economic basis, however, may be simply summarized at this point as the greed of the Nazi, conspirators for the raw material, food and other supplies which their neighbor possessed, and which they conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of their war machine. To these defendants, a need was translated as a right, and they early began planning and preparing with typical care and detail to insure that every bit of the plunder, which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression, would be exploited to their utmost benefit. August of 1940, General Thomas, the Chief of the B Group Army, received a hint from the Defendant Goering about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R. which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. I also said at that time that I would later introduce evidence that in November 1940 8 months before the attack - Thomas was categorically informed by Goering of the planned operation in the East, and preliminary preparations were commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to be occupied in the course of such operation. Goering, of course, played the overall leading role in this activity, by virtue of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan. at page 369 of his draft, which is our Document 2353-PS, introduced earlier as USA Exhibit No. 35; the part I will read is at pages 10 and 11 of the English translation.
"In November 1940, the Chief of Wi. Rue, together with Secretaries of State Korner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.
"By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi. Rue at the end of 1940.
"The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first of all the following tasks:
"1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian armament industry, its location, its capacity and its associate industries.
"2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers and their dependency one on the other.
"3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the Soviet Union.
"4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum (crude oil).
"5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in the Soviet Union.
"These points were concentrated in one big compilation 'War Economy of the Soviet Union and illustrated with detailed maps, etc."
I am still quoting: "Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important factories in Soviet Russia and a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of the German war economy organization.
"For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was created, first in charge of Lt. Col. Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier General Schuberth. The work was carried out according to the directives from the chief of the office, respectively" -- I suppose -- "the group of departments for foreign territories (Ausland) with the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any other persons possessing information on Russia.
Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the territories." That ends the quotation. proceeded to a point where a broader plan of organization was needed, and so General Thomas held a conference with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for such a plan. A memorandum of this conference, classified "Top Secret" and dated 1 March 1941 was captured, and is our Document 1317-PS. I now offer it in evidence as US Exhibit 140. The text of this memorandum reads as follows:
"The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be drafted for the Reich Marshal.
"Essential Points:
"1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the four-year plan.
"2. The organization must include everything concerning war economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already a special mission of State Secretary Backe.
"3. Clear statement that the organization is to be independent of the military or civil administration. Close coordination, but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.
"4 Scope of activities to be divided in two steps:
a) Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to secure the removal of important goods.
b) Administration of the occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically complementary districts."
And then, on the bottom of page 1:
"5. In view of the extended field of activity, the term 'war economy inspection' is to be used preferably, instead of armament inspection.
"6. In view of the great field of activity, the organization must be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly numerous. The main mission of the organization will consist of seizing raw materials and taking over all important concerns. For the latter mission reliable persons from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can only be performed by the aid of their expedience. (For example, lignite, are, chemistry, petroleum).
"After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization within a week.
"Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building is essential. An officer must still be appointed for the Wi. and Ro, with whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.
"Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the second half of next week. Also, the 4 officers who are ordered to draw up the individual armaments inspection are to report to the office Chief at the end of the week.
"Signed, "Hamann."
as a Captain and apparently the junior officer present, so presumably it fell naturally enough to Hamann to prepare the notes on the Conference. was organizing at the direction of Goering was clearly recognized by Keitel in his operational order of 13 March 1941. This order is No. 447-PS, and I have already offered it in evidence earlier as Exhibit USA 135.
At that time I quoted the paragraph in the order in which it was stated that the Fuehrer had entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operation and political administration to the Reich Marshal who, in turn, had delegated his authority to the Chief of the Wi. Rue. Amt. meeting on 28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a conference was held with various branches of the armed forces to explain the organizational setup of the economic staff Oldenburg. Oldenburg was the code name given to this economic counterpart of plan Barbarossa. A report of this conference is captured Document No. 1157-PS, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 141. Section 1 of this memorandum deals with the general organization of Economic Staff Oldenburg as it had developed by this time, and I should like to read most of that section into the record. The report begins:
"Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours on 29th April 1941.
"Purpose of meeting: Introduction to the organizational structure of the economic sector of this action.
"As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand of all economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the overall direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas under political administration.
"The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic general staff working under the director of the industrial armament office (Chief Wi Rue Amt.)
"Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is the" -
and then a heading -
"Economic Staff Oldenburg for special duties under the command of Major General Schubert.
"His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided, are:
"These offices are used in the military rear area. The idea is that in the territory of each army group an economic inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.
"A distinction must be made between the military rear area on the one hand, and the battle area proper and the rear area of the army on the other hand. In the last economic matters are dealt with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the army headquarters command, that is, the laison officer of the industrial armament office within the supreme command of the armed forces at the army headquarters command. For the battle area, he has attached to him technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery troops far raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and means of production.
"In the territory between the battle and the military rear area, the rear area of the army, group IV Econs at the various field commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of the industrial armaments office in order to support the army headquarters commands specialists responsible for supplying the troops from the country's resources and preparing the subsequent general economic exloitation.
"While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the locality.
"The new feature inherent in the organization under the command of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal with military industry, but comprises the entire economic field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, etc.
"This also corresponds with the internal organization of the individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down to the economic commands, requires a standard sub-division into three large groups, i.e.
"Group M, dealing with troop requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization;
"Group L, which concerns itself with all questions of feeding and agriculture, and "Group W, which is in charge of the entire field of trade and industry, including raw materials and supplies; further, questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, commerce and exchange of commodities, and manpower allocation.
"Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General von Hanneken."
personnel and planning problems, and similar details, which I think it unnecessary to put into the record. with which these Nazis prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage a wanton attack on a neighbor they had pledged to security, but that they also intended to strip that neighbor of its food, its factories, and all its means of livelihood. question of motivation, these men made their plans for plunder being fully aware that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and starvation for millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union.
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a good time to adjourn.
(A recess was taken from 1120 to 1130 hours.)
DR. DIX: I beg your pardon. We ask the Court to be excused. Through some error, we couldn't come in here.
MR. ALDERMAN: May the Tribunal please, I have been informed by the interpreters that I have been speaking at a great speed this morning, so I shall try to temper the speed. political phase of the aggression. As I have already indicated and as I shall develop more fully later in this discussion, there were both economic and political reasons motivating the action of the conspirators in invading the Soviet Union. I have already discussed the extent of the planning and preparations for the economic side of the aggression. Equally elaborate planning and preparation was engaged in by the conspirators to ensure the effectuation of the political aims of their aggression. It is, I believe, sufficient at this point to describe that political aim as the elimination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a powerful political factor in Europe and the acquisition of lebensraum.