The Nazis reacted to this altered situation with lightning rapidity, and the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on.
as GB 120, to the second part on page 3 of the document, consisting of a record of a conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia, dated March 27, 1941.
It shows that those present included the Fuehrer; Reich Marshall, of course the Defendant Goering; Chief, OKW, that is the Defendant Keitel; Chief of the Wehrmacht, Fuehrung Stab, that is the Defendant Jodl. Then over the page later on the following persons were added. I call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that those who came in later included the Defendant Ribbentrop.
If I might read the part of Hitler's statement set out on page 4:
"The Fuehrer describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-German."
I think I can pass on to the second paragraph:
"The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country's attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the Government would have happened during the Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious." draw the Tribunal's attention:
"The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.
"It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible.
An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Roumania's main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed to the Duce.
"Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised in these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.
"This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time." third paragraph, two days after the pact had been signed and the assurances given because there had been a coup d'etat, and it is just possible that the operations against Greece may be affected, the destruction of Yugoslavia is decided on without any question of taking the trouble to assert the views of the new Government. the document, which I would like to read.
"5) The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force ground installations and to destroy the capital of Belgrade in attacks by waves."
I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how ruthlessly this bombing was done, when the residential areas of Belgrade were bombed at 7 o'clock on the following Sunday morning, the morning of the 6th.
THE PRESIDENT: The 6th of April?
COLONEL H. PHILLIMORE: The 6th of April. Part V, at page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by Defendant Jodl and I would read one small paragraph at the top of the following page, page 6:
"In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory." the Defendant Jodl. put that in as GB.125. It is an extract from the order issued after the meeting, from the minutes of which I have just read, that is the meeting of the 27 of March, recorded in PS.1746, Part II. It is worth reading the first paragraph.
"The military putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible."
I pass to the next document, PS-1835? which I put in evidence as GB-126.
It is an original telegram, containing a letter from Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop.
It is written to advise Mussolini of language the Duce is given his orders.
If I might read the first "Duce, Events force me to give you, Duce, by this the "(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece.
Considered "(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly together by mutual interests.
Unfortunately these endeavours produce any definite result.
Today's reports leave no doubt "(3) I don't consider this situation as being "(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all with necessary military means.
The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria.
Now I would operations in Albania in the course of the next few days.
I "These measures should not be considered as designed for "I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should "(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything anything about them.
These measures will completely lose their value should they become known."
I pass to R.95, the next document in the bundle, which I put in as GB-127.
It was referred to by my learned friend, the Attorney General.
It is merely an operational order, signed by General von contained in Directive No. 25, which was the document C-127, an extract from which I put in as GB-125.
I won't trouble the Tribunal with GB-114.
The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place on this "From the beginning of the struggle it has been England's to her, and then finally in misusing her for Britain's purposes.
"The documents published today afford"--that refers to the German 'White Book' which they published of all the documents leading up to the invasion--"The documents published "In the face of this I have always emphasized that:
"(1) The German people have no antagonism to the "(2) We shall never, as in the World War, tolerate German living space.
We have swept the northern flank free of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in the south."
Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal's "In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it place between Germany and Serbia.
I have not only offered the and various Nations allied to Germany."
I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document which has already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as U.S. Exhibit No. 34.
It is a record of a lecture delivered by the Defendant Jodl on 7th November, 1943.
At page 4 there is a short on the action taken in April, 1941.
I refer to Paragraph 11 on page 4:
"What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the 'extra-turn' of the Italians against Greece. The attack, which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part which -- taking a long view of the matter -would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the North was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that country."
If I might summarize the story; the invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as December or November 1940 and planned for the end of March or the beginning of April, 1941. No consideration was at any time given to any obligations under treaties or conventions which might make such invasion a breach of international law. Care was taken to conceal the preparations so that the German Forces might have an unsuspecting victim. course, was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to secure her cooperation for the offensive against Greece or at least, to ensure that she would abstain from any interference.
The coup d'etat of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then decided, that irrespective of whether or not his Government had any hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks, Yugoslavia must be liquidated.
It was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia's intentions when it would be so little trouble, now that the German troops were deployed, to destroy her militarily and as a national unit. Accordingly, in the early hours of Sunday morning, the 6th of April, German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece simultaneously, with the formality of handing a note to the Greek Minister in Berlin, informing him that the German forces were entering Greece to drive out the British.
M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in replying to information of the invasion from the German Embassy, replied that history was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same reply as in the preceding October. But, as I have the honor to conclude the British case, I would like, if the Tribunal would allow me, to draw their attention, very shortly indeed, to one common factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I can do it, I think, in five minutes. was used with singular consistency, not only by the Nazis themselves, but also by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise, even though only a few hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus, there was, of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland. the night of April 8 - 9 and was well under way, as a military operation, before the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish Foreign Minister, at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th, and to the Norwegian Minister, between half past four and five on that morning. than five o'clock, in most cases earlier, in the small hours of the 10th of May, whilst the formal ultimatum, delivered in each case with the diplomatic excuses and explanations, was not presented until afterwards. In the case of Holland, the invasion began between three and four in the morning. It was not until about six, when The Hague had already been bombed, that the German Minister asked to see M. van Kleffens.
In the case of Belgium, where the bombing began at five, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until eight. The invasion of Luxembourg began at four and it was at seven when the German Minister asked to see M. Beck.
Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o'clock on the morning of the 28th of October, in 1940, when his Minister in Athens presented a three hours ultimatum to General Metaxas. in the small hours of April 6, 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia, no diplomatic exchange took place even after the event but a proclamation was issued by Hitler, a proclamation from which I read an extract, on five o'clock that Sunday morning, some two hours before Belgrade was bombed. five that M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory. out is, in itself, further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous character of the Nazi regime. Attack without warning at night to secure an initial advantage and proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. Their method of procedure is clearly the method of the barbarian, of the State which has no respect for its own pledged word, nor for the rights of any people but its own. the honest broker himself or by his honest clerk, the Defendant Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on after a short adjournment? That's what you were intending to do?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, we'll adjourn for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken from 1600 to 1610 hours.)
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding with the presentation of the evidence relating to the aggression against the Soviet Union, I should like to take about fifteen minutes to offer two further documents relating to the aggression against Austria.
supplement to Document Book N. Office. They have been made available to us through the courtesy of our British colleagues. This is in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12 March 1938, from Ambassador Neville Henderson, at the British Embassy, Berlin, to Lord Halifax. It roads:
"My Lord, "With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th, I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath in accordance with the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on the same evening.
"The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron von Neurath at the same time."
to Defendant Von Neurath and it reads as follows:
"Dear Reich Minister, "My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, inter alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be National Socialists, and the readmission of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in Vienna.
"I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to the German Government that if this report is correct H.M.G. - meaning the Majesty's Government - "in the U.K. feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.
"As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues."
I now offer Document 3287-PS, as U.S.A. Exhibit No. 128. to the British Foreign Office of Defendant Von Neurath's letter of response dated 12 March 1938. The letter is identified in the document with the letter "L". British Government was undertaking the role of protector of Austria's independence. I quote from the second paragraph of his letter:
"In the name of the German Government I must point out here that the Royal British Government has no right to assume the role of a protector of Austria's independence. In the course of diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German Government never left any doubt with the Royal British Government that the formation of relations between Germany and Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern of the German people and that it did not affect third Powers".Then, in response to the assertions regarding Germany's ultimatum.
Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events.
I quote the last two long paragraphs of the letter; in the English translation I start at the bottom of page 1 of the letter:
"Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced, on the evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and arbitrary resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an election within a few days which, under the prevailing circumstances, and especially according to the details provided for the execution of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of oppressing politically the predominant majority of the population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria's internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore, a crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and in the formation of a now Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development. Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention; according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the matter is that the question of sending military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the press, to the German Government, urgently asked for the dispatch of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to it.
"This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the attitude of the Gentian Government, as assorted in your letter, could lead to some unforeseeable reactions. A complete picture of the political situation is given in the proclamation which, at noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take place only if eventually a third party should try to exorcise its influence, contrary to the peaceful intentions and legitimate aims of the German Government on the shaping of events in Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of self-government of the German people."
presented to the Tribunal, this version of the events given by the Defendant von Neurath is a hollow mockery of the truth. 1780-PS, USA Exhibit No.72, Jodl's diary, the entry for March 10, 1938, the fact that von Neurath was taking over the duties of the Foreign Office while Ribbentrop was detained in London, that the Fuehrer wished to send an ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet, that he had dispatched a letter to Mussolini of his reasons for taking action, and that army mobilization orders were given. different documents. I refer to 812-PS, USA Exhibit No.61, Report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Buerckel, dated 6 July 1939, which was transmitted to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart on 22 August 1939. The portion reporting on the events of March 11 have already been read to the Tribunal. of Goering's telephone conversations, relevant portions of which I have already read to the Tribunal. clarity, that the German Nazis did present an ultimatum to the Austrian Government, that it would send troops across the border if Schuschnigg did not resign, and if Defendant Seyss-Inquart were not appointed Chancellor. telegram came from Berlin and not from Vienna, that Goering composed the telegram and Seyss-Inquart did not even have to send it, but merely said "agreed."
The transcripts of Goering's telephone calls also included the telephone call between Goering and Ribbentrop, indicated as Part W of that document, in which the formula was developed and recited for English consumption that there had been no ultimatum and that the German troops crossed the border in response only to the telegram.
find the same bogus formula coming from the pen of the Defendant von Neurath. He was at the meeting of November 5, 1937, of which we have the Hossbach minutes, United States Exhibit 25. And so he knew very well the firmly held Nazi ideas with respect to Austria and Czechoslovakia. And yet, in the period after March 10, 1938, when he was handling the foreign affairs for this conspiracy -- and particularly after the invasion of Austria he played out his part in making false representations. He gave an assurance to Mr. Mastny regarding the continued independence of Austria. I refer to the document introduced by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Document TC-27, GB Exhibit 21. using the letterhead of the Secret Cabinet Council, as the exhibit shows, reciting this diplomatic fable with respect to the Austrian situation, a story also encountered by us in the transcript of the Goering-Ribbentrop telephone call, all in furtherance of the aims of what we call the conspiracy. appropriate for me to present the case on collaboration with Japan and the attack on the United States on this December 7, 1945, the fourth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, our plan was to proceed chronologically, so that part of the case must wait its turn for presentation next week. wars of aggression, perhaps one of the most colossal mis-estimates in history, when Hitler's intuition led him and his associates to launch an aggressive war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. account of the aggression against Czechoslovakia. In the meantime, our British colleagues have given you the evidence covering the formulation of the plan to attack Poland and the preparations and initiation of actual aggressive war.
In addition, they have laid before the Tribunal the story of the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression involving the planning and execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece, and in doing so, the British prosecution has marshalled and presented to the Court various international treaties, agreements and assurances and the evidence establishing the breaching of those treaties and assurances.
but one of the defendants' acts of aggression, the invasion of the USSR. The section of the Indictment in which this crime is charged is Count I, Section 4 (f), Paragraph (6), German invasion on June 22, 1941 of the USSR Territory in violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August, 1939. The first sentence of this paragraph is the one with which we shall be concerned today. It reads:
"On June 22, 1941, the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR and without any declaration of war invaded Soviet territory, thereby beginning a war of aggression against the USSR." in document book marked "P", which we now hand to the Court.
First, if the Tribunal please, the inception of the plan. As a point of departure for the story of aggression against the Soviet Union, I should like to take the date 23 August, 1939. On that date, just a week before the invasion of Poland, the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the USSR, which is referred to in this section of the Indictment which I have just quoted. This treaty, Document Number TC 25, has been introduced in evidence by our British colleagues, but it contains two articles which I should like to bring to the attention of the Tribunal. Article C 1 provided as follows:
"The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one another, whether individually or jointly with other Powers." the Contracting Parties, regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two parties would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by friendly exchanges of view or, if necessary, by arbitration commissions. story which is to follow. This treaty was signed for the German Government by the defendant Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as somewhat of a surprise to the world, since it appeared to constitute a reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy.
The explanation for this about-face has been provided, however, by no less eminent a witness than the defendant Ribbentrop himself in a discussion which he had with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. A report of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German diplomats in the field for their strictly confidential and purely personal information. This report we now have. It is number 1834-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 129, the original German document. for the Pact with the USSR. That is Page 4 of the German.
(Reading)
"Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia -a necessity for avoiding a two-front war." entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and non-aggression, it is not very surprising to find that they regarded it, as they did all treaties and pledges, as binding on than only so long as it was expedient for them to be bound. That they did so regard it is evidenced by the fact that even while the campaign in the West was still in progress, they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of aggression against the USSR. set forth in our document L-172, already in evidence as USA Exhibit Number 34, the defendant Jodl admitted -- and I shall, read from Page 7 of the English translation, which is at Page 15 of the original German text:
"Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East' -- that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, did you say Page 7?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I seem to have only five pages of it.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is numbered at the top of thepage.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading from L-172?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. I thought you were reading from 1834-PS. Yes, go on.
MR. ALDERMAN: "Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East -- that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the Fuehrer himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible." in progress, and so any action in the East necessarily had to be postponed for the time being. On 22 June, 1940, however, the Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiegne, and the campaign in the West, with the exception of the war against Britain, came to an end. The view that Germany's key to political and economic dominance lay in the elimination of the USSR as a political factor and in the acquisition of lebensraum at their expense had long been basic in Nazi ideology. As we have seen, this idea had never been completely forgotten, even while the war in the West was in progress. Now, flushed with the recent success of their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the Nazis began serious consideration of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union.