A In no way whatever. Keppler -
Q (Interposing): All right.
A (Continuing): -- had no influence at all on the nomination of State Councillor. have? You disagree with his statement, as I understand it. I want to make that clear. matter with a friend of mine and then suggested it to Schuschnigg. A proposal from Keppler would probably have been cause for Schuschnigg's not nominating me. somebody spoke to him, and the Nazis with whom you were familiar in those days had nothing to do with it, had they?
A Oh no, that is what I don't want to say. The possibility of appointment to State Councillor was discussed between Rainer and myself, and a mutual acquaintance had previously discussed the question with me before talking to Zernatto. Then I discussed it with Rainer, but there was no influence with regard to the appointment. 386-PS, introduced before this Tribunal many months ago. Do you recall that Hitler, in the course of this discourse that is reported by Hoszbach, stated some of the plans that he had for Austria as well as for Czechoslovakia? Do you remember that? It is in the document.
Q That was the 11th of November 1937 -- no, I'm sorry; it was on the 5th of November 1937. When did you first hear about that meeting? For the first time in your life, when did you hear about it? Dr. Jury?
Q Do you remember it very well, or would you like to see a copy of it? I will show it to you. We have a copy here. You haven't seen this; this is a new document.
A That's right. November 1937 and said:
"I personally believe that there will be no visible results until early next year. In the meantime, I have received an authentic report from Linz..." and you go on to talk about a newspaper article.
What I wanted to know was: What did you mean by the events in the early part of 1938? that any political position wouldn't remain static. The National Socialists thought that during the subsequent weeks either Schuschnigg would retire or something would happen in any case. I considered the situation to be different. It was my opinion that the new political developments in Austria wouldn't happen until the spring, that is to say, developments towards further permissible activities for the National Socialists. important to your answer. I wanted to go back a little bit. You see, you open your letter by referring to a conversation with Mr. Keppler. Now, he is the man who was Hitler's emissary on the 11th and 12th of March when Austria, was handed over to the Nazis, isn't he?
Q And you say, "The conversations were carried on in complete quiet and they were also extremely revealing. I don't believe that the matters have as yet been so fully investigated as it seems to be the case on the national side and in the Reich."
Then you go on, "I should be pleasantly surprised if the initial solution were to take place here in the course of this year."
the Nazis. Isn't that what you had in mind when you wrote this letter? Isn't that the "initial solution"?
A No. First of all, it doesn't say that my conversation with Keppler was secret.
Q It says "in complete quiet". I don't know whether that is secret. I don't know what that means.
A Yes, it means that we talked very realistically. Possibly it was mentioned that some diplomatic pressure might be applied, but the target was permissible activities for National Socialists in Austria, with the intention, however, that the Anschluss should be aimed at and achieved.
The contents of the Hoszbach Document weren't mentioned at all, and I am perfectly convinced that Keppler had no idea of what they were. Keppler didn't have a very strong position with the Fuehrer, you see.
Q Yes. You recall you wrote Keppler a letter a little later, in January of 1938. Do you remember that? responsibility or whatever the popular expression is. indeed, to whom Keppler refers in his letter?
A No, the mandate was the Austrian State Councillorship. That is what I wanted, and I wanted the task of investigating the understanding necessary with the national opposition for cooperation with us. I didn't receive a mandate from Keppler, and I could hardly have accepted one.
Q You know the document is in evidence, 3397-PS. It is USA-702. Keppler says that he informed Goering of the situation and that Goering told him to keep you at your task, or that is the sense of it.
Now, my question is: Why should Goering be interested in this mandate if it only had to do with your position as State Councillor in Austria? He wasn't an official of the Austrian Government, and you were.
A May I have the document in this case?
You will also find reference in here to Dr. Jury, the very mean concerning whom we talked a few minutes back, and to whom you wrote that letter on the 11th of November.
A Which half do you mean, Mr. Prosecutor.
Q I'm sorry; I didn't understand that. Which what?
A Which position do you mean with reference to this letter?
Q Well, my question about it is this: I am wondering why Keppler would go to Goering with your desire to withdraw from whatever position it was that you occupied with respect to the Nazis, or, as you put it, with respect to your place as State Councillor, and it is even more of a problem to us with respect to your explanation.
What did Goering have to do with that?
A Yes, quite. Yesterday I stated that Dr. Schuschnigg had given me the task of investigating conditions for cooperating with national opposition. I always told Schuschnigg that the Austrian National Socialists wouldn't cooperate without Hitler's agreement. With the knowledge of Zernatto and Dr. Schuschnigg I visited Goering and Hess, and both these gentlemen knew that I not only had contact with Austria, but also with German National Socialists, something which was also known to those gentlemen in the Reich, and they were interested. If now I should suddenly say, "I stop; I am not going on", then I should consider it my duty to inform these men in the Reich that they can no longer expect my work, my cooperation. Of course, that is a matter of course. One would always have to do that sort of thing.
after your meeting with Hess and Goering, too, wasn't it? Of course it was, you saw Goering in July, 1937.
Q Well, alright. Now I will ask you a little bit about this meeting with Herr von Papen in Garmisch and which was not planned, as I understand you. You talked about the possibility of the position of the Minister of Security being filled by a member of the Nazi Party. Did you also talk of the possible trip of Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden, which didn't come so long after this meeting?
A No, we didn't mention it. The technical means were there, and whether a meeting between Dr. Schuschnigg and Hitler was to be arranged was not discussed by us.
Q Wasn't it discussed at all? Wasn't there any discussion about it? between Schuschnigg and Hitler, and from whom?
A I think two days ... On or about 10th of February, I had news ciming from Rainer or Globocnik telling me beforehand that this meeting was arranged. It was at the same time that Zernatto asked me to come to Vienna, but he still didn't tell me what it was about.
Q Actually, isn't it a fact that you prepared notes for Hitler which were the basis of his discussions with Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden?
A I didn't quite understand. What was it that I was supposed to have prepared?
Q My question is, isn't it a fact that you prepared notes, or if you prefer to call it a memorandum, for Hitler which he used as the basis of his discussion with Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden? gave it to Zernatto and Dr. Rainer, either one or the other. It is perfectly possible that Raines passed it on to the Reich. you and your associates, the night before the conference, that he was sent to Berchtesgaden ahead of Schuschnigg and Von Papen with that memorandum, isn't that a fact?
A Dr. Muehlmann?
A Dr. Muehlmann went to Berchtesgaden at that time and I was informed that he probably took notes about my last conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg.
Q Don't you know that he did, and Schuschnigg didn't know and that's the important thing that Muehlmann was doing up there ahead of him? He took the notes and conditions you had presented to Schuschnigg the night before. Schuschnigg didn't know that when he went there like a lamb the night before.
A I am convinced Schuschnigg didn't know. Quite probably he informed Keppler. When I talked to Dr. Schuschnigg, I did not know Muehlmann would go.
Q When did you find out that Muehlmann did go?
AAfter the discussion with Dr. Schuschnigg, I returned to my office and these was Dr. Rainer, and probably someone else, and I told Dr. Rainer about our conversation. Possibly Muehlmann was present and consequently, I don't want to except myself from this, we decided to inform Hitler of the contents of our conversation.. In the meantime, Dr. Schuschnigg probably went to the station and there would not have been any reason to inform him directly. nature of the conversation with Chancellor Schuschnigg that night?
AAt that time, I san no opportunity or cause to inform Dr. Schuschnigg of the fact that Muehlmann was going. is that you did want to let Hitler knew that you had this conversation with Schuschnigg, and what you said? versation with the head of your own State to which you owed allegiance?
A I don't see that this is a breach of faith, informing the leader of another state. Germany at that time without notifying your own Chancellors Schuschnigg didn't know that you sent that note on the Hitler, now be frank about it?
A Right, it is certain that Dr. Schuschnigg didn't know. But Dr. Schuschnigg did know that I was in constant contact with the Reich through Keppler, and that the outcome of our conversation was always based on the Reich for it was not a political understanding unless Hitler agreed. That's a fact. We could not have made a political understanding any other way. Schuschnigg. Do you remember the time when you gave him your word of honor that you would not make known his plans for the plebscite? what your associates asked you and what answers you made?
A Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot help it, but I think you are making a mistake. At that time I did not go to the Regina Hotel. It was on the evening of the 10th of March and it was quite a different story. First of all, it was wrong for Dr. Schuschnigg to ask me for my word of honor. On the evening of 12 February it was my duty to inform the Reich. But I kept my word. Still, on the same evening, Jury came to me, you have heard this from other sources, and not with a word did I mention that to Jury. Then, on the following morning, Rainer came .... He said that it was in the morning, but it was toward the middle of the day, really.
Q Well, I will accept the correction as to the time, but I don't think it's very important.
Q Very well, we will settle for that. I want you to hear what Rainer says about this keeping of your word.
"Seyss-Inquart said that he knew about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep it secret, but during the talk, he made it understood that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from the very first moment." as both you and Schuschnigg understood it.
A In this case, it was not possible to do it any differently. It was toward mid-day of the day when this thing happened, but you can't stand in front of me and tell me that this is a bunch of lies because I did promise Schuschnigg to do this -- to keep this secret.
tions in order to give to your associates what Schuschnigg asked you to keep confidential. gaden, about the terrible threats and the terrible way Schuschnigg was treated up there?
A That I heard from Zernatto. I think it was, if I am right, on February 13. Then I heard it from Dr. Schmidt. He told me about it himself. was treated and I suppose you knew about Keitel being called in to frighten him, and all the threats of marching in by sundown. You had a full knowledge of what happened, didn't you?
A I don't know the story of Keitel, but Schuschnigg told me that the generals were there, and apparently there was military pressure exercised. Government as Minister of Security. Schuschnigg told you that, didn't he? have an Interior and Security Minister at their disposal, and Schuschnigg agreed with Hitler on that question. Schuschnigg was supposed to have mentioned my name, but that is nothing but rumors and stories and I don't know much about that. coming here who was at that meeting, Dr. Schmidt. Are you telling this Tribunal that it was Schuschnigg who suggested your name, and not Hitler who demanded that you be appointed?
A I don't want to tell the Tribunal any stories, I merely want to give to them the background of events as far as possible. If Schmidt says that it was the Fuehrer who suggested my name, then of course I will believe him. timony of Foreign Minister Schmidt that Hitler demanded it and that Schuschnigg agreed.
A Dr. Muehlmann told me that. But I want to say, that the facts are as you state them. This is a tactical task. If the Fuehrer forced Schuschnigg to supply the Minister of the Interior, and then there is a display of words, I do not want to draw any conclusion from that as to who was supporting my defense.
Q I think that is very brave. The fact of the matter is that it was all arranged; you know it and so did Hitler that you were to be included in the government and that anything that went on was unimportant as to who actually mentioned your name first? demand the Ministry of the Interior and that I would be nominated. Von Papen did not inform me about the outcome of his conversation with Hitler, you see. I only questioned that that is how the matter might proceed. I was not by any means so much of a persona grata in Berlin that Berlin would certainly decide on me. Berchtesgaden, Hitler broke it, did he not?
Q He broke it before the 17th, didn't he? Do you remember when he appointed Klausner as head of the Party, despite the fact that he had agreed with Schuschnigg that no such thing would be done and that there would be no such political organization? You knew about that, didn't you, when it was done? question.
Q Maybe it is a little involved. The point is that a fewdays after the meeting in Berchtesgaden, Hitler appointed Klausner as the head of the illegal Nazi Party in Austria; isn't that so? I myself suggested to Hitler that he ought to agree to Klausner being the leader of the National Socialists in Austria. It was perfectly clear to me that no National Socialist in Austria would follow anybody unless Hitler was agreeable. you have offered to the Tribunal? Would you accept his record of when it happened?
Q He says it was a fewdays after the Berchtesgaden meeting. I suppose that could be the 17th, but it is not likely. Wasn't it before you went to Berlin?
A Who said that--I? and at that time I think Klausner had not yet been nominated, because I myself mentioned to Hitler that he ought to agree to Klausner's becoming the leader of the Austrian Nazis. and Germany, because if as Zernatto indicates, this agreement was broken a few days after the meeting, then when you went to Berlin and talked about a Trojan Horse you know that Hitler had already started his illegal activity in Austria, if, indeed, it was before you went there. Hitler's but several peoples'. They never ceased, and it was my intention to bring this illegal work into a form which we could control from Austria, something which I also told Schuschnigg. I said that the Austrian Nazis will not do anything without Hitler.
Q That is not the point. I am not going to labor it further. I am going to ask you one other question about your meeting with Hitler. You surely know by the 17th how badly Schuschnigg and Schmidt had been treated at Berchtesgaden. Did you say anything to Hitler about that in the course of two and a half hours' conversation with him?
A No. For the policy of the Fatherland Front from 1934 I was not responsible. It was a reaction to the suppression of the National Socialists in Austria.
Q Well, all right. Now we come down to the 8th day of March. That is the day that Schuschnigg told you about the plebiscite that he intended to hold in a few days. the copy of it to Hitler, was it not? to Hitler?
A I don't know, but I would not have thought about it for a minute because after 12 February 1938, I had to inform the Reich.
Q You certainly also had to inform Schuschnigg, didn't you, as his State Counsellor that you were sending a copy of this very important letter to Hitler? You did not tell Schuschnigg about that, isn't that true? I certainly had informed Zernatto; that I was right there is no doubt.
Q We will see about that. The next night you had a meeting with Schuschnigg and Schmidt and Scubl, I guess in the Chancellory office. You never mentioned the fact to anyone of them there that you had already communicated with Hitler by special courier; do you remember that meeting?
AActually I do not have a clear picture of it. I only remember the meeting of March 10, but that possibly -- very probably -- is like that. Klausner; right after that meeting you went right down the street and saw your associates. Did you tell them what Schuschnigg had said to you and what you had said to Schuschnigg in the conversations a little earlier?
A On 10 March, is that right?
Q But your courier was back from Berlin, wasn't he; Globocnik had returned from Berlin?
A Yes. Globocnik came back and informed us that Berlin was refusing to agree to this plebiscite and that the following day I would receive a message indicating Hitler's attitude. give instructions for the mobilization of the Party in Austria to be ready to put on demonstrations or to seize power the next day. You were there when he laid out his plans. Do you remember that?
A I think that is an exaggeration on Rainer's part. I only remember that Klausner said "Well, then we shall have to be in touch with you tomorrow." That of course demonstrations might happen, that was so natural that everybody was aware of it. If that matter was not cleared up, then and there, there would be serious demonstrations, but the government also knew that. that these demonstrations were not spontaneous at all, as I thought you were trying to convey to the Tribunal, but that they were wellplanned out by your associates.
A That the actions were not spontaneous? Certainly they were not.
Q They were not?
Q All right. Now then, when Horstenau came back from Berlin on the next morning -- 11 March -- he told you about the planned or the talk of military events in Berlin, didn't he?
A Horstenau?
A Yes, and we told Dr. Schuschnigg the same thing. same morning. hours, I reported all details, and the letter was merely a confirmation of them.
Q The letter was an ultimatum, to Schuschnigg, wasn't it, and it was written by you at the direction of your political superior, Klausner?
A No. Rainer has stated that, but that again is one of his statements. Mr. Prosecutor, if an ultimatum can be mentioned in this connection, then I would have given it orally beforehand because when I was leaving Dr. Schuschnigg I asked him to reply to me by two o'clock in the afternoon, and I said that in the event of his refusal Glaise and I would have to resign, but at that time I had not even spoken to Klausner yet. report, in this document, 812-PS, you say is untrue. He also says there -
A Untrue? No, but slightly exaggerated.
Q All right. I just want to get your views, I repeat, because you will not be available after he comes to the stand. He also says that he talked with you about the seizure of power in the event that Schuschnigg refused your ultimatum. Do you say that is so or not so?
A I don't remember. I don't think so. possible steps for the taking over of Austria and handing it over to Germany? Is that true or not? wards. your view, I think. saying that there was a bad situation in Austria, that that telegram was actually brought back by Glaise Horstenau. He says that in the same document. What do you say to that?
Q Well, how is it incorrect, if it isn't correct? You indicate that there is some truth in it.
A Yes. I received Hitler's letter through a courier, not through Glaise Horstenau. In that letter there was a draft for a telegram.
on the telephone, and the same one that Keppler referred to when he talked to Dietrich on the telephone, isn't it?
Q Well, finally, let me ask you this about that particular day. This radio speech that you made was really made at the direction of Goering, was it not? He told you -
Q -- to make a statement, didn't he?
A No, not at all. There is no question of it. with you. It is 1957 hours that night, where he told you to make a statement to the people, and about three minutes later you went on the radio and made it. What do you mean that Goering did not tell you to do it?
A Yes, but Goering asked me to do something quite different. He asked me to state that there was a provisional government now to take over power. That is what I believe. I introduced myself as Minister of the Interior and Security and I demanded that the people should remain quiet and should not put up any resistance to the arrival of German troops, which was exactly what Schuschnigg had said a half hour before me. you talked to Goering?
A Yes; I talked to the Reichsmarshal -- Field Marshal Goering such a lot that I don't want to implicate him or myself in anything that you might have concluded from telephone calls. I believe that I did not do any of these things.
your selling out Austria to Germany? He certainly had a great interest in what happened there that day, did he not?
A Yes, but I don't think your expression "selling out" is very suitable. Goering had obvious interests to bring this thing to a final decision in some fantastic way. the building, and that you thought they were there because Miklas and Schuschnigg did nothing to remove them, that they could very easily have removed them. Now, the truth of the matter is that you were the minister for security, and it was your responsibility to remove them, was it not?
A No, I was not in the buildings. Apart from that, there was Dr. Scubl, and one word from Dr. Miklas or Dr. Schuschnigg would have sufficed, whereupon 300 men from the guard battalion would have arrived to put the matter right. You couldn't expect me, at that moment, to proceed against the National Socialists. your finger would have sufficed, would it not, to get them out of there? They were your National Socialist SS men; beside the fact that you were the head of the police.
A Whether they would have obeyed me or not, I don't know. I didn't have command over the National Guard Battalion. Certainly, indubitably, I could have exercised my influence and it might have been successful, but these men who were there did not mean anything very much in my eyes.
Q The place was surrounded with them, was it not? They were not only in the building, but they were outside of it and on the roofs of the neighbouri building. You remember all that? the time. here in your behalf, and see what he says about it. that he wrote about that historical night? Are you familiar with that?
A Oh yes; you can call it more than an article.
Q Yes. He called it "Hours of historical Decision."
MR. DODD: This is 4004-PS, Mr. President, USA-883. BY MR. DODD: gives from the one that you have given to this Tribunal, is it not? If you know the article, and you say you do. He says, you know, that Kaltenbrunner commanded 700 SS men there that night, and that Lukesch had 6,000 SA men within half an hour, and they received the order to advance and occupy the Federal Chancellery and to hold the ring and the building until the National Socialist Government was proclaimed; and that 40 SS men, under Kaltenbrunner's adjutant, Rinner, received the order to force their way into and occupy the French Chancellery, and so on.
He says that you are the man who ordered that Rinner be let in. That is very important, and I would like to know what you say about that. Rinner was in command of the 40 SS men, that you say somebody else should have removed. You will find that he says:
"It was going on 10 o'clock when the commanding officer of the guards reported to the Minister of Security, Dr. Seyss, who happened to be in our room, that a man accompanied by 40 others demanded to be let in through the gate, invoking higher orders.
I quickly informed Dr. Seyss that these were Rinner and his 40 men who had been detailed for the occupation of the Federal Chancellery. Dr. Seyss ordered that Rinner be brought upstairs. I shall never forget this moment. Escorted by a guardsman as tall as a lamp-post, Felix Rinner, the famous Austrian track champion", and so on. quarters that night, and you are the man, actually, who let him in.
A That is an article of victory, written in the mood of victory. All I can say is that these National Socialists, in black trousers and white shirts, were noticed by me. I saw that they were in the corridors and I asked, "What goes on?" But this dramatic account that I had opened the gate -- well, let's wait and see whether Rainer confirms that.
Q Well, I understand that; we look forward to it as well as you do. responsibility, gave the order to open the gate and let those men in. But you say that isn't so. That is all I want to know.
A No, no; that is quite new and strange to me.
Q Well, I think we can pass on. There isn't any truth at all, I expect, is there, in this whole article by Rainer? Or is there something that you might admit is true? You know he is going to be your witness.
A I am extremely interested to see what he says here. This is a somewhat poetical account of these events. The basis is probably quite correct, but there is a lot of victory celebration attached to it. question, that Guido Schmidt, in testimony which we have here and which I will be glad to present to you, says that the place was surrounded by these SS men and that they were in there with your knowledge. What do you say to that? He is also going to be your witness. around the Chancellery. Whether they were SS or SA or what, that I don't know. There were a lot of women amongst them.
but I told Dr. Schuschnigg as early as that morning that if we could not agree, then he would have to expect large-scale demonstrations from the Party.
Q Now, one other matter. Did you tell the Tribunal, or did I understand you correctly when I heard you testify that Miklas resigned without any request from you? That is, President Miklas, who was then the Bund President of Austria. Is it your testimony that he resigned without any request from yo he would not do that, he would resign, and according to the Constitution his rights would then pass on to me. He said he was not goint to try to beat developments. I don't think I told him to resign; I merely demanded that he sign the law. he says that you demanded it. Now do you remember, or have you forgotten, or do you say that is untrue?
A No; I consider that is out of the question because I clearly remember how he said: "I can't sign the law, but I shall not stand in the way of developments. If you confirm to me that it is necessary that the Anschluss be carried out, then I shall resign and you will have my powers." If he understood that as a demand from me to resign, then I don't want to contradict him. I don't want to make his position any more difficult, because I confess that I was in favor of the Anschluss. like. In any event, it is his testimony before the court in Vienna, on the 30 day of January 1946. It is document 3697-PS, and it becomes USA-884. If you would like to see it, you may. He says just about what I put to you, that you talked around it a good deal, said it was very distasteful for you, but nevertheless you were bound to comply with the order from Germany and therefore he had to resign. Himmler, about Buerckel? One of them is in evidence, and I want to ask you if you remember the other one. Do you remember the letter that you wrote to Himmler in which you said that it was not true that you were interfering with the deportation of the Jews, that you had only insisted that they be turned over to Kaltenbrunner's men, the SD?
