That is in these terms. It is a speech by Hitler and states:
"I have given binding declarations to a large number of States. None of these States can complain that even a trace of a demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany. None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend that a request has ever been put to them by the German Government or by the German public opinion which was incompatible with the sovereignty and integrity of their State.
"I was pleased that a number of European States availed themselves of these declarations by the German Government to express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality. This applies to Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, et cetera". 1939, which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was the day after the Nazi invasion of Poland. The Court will observe the next document in British Document Book 3, Exhibit TC-31, which would be GB Exhibit 79. That is an aidememoire that was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on 2 September 1939. It reads:
"The German Reich Government is determined, in view of the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under no circumstances to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur. Shoud the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate," appears as the next document in the book, TC-32, which would be Exhibit GB-80. That is a speech by Hitler on the 6 October 1939, and if the Court will observe paragraph 2 at the top of the page, the extract from the speech reads as follows:
"Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern States; neither has she any today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they do not feel themselves threatened in any way."
These are clear and positive assurances which Germany gave. The Court will see that violation of these assurances is charged in paragraph 22 of Appendix C of the Indictment, at page 43. The Court will notice that there is a minor typographical error in the date of the first assurance, which is alleged in the indictment to have been given on the 3 September 1939. The Court will see from Exhibit TC-32, which is GB-79, that the assurance was in fact given on 2 September 1939. to the brutal Nazi aggression on Norway and Denmark, and the evidence which the Prosecution will now place before the Court will in my submission establish beyond reasonable doubt that these assurances were simply given to lull suspicion and cause the intended victims of Nazi aggression to be unprepared to meet the Nazi attack. For we now know that as early as October 1939 these conspirators and their confederates were plotting the invasion of Norway, and the evidence will indicate that the most active conspirators in that plot were the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. ssion, in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it. The chief instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg; Raeder because he thought Norway strategically important and because he coveted glory for his Navy; Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway which he sought to develop. the Defendant Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column agent, the very personification of perfidy.
invade Norway is found in a letter which the Defendant Raeder wrote on the 10th January 1944 to Admiral Assmann, the official German Naval historian. further on in this book of documents, I should explain that in this book of documents the documents are inserted in the numerical order of the series to which they belong and not in order of their submission to the Court. I am trusting that that will be a more convenient form of bundling them together than to set them down in the order of presentation. That would be Exhibit GB-81.
THE PRESIDENT: 66?
MR. ELWYN JONES: C-66. It is headed "Memorandum for Admiral Assmann for his own information; not to be used for publications." If the Tribunal turns to the next page, headed "(b) Weser-Ubung," the Tribunal will find from documents which I shall shortly be submitting to the Court, that Weser-Ubung was the code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark.
I will omit the first sentence. The document, which, as I have said, is a communication from the Defendant Raeder to Assmann, reads as follows:
"During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October, 1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this letter on to C/SK1 for their information" -- which is the Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff -- "and prepared some notes based on this letter for my report to the Fuehrer, which I made on the 10th of October, 1939, since my opinion was identical with that of Admiral Carls, while at that time, SKI was more dubious about the matter. In these notes, I stressed the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would have for us - control of the approaches to the Baltic, outflanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast - outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the year 1917-18. Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our correspondence thought that Narvik could be excluded. The Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question himself." to it later, so that the story may be revealed to the Court in a chronological order. of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords a good example of the participate of the German High Command in the Nazi conspiracy to attack inoffensive neighbors. Raeder reported to Hitler on the 10th of October, 1939 -
THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): When was that report?
MR. ELWYN JONES: This report was made in January 1944 by the Defendant Raeder to Assmann, who was the German Naval historian, and so presumably was for the purposes of history.
a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On the 3rd of October, Raeder made out the questionnaire to which I now invite the Court's attention. It is C-122, and the Court will find it next but one to C-66 in the document book. That will now be GB-82.
That, as the Tribunal will observe, is headed "Gaining of Bases in Norway, (extract from War Diary)" and bears the date of the 3rd of October 1939. It reads:
"The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that the Fuehrer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving our strategic and operational position. The following questions must be given consideration:
"(a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
"(b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?
"(c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?
"(d) Will the harbours have to be developed completely as bases, or have they already advantages suitable for supply position?"
Then there follows in parenthesis:
"(F.O.U-boats" -- which is a reference, of course, to the Defendant Doenitz--"already considers such harbours extremely temporarily."
) And the n Question (e): "What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining bases in North Denmark, e.g.Skagen?"
in the document book to the first of the C exhibits. This will be Exhibit That document is headed "Flag Officer Submarines, Operations Division," and is marked "Most Secret."
The subject is "Base in Norway."
and then conclusions. I am proposing to read the last Paragraph, III:
"The following in therefore proposed:
"(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:
"a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen, provisions "b) Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an encounter.
"c) Good opportunities for accommodating U-beat crews.
"d) Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S units.
"Secondly, Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in Narvik as an alternative."
pressing his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage ho found a powerful ally in the Defendant Rosenberg. as a political weapon are now unhappily proven historical facts, but should proof be required of that statement it is found in the remarkable document which I now invite the Court to consider. I refer to Exhibit 007-PS, which is after the TC and D series in the document book. That will be Exhibit GB-84.
That is headed on page one, "Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party (Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP) from 1933 to 1943". It reads:
"When the Foreign Affairs Bureau (Aussenpolitsche AMTO was established on the 1st of April 1933, the Fuehrer directed that it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency, but should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and suggestions.
"Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the newly-established Bureau devoted particular attention to internal conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as to the effects of World Bolshevism primarily in other European countries. It entered into contact with the most variagated groups inclining towards National Socialism in combating Bolshevism, focussing its main attentions on Nations and States bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand, those nations and states constituted an Insulating Ring encircling the Bolshevist neighbour; on the other hand they were the laterals of German living space and took up a flanking position towards the Western Powers, especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired influence by one means or another, --"and the court will shortly see the significance of that phrase"-- "--the Bureau was compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the completely different living conditions, the ties of blood, intellect and history "In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based after the World War of 1914-18.
There the Bureau put the entire relations with the Nordic peoples.
For this purpose it took the Nordic Society in Luebeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities, especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely political co-operation in Sweden and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic ideology was founded in Norway. Very close relations were established with its founder, which led to further consequences." ment, which is four pages forward -- in the intervening pages I may say there is an account of the activity of Rosenberg's Bureau in various parts of Europe and indeed of the world, which I am not proposing to call the Tribunal's attention to at this stage -- but if the Tribunal will look at the last paragraph of the main body of the report, the last two sentences read: its task as terminated."
THE PRESIDENT: I have not got the place.
MR. ELVIN JONES: I beg your Lordship's pardon; it is page 4 of the report. It is the page which bears the signature of the Defendant Rosenberg.
"With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections in many lands can be resumed under a different guise." on the next page, the Tribunal will appreciate what the "exploitation of personal connections" involved.
Annex One to the document is headed, "To Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943." It is headed, "The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway During the War Years 1939-1940", and it reads:
"As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in Scandinavia only 'Nasjonal Samling' led in Norway by the Former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve, Vidkun Quisling, deserved serious political attention.
This was a fighting political group, possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic Community. Naturally all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent, by any means, its success among the population. The Bureau maintained constant liaison with Quisling and attentively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class, which had been taken in tow by the English.
"From the beginning, it appeared probable that without revolutionary events, which would stir the population from their former attitude, no successful progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected. During the winter 1936-1939, Quisling was privately visited by a member of the Bureau.
"When the political situation in Europe came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the Nordic Society in Luebeck in June. He expounded his conception of the situation, and his apprehensions concerning Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area, and to the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the Norwegian coast in case of a conflice between the Greater German Reich and Great Britain.
"Assuming that his statement would be of special interest to the Marshal of the Reich Goering for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State Secretary Koerner by the Bureau. The Staff Director of the Bureau, handed the Chief of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Fuehrer." stage of my presentation of the evidence, if I may, the Court will see how Quisling came into contace with Raeder. The Prosecution's submission with regard to this document is that it is another illustration of the close interweaving between between the political and military leadership of the Nazi State, of the close link between the professional soldiers and the professional thugs.
his collaboration with Rosenberg and I will invite the Court's attention once more to Exhibit C-66, which is Exhibit G.B. 81. In the page headed "Weser-Ubung," the second paragraph of the Raeder report, reads as follows:
"In the farther developments, I was supported by Commander Schreiber, Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-Chief personally -- in conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me -- with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg." ments in December. contact personally with Quisling are not very clear. But I would draw the Court's attention to the Document C-65, which precedes -
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the end of that paragraph?
MR. ELVYN JONES: With your Lordship's permission, I would like to revert to that in a later stage of my unfolding of the evidence.
In the Document C-65, which will be Exhibit G.B. 85, we have a report of Rosenberg to Raeder, in which the full extent of Quisling's preparedness for treachery and his potential usefullness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed to the Defendant Raeder. with, in reading Rosenberg's statement, 007-PS. But if the Court will look at the second paragraph of Exhibit G.B. 85, C-65, it reads as follows:
"The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a report, would be provided by the fact that the Storthing--" --that is to say the Norwegian Parliament -- "--had, in defence of the constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter which he had received only a short time previously from the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter, Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that; if things went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished." paragraphs, the details of a treacherous plot to overthrow the government of his own country by the traitor Quisling, in collaboration with the Defendant Rosenburg, will be indicated to the Court.
"A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of a coup, and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and provided with experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who are practiced in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with all speed to Norway, where details would then require to be further discussed. Some important centres in Oslo would have to be taken over immediately, and at the same time the German Fleet, together with suitable contingents of the German Army, would go into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling has no doubts that such a coup, having been carried out with instantaneous success -- would immediately bring him the approval of these sections of the Army with which he at present has connections, and thus it goes without saying that he has never discussed a political fight with then.
As far as the King is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an accomplished fact." by subsequent developments.
The last sentence reads:
"Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations." of abuse sufficiently strong to describe that degree of treachery.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that document dated?
MR. ELVYN JONES: That document does not bear a date.
THE PRESIDENT: The will take off now.
(Whereupon at 1700 o'clock the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene on 7 December 1945, at 1000 o'clock).
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The United States of
MR. ELWYN JONES: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon when the Tribunal adjourned I was dealing with the stage of the Nazi conspiracy against Norway at which the activities of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg converged. The Court will remember that I submitted in evidence Exhibit C-65, which was a report from the Defendant Rosenberg to Raeder regarding Quisling, and ending with the infamous words: "Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations." material parts of Exhibit C-66, which was the report of Raeder to Admiral Assmann, which disclosed how, in December of 1939, the Defendant Raeder did in fact meet Quisling and Hagelin. the purposes of the record, will be GB-86. The Court will observe that that is a report by Raeder of a meeting of the Naval Staff with Hitler on the 12th of December, 1939, at 1200 hours, in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to Hitler.
The report is headed "Norwegian Question", and the first sentence reads:
"C-in-C Navy"--who of course was the Defendant Raeder--"has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates the impression of being reliable." of Quisling's views, views with which the Court is by now familiar because of my reading of extracts from the document 007-PS; but I draw the Court's attention to the fourth paragraph in document C-64, beginning:
"The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a long while. C-in-C Navy"--that is, of course, Raeder--"suggests that if the Fuehrer forms a favorable impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation.
"(a) By peaceful means; that is to say, German forces summoned by Norway, or "(b) To agree to do so by force."
this report to Hitler.
If the Court will now look at Exhibit C-66, which is Raeder's record of these transactions for the purposes of history, the Court will observe, in the last sentence of the second paragraph of the section of C-66 headed "(b) Weseruebung", these words:
"Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer"-
THE PRESIDENT: I haven't got it.
MR. ELWYN JONES: I beg your Lordship's pardon; it is C-66, the second page, headed "Weseruebung", in the second paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
MR. ELWYN JONES: The third line.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ELWYN JONES: "Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me, with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg."
And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the page: "At the crucial moment, R"--presumably Rosenberg--"hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the 14th of December."
That is, of course, Raeder's note, and it indicates the extent of his contact in this conspiracy.
The report continues:
"On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December, the Fuehrer gave the order that the preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the development of the Norwegian question, and continued to be somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations, which were undertaken by Captain Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff." ring to the crucial moment was an appropriate one, because the Court will see that on that day, the 14th of December, Hitler gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. document book, and which the Court will remember is Rosenberg's report on the activities of his organization--it is after the "D" documents--if the Court will turn to about ten lines from the bottom of the first page of Annex I, dealing with Norway, the Court will see that there were further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in December, and I am going to read now the section beginning:
"Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer on 16 December, and once more on 18 December. In the course of this audience the Fuehrer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway, as well as of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theater of war and to draw still other nations into the conflict." here was an instance where pressure had to be brought to bear on Hitler to induce him to take part in these operations.
The report continues:
"Should the enemy attempt"--there is a mis-translation there--"to extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, he promised Quisling financial support of his movement, which is based on Greater German ideology. Military exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the special military staff, which transmitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs"--that is to say, by Ribbentrop's organization-"the Minister for Foreign Affairs"--that is to say, Ribbentrop--"being kept continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau," which, of course, was Rosenberg's organization.
"Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was assigned to the Naval Attache in Oslo. Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy." and the Nazi service chiefs. January 1940 is not full, but the Court will see that the agitation of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the Court to consider a letter of Keitel's, Exhibit C-63, which, for the purposes of the record, will be GB-87. The Court will observe that that is an order--a memorandum--signed by Keitel, the Defendant Keitel, dated the 27th of January, 1940. It is marked "Most Secret, five copies; reference, Study 'N'", which was another code name for the Weseruebung preparations, "Access only through an officer."
It is headed: "C-in-C of the Navy"--that is to say, the Defendant Raeder--"has a report on this."
The document reads:
"The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes that Study 'N' should be further worked on under my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the general war policy. For these reasons the Fuehrer has commissioned me to take over the direction of further preparations.
"A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Headquarters for this purpose, and this represents at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff."
Then, at the end of the memorandum:
"All further plans will be made under the cover name 'Weseruebung.'" I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal's attention to the importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to the date of this important decision.
various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking this Norwegian operation; and the issuance of this directive of Keitel's on the 27th of January, 1940, was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the OKW, had accepted the proposition of the group that was pressing for this Norwegian adventure, and turned the combined resources of the German military machine to the task of producing practical and coordinated plans for the Norwegian operation. planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started through the normal channels. Defendant Jodl, to see how the preparations progressed. That is Exhibit Number 1809-PS, which will be, for the purposes of the record, GB-88. That, the Court will observe, is the last document in the document book.
are set out in the diary, because the first three pages relate to entries which will be dealt with in another part of the case.
I invite the Court's attention to page 3 of these extracts from Jodl's diary, beginning at the bottom, February 6th. The entry under the date line of February 6th starts: "New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only end guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war."
I would like to repeat that entry, if I may be permitted to do so:
"New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war."
The next entry which I invite the Court's attention to is the entry of the 21st of February.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean: "To carry out 'H'"?
MR. ELWYN JONES: That is a reference to another code word, "Hartmudt", which the Court will see disclosed in a subsequent document, That is another code word for this Norwegian and Danish operation.
The entry of February 21st in Jodl's diary reads: "Fuehrer has talked with General von Falkenhorst, and charges him with preparation of 'Weser Exercise.' Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the armed forces."
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): "Weser Exorcise" -- is that Norway too?
MR. ELWYN JONES: That is Norway too, My Lord, yes. That is a translation of "Weseruebung."
The entry on the next page, under the date of February 28th:
"I propose, first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer, that Case Yellow"--which, as the Court knows, is the code name for the invasion of the Netherlands--"and Weser Exercise"--the invasion of Norway and Denmark--"must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed. The Fuehrer completely agrees, if this is in any way possible." 6th that the neutrality of Belgium might be observed had been abandoned by February 28th. Court with further entries of the 28th of February, which relate to the forces to be employed in the invasion of Norway and Denmark.
February 29th, the second paragraph:
"Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, Chef Landesverteidigung, instructed to make out immediately the order of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director of Armed Forces to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening of the staff."
And there, for the moment, I will leave the entries in Jodl's diary and refer the Court to the vital document C-174, which, for the purposes of the record, will be GB-89. And the Court will see, from that document, that it is Hitler's operation order to complete preparations--the Court will observe that that is Hitler's order to complete the preparations for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears the date of the 1st of March, 1940, and it is headed: "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Most Secret."
Then, "Directive for Fall Weseruebung.
"The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces--Fall Weseruebung. This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain."