Although the fact of the Polish negotiator expected by the Reich did not arrive, removed the necessary conditions for informing His Majesty's Government for the views of the German Government as regards the possible basis for negotiation. Since His Majesty's Government themselves had pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of the presentation of the last British note, precise information as to the text of the German proposals which will be regarded as a basis for negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary. And thereafter they go on to set out the story, or rather their version of the story of the negotiations over the last few days.
I pass to the next document in the Tribunal's book, back to the document TC 54, which becomes GB 73.
On the 1st of September, when his armies were already crossing the frontier and the whole of the frontier, he issued this proclamation to his Armed Forces:
"The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly relations as aimed at by me, wants to force the issue by way of arms.
"The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation which cannot be tolerated by a great power show that Poland is no longer prepared to respect the Reich's frontiers. To put an end to these mad acts I can see no other way but from now onwards to meet force with force.
"The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the German people.
"I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the last.
"Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany.
"Long live our people and the Reich." generals. He had afforded them their propagandistic justification, and at that time, anyway, it didn't matter what people said about it afterwards. "The view shall not appear, asked later on, whether we told the truth or not. Might is what counts -- or victory is what counts and not right." invasion of Polish ground, the British Government, in accordance with their Treaty of Legations, sent an ultimatum to the German Government, in which they stated that unless the German -- I quote from the last paragraph:
"I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland."
and so at nine o'clock -- the document I have just referred to will be GB 74 -- at nine o'clock on the 3rd of September a final ultimatum was handed to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. I quote from the third paragraph.
"Although this communication was made more than twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but German attacks upon Poland have been continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honor to inform you that, unless not later than eleven o'clock, British Summer Time, today 3rd September, satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by the German Government, and have reached His Majesty's Government in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries as from that hour."
And so it was that at eleven o'clock on the 3rd of September a state of war existed between Germany and England and between Germany and France. It all appeals to peace. It all appeals to reason. We now see completely stillborn, stillborn when they were made, plans, preparations, intentions, determination to carry out this assault upon Poland had been going on for months, for years before. It mattered not what anybody but the German Government had in mind or whatever rights anybody else but the German nation thought they had, and if there is any doubt left at all after what we have seen, I would ask you to look at two more documents. document book, PS 1831, which becomes GB 75. Even now on the 3rd of September Mussolini offers some chance of peace.
We have here a telegram. It is timed 6:30 hours, and I'm afraid I'm unable to say whether that is 6:30 in the morning or the evening, but it is dated the 3rd of September, and I quote:
"The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the Duce's order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:
"Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision to the Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference with France, England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would leave the Army Corps where they are at present." And it will be read that on the 3rd of September they had advanced a considerable way over the frontier. "2. Calling the conference within two or three days. 3. Solution of the Polish-Germ an controversy which would be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today.
"This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in France.
"Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany has had already its 'moral satisfaction.' If it would accept the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long duration." Germany's aims were and, of course, the offer was turned down in the illuminating letter which Hitler was to write in reply.
I refer you back to the document before that. That will be GB-76. I beg your pardon, it's still part of the same exhibit GB 75.
"Duce:
"I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation."
THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, the "GB" references you give are not on the documents at all; they are the exhibits themselves, which are to be put on the document after they have been put in.
MR. GRIFFITH JONES: Yes. That is correct. They will be put in by the Court, of course.
THE PRESIDENT: You will try to make clear the references which are on the document so that the Tribunal could find the document itself?
MR. GRIFFITH JONES. Yes. The last document was PS 1831, and it's the very last one in the document book. That's the one I've just referred to--the telegram from Mussolini. The document to which I am about to refer to is the one but last in the Tribunal's book but it has the sane number on it as the last because it forms part of the same exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: I think if you'll just explain the system in which the exhibits are numbered it would help some.
MR. GRIFFITH JONES: The exhibits are numbered at the present moment before they are put in evidence with a variety of serial numbers, such as "PC", "PS", and "L" and other letters. There's no significance attached to that at all. It depends on who they have been found by and what files they have come from. When the documents are put in as exhibits, they are marked by the court with a court number. The documents are put in by the United States representatives prefixed with the letters "US". The documents which have been put in by the British prosecutors have all been prefixed with the letters "GB". If it would be of any assistance to members of the Tribunal I will have their document bocks marked up this evening with the new court numbers that have been put upon them by the court officials during the course of the day.
THE PRESIDENT: We'll talk about that later.
MR. GRIFFITH JONES: If there is any document missing from any of these bocks I have a copy.
THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read PS 1831?
MR. GRIFFITH JONES: Yes, that is GB 75.
"Duce:
"I first want to thank you for your last attempt at mediation. I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that the conference would be successful. Because, for the last two days the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found, if England would not have been determined towage war under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because, Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more than one-half year or one year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At present, the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is so overwhelmning in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt whether this fast success could be achieved in one or two years. England and France would have armed their allies, to such an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German Armed Forces could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose after cold deliberation the moment for resistance in such a way that the probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a rock. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I believe also - even if we march now over different roads that fate will finally join us.
If the National Socialistic Germany were destroyed by the Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of the future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man in unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air force is complete, although scarcely one-third of it is in Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have given to me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in the future."
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES (continuing): That completes the evidence
MR. ELWYN JONES: May it please the Tribunal, in the early and Denmark.
It is my duty to present to the Tribunal the Prosecution's evidence upon those invasions, which has been prepared With the Court's permission I would like, first of all, to deal with agreements between Germany and Norway and Denmark.
In the first 1926.
The Court will find that Treaty, TC-17, on the first page of British Document Book No. 3, and to that exhibit it may be convenient to give the number GB-76.
I am only proposing to read "The Contracting Parties undertake to submit to the "Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure provisions of such Conventions."
after the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia. The Court will find that
THE PRESIDENT: Does that follow the last treaty?
MR. ELWYN JONES: That follows the last treaty, My Lord.
With the Court's permission, in view of the identity of the "His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland and the "Being firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and by means of a treaty and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
of the German Reich."
"The Kingdom of Denmark and the German Reich shall in no "Should action of the kind referred to in Paragraph 1 be any way."
and the second paragraph states:
"The Treaty shall come into force on the exchange of the period of ten years from that date."
And as the Tribunal will observe that is dated 31st May, 1939.
At the bottom of the conspirators were party to a similar perfidy.
In the first exhibit number GB-78.
The Tribunal will observe there the April, 1939.
That, of course, was after the annexation of Scandinavian States.
That is in these terms. It is a speech by Hitler and states:
"I have given binding declarations to a large number of States. None of these States can complain that even a trace of a demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany. None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend that a request has ever been put to them by the German Government or by the German public opinion which was incompatible with the sovereignty and integrity of their State.
"I was pleased that a number of European States availed themselves of these declarations by the German Government to express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality. This applies to Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, et cetera". 1939, which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was the day after the Nazi invasion of Poland. The Court will observe the next document in British Document Book 3, Exhibit TC-31, which would be GB Exhibit 79. That is an aidememoire that was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on 2 September 1939. It reads:
"The German Reich Government is determined, in view of the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under no circumstances to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur. Shoud the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate," appears as the next document in the book, TC-32, which would be Exhibit GB-80. That is a speech by Hitler on the 6 October 1939, and if the Court will observe paragraph 2 at the top of the page, the extract from the speech reads as follows:
"Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern States; neither has she any today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they do not feel themselves threatened in any way."
These are clear and positive assurances which Germany gave. The Court will see that violation of these assurances is charged in paragraph 22 of Appendix C of the Indictment, at page 43. The Court will notice that there is a minor typographical error in the date of the first assurance, which is alleged in the indictment to have been given on the 3 September 1939. The Court will see from Exhibit TC-32, which is GB-79, that the assurance was in fact given on 2 September 1939. to the brutal Nazi aggression on Norway and Denmark, and the evidence which the Prosecution will now place before the Court will in my submission establish beyond reasonable doubt that these assurances were simply given to lull suspicion and cause the intended victims of Nazi aggression to be unprepared to meet the Nazi attack. For we now know that as early as October 1939 these conspirators and their confederates were plotting the invasion of Norway, and the evidence will indicate that the most active conspirators in that plot were the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. ssion, in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it. The chief instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg; Raeder because he thought Norway strategically important and because he coveted glory for his Navy; Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway which he sought to develop. the Defendant Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column agent, the very personification of perfidy.
invade Norway is found in a letter which the Defendant Raeder wrote on the 10th January 1944 to Admiral Assmann, the official German Naval historian. further on in this book of documents, I should explain that in this book of documents the documents are inserted in the numerical order of the series to which they belong and not in order of their submission to the Court. I am trusting that that will be a more convenient form of bundling them together than to set them down in the order of presentation. That would be Exhibit GB-81.
THE PRESIDENT: 66?
MR. ELWYN JONES: C-66. It is headed "Memorandum for Admiral Assmann for his own information; not to be used for publications." If the Tribunal turns to the next page, headed "(b) Weser-Ubung," the Tribunal will find from documents which I shall shortly be submitting to the Court, that Weser-Ubung was the code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark.
I will omit the first sentence. The document, which, as I have said, is a communication from the Defendant Raeder to Assmann, reads as follows:
"During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October, 1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this letter on to C/SK1 for their information" -- which is the Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff -- "and prepared some notes based on this letter for my report to the Fuehrer, which I made on the 10th of October, 1939, since my opinion was identical with that of Admiral Carls, while at that time, SKI was more dubious about the matter. In these notes, I stressed the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would have for us - control of the approaches to the Baltic, outflanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast - outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the year 1917-18. Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our correspondence thought that Narvik could be excluded. The Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question himself." to it later, so that the story may be revealed to the Court in a chronological order. of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords a good example of the participate of the German High Command in the Nazi conspiracy to attack inoffensive neighbors. Raeder reported to Hitler on the 10th of October, 1939 -
THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): When was that report?
MR. ELWYN JONES: This report was made in January 1944 by the Defendant Raeder to Assmann, who was the German Naval historian, and so presumably was for the purposes of history.
a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On the 3rd of October, Raeder made out the questionnaire to which I now invite the Court's attention. It is C-122, and the Court will find it next but one to C-66 in the document book. That will now be GB-82.
That, as the Tribunal will observe, is headed "Gaining of Bases in Norway, (extract from War Diary)" and bears the date of the 3rd of October 1939. It reads:
"The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that the Fuehrer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving our strategic and operational position. The following questions must be given consideration:
"(a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
"(b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?
"(c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?
"(d) Will the harbours have to be developed completely as bases, or have they already advantages suitable for supply position?"
Then there follows in parenthesis:
"(F.O.U-boats" -- which is a reference, of course, to the Defendant Doenitz--"already considers such harbours extremely temporarily."
) And the n Question (e): "What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining bases in North Denmark, e.g.Skagen?"
in the document book to the first of the C exhibits. This will be Exhibit That document is headed "Flag Officer Submarines, Operations Division," and is marked "Most Secret."
The subject is "Base in Norway."
and then conclusions. I am proposing to read the last Paragraph, III:
"The following in therefore proposed:
"(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:
"a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen, provisions "b) Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an encounter.
"c) Good opportunities for accommodating U-beat crews.
"d) Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S units.
"Secondly, Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in Narvik as an alternative."
pressing his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage ho found a powerful ally in the Defendant Rosenberg. as a political weapon are now unhappily proven historical facts, but should proof be required of that statement it is found in the remarkable document which I now invite the Court to consider. I refer to Exhibit 007-PS, which is after the TC and D series in the document book. That will be Exhibit GB-84.
That is headed on page one, "Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party (Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP) from 1933 to 1943". It reads:
"When the Foreign Affairs Bureau (Aussenpolitsche AMTO was established on the 1st of April 1933, the Fuehrer directed that it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency, but should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and suggestions.
"Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the newly-established Bureau devoted particular attention to internal conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as to the effects of World Bolshevism primarily in other European countries. It entered into contact with the most variagated groups inclining towards National Socialism in combating Bolshevism, focussing its main attentions on Nations and States bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand, those nations and states constituted an Insulating Ring encircling the Bolshevist neighbour; on the other hand they were the laterals of German living space and took up a flanking position towards the Western Powers, especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired influence by one means or another, --"and the court will shortly see the significance of that phrase"-- "--the Bureau was compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the completely different living conditions, the ties of blood, intellect and history "In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based after the World War of 1914-18.
There the Bureau put the entire relations with the Nordic peoples.
For this purpose it took the Nordic Society in Luebeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities, especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely political co-operation in Sweden and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic ideology was founded in Norway. Very close relations were established with its founder, which led to further consequences." ment, which is four pages forward -- in the intervening pages I may say there is an account of the activity of Rosenberg's Bureau in various parts of Europe and indeed of the world, which I am not proposing to call the Tribunal's attention to at this stage -- but if the Tribunal will look at the last paragraph of the main body of the report, the last two sentences read: its task as terminated."
THE PRESIDENT: I have not got the place.
MR. ELVIN JONES: I beg your Lordship's pardon; it is page 4 of the report. It is the page which bears the signature of the Defendant Rosenberg.
"With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections in many lands can be resumed under a different guise." on the next page, the Tribunal will appreciate what the "exploitation of personal connections" involved.
Annex One to the document is headed, "To Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943." It is headed, "The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway During the War Years 1939-1940", and it reads:
"As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in Scandinavia only 'Nasjonal Samling' led in Norway by the Former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve, Vidkun Quisling, deserved serious political attention.
This was a fighting political group, possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic Community. Naturally all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent, by any means, its success among the population. The Bureau maintained constant liaison with Quisling and attentively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class, which had been taken in tow by the English.
"From the beginning, it appeared probable that without revolutionary events, which would stir the population from their former attitude, no successful progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected. During the winter 1936-1939, Quisling was privately visited by a member of the Bureau.
"When the political situation in Europe came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the Nordic Society in Luebeck in June. He expounded his conception of the situation, and his apprehensions concerning Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area, and to the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the Norwegian coast in case of a conflice between the Greater German Reich and Great Britain.
"Assuming that his statement would be of special interest to the Marshal of the Reich Goering for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State Secretary Koerner by the Bureau. The Staff Director of the Bureau, handed the Chief of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Fuehrer." stage of my presentation of the evidence, if I may, the Court will see how Quisling came into contace with Raeder. The Prosecution's submission with regard to this document is that it is another illustration of the close interweaving between between the political and military leadership of the Nazi State, of the close link between the professional soldiers and the professional thugs.