Q No. It never was turned back to the church people, either, was it?
A No. Out of this monastery, because the actual space was not sufficient for the large meetings in Vienna, we wanted an additional large museum which was to be open to the public. We started with this idea. We had many collections at our disposal, and put them there. Beyond that, we needed the strong cellars of this monastery for a place of safe-keeping for the many objects of art which we wanted and had to protect against bombing attacks. Adolf Hitler school was a thought entertained but briefly. I discussed it with one or more of my collaborators; then, however, I completely dropped this thought, first of all because it would have created very bad will if we had put an Adolf Hitler school into a space which had been church property before, and then also since we needed the monastery for other and more pressing reasons. unication from Bormann? when did you first discover that Bormann was so anti-religious and so anti-church as you told the Tribunal he was?
Q (Interposing) Just tell us when you found that out.
A I was just about to. His anti-religious attitude was shown most clearly by Bormann in the year 1943, but already beginning in the year 1937 he showed the first signs.
Q And this telegram from him was when ? 1941?
Q Mr. Witness, when did you first start to do business with Himmler?
Q (Interposing) Himmler?
A (Continuing) -- Himmler in 1929. That is the year I met him. In 1929 when I visited the party leadership, at that time he was the propaganda chief of the party, and that was our first meeting.
What I really wanted to know was when you and your youth groups started really to do business with him for the first time. And by "business" I mean arrangements such as the recruitment of young men into the Death's Head brigade of the SS. The agreement regarding the patrol service, the date of which I do not recollect at this moment, I believe was one of the first agreements which I concluded with him; and this was not an assurance of reinforcements for Death's head Units, but for police units. These were special troops to be at the disposal of the police. your youth organization to the SS? When was the last time that you remember this program's being effective?
A I did not artificially try to drive people into the SS. But I permitted the SS, just as I permitted the police, to recruit from among my youth.
Q I did not ask you that. I asked you when you would say was the latest date when you were effectively helping, at least, Himmler to get young candidates from the young people of Germany through your Hitler Youth Organization. I do not expect an exact date. Approximately? Army units. The SS and the Waffen SS carried on a very active recruitment among my youth which took place until the last days of the war, and I could do nothing to prevent this recruitment. of the war and the mid-days of the war, did you not? volunteered had to fight.
Q I was talking about something other than fighting. You knew what was going on in the East, and you knew who the guards were in the concentration camps, did you not?
I did not know that young men who volunteered to go into the Waffen SS were used to guard concentration camps. two of them yourself? fically for SS Death's Head troops. supervision of concentration camps or that it was being carried on through the Death's Head units. And aside from that, at that time, I saw the concentration camps to be something quite normal, as I testified this morning. that you found out about the extermination. And I want to talk to you about that a little bit, and ask you some questions, The first one is, How did you find out? Was it actually through this man Colin Ross?
A I said that I heard about these things through Colin Ross? that I could reach, because I wanted to find out something definite about these matters.
Q Really I asked you if, from any other source, did you find out? and you can answer that pretty simply. We know that you found out through Ross. Did you hear from anyone else what you found out?
THE PRESIDENT: I an sorry; I am not hearing.
THE WITNESS: I tried to have assurance and certainty-
THE PRESIDENT: Would you repeat that? The last thing I have is, he said he put questions to all sorts of persons he could find.
MR. DODD: Yes,sir. BY MR. DODD: way of the exterminations in the East?
A No. To all practical purposes, I could not get any definite knowledge.
A Most of the people did not have any information. They were not well in formed. I received anything that was positive and certain through the Warthe Gau. extermination of Jews, did you not/
Q (Interposing) Written reports, I mean. sent to the Reichs Defense Commissar for the attention of the completent official. And usually an expert in the department received the reports. They were transmitted to the inspector of the order police.
I have locked at the text which was submitted in Kaltenbrunner's case, but before then I never saw it.
Q You mean you did not know that it was arriving in your office?
A My office was the central office; it was not the office of the Reich Defense Commissar, and the affairs of the Reich Defense Commissar are the affairs handled by the Regierungspraesident. His expert concerned himself with the things coming in and going out every day. npt?
Q This was an SS report of a highly confidential nature, was it not? You were not just peddling this all ever Germany?
Q You got the 67th copy? to me, but they were sent to an expert, a Mr. Fischer, in this case.
Q And who was Mr. Fischer?
A I said this morning already that this name of Mr. Fischer does not mean anything to me. I assume that he was the special expert for Reich defense matters.
files.
MR. DODD: We ought to have a fall translation, Mr. President, because some of this we located too late. BY MR. DODD: from your files. And in there you will find -- and I will direct your attention to the page -- something I think will recall to your mind who Dr. Fischer is.
I think it is page 29. You will find the namesof persons to serve on the Reich Defense committee submitted; and you will find the name of Fischer, together with General Stuelpnagel, Major General Gauzia, Dr. Forster -- do you find that? This was your own Reich defense council before which you appeared from time to time, and with whom you met frequently. And I will show you documents on that, if you care to deny it.
A. Just a moment, please. Will you please repeat the page to me?
Q. Page 29; it is a memorandum dated the 28th of September, 1940.
Q. Do you find Fischer's name as one of thos suggested to your defense counsel? His is the last name, by the way, and his signature. He is the one that suggested the others to you.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, will you go a little bit more slowly?
MR. DODD: Yes.
A. He is mentioned here as the 20th name, "Regierungsrat Dr. Fischer, Expert for Reich Defense Matters." That means the expert for the Regierungspresident. Then, most probably I saw him at one meeting or the other. I take it that he kept the minutes. However, I have no personal recollection of this gentleman. I must dispute any recollection. I do not identify that name with anyone, but I assume that he was the one who received the mail coming in to the Reich Defense Commissar, and who kept the record. BY MR. DODD:
Q. All right.
A. He may have served in another capacity. He was of a rather low rank, and because of his junion status, he probably did not carry on any other functions.
Q. On page 31 of that same file you will find another reference to him, and your initials on the paper, at this time. It is the membership list of the Reichs Defense Committee. There are 20 persons on there, and the last name is Fischer's. At the bottom of the page are your initials, apparently approving the list. Do you see that?
A. Yes; I had to initial this list.
Q. And you approved the membership, did you not?
A. I do not wish to calim that if I were confronted with this man I would not recognize him. He seems to have been the official who kept the minutes. However, in this large circle of people who met at meetings of this kind, he did not come to my attention. I was not conscious of him. Only very few meetings of this type of the Reich Defense Council actually did taker place. This seems to me the decisive point, that I did not meet him personally, and he did not report personally.
Q. How could you fail to meet him? You met regularly in 1940 with this Reichs Defense Committee. We have some documents here, and I will be glad to show them to you, showing exactly what you said before that Committee.
A. Yes, he probably was the one who kept the minutes of the meetings.
Q. Well surely, then, you saw him on some occasions, certainly, between 1940, the date of these files, and 1942, the date of the SS reports on the exterminations. Apparently he was with you for two years before the first report that we have, which is dated 1942, and he was one of twenty on your Council.
A. I believe I must describe just how this Reichs Defense Committee was made up. This was a circle of the leading commanding generals of the Army and the Luftwaffe. There were several Gauleiters, and also present were the people who are mentioned here, Dr. Putt, the representative of the Fueherueng Staff Werkschaft, of the economic staff, and all the others who are listed here. In this large circle of people, this circle which I greeted on arrival, there was an official who kept the records and the minutes, who was among the many, many officials in my office. very infrequently. Dr. Fischer did not report to me all the time, and he did not show me the minutes of these sessions, but the Regierungspresident was the one who reported to me.
Q. Do you think that Heinrich Himmler or Reinhart Heydrich were sending these reports to inferior people around Germany in these Gaus about the exterminations in the East?
A. If these reports had been meant for me, they would have been sent to me directly. At any rate, I said today that I do not dispute having had knowledge of the shooting of Jews in the East, but at a later period of time, and I mentioned it in that connection. However, the reports themselves were not in my hand. If these reports had been before me, they would have had a certain notation, which I would recognize immediately.
Q. Well, let's see. Of course they are addressed to you, to the attention of Fischer.
I am going to move on a little bit. Now I am going to tell you that you got weekly reports. You haven't seen these. What do you say to that?
A. Weekly reports?
Q. Yes.
A. I received many, many from many different places.
Q. No, I am talking about one kind of report. I am talking about the reports from Heydrich and Himmler.
Q Well, you had better take a look. We have 55 of them, for 55 weeks. They are all here, and they run consecutively, and Dr. Fischer is not involved in these. Each one bears the stamp of your office having received it, and the date that it was received. to the Jews in the East. over at this time -- emanated from the Chief of the Security Police to the Office of the Reichs Defense Commissar. In the first document I can see that it is not signed or initialed by me; it shown the signature of the Regierungspresident. I did not receive these reports; otherwise my signature or sign would have been be there.
Q Dr. Mell Bruegge was the man who received them, according to the note, and he was your chief assistant. Incidentally, I think we ought to make this clear to the Tribunal, that both of your chief assistants were SS Brigade Fuehrers, were they not?
A I would have mentioned that anyway, that Dr. Mell Bruegge was one of the confidants of Himmler.
Q And he was your chief assistant, that is the point I am making. And your other chief assistant was also an SS Brigade Fuehrer. wish to accuse me of. there is one thing I do want to ask you.
Were you pretty friendly with Heydrich? an invitation to me as President of the Southeast Company. He invited me, and I did accept. However, I did not have a close, personal contact with Heydrich. terrorizing Czechoslovakia? was in Prague, wanted to carry out a policy of accommodation, especially as it applied to Czech workers.
In him I did not see an exponent of a policy of terror. Of course, I have no practical knowledge of the incidents which took place in Czechoslovakia; I only visited there once or twice.
Q You sent a telegram to "Dear Martin Bormann" when Heydrich was assassinated; do you remember that -- the man who was, I understand, not in your good standing in 1942? Do you remember when Heydrich was assassinated by some Czech patriots in Prague?
Q Do you remember what you did when you heard about it?
A No, I can't remember exactly.
"Reichsleiter Bormann; Berlin, Party Chancellery; express, urgent, immediate attention.
"Dear Martin Bormann:
"I request that the following be submitted to the Fuehrer.
"Knowing the Czechoslovak population and its attitude in Vienna as well as in the Protectorate, I would draw your attention to the following.
"The enemy powers and British cliques around Benesch have for a long time felt bitterly regarding the loyalty to be observed generally among the Czechoslovak workers and their contribution to German war economy. They are seeking for a means to play off the Czechoslovak population and the Reich against each other. The attempt of Heydrich was without doubt planned in London. The British arms of the assailant point to parachuted agents. London hopes by this attempt to induce the Reich to take draconian measures for the purpose of creating a resistance movement among Czechoslovak workers. In order to prevent the world thinking that the population of the Protectorate is in opposition to Hitler, these acts must immediately be branded as of British authorship. A sudden and violent air attack on a British cultural town would be the most efficacious, and the world would have to be informed thereof under the headline 'Revenge for Heydrich'. That alone should induce Churchill to desist immediately from plotting the outrages which have begun to occur in Prague. The Reich retaliates for the attack at Prague by a counter-attack. It is proposed to give the following information to the press tomorrow regarding the attempt on Heydrich's life."
it originated in Berlin. You sign it, "Heil Hitler, Dein, Schirach."
Do you remember sending that telegram to Bormann?
A I just listened to the English translation. I should like to see the German original, please.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you read, I thought, a British "coastal" town, did you not?
MR. DODD: No, "cultural", I meant to say, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is what I have got.
MR. DODD: Yes, it is "cultural". BY MR. DODD:
Q Incidentally, I call your attention, Mr. Witness, to the word "cultural You have expressed such a great interest in culture.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be all right to break off now, or do you want to go on?
MR. DODD: I hoped I could finish. I won't be many minutes, but I do have one or two rather important documents that I would Like to put to the witness.
Mr. President, if we recess, may I ask that the witness not be talked to by his counsel over night? I think it is only fair, when a witness is under corss-examination,that he not have conversations with his counsel.
THE WITNESS: I should like to say to this document -
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I should like to have this question clarified as to whether as a defense attorney I may talk with my client. Just a little while ago Mr. Dodd questioned the right of my talking with my client and , of course, I acquisced, But, If I am told now that I may not speak with my client until the end of the cross-examination, and if the cross-examination will be continued on Monday, then that would mean that I might not speak with my client tomorrow, and the day after not at all. But, in order to defend him and for his defense, I must have the opportunity to discuss the matters which were brought up here today and to discuss then with my client.
Mr DODD: Mr. President, I will withdrew my request. I forgot we were going over until Monday. I do think it is the ordinary rule, but I do think it might present some difficulty for the counsel here.
I want to be fair with the Tribunal. During the recess Dr. Sauter approached the witness stand and I did tell him then that I did not think he should talk with him during the recess while he was under cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is the British rule, but I think under the circumstances we had better let Dr. Sauter -
MR DODD: I quite agree. I was not thinking we would go beyond tomorrow but I do not want to interfere with his consortaion over the weekend.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 27 May 1946, at 10000 hours.)
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to make certain that I did offer the following documents in evidence:
3914-PS, which would become USA-863; 3943-PS, which would become USA-964; and 3877-PS, which would become USA-86 5.
THE PRESIDENT: Give me the first one.
MR. DODD: 3914-PS, which is USA-863.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. the witness-stand and testified further as follows:
CROSS-EXAMINATION (continued) BY MR. DODD:
Q. Mr. Witness, at the close of the session on Friday we had just handed to you a copy of the teletype message to Martin Bormann. I had read it to you over this transmission system. I wish to ask you now if you sent that message to Bormann.
A Yes, I did despatch that teletype message. And I should like to give an explanation in this connection -while that we will be talking, that you wait a moment after the question is given. It would help with the interpreting. I will try to do the same. And perhaps we will work a little better together. of "Du," the friendly "you," with Bormann. Bormann comes from the same town where I come from. I knew him from Weimar, but only slightly. When in 1928 or 1929, he came to Munich he paid a visit to me and because he was the older of us he offered no the "Du" on that occasion. We maintained that until in 1943 he on his own account, own initiative, dropped that form and addressed me in his letters with the less personal form of "Sic."
cerned, we were in the third year of the war. The Czech population both in the former Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia as well as Vienna had remained perfectly quiet. In the Protectorate conditions were almost like peacetime conditions. I had a very strong check of the population in Vienna. Because of the attempt on Heydrich's life I had to anticipate that there might be trouble in the Protectorate which no doubt would have serious repercussions in Vienna. This was the time when the German troops were advancing on the peninsula of Kertsch. It was a time when nothing could be allowed to happen behind our front. And simultaneously with the news of the murder of the Protector I received official notification that the attempt, as it is mentioned in this document, had been carried out by British agents and with a British weapon. reports that British Bombers had attacked living quarters in Hamburg and Paris and that they had attacked German cultural monuments at Kiel. Consequently I suggested reprisal measures, so as to ascertain the British guilt in this attempt to the world and so as to prevent serious trouble in Czechoslovakia. That's all I have to say. And this teletype message is genuine. ing translation during the cross-examination on Friday, if I May? On that occasion the German word, "Retter," was translated into English, "Saviour." A difficulty in translating from German and into English exists in this case. It is an expression which I have used in my book when I described the Fuehrer as a "Retter," a rescuer, a saviour. the difficulty is that you can only translate the German word with "saviour." But "saviour" in the German re-translation means "the holy man, the saintly man." So as to make it quite clear what the German "Retter" is meant to express in the English, I should have to use an auxiliary sentence and I would have to say that the exact translation would be "rescuer."
In that case the worldly significance of the word is more clearly expressed. And in the comparison of a head of the State, or the description of the head of the State, as the "saviour," there was no blasphemy meant or intended. If I had written in German that the head of the State was a saint, then, of course, that would be blasphemy.
THE PRESIDENT: This sort of explanation should be kept for re-examination. It is not a matter which ought to interrupt the cross-examination.
MR. DODD: I have only one of two additional questions on the subject of this message.
Cambridge, Oxford, Canterbury?
A No, I had no particular imagination in that connection. I thought that one ought to choose an objective which would correspond with the objectives hit by British bombers in Germany
Q As long as it was a cultural city. Were you thinking of what happened in Germany or of what happened to Heydrich? and I wanted to use this opportunity and suggest that it should be made unmistakeably clear that the murder of Heydrich had not been committed from amongst the Czech population but that it came originally from circles of Czech emigrants in London and had been done with British support. In the case of this hitting back in the third year of the war, there should be a reply to the attempt against Heydrich, combined with the reply to the attempt of hitting German cultural monuments. alleged bombings of cultural objects in Germany, did you?
A The Armed Forces communiques has already stated that. They had become generally known.
Q That is not what I asked you. Isn't it a fact that in this teletype you made no reference at all to the alleged bombing of cultural objects in Germany, nor did you relate your suggestion for the bombing of a cultural town in England to any alleged cultural bombing in Germany, but rather, you made it perfectly clear that you wanted to strike at a cultural town in England because of what had happened to Heydrich. That is so, isn't it? man cultural places. That was a fact that was known to the entire population of Germany from the daily attacks of British bombers. Heydrich, did you not?
A No, that is not true. I had considered Heydrich in this particular case to be the representative of our Reich in Bohemia and Moravia and not the Chief of the Gestapo.
A I knew that he was the Chief of the Gestapo. I did not know that he had committed that atrocities which have since become known.
Q You had no knowledge that he was considered "the terror of the Ges tapo"?
A That is an expression which the enemy's propaganda used against hi
Q You mean you still think it is propaganda? led a terror before he was killed in 1942?
Q How did you know it?
A I merely want to state here that the Reich Protector Heydrich, as*--* as I was concerned, was a different person during this third year of the war than the Chief of the Gestapo. We were concerned with a political measure. did you? Do you recall what else you suggested not long afterwards?
A No, I don't know. further so-called retaliation for the assasination of Heydrich?
Q You suggested evacuating all of the Czechs out of Vienna didn't you which goes back to something which occured in 1940 during a report of mine to the Headquarters and which the Fuehrer himself had said with reference to Vi I think I have already mentioned that during my own examination he said that Vienna was to become a German city and that the Jews, as well as the Czechs, were gradually to be evacuated from Vienna.
I said that during my own statement here
Q My question is. Isn't it a fact that a few days after the assasination of Heydrich you suggested the evacuation of the Czechs from Vienna as a retalitory measure for the assasination of Heydrich?
A It is possible, but I have no recollection of it. It is possible that during the excitement caused by this event, which upset me a great deal, I might have said something like that. Mr. President. Vienna City Council on June 6 1942, as you will see on page nine of the original. You were present, and according to these notes, you spoke as the Reichsleiter, Balder von Schiracht and, moving down toward the bottom of that page, you will find this statement:
"Finally, he--" meaning you--" disclosed that already in the latter part of summer or in the fall of this year all Jews would be removed from the city, and that the removal of the Czechs would then get underway, since this is the necessary and right answer to the crime committed against the Deputy Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia."
Do you remember saying that? genuine, and they seem to represent the sense of what I said at that time. I was very much excited about Heydrich's death. I was afraid of serious trouble in Bohemia and Moravia, and I have expressed it. that I did not do anything about it after that. not agree--that you made the two suggestions, at least: one for the bombing of a cultural English town and the other for the wholesale evacuation of the Czechs from Vienna, because of the assasination of this man Heydrich. Czechs. It is equally true, as a historical fact, that I dropped the thought and that it was never carried out. It is correct that I suggested the bombing of a British cultural place as an ans wer to the attempts against Heydrich and the answer to the numerous bombardments of German cultural places in the third year of the war during a time when they are vital matters for the German people concerned.
from Czechoslavakia as a punishment for the murder of Heydrich, didn't he?
A I don't know about that. rather seen this morning. You recall that on Friday we talked about your relation ship with the SS and with similar and I want to ask you this morning if it isn't a fact, Mr. Witness, that you worked very closely with Himmler and his SS from almost the earliest days right down to almost the last days of your regime in Vienna. I wish you would answer that quest on. feel that you have some necessary explanation, I feel you will be permitted to give it. Will you tell the Tribunal first of all, if you did closely cooperate with Himmler and his SS from the earliest days of our public office to the very late days of your public office? influence upon education did not exist.
Q Let us stop right there and inquire a little bit. Isn't it a fact that Himmler assigned SS personnel to you youth organisation for the training purpose of your young people? You can answer that very simply. Did he or did he not?
A Training purposes, educational purposes?
A I don't know anything about that. The fact that liason officers were as would not be unusual because practically all ministries and organizations had liaison officers, but I have no recollection of what you might be referring to.
Q. I think we had better clear this up first, and I ask you that you look at document 3931-PS, which is a new document which becomes USA 867, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: It will become what?
MR. DODD: USA 867. BY MR. DODD:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, if you will look at this document, you will observe that it is a message which you sent to "Dear Party Member Bormann" in August of 1941. It is quite long, and there won't be any necessity. I am sure, for reading all of it, but I want to direct your attention to some parts of it that might help your memory with respect to the SS. take over some of the training of young people,hadn't it, some time in the summer of 1941?
A. I think it was on Thursday that I said during my examination that in the spring of 1939 the SA had attempted to dominate the pre-military education of youth of two certain ages. I think that such attempts were repeated in 1941.
Q. You were complaining to Bormann about it when you wrote this message? You recall now, from just looking at the letter, that that is the whole substance of the letter -- a complaint about the attempt of the SA to directly control the training of some young people in the Hitler Youth Organization.
A. As far as this long telepring letter is concerned, I can not tell you anything about it without reading it through.
Q. Well, let's see. If you will turn -- It is the second page of the English text. You don't have any pages there. I think it is all one. It is all a teletype, but it is about -- not too far down on the first part of it. First of all, I want to have you see if you can find the statement that "The Hitler Youth has considered it necessary from the very beginning to make the Party itself the agency for the direction and administration of its military training."