If immediate conflict were unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German side, but for various reasons he would welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later time."
No question of welcoming the cancellation of a general conflict; the only concern of anybody is as to time.
"Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to that country but would develop into a general European war." Hitler from any immediate action. I quote two lines from the argument at the top of page 5 of the exhibit:
"For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany."
Then we get the Fuehrer's answer to those arguments, half-way down page 5:
"The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the condition of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations. Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September and Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously could not bombard or destroy the place."
They couldn't possibly bombard or destroy any place where there happened to be Germans living. Warsaw, Rotterdam, England, London - I wonder whether any sentiments of that kind were held in consideration in regard to those places.
"Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer's view, the Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer answered that this settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August. To the question of Ciano's as to what solution the Fuehrer proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer had made this proposal personally to Beck at his visit to Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. It return for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia, and even proposed to advance to Berlin." ing day.
On page 7, in the middle of the page, it will be seen:
"The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1) in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her political intention, she must be forced to do so."
I go to the last line on that page:
"As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist further in the world through lack of space; not only was there no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded by its present poss ession; they sat like misers with their heaps of gold and deluded themselves about their riches.
The Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet more easily because their interests did not clash on any point.
"The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy already was the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Fuehrer said that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had recognized it and had said as much in his well-known letter to Manzzini.
The interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there never could be a conflict between them.
"Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in yesterday's conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the West. The Fuehrer said that Poland must be struck down so that for 50 years" -- there appears to have been a question raised in the translation -- for so many years long she would have been incapable of fighting. "In such a case, matters in the West could be settled.
"Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear explanation of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite information on one point in order that the Duce might have allthe facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to mate no decision because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with Poland could be localized on the basis of long experience. He--Ciano--quite saw that so far the Fuehrer had always been right in his judgment of the position. tain measures of precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following question:
"The Fuehrer had mentioned two conditions under which he would take Poland (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation, and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The first of these conditions depended on the decision of the Fuehrer, and German reaction could follow it in a moment. The second condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realized that this date depended upon climatic conditions.
"The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must be made clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the decisive part of military operations against Poland could be carried out within a period of 14 days and the final liquidation would need another four weeks, it could be finished at the end of September or the beginning of October.
These could be regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore, that the last dates on which he could begin to take action was the end of August.
"Finally, the Fuehrer assured Ciano that since his youth he had favored German-Italian cooperation, and that no other view was expressed in his books. He had always thought that Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since there were no conflicts of interest between them. He was personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in history; that he could be this man's friend was for him a matter of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce."
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for ten minutes.
(Whereupon at 1155 hours a ten-minute recess was taken.)
(The Tribunal resumed at 12.15 p.m.)
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: If the Tribunal please, I never actually put that last document that I was referring to in as an exhibit.
It is showing that at the same time the economists had not been idle.
It is a Fuhrer.
He says:
"My Fuhrer!
"I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday.
How happy and how grateful to you we ought to be for being "ranted the favor of experiencing these over "The information given to me by Field Marshal Goering, that you, my happy.
I hereby report to you with all respect that I have succeeded by not affect us in the least.
In the meantime I have quite inconspicuously German economy abroad which it was possible to lay hands on.
Under the serious shocks.
I have considered it my duty as the general plenipoten "Heil my Fuhrer /signed/ Walter Funk."
Obersalzburg to his commanders in chief. By the third week of August, preparations were complete.
That speech has already been read to the Tribunal.
I would, perhaps, ask the Tribunal's patience if I quoted On the first nape of PS-1014, which is already US-30, the fourth line:
"Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we ware determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers."
The second paragraph:
"Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.
Even if war should objective."
Again, the famous sentence in the third paragraph:
"I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never mind whether it be plausible or not.
The victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not.
In starting and making a war, not the Richt is what matters but Victory."
I turn to the next page, the third paragraph:
"It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later.
I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought wards against the East."
significant as we continue the story of the last few days:
"We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc.
It is a big arm, which demands great efforts.
I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund "The political arm is set farther.
A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony.
The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations."
And, again, the very last line becomes significant later:
"Goering answers with thanks to the Fuhrer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty."
constitution of the Free City. I put in the next document, which is time.
That is TC-72, Number 62, which becomes GB-50.
Nazi Government with the aid of the SS. The Tribunal has already heard in which he referred to the provision of Polish uniforms to the SS about on the German side of the frontier.
I refer the Tribunal now Blue Book.
They are reports from the British Ambassador in Warsaw.
The first of them, TC-72, No. 53, which becomes GB-51, is dated "Series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German "Polish patrol met party Germans one kilometre from East Prussian frontier near Pelta.
Germans opened fire. Polish "German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo, "Gazeta Polska, in inspired leader, today says these are more than incidents.
They are clearly prepared acts of aggression army's arms, and in one case it was a regular army detachment.
"These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong attitude of defence.
Facts spoke for themselves and acts of aggression came from German side.
This was best answer to "Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment has since shot Pole across frontier and wounded another."
I pass to the next report, TC-72, No. 54, which becomes GB-52.
"Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story Story is without any foundation whatever."
"So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill "2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by Polish civil authorities.
Warsaw, and so far as I can "3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda "4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since March--"were ready to go against Poland--"that has since March exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities.
I suppose this has been done with object (a) creating war spirit in Germany (b) impressing public opinion abroad (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent "5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two "6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by "7. German treatment" of Czech Jews and Polish minority is "8. In face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if "9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister prove that Herr Hitler's allegations regarding German minority are false."
And I again weigh further corroboration of General Lahousen's evidence in a memoranda, which has been captured, in a conversation between the writer and Keitel. It is PS-795, and it becomes GB 64. That conversation with Keitel took place on the 17th of August, and from the memorandum I quote the first paragraph:
"I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that He agrees that I instruct the General Staff.
He says that he does not think much of actions of this kind.
However, he had planned the execution of this special action.
In be executed only by the Army."
week in August -- I mean at the end of the third week in August. On the 22nd of August, the Russian--German-Non-aggression Pact was signed in Moscow, and we have heard in Hitler's speech of that date to his commanders in chief what has gone down as a shock to the rest of the world. In fact, the orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that Treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of the 25th of August. Orders were given to invade Poland in the early hours of the 25th of August, and that I shall prove in a moment. ment was signed in Moscow, news reached England that it was being signed, and that, of course, the significance of it from a military point of view as to Germany apparently in the present circumstances was obvious, and the British Government immediately made their position clear in one last hope, and that one last hope, if it was a hope, was that the German Government might possibly think better, and I refer to Document TC 72 No. 56; it is the first document in the next to the last part of the Tribunal Document Book, in which the Prime Minister wrote to Hitler.
That is Document Book GB 55:
"Your Excellency.
"Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures taken by His Majesty's Government, and announced in the press and on the wireless this evening.
"These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it can not alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland, which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfill.
"It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going too far,
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: "It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.
"If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to forsee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured." try to solve the difficulty without the course to the use of force, and they suggested that a truce should be declared while direct discussions between the two governments, the Poland and German Governments, might take place. I quote in Prime Minister Chamberlain's language:
"At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the grave consequences to humanity, which may follow from the action of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put before you." Prime Minister Chamberlain, and that document is TC 72 No. 60, and it becomes GB 56. He started off by saying that Germany has always sought England's friendship, and goes on and says that, "Like every other State possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible to renounce." I quote the third paragraph as follows:
"Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig, and of the Corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization against Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards Roumania, Hungary, etc., as well as the so-called guarantee declarations, which were subsequently given, had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to "negotiate on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also.
"The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland that she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement thence-forward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German inhabitants living in Poland."
which I just referred:
"The atrocities which then have been taking place in that country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a Great Power such as the German Reich, which is expected to remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic strangulation."
It goes on and says that "Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution of the Germans," and the fact there is a British guarantee to Poland makes no difference to its determination to end this state of affairs. I quote from paragraph 7:
"The German Reich Government has received information to the effect that the British Government has the intention to carry out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures other than those of a defensive character against England, or France, and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended, and does not in the future intend, to attack England, or France, it follows that this announcement, as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich.
I, therefore, inform your Excellency that in the event of these military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate moblization of the German forces."
If the intention of the German Government had been peaceful. If they really wanted peace and not war, what was the purpose of these lines, of these lines saying that they had never intended to attack England or France, and carry out no mobilization. In view of what we now have, what we know to be in those lines, what again was their intention, adding again the expression, of peaceful settlemtn of the Danzig question, when I quote again from the last paragraph:
"The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles distate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life fought for Anglo German friendship; the attitude adopted by British diplomacy - at any rate up to the present - has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be happier than I." assistance was signed in London. It is unnecessary to read that document. The Tribunal will be wall aware of its contents where both governments undertake to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression against either by any third power. I quote document TC-73, No. 91 which becomes GB-57. I shall refer to a letter between the British Prime Minister, and refer also to a similar correspondence which took place a few days later between the French Prime Minister Daladier and Hitler.
I invite your attention to this because it is desired to show how deliberately the German Government was set about their pattern of aggression. "The French Ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your personal communication," written on the 26th August.
"In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility which two heads of the Governments can possibly take upon themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great nations, who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to you personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of peace still rests in your hands.
"You can doubt whether my own feelings towards Germany, nor France peaceful feelings--" I think that must be a mistake. It should be, "You cannot doubt".
THE PRESIDENT: "You cannot doubt what are my own feelings"
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: Yes, I am obliged to you sir.
"I cannot doubt" I think that should be. I think that must be a mistake. I think that must be it.
"You cannot doubt but what are my own feelings towards Germany, nor France's peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations not only peace, but also sincere cooperation in their own interests, as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. Unless you credit the French people with lower sense of honor, than I credit the German Nation with; you cannot doubt that France loyaly fulfills her obligations towards other powers, such as Poland, which as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace with Germany.
"These two convictions are fully compatible.
"Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution of the international crisis, with all honor and dignity for all nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.
"Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland's readiness, which she has always shown to submit to the mutual application of a method of open settlement, as it can be imagined between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the clearest conscience I can assure you that among the differences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such a method, the purpose of reaching a peaceful and just solution.
"Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in France's clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies, which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state of mind.
"In so serious an hour, I sincerely believe that no high minded human being could understand it, if a war of destruction was started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace could in all certainty work for this aim, without any prejudice to German honour. I, who desire good harmony between the French and the German people, and who am on the other hand bound to Poland by bonds of friendship, and by a promise, am prepared, as head of the French Government, to do everything an upright man can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion.
You and I were in the trenches in the last war. "You know, as I do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war have left in the conscience of the peoples; without any regard to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind's eye of your outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road of peace, towards the fulfilment of its task in the common work of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion.
"If French and German blood should be shed again, as it was shed 25 years ago, in a still longer and more murderous war, then each of the two nations will fight, believing in its own victory. But the most certain victors will be - destruction and barbarity."
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will adjourn now until two o'clock.
(Whereupon at 1300 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1400 hours). Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
COLONEL STOREY: If it please the Tribunal, with the consent of Mr. Jones may I make an announcement to the Defense Counsel.
This evening at 7:30, in the courtroom there will be a showing of the remainder of the moving pictures which the United States intends to introduce in evidence. At 7:30, in the courtroom this evening, the remainder of the motion pictures which the United States will offer in evidence will be shown for the Defense Counsel. We urge that all of them come at 7:30.
DR. DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): I believe I should explain in the name of the defense that in regard to films it doesn't seem necessary to ask that the films be shown twice. We recognize the cooperation of the prosecution in this respect, but our evenings are very much taken up by the preparation of the defense and talking to our clients. ments. Documents have to be read in advance, but inasmuch as the witnesses are only coming up during the main proceedings, the movie will only be used during the main proceedings, and I don't really believe that the prosecution will have to take the trouble to show us the movies twice, the night before as well as the day after. only that we are so very much preoccupied with our preparations that we do not have the time to come at night. But I repeat that we recognize the cooperation of the prosecution very much indeed. I would like you to understand my words in this respect.
THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand that you think it will be unnecessary for the Defendants' Counsel to have a preview of the films, to see them before they are produced in evidence? Is that what you are saying?
DR. DIX: That is what I said, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am not sure that you were here when Dr. Dix began his observations, but I understand that what he says is that in view of the amount of preparation which the Defendant's Counsel have to undertake, they do not consider it necessary to have a view of these films before they are produced in evidence, but at the same time he wishes to express his gratification at the cooperation of the Counsel for the prosecution.
COLONEL STOREY: Very agreeable. It's all right with us. We were doing it for their benefit.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: When the Tribunal rose for the adjournment, I had just read the letter from M. Daladier of the 26th of August. On the 27th of August, Hitler replied to that letter, and I think it unnecessary to read the reply. The sense of it was very much the same as that which he wrote to the British Prime Minister in answer to the letter that he had received earlier in the week. in evidence as GB-58, so perhaps the Tribunal would treat both those letters as the same number. After that, nobdoy could say that the German Government was in any doubt as to the position that was to be taken up by both the British and French Governments in the event of German aggression against Poland.
But the pleas for peace did not end there. On the 24th of August, President Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and to the President of the Polish Republic, I quote only the first few paragraphs of his letter:
"In the message which I sent you on the 14th April, I stated that it appeared to be that the leaders of great nations had it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impended, but that, unless the effort were immediately made, with good mil on all sides, to find a peaceful and constructive solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world was confronting must end in catastrophe appears to be very near at hand indeed" Tribunal will forgive me if I read a little slower.