The Polish Government alleges that they wrote, as indeed they did, the German Government on the 26 of March, giving their point of view, that they then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and German Governments of the City of Danzig, based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal affairs. They said they were prepared to examine the possibilities of a motor road and railway facilities and that they received no reply to those proposals.
"It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland", which, of course, in a word, summarizes the whole position of the Polish point of view. And thereafter, they reject the German accusation that the Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish agreement. agreements with other nations and lastly, on the next page, they say that they are still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do so. two letters, to which I referred only a few minutes ago, it becoming G.B. 41, on the bottom of the page there is a figure 614, on the first page of that Exhibit, "Directives From Hitler and Keitel Preparing for War and The Invasion of Poland," I would refer to page 6 of that particular Exhibit. The page number will be found at the bottom of the page, in the center. It is a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; it is signed by Hitler. It is dated the 10th of May. It goes to the various branches of the OKW, and with it apparently were enclosed "Instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy."
I only mention it now to show better that throughout this time preparations for the immediate aggression were continuing.
That document will still be part of the same Exhibit.
Again, on the next page, which is headed "C-120 L", is set out a precis only, not a translation, and therefore perhaps I will not read it. But it is the annex, showing the "Directives for the war against the enemy economy and measures of protection for our economy." being carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment. May 1939, finishes really with that famous meeting or conference in the Reichschancellery on the 23 of May, about which the Tribunal has already heard. It is L-79 and is now already U.S.A.27 and it was referred to, I think, and has been known as the Schmundt Minutes. It is the last document which is in the Tribunal's Document Book and I do not propose to read anything of it. It has been read already and the Tribunal will remember that it was the speech in which Hitler was crying out for "lebensraum" and said that Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding their living room in the east, and where he said that the decision had been taken to attack Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you remind me of the date of it?
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: The 23rd of May 1939. among many others, were present. It has three particular lines that I want to remind the Tribunal of:
"If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England."
attack Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France.
final preparations taken from June to the beginning of the war, at the beginning of September. If the Tribunal will glance at the index to the Document Book, they will find I have, for convenience, divided the evidence up under four subheadings: Final Preparations of the Armed Forces, Economic Preparations, the Famous Obersalzburg Speeches, and the Political or Diplomatic Preparations Urging On Of The Crisis and the Justification for the Invasion of Poland. dealing with the final preparations of the Armed Forces. It again is an Exhibit containing various documents, and I refer particularly to the second document, dated the 22nd of June 1939. This is Document C-126, which will become GB.45. called for. Now, here it is.
"The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a 'preliminary timetable' for 'Fall Weiss' based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this timetable.
"The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points:
"1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and for the exercise units it is intended to form for these maneuvers.
"It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments."
All this became relevant, particularly relevant later, where we find the German Government making allegations of mobilization on the part of the Poles.
Here we have it in May or rather June, they are mobilizing, only doing so secretly.
"For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out." it will be seen that that Order is signed by the Defendant Keitel. I think it is unnecessary to read any further from that document. There is, which will save turning back, if I might take it rather out of date now, the first document on that front page of that Exhibit, a short letter dated the 2nd of August. It is only an extract, I am afraid, as it appears in the translation.
"Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out 'Fall Weiss' remaining unchanged. F.O. U-Boats is handing in his Operation Orders by 12 August." U-boats were to go out into the Atlantic "by way of precaution in the event of the intention to carry out 'Fall Weiss' remaining unchanged."
I turn to the next document in the Tribunal's book, C-30, which becomes GB.46. That is a letter dated the 27th of July. It contains orders for the Air and Sea Forces for the occupation of the German Free City of Danzig.
"The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy the Danzig Free State immediately in order to protect the German population. There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms."
It then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this again becomes more relevant when we discuss the diplomatic action of the last few days before the war, when Germany was purporting to make specious offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means.
I would like to offer this as evidence that the decision had been taken and nothing was going to move him from that decision. That document, as set out, says that "There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms." Nevertheless, that was not the only condition upon which the occupation was to take place and we find that during July, right up to the time of the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to prepare them to take part in the coming occupation. GB.47, where there are set out a few only of the reports which were coming back almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, the Consul-General in Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister. The sum total of those reports can be found in the British Blue Book. I now would refer to only two of them, as examples of the kind of thing that was happening. the 1st of July 1939.
"Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig Heimwehr.
"All approaches to hills and dismantled fort, which constitute a popular public promenade on western fringe of the city, have been closed with barbed wire and 'verboten' notices.
"The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards: 'Comrades keep your mouths shut lest you regret consequence.'
"Master of British steamer 'High Commissioner Wood', whilst he was roving Koenigsberg from 28th June to 30th June, observed considerable military activity, including extensive shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar material by small coasting vessels. On 28th June four medium-sized steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, etc., left Koenigsberg, ostensibly returning to Hamburg after maneuvers, but actually proceeding to Stettin. Names of Steamers", and so forth. of the exhibit, dated the 10th of July, states:
"The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me that on 8th July he personally saw about thirty military lorries with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg, where numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges. There were also eight large anti-aircraft guns in position, which he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three six-barreled light anti-aircraft machine guns. There were about 500 men drilling with rifles, and the whole place is extensively fortified with barbed wire."
I don't think it is necessary to occupy the Tribunal's time in reading more. be found in the British Blue Book, which set out the arming and preparation on the free city of Danzig. practically complete -- and it will be remembered that they had to be complete for an invasion of Poland on the 1st of September -- we find Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop at last disclosing their intentions to their allies the Italians.
One of the passages in Hitler's speech on the 23rd of May, it will be remembered -- I will not quote it now because the document has been read before. However, in a passage in that speech Hitler, in regard to his proposed attack on Poland, had said, "Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and the Japanese." his Italian comrades, and does so in the hope that they will join him. than a few passages. The meeting can be summarized generally by saying, as I have, that Hitler is trying to persuade the Italians to come into the war with him. The Italians, or Ciano, rather, is most surprised. He had no idea, as he says, of the urgency of the matter, and they are not prepared. He, therefore, is trying to dissuade Hitler from starting off so soon until the Duce can have had a little more time to prepare himself. meeting is that they show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and France ultimately, anyway, if not at the same time as Poland.
I refer the Tribunal to the second page of the exhibit. Hitler is trying to show the strength of Germany, the certainty of winning the war, and therefore he hopes to persuade the Italians to come in.
"At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements in prospect." I quote from the top of the second page. "Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction could be taken into service. As far as the land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been called to the colors." England. We have been concentrating rather on Poland, but here his thoughts are turned entirely toward England.
"If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions and one armoured division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any fighters since, at the outbreak of war, the German Air Force would at once attack England and the English fighters would be urgently needed for the defense of their own country.
"With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland -- which would not take long -- Germany would be in a position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt"--doubts which, perhaps, in view of the subsequent performances, were well justified.
"The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in this respect." such a threat to Germany on Germany's Eastern Frontier.
"If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas was different. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews, and nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less in number than the total population and, as already said, their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the shortest time.
"Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation."
I pass on to the next page, at the top of the page:
"Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and northeasterly direction of a German policy.
The east and north-east, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions."
Now we get the truth of this matter. It is not the persecution of German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but economic reasons, the need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland.
"In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Danzig was a Nurnberg of the North, an ancient German city awaking sentimental feelings for every German, and the Fuehrer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav tends and that a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this kind.
"Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer's statement, first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion the Danzig question would be settled in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made plans for a period of two or three years.
If immediate conflict were unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German side, but for various reasons he would welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later time."
No question of welcoming the cancellation of a general conflict; the only concern of anybody is as to time.
"Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to that country but would develop into a general European war." Hitler from any immediate action. I quote two lines from the argument at the top of page 5 of the exhibit:
"For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany."
Then we get the Fuehrer's answer to those arguments, half-way down page 5:
"The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the condition of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations. Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September and Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously could not bombard or destroy the place."
They couldn't possibly bombard or destroy any place where there happened to be Germans living. Warsaw, Rotterdam, England, London - I wonder whether any sentiments of that kind were held in consideration in regard to those places.
"Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer's view, the Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer answered that this settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August. To the question of Ciano's as to what solution the Fuehrer proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer had made this proposal personally to Beck at his visit to Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. It return for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia, and even proposed to advance to Berlin." ing day.
On page 7, in the middle of the page, it will be seen:
"The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1) in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her political intention, she must be forced to do so."
I go to the last line on that page:
"As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist further in the world through lack of space; not only was there no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded by its present poss ession; they sat like misers with their heaps of gold and deluded themselves about their riches.
The Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet more easily because their interests did not clash on any point.
"The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy already was the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Fuehrer said that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had recognized it and had said as much in his well-known letter to Manzzini.
The interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there never could be a conflict between them.
"Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in yesterday's conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the West. The Fuehrer said that Poland must be struck down so that for 50 years" -- there appears to have been a question raised in the translation -- for so many years long she would have been incapable of fighting. "In such a case, matters in the West could be settled.
"Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear explanation of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite information on one point in order that the Duce might have allthe facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to mate no decision because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with Poland could be localized on the basis of long experience. He--Ciano--quite saw that so far the Fuehrer had always been right in his judgment of the position. tain measures of precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following question:
"The Fuehrer had mentioned two conditions under which he would take Poland (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation, and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The first of these conditions depended on the decision of the Fuehrer, and German reaction could follow it in a moment. The second condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realized that this date depended upon climatic conditions.
"The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must be made clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the decisive part of military operations against Poland could be carried out within a period of 14 days and the final liquidation would need another four weeks, it could be finished at the end of September or the beginning of October.
These could be regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore, that the last dates on which he could begin to take action was the end of August.
"Finally, the Fuehrer assured Ciano that since his youth he had favored German-Italian cooperation, and that no other view was expressed in his books. He had always thought that Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since there were no conflicts of interest between them. He was personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in history; that he could be this man's friend was for him a matter of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce."
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for ten minutes.
(Whereupon at 1155 hours a ten-minute recess was taken.)
(The Tribunal resumed at 12.15 p.m.)
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: If the Tribunal please, I never actually put that last document that I was referring to in as an exhibit.
It is showing that at the same time the economists had not been idle.
It is a Fuhrer.
He says:
"My Fuhrer!
"I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday.
How happy and how grateful to you we ought to be for being "ranted the favor of experiencing these over "The information given to me by Field Marshal Goering, that you, my happy.
I hereby report to you with all respect that I have succeeded by not affect us in the least.
In the meantime I have quite inconspicuously German economy abroad which it was possible to lay hands on.
Under the serious shocks.
I have considered it my duty as the general plenipoten "Heil my Fuhrer /signed/ Walter Funk."
Obersalzburg to his commanders in chief. By the third week of August, preparations were complete.
That speech has already been read to the Tribunal.
I would, perhaps, ask the Tribunal's patience if I quoted On the first nape of PS-1014, which is already US-30, the fourth line:
"Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we ware determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers."
The second paragraph:
"Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.
Even if war should objective."
Again, the famous sentence in the third paragraph:
"I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never mind whether it be plausible or not.
The victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not.
In starting and making a war, not the Richt is what matters but Victory."
I turn to the next page, the third paragraph:
"It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later.
I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought wards against the East."
significant as we continue the story of the last few days:
"We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc.
It is a big arm, which demands great efforts.
I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund "The political arm is set farther.
A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony.
The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations."
And, again, the very last line becomes significant later:
"Goering answers with thanks to the Fuhrer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty."
constitution of the Free City. I put in the next document, which is time.
That is TC-72, Number 62, which becomes GB-50.
Nazi Government with the aid of the SS. The Tribunal has already heard in which he referred to the provision of Polish uniforms to the SS about on the German side of the frontier.
I refer the Tribunal now Blue Book.
They are reports from the British Ambassador in Warsaw.
The first of them, TC-72, No. 53, which becomes GB-51, is dated "Series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German "Polish patrol met party Germans one kilometre from East Prussian frontier near Pelta.
Germans opened fire. Polish "German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo, "Gazeta Polska, in inspired leader, today says these are more than incidents.
They are clearly prepared acts of aggression army's arms, and in one case it was a regular army detachment.
"These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong attitude of defence.
Facts spoke for themselves and acts of aggression came from German side.
This was best answer to "Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment has since shot Pole across frontier and wounded another."
I pass to the next report, TC-72, No. 54, which becomes GB-52.
"Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story Story is without any foundation whatever."
"So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill "2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by Polish civil authorities.
Warsaw, and so far as I can "3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda "4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since March--"were ready to go against Poland--"that has since March exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities.
I suppose this has been done with object (a) creating war spirit in Germany (b) impressing public opinion abroad (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent "5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two "6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by "7. German treatment" of Czech Jews and Polish minority is "8. In face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if "9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister prove that Herr Hitler's allegations regarding German minority are false."