"He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw students' demonstrations during Count Ciano's visit." I think I can go straight on to the larger paragraph, which commences with "Further."
"Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland's frontiers in exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between you and him in Warsaw" -that is, between him, of course, and Mr. Beck.
"He said that there had been further conversations between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an unfavourable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. M. von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the Chancellor only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favour of good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression that difficulties arising between us were also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich's real aims. The problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion our two States were dependent on each other." Briefly, Ribbentrop emphasizes the German argument as to why Dating should return to the Reich, and I turn to the first paragraph on the following page.
"I stated" -- that is Mr. Lipski -- "I stated that now, during the settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no understanding whatever between us.
The Czech issue was already hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes over the Czechs -
THE PRESIDENT: "With the Czechs."
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon.
"-- with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphasized our community of race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we had given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious blow to our relations.
"Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that this could be discussed.
"I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk over this matter. He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his offers.
"Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania.
"Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the latter's return from Rome, and they had discussed the Memel question, which called for a solution."
That conversation took place on the 21st of March. It wasn't very long before the world knew what the solution to Memel was. On the next day German armed forces marched in. is unnecessary -- turn over to TC-72, Number 17, which becomes GB-39. anxiety was growing both in the Government of Great Britain and the Polish Government, and the two Governments therefore had been undertaking conversations between each other.
On the 31st March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons, and he explained that as a result of the conversations that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments -- I quote from the last but one paragraph of his statement:
"As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.
"I may add that the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government!" Anglo-Polish Government, which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister had given a week before, and in which Poland assumed Great Britain of her support should she, Great Britain, be attacked.
I needn't read it all. Infect, I needn't read any of it. It is TC-72, Number 18. I put it in as GB-40. were feeling at that time appears to have been well justified. During the same week, on the 3rd of April, the Tribunal will see in the next document an order signed by Keitel. It emanated from the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3rd April 1939. The subject is "Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40.
"Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being reissued.
"Part I (Frontier Defence) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.
"Part II 'Fall Weiss'" -- which is the code name for the operation against Poland -- "Part II, 'Fall Weiss', is attached herewith. The signature of the Fuehrer will be appended later.
"The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to 'Fall Weiss':
"1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operations can be carried out at any time from 1st September 1939 onwards." This is in April, the beginning of April.
"2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for 'Fall Weiss' and to arrange by conferences the synchronised timings between the three branches of the armed forces.
"3. The plan of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the time-table must be submitted to the OKW by the 1st of May, 1939." the heading "Distribution", went to the OKH, OKM, OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Are those words at the top part of the document, or are they just notes?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: They are part of the document.
THE PRESIDENT: "Directives from Hitler and Keitel, Preparing for War."
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon; no, they are not. The document starts from under the -words "Translation of document signed by Keitel."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: The first words being "Top Secret." "Distribution", it will be seen that there follows a translation of another document, dated 11th of April, and that document is signed by Hitler.
"I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of the war." No question about war, "conduct of the war."
"Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:
"I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and protection against surprise air attacks.
"II. 'Fall Weiss'.
"III. The annexation of Danzig.
"Annexe IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development." Annexe I is set out, which is the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich, and I would quote from Paragraph (2) under "Special Orders."
"Legal Basis.
"It should be anticipated that a state of Defence or State of War, as defined in the Reichsdefense law of the 4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be based on the laws valid in peacetime."
My Lord, that document is C-120. It becomes GB-41. It contains some other later documents to which I shall refer back in chronological order.
by the Anglo-Polish communique of the 6th of April, was seized upon by the Nazi Government to urge on, as it were, the crisis which they were developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland. they alleged that the Anglo-Polish declaration was incompatible with the 1934 Agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by reason of entering into that Agreement, Poland had unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement. that document:
"The German Government have taken note of the Polish-
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the reference to it?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: It is TC-72, Number 14. It becomes GB-42. complete dishonesty of the whole document on the face of it.
"The German Government have taken note of the Polish-British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish Government and the British Government a temporary understanding to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement which will provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two states being directly or indirectly threatened." the history of German friendship towards Poland. I quote from the last paragraph, paragraph 5, on that page:
"The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish Government with the British Government is in such obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago that the German Government can take note only with surprise and astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy.
"Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement is intended as a regular Pact of Alliance, which, by reason of its general sense and of the present state of political relations, is directed exclusively against Germany.
"From the obligation now accepted by the Polish government, it appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take an active part in any possible German-British conflict, in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 declaration."
"Paragraph 7: Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government. In view of this, the German Government are obliged to conclude that the Polish Government do not at present attach any importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by means of direct, friendly discussion with the German Government. The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path traced out in 1934 to the shaping of German-Polish relations." fact that orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable. negotiations and discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st, which the government had made; the return of Danzig, the autobahn, the railway and the promise by Germany of the twenty-five years' guarantee and I go down to the last but one paragraph on page 3 of the Exhibit, under the heading (1):"The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of Poland's frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent strengthening of the friendly, neighbourly relations between the two countries.
The Polish Government even rejected German proposals made with this object.
"At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to another state, political obligations which are not compatible either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the German-Polish declaration of the 26 of January, 1934. Thereby, the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration null and void." nevertheless, they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland. speech in the Reichstag, 28 of April, in which he repeated, in effect the terms of the memorandum. This is Document C-72 Number 13, which becomes G.B. 43. I would only refer the Tribunal to the last part of the second page of the translation. He has again repeated the demands and offers that Germany made in March and he goes on to say that the Polish Government have rejected his offer and lastly:
"I have regretted greatly that this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government--" -- I beg your pardon -- "I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government. Bat that alone is not the decisive fact. The worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia, a year ago, believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me.
This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a question which intimately affects the German people, by a truly unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all doubt, that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the International Press, led, as you know, to the so-called guarantee offer, and to an obligation on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance."
It is unnecessary, My Lord, to read more of that. It shows us, as I say, how completely dishonest everything that the German Government was saying at that time. There was Hitler, probably with a copy of the orders for "Fall Weiss" in his pocket, as he spoke, saying that the intention to attack by Germany was an invention of the International Press. Government issued a memorandum on the 28 of April. It is set out in the next Exhibit, TC-72 Number 16, which becomes G.B. 44. It is unnecessary to read more than-
THE PRESIDENT: It is stated as the 5 of May, not the 28th of April.
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: I beg your pardon, yes, on the 5th of May. that reply. I can summarize the document in a word. It sets out the objectives of the 1934 agreement to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly relationship between the two countries; to solve difficulties by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish Government appreciates that there are difficulties about Danzig and have long been ready to carry out discussions. They set out again their part of the recent discussions and I turn to the second page of the document, the one but last paragraph or perhaps I should go back a little, to the top of that page, the first half of that page.
The Polish Government alleges that they wrote, as indeed they did, the German Government on the 26 of March, giving their point of view, that they then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and German Governments of the City of Danzig, based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal affairs. They said they were prepared to examine the possibilities of a motor road and railway facilities and that they received no reply to those proposals.
"It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland", which, of course, in a word, summarizes the whole position of the Polish point of view. And thereafter, they reject the German accusation that the Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish agreement. agreements with other nations and lastly, on the next page, they say that they are still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do so. two letters, to which I referred only a few minutes ago, it becoming G.B. 41, on the bottom of the page there is a figure 614, on the first page of that Exhibit, "Directives From Hitler and Keitel Preparing for War and The Invasion of Poland," I would refer to page 6 of that particular Exhibit. The page number will be found at the bottom of the page, in the center. It is a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; it is signed by Hitler. It is dated the 10th of May. It goes to the various branches of the OKW, and with it apparently were enclosed "Instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy."
I only mention it now to show better that throughout this time preparations for the immediate aggression were continuing.
That document will still be part of the same Exhibit.
Again, on the next page, which is headed "C-120 L", is set out a precis only, not a translation, and therefore perhaps I will not read it. But it is the annex, showing the "Directives for the war against the enemy economy and measures of protection for our economy." being carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment. May 1939, finishes really with that famous meeting or conference in the Reichschancellery on the 23 of May, about which the Tribunal has already heard. It is L-79 and is now already U.S.A.27 and it was referred to, I think, and has been known as the Schmundt Minutes. It is the last document which is in the Tribunal's Document Book and I do not propose to read anything of it. It has been read already and the Tribunal will remember that it was the speech in which Hitler was crying out for "lebensraum" and said that Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding their living room in the east, and where he said that the decision had been taken to attack Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you remind me of the date of it?
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: The 23rd of May 1939. among many others, were present. It has three particular lines that I want to remind the Tribunal of:
"If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England."
attack Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France.
final preparations taken from June to the beginning of the war, at the beginning of September. If the Tribunal will glance at the index to the Document Book, they will find I have, for convenience, divided the evidence up under four subheadings: Final Preparations of the Armed Forces, Economic Preparations, the Famous Obersalzburg Speeches, and the Political or Diplomatic Preparations Urging On Of The Crisis and the Justification for the Invasion of Poland. dealing with the final preparations of the Armed Forces. It again is an Exhibit containing various documents, and I refer particularly to the second document, dated the 22nd of June 1939. This is Document C-126, which will become GB.45. called for. Now, here it is.
"The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a 'preliminary timetable' for 'Fall Weiss' based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this timetable.
"The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points:
"1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and for the exercise units it is intended to form for these maneuvers.
"It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments."
All this became relevant, particularly relevant later, where we find the German Government making allegations of mobilization on the part of the Poles.
Here we have it in May or rather June, they are mobilizing, only doing so secretly.
"For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out." it will be seen that that Order is signed by the Defendant Keitel. I think it is unnecessary to read any further from that document. There is, which will save turning back, if I might take it rather out of date now, the first document on that front page of that Exhibit, a short letter dated the 2nd of August. It is only an extract, I am afraid, as it appears in the translation.
"Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out 'Fall Weiss' remaining unchanged. F.O. U-Boats is handing in his Operation Orders by 12 August." U-boats were to go out into the Atlantic "by way of precaution in the event of the intention to carry out 'Fall Weiss' remaining unchanged."
I turn to the next document in the Tribunal's book, C-30, which becomes GB.46. That is a letter dated the 27th of July. It contains orders for the Air and Sea Forces for the occupation of the German Free City of Danzig.
"The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy the Danzig Free State immediately in order to protect the German population. There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms."
It then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this again becomes more relevant when we discuss the diplomatic action of the last few days before the war, when Germany was purporting to make specious offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means.
I would like to offer this as evidence that the decision had been taken and nothing was going to move him from that decision. That document, as set out, says that "There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms." Nevertheless, that was not the only condition upon which the occupation was to take place and we find that during July, right up to the time of the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to prepare them to take part in the coming occupation. GB.47, where there are set out a few only of the reports which were coming back almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, the Consul-General in Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister. The sum total of those reports can be found in the British Blue Book. I now would refer to only two of them, as examples of the kind of thing that was happening. the 1st of July 1939.
"Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig Heimwehr.
"All approaches to hills and dismantled fort, which constitute a popular public promenade on western fringe of the city, have been closed with barbed wire and 'verboten' notices.
"The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards: 'Comrades keep your mouths shut lest you regret consequence.'
"Master of British steamer 'High Commissioner Wood', whilst he was roving Koenigsberg from 28th June to 30th June, observed considerable military activity, including extensive shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar material by small coasting vessels. On 28th June four medium-sized steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, etc., left Koenigsberg, ostensibly returning to Hamburg after maneuvers, but actually proceeding to Stettin. Names of Steamers", and so forth. of the exhibit, dated the 10th of July, states:
"The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me that on 8th July he personally saw about thirty military lorries with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg, where numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges. There were also eight large anti-aircraft guns in position, which he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three six-barreled light anti-aircraft machine guns. There were about 500 men drilling with rifles, and the whole place is extensively fortified with barbed wire."
I don't think it is necessary to occupy the Tribunal's time in reading more. be found in the British Blue Book, which set out the arming and preparation on the free city of Danzig. practically complete -- and it will be remembered that they had to be complete for an invasion of Poland on the 1st of September -- we find Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop at last disclosing their intentions to their allies the Italians.
One of the passages in Hitler's speech on the 23rd of May, it will be remembered -- I will not quote it now because the document has been read before. However, in a passage in that speech Hitler, in regard to his proposed attack on Poland, had said, "Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and the Japanese." his Italian comrades, and does so in the hope that they will join him. than a few passages. The meeting can be summarized generally by saying, as I have, that Hitler is trying to persuade the Italians to come into the war with him. The Italians, or Ciano, rather, is most surprised. He had no idea, as he says, of the urgency of the matter, and they are not prepared. He, therefore, is trying to dissuade Hitler from starting off so soon until the Duce can have had a little more time to prepare himself. meeting is that they show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and France ultimately, anyway, if not at the same time as Poland.
I refer the Tribunal to the second page of the exhibit. Hitler is trying to show the strength of Germany, the certainty of winning the war, and therefore he hopes to persuade the Italians to come in.
"At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements in prospect." I quote from the top of the second page. "Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction could be taken into service. As far as the land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been called to the colors." England. We have been concentrating rather on Poland, but here his thoughts are turned entirely toward England.
"If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions and one armoured division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any fighters since, at the outbreak of war, the German Air Force would at once attack England and the English fighters would be urgently needed for the defense of their own country.
"With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland -- which would not take long -- Germany would be in a position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt"--doubts which, perhaps, in view of the subsequent performances, were well justified.
"The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in this respect." such a threat to Germany on Germany's Eastern Frontier.
"If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas was different. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews, and nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less in number than the total population and, as already said, their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the shortest time.
"Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation."
I pass on to the next page, at the top of the page:
"Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and northeasterly direction of a German policy.
The east and north-east, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions."
Now we get the truth of this matter. It is not the persecution of German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but economic reasons, the need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland.
"In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Danzig was a Nurnberg of the North, an ancient German city awaking sentimental feelings for every German, and the Fuehrer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav tends and that a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this kind.
"Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer's statement, first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion the Danzig question would be settled in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made plans for a period of two or three years.