The enemy powers want the war, with the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and her rights, she must use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness, at the same time fully respecting the laws of military ethics."
Now, let's see what you were suggesting.
"Germany's principle enemy in this war is Britain. Her most vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The nacal war at sea against Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with the aim of destroying Britain's fighting spirit within the shortest possible time and of forcing her to accept peace."
Now, miss one paragraph and look at the next:
"The principal target of the Directorate of Naval strategy is the merchant ship" --now, let's look--"not only the enemy's, but in general every merchant ship which sails the seas in order to supply the enemy's war industry, both by way of imports and exports. Besides this, the enemy warship also remains a military target," Now, wasn't that the object which you in the Naval Command were putting to Hitler and to the Foreign Office, to use the utmost ruthlessness to destroy Britain's fighting spirit, and to attack every merchant ship coming in or going out of Britain?
Wasn't that your object? and they were advised not to enter certain territories and areas. Are you seriously suggesting to the Tribunal that what you meant by that paragraph was that neutral ships were only to be attacked with warning?
A Of course. To begin with, we had warned them when our blockade was established. We warned them that they shouldn't enter this area because they would come under considerable danger. That I am saying, and I can prove it. document. Now, just turn to page -
Q If you will turn to Section C of the document, "Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain."
"Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means at our dis posal as expeditiously as possible.
Military success can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea communications wherever they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cub off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as this is possible without detriment to military requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law; however, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law."
Wasn't that the view that you were putting up to the Foreign Office and the Fuehrer, "Use international law as long as you can, but if international law conflicts with what is wanted for military success, throw international law over board." asn't that your view?
Q Well, then, explain these words. Explain these words: "We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as this is possible without detriment to military requirements. However, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out even if they are not covered by international law."
What did you mean by that if you didn't mean to throw international law overboard?
A It says "If the existing-international law can't be applied." It is generally known that international law had not yet been coordinated with submarin warfare, just as in the use of aircraft at that time. It says pricipally that defeat of enemy resistence must be based on legal considerations, and no legislation for naval warfare--during the entire war, and continuously, new naval law did arise, particularly applying to neutrals. For instance, the Pan-American Security Conference defined a safety zone 300 miles around the American Coast, which was a tremendous sea area for traffic. they themselves made on the 4th of November 1939, that it would be dangerous for neutral ships to enter it. It was then prohibited that their own ships and citizens should enter this area.
similarly, and then they would be damaged. Then only such neutrals travelled to Great Britain which had contraband aboard, and made money through that, or which were forced by the British through their ports of control to enter that area and nevertheless submit themselves to those dangers. airplanes or submarines from the time that Germany signed the Submarine Protocol of 1936 to the beginning of the war? You say that international law had to adapt itself to changes in weapons of war.
What changes had taken place between 1936 and 1939?
A The following change took place: The U-boat protocol of 1936 was signed by us because we assumed -
Q That is not an answer to my question. My question is quite clear. It is: What changesin weapons of war, either in the air of in the submarines, had taken place between 1936 and 1939? Now, there is a question. You are a naval officer of 50 years experience. Tell me, what were the changes? longer in a position on surface to investigate enemy ships or any other ships, particularly near the enemy coast where the U-boats -
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. The question you were asked was, what changes had taken place in the weapons of war, either airplanes or submarines.
THE WITNESS: But Mr. President, the changes referred to aircraft. The possibility of escape decreased continuously, and their uses were increased above the water. That led to the situation that any examination of merchant vessels wasn't possible at sea without aircraft being called to threaten the submarine. That got worse and worse. Later on rescues had to be limited in the presence of enemy aircraft, and the entire submarine warfare was completely turned upside down in that manner. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: statement that international law was to be thrown overboard where it didn't fit in with military necessities? Is that the only change, the increase in the power of aircraft between 1936 and 1939?
A I have already said once it wasn't thrown overboard. It was to be limited, and that was done by others too.
Q Well, now, just would you look at the next paragraph. You talked about your consideration for neutrals. At the top of page 5 in the English text it is the paragraph that follows the one that I have just read. You say:
"In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare.
"The Supreme War Council, after considering the political, military and economic consequences within the framework of the general conduct of the war, will have to decide what measuresof military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfilment of military requirements, this decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances, and under no circumstances may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World War to our detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats of other countries, including the U.S. coming into the war, which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier willit show results and the sooner will the war come to an end."
expressed in the paragraph which I have just read to you? you are trying topresent it.
A (Interposing) This is the point. We had had the experience during the First world War that as soon as intensification had been oredered and as soon as the first neutral had raised a finder to object, there were at once reprisal measures, particularly when the United States participated. And now I am saying in this paragraph that under all circumstances it must be avoided, that we withdraw our measures at once; and what I mean is that we should consider our measures as carefully as possible. That is the reason for the discussion when the Foreign Office, and so on and so forth, namely to avoid the situation where later an there might be withdrawals, which would mean a considerable loss of prestige and effect.
That is the reason. Numerous protests came, too, from England, and in most cases they were unanswered. I can quote from the Document C-170, U. S. 136, where there are a lot of figures, Number 4, where it says, "The Soviet Russian note against the British blockade warfare of the 20th of October, 1939"; and Number 17, where it states, "on the 31st of October, where political measures and --"
Q (Interposing) All that I ask is, was that a proper procedure? at the point of doing it. The Red attack against the British blockade, which is a violation of international, -- these attacks were made by Mr. Molotov. There were objections which were always turned down. But I wanted to prevent objections, and the entire document shows that our objections were always aiming at considering our measures and introducing them in such a way that they could not be objected to, but were always legally justified.
objections if you suggest in this paragraph to us the most ruthless measures and disregard every protest that neutrals made? How is that going to prevent objections? not any interference. If I told you that this is a dangerous area, which they want to enter only because they want to make money or because they are being forced by the British, then I need not accept any pretest. They are acting for egotistical reasons, and they must pay the bill if they die.
Q That is true. They are to pay the bill if they die. That was what it came to, was it not? They had considerable objection to exposing themselves to that risk, and that was their business to decide.
THEPRESIDENT: Sir David, we might break off now for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to be much longer, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I thought about a half hour, my Lord. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: suggests that it calls for a siege of England, that is, the sinking without warning of all ships that come into a big area around England.
A (The witness made a gesture with the microphone.)
Q Didn't you hear?
Q Sorry. In this document the Naval Command suggests what is called the siege of England, on pages 10 to 13. And that is the sinking of all merchant shipping, including neutrals and tankers which come into areas around England. Isn't that so?
A No, that is not true. The Commander of the Navy does not suggest that, but discusses it, since the blockade had been discussed and rejected. It discusses also the term of siege and comes to a conclusion why it should not be undertaken, that the siege until that time had not been accepted by international law but should be introduced; and it draws the conclusion from all these conclusions on the last page before the last as to what shall now be considered the final conclusion -- and there, only those measures which can be justified by the actions taken by the British are to be taken. And the entire discussion about blockage and siege was in the foreground always, whether the neutrals wouldn'to be damaged too much by that. And the entire subject of siege is based upon the fact that Prime Minister Chamberlain had already said -- on the 26th of December -- that between a blockade on the seas and a siege on the continent there wouldn't be any difference and the commander of a siege would try to prevent with all means the entry of anything into the fortress. in the same situation as a fortress under siege.
of a siege but you do not want any siege area declared. Will you look at paragraph 2 of the conclusions, and then I will leave the document to the Tribunal. That is the point I suggest. In paragraph 2 of the conclusions you say, "For the future conduct of economic warfare, the basic military requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment of the siege by sea as a most intensified form of economic warfare meets this demand. Without the publie announcement of a state of siege, after it has been clearly defined as a concept, a declaration which would have drawbacks militarily and from the point of view of international law and even without the declaration of a prohibited zone, it seems perfectly possible at the moment -- as has been explained in this memorandum -- to take military measures to introduce the intensect form of economic warfare. And to achieve what is at present the greatest possible effectiveness in the interruption of enemy trade -- now the last words -- "without directors of naval strategy being bound down in all cases in special forms and areas." effective a siege without proclaiming any area. Isn't that so?
A That is not the conclusion. The conclusion is that we cannot carry out the siege and that that would be a matter of political leadership to decide. The political leadership of the State has never suggested a siege by decree, but it can beseen here quite clearly what on the basis of the memorandum is suggested and then how the intensification took place by and by.
Q Let me finish. My suggestion is -- and there I leave it -- that you rejected a formal siege but you claimed the right to sink at sight without warning all neutral vessels in an area which the Higher Command may choose. afraid time is getting on.
A That is no siege, however. That was an individual directive issued after neutral ships did not hoed our warning and continued to enter the sea around England in order to support England in the economic warfare which England with her ruthlessness and severity was conducting against us. the attention of the Tribunal has been drawn to it. I want to come to another point: You have mentioned certain matters, in answer to Dr. Horn this morning, with regard to the treatment of American ships in the summer of 1941. In April, 1941, you were pressing for German Naval Forces to operate freely up to three miles of the American Coast instead of the 300-mile safety limit which the Americans were suggesting, were you not? Well, to save time I hand you Document 894, GB-472. That says you couldn't got in touch with the Defendant von Ribbentrop and therefore you asked Baron von Weizsaecker to get a decision on these points: "I, concerning the German Naval Forces in the western part of the Atlanti Ocean being allowed to operate freely as far as the international] customary three-mile boundary; 2, the cancellation of the preferential treatment which American merchant vessels have been enjoying so far in our warfare at sea."
Now, I hand you No. 850 -- which is GB-473. Your suggestion, which had been made in April, was turned down by Hitler in June. It is from Ritter in the Foreign Office, a memorandum, and it reads:
"General Jodl informs me that at the recent interview which Grand Admiral Raeder had with Hitler, the more extensive orders issued to the naval forces, as they were discussed in connection with the Raeder interview, have been postponed until further notice.
"Also, permission to attack U. S. merchant vessels with in the framework of the prize laws, has not been granted." and attack up to the three-mile limit. Now, I want you to come to another point -
A No, please may I make a statement concerning that? I should like to say something, even if you don't put a question to me. It isn't right. and the following dates in 1941, a number of intensifications took place on the part of the United States, which I mentioned this morning, from the document which I had before me. Therefore, it was clear that I, on behalf of the Command of the Navy, which was supposed to conduct a most effective naval war, urged that also with respect to the United States stops should be taken which were permissible according to international law. At least, that one should start slowly taking these stops; and first of all, that one should no more respect that 300-mile limit, but go as far as the three-mile limit, where according to existing international law it was possible to attack. That is to say, not against international law, but it was just discontinuing certain favorable conditions which we had granted the United States.
Q There isno dispute between us. I was just establishing that point. the Grand Admiral Doenitz the Prosecution has demanded of us that we should not treat certain neutrals better than others. We should treat them equally; that is to say, we should have to sink them, no matter whether we wanted to do so. The second thing, it was a matter of course that a justified suggestion on my part had been rejected by the Fuehrer if, according to the political situation, I was of the opinion that at that time he did not desire any intensification towards the United States.
Q Now, I want you to come to quite a different point. Do you say that you did not knew anything about the extermination of Jews in the Eastern territories? it, And, may I add for explanation, that Hitler took a man like myself, who in his opinion he knew would not have spoken under any circumstances about such things, because he had to be afraid that on my part there would be serious objections. I have explained the other day why I used the word "just" in my memorial speech. I was obliged to do so. But that had nothing to do at all with extermination of Jews. About the Jewish matter -only was informed when Jews, who were well known to me usually friend of my parents, approached me and told me that they were about to be evacuated from Berlin. And then I intervened for them. On thos occasions I was told, when I asked that they should be evacuated into cities where ghettos had been established -- A ghetto for me always was a district in a city where all the Jaws lived together.
Q I have asked you, did you know or did you not. You could have answered that yes or not. I want you to answer about a certain -been asked and every man in my position or in the ideology that we had says the same, that he doesn't know anything about it. Then, for that reason, I should like to explain that one did not hear about these facts because individual civilians certainly didn't talk to you about that because they were always afraid that they would get into difficulties if they talked about these things at all. The Fuehrer did not speak about it. With Himmler I had no relations, and with other agents of the Gestapo I didn't have any contact either. I didn't know anything about it. the East Baltic Coast. Is this right that you had the naval chief command, and then the Flag Officer Talin and, under him, you had a command at Libau; is that right? Was that your chain of command?
A I didn't understand that. chief command, Flag Officer Talin, and an attachment under him at Libau?
A I assume that depends on the various matters. If those were matters of operations, then it had to do with the group commander east or north; and as far as matters of organization were concerned, then it might have gone about the station chief of the Baltic Sea. at Libau; had you not? oath by one of the naval employees at Libau.
This witness says:
"Deposition on oath of WALTER KURT DIETMANN."
And then it says:
"I was Naval-Administration Inspector and officer in charge of the Naval Quartermaster Stores in Liban in Latvia.
"I held this position from the beginning of August 1941 to the end of March 1942.
"The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed to be about 7,000 people.
"Up to the end of March 1942 many thousands of those had already been 'evacuated' by the Gestapo and the Latvian police.
"Evacuated was the local expression for the annihilation of these people.
"All Jews were registered. When a new lot was evacuated it happened in the following way:
"The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses, put them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about six to seven kilometers outside the town. Later on these people had to march and were not taken any more in lorries to that place.
"In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machineguns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. The police, of course, got their orders from the German Gestapo.
"I personally didn't witness these incidents but comrades told me all about them.
"Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the Navy.
"About 80,100 people worked in the Quartermaster Stores every "About 100,150 people worked in the Town major's Office every "About 50 people worked at the local Naval Building Office "Through these contacts and through personal visits of Jewsin their houses I heard a lot regarding these terrible happenings in Libau during these months.
"I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant Dr. Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior, the officer in charge of the Hospital Administration Mueller, both were Naval Administration Officials. I pointed out to them these already mentioned awful happenings.
The answer I got was that they couldn't do anything and that things like that were best overlooked.
"The assistant Naval Administration Officer (Marine Veraltungs-Assistant) Kurt Traunecker accompanied a transport of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He stayed a few weeks in Libau and he definitely disapproved of the conditions there regarding the annihilation of the Jews.
"He then went back to Kiel to the Local Quartermaster Stores. There again he showed his disapproval of what he had seen and thereupon was ordered to appear at the Naval Administration Headquarters (Marine Intendantur). Whom he saw there, I don't know, but it was made clear to him that these occurrences were not true, and therefore he should not talk about them any more, otherwise he would get into serious trouble.
"My personal opinion isthat the higher formations of the Navy in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of these terrible conditions." on the East Coast of the Baltic and with these things happening, that nobody reported to you that the Jews were being slaughtered by the thousands in the Eastern territories; are you saying it? this? Had you an efficient staff? You said you had an efficient staff.
A That is a question which doesn't belong here. Of course I had only efficient officers around me. But here we dealt with things which were not done by the navy. It says here that in all places it was the police and so on. I even was in Libau once and I was told that the only thing about that matter that was peculiar was that in Libau, contrary to their habits, otherwise, the Jews were craftsmen, an that, therefore, they were doing useful work there. That was the only thing that I had heard about it About any extermination of any kind, that I can't say. I was there the year after it was occupied.
Q Were you there in 1941 or 1942?
A I said just now that I don't know just exactly; I have to look it up somewhere.
It was the year after it was occupied. It didn't say here that anything was reported. It is said only that it was discussed in the Navy-Intendantur. Of course I would have intervened if I would have heard about it.
Q You think you would? Well, I'll leave that. Now, tell me about the commander order of the 18th of October, 1942 and you passed it on to your various divisions of the Navy; did you not?
Q Did you approve of it?
A I did not recommend it, but I passed it on. I have to make a statement if you want to know how I thought about it.
Q Well, that's not what I'm asking you. I'm asking you -- first answer my question -- did you approve of an order to shoot commandoes or to hand them over to the SD to be shot; did you? Fuehrer, such as it came into my hands, I passed it on with the remark as to how far it has to be passed on and how it has to be returned; all that had been ordered by Hitler in detail. From me it was only essential that in one of the first paragraphs it said the basis on which this order was given, and the reasons why Hitler considered deviation from International Law justified. One had to add to that. was informed that on the occasion of the commando enterprise of the British and France, the prisoners are sent from the labor service who were working along the coasr, had been shackled with a noose around their neck and the other and around the leg, so that when the leg weakened, the noose around their neck -
Q Well, answer this: Did you approve of the order or not? You haven't answered it yet. Did you approve of the order?
A I say again, no. I say I did not approve. I did not recommend it. I said that twice already. I just passed it on because it was an order from my superior, and then it had to be added in one of the last paragraphs where it said that that order should not be applied in case of operations, and there I ordered that we in the navy should stress this point because that was our major field of activity.
But I say "no" on account of that order which you saw some good reasons to object to the Fuehrer. And I would like to state that very clearly as a soldier I was not in a position to go to my supreme commander and chief of state and to tell him,"Show me your evidence for that order"; that would have been mutiny and could not have been done under any circumstances.
a great deal in this trial, which you must have listened to, was the case of naval men coming in with a two man torpedo, trying to sink the "Tirpitz". Do you remember that case? Surely you can answer that Yes or No, because either you remember or you do not. We have discussed it about six times.
A Yes, I remember. If I remember I will say Yes. You don't have to assume the contrary. General, or Admiral Inspector, of the German Navy, that there was started a Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende, under Vice Admiral Helmut Heir, which included in its command one-man torpedoes, one-man U-boats, explosive motor boats, and had personnel, starting at about 5,000 and rising, I think, as for as 16,000? Did you know that there was a Kommando in the Navy, Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende? Did you know that?
A Yes, that I knew of course. That was quite open. thousands of personnel in that Kommando that was dealing with ne-man and two-man torpedoes and explosive motor boats? Would you have approved if we had shot them ut of hand? not have to do anything about, I can not give any information.
Q If you don't want to answer, it is good enough for me. I will point it out to the Tribunal in due course.
A But you interruptedme again. I should like to make a second point after what I said first. Secondly, these units fought quite openly, just below the coast and had no murderous instruments or instruments for sabotage with them, so they were fighters just like the fighters in a submarine. so I will not argue.
I want you to point to one ether point. Was it under your orders that the log on the"Athenia" was falsified? Wasit by your direct Order?
A No, not at all. I have explained the other day here that my order was, first, absolute secrecy upon the order of the Fuehrer; secondly, politically, it will be dealt with by the OKM -- third, there was a third point; I will find it in a second. I do not intend to punish the commander because he acted in good faith and committed an error. That is what I ordered. I did not order anyt hing further concerning that.
Q Do you know under whose orders the log was falsified? I am very anxious to know. The log was falsified. I have asked the defendant Doenitz. He can not tellme. He has put in an affidavit that the matter was to be left to you, and now I am asking you whether you can tellme. I think the commander is dead, as far as I remember, so he can not tell me. Do you say that you can not tell me under whose orders the log of the submarine U-30 that sank the "Athenia" was falsified? did not bother with such details. I did not order such details. The other day here -- I don't know whether Admiral Wagner said that who did it was mentioned. I assumed that it was within the flotilla.
Q Tell me just this about the "Athenia". You told us the other day that you gave these orders and then washed your hands of the matter. Nearly a month later -
Q You had nothing to do with it. Nearly a month later the Propaganda Ministry put out this suggestion, I think you said on Hitler's orders that the "Athenia" had been sunk by Churchill. Did you not feel that it was your duty as Grand Admiral and head of the German Navy to make any protests against this disgraceful, lying suggestion that the First Lord of the British Admiralty had deliberately sent to their deaths a lot of British and American subjects? Did you not think it was your duty to do, that? any idea about it. I felt terrible about it when the First Lord of the Admiralty was attacked in that undignified way, but I could not change anything.
it.
Q Did you translate your indignation into actions? That is what I am asking.
A Into what kind of action?
A That Hitler shout cause Goebbels to deny that article? That Hitler would not do if he himself had caused the article.
Q I want to get it clear. You did nothing when you knew that von Blomberg and von Fritsch, who were old friends and comrades of yours, had been framed up by sections of these Nazi plotters; you did nothing about that? You did nothing to protest against the treatment meted out to von Blomberg or von Fritsch? You did nothing, did you? You have said yourself this morning that I did not know at that time. Later when I was informed further, I put the whole picture together. At that time I was not in a position to assume that such methods would be at allpossible. I just want to get it quite clear that the first time in your life that you were moved to protest was, I think, in March, 1945, when you saw the actual marks of torture on the hand of your friend, Herr Gessler, and at that time Soviet troops were over the Oder and the Allies were over the Rhine, and that was the first time that you made any protest when you took off your Party Golden Emblem, wasn't it? That was the first protest you ever made in your naval, military, political career; is that right?
A No. When Dr. Gessler, who in spite of my objections had been kept for several months in a concentration camp, returned from the concentration camp and informed me, he was in a very poor condition. In spite of my request in August, at the time when he was sent to the concentration camp and at which time I had asked the Fuehrer through Admiral Wagner that he be questioned quickly because he was certainly innocent in connection with the -