That's right, isn't it?
Q Well, but what is the difference? with the exception of those for which we had a special political interest. time for Norway and Sweden and Denmark, so you sank their ships at sight. That's right, isn't it? warning. that, you wouldn't sink it. Would you look at documents 846 and 847? COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, they are two new documents. They will be GB-452 add 453. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q Will you look at the first of these, that is 846? That is a telegram from your Ambassador at Copenhagen, dated the 26th of September 1939, That is before your first warning and before any of these zones had been declared. The second Sentence:
"Sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarines still cause great worry here, owing to Danish food transports to England." neutrals right away in the first three weeks of the war, hadn't you? special reason in these cases. I know of some cases of Danish and Swedish, ships which occurred in which these ships had turned toward the U-boat and the U-boat in turn, because of resistance, had to attack the ship.
Q You don't think it was because the blame could be put upon mines? March, 1940, again from the German minister at Copenhagen. It is the first paragraph:
"The King of Denmark summoned me to his presence in order to tell me what a deep impression the sinking of six Danish ships last week, apparently without warning, had made on him and on the whole country."
And then, passing on two sentences:
"I replied that the reason why the ships sank had not yet been elucidated. In any case, our naval units always kept strictly to the Prize Regulations, that vessels sailing in enemy convey or in the vicinity of the same took upon themselves all the risks of war, insofar as any sinkings had been carried out without warning.
It seemed that they could be traced back to the German notifications made to date.
"At the same time, I pointed out the dangers of the waters around the British coast where neutral ships inevitably involved in compromising situations on account of measures taken by the British. The King assured me emphatically that none of the Danish ships were sailing in convoy, but it would probably never be possible subsequently to clear up without possibility of doubt the incidents which had led to the sinking." sink-at-sight policy? but I am of the opinion that possibly these ships were sunk in that area before the English coast was in those areas or becaouse heavy defensive measures at open sea could not obtain at that point any longer.
Q Very well. We will come to an incident where I think I can supply you with details. Would you look at Document D-807?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, that is a new document; it becomes GB-454. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE: to the sinking of three neutral ships, the 'Deptiord', the 'Thomas Walton', and the 'Garoufalia', The document is in three parts. It first sots out the facts as they were known to you. The second part is a note to the Foreign Office, and the third is a draft reply for your foreign office to send the neutral governments. If you look at the end of the document you will see, 1-A; the document emanates from your department.
"It is proposed in replying to Norwegian notes, to admit only the sinking by a German U-boat of the SS 'Deptford', but to deny the sinking of the two other steamers."
Would you follow it?
"According to the data attached to the notes presented by the Norwegian Government, the grounds for suspecting a torpedo to have been the cause of the sinkings do in fact appear to be equally strong in all three cases according to the Norwegian Foreign Minister's speech of the 19th January, the suspicion in Norway of torpedoing by a German U-boat appears however, to be strongest in the case of the SS 'Deptford,' wheresa in the other two cases it is at least pretended that the possibility of striking mines has to be taken into account; this is considered improbable in the case of the SS 'Deptford', anyhow, because other vessels had passed the same spot.
"The assumption that the SS 'Thomas Walton' struck a mine may be supported. since the torpedoing occurred towards evening and nothing was observed, and since furthermore several explosions took place in the same area owing to misses by torpedoes.
"In the case of the SS 'Garoufalia', a denial appears expedient, if only because a neutral steamer is concerned, which was attacked without warning. Since it was attacked by means of an electric torpedo, no torpedo wake could be observed."
Do you say in the face of that that you aid not deceive the neutrals? That is the advice you were given by the defendant Raeder as his staff officer, is it not?
A. This memorandum did not emanate from me; it emanated from 1 i a, which are the letters of a certain expert in the department.
Q. You would not have seen it?
A. I do not recall this memorandum.
Q. Why do you say "emanated from 1 i a? It has "1 a" at the end of it.
A. If this memorandum originated and was passed on, then I thought -
Q (Interposing) I will just read the next part of the note to remind you.
"The following" facts have thus been ascertained:" -- this is what you are writing to the foreign office -
"The steamer "Deptford' was sunk by a German U-boat on the 13th of December --"
I am sorry. I should have started earlier.
"It is suggested that Norwegian notes regarding the sinking of the Steamships 'Deptford', 'Thomas Walton' and 'Garoufaliea' be answered somewhat in the following manner:
"As a result of the communication from the Norwegian Government, the matter of the sinking of the steamships 'Deptford', 'Thomas Walton', and 'Garoufalia' has been thoroughly investigated. The following facts have thus been ascertained:
"The steamer 'Deptford' Was sunk by a German U-boat on the 13th of December as it was recognized as an armed enemy ship. According to the report of the U-boat Commander, the sinking did not take place within territorial waters. but immediately outside. The German Naval Forces have strict instructions not to undertake any military operations within neutral territorial waters. Should the U-boat Commander have miscalculated his position, as appears to be borne out by the findings of the Norwegian Authorities and should Norwegian territorial waters have been violated in consequence, the German Government regrets this most sincerely.
"As a result of this incident, the German Naval forces have once again been instructed unconditionally to respect neutral territorial waters. If a violation of Norwegian territorial waters has indeed occurred, there will be no repetition of it. As far as the sinking of the steamships 'Thomas Walton' and 'Garoufalia' is concerned, this cannot be traced to operations by German U-boats as none of them were in the naval area indicated at the time of the sinkings."
same line. the neutrals?
A. The neutrals had been advised that in these areas, threats and dangers of war were to be encountered, and we were of the opinion that we were justified in not telling them through which war measures these areas were endangered, or which war measures would be used.
Q. Is that really your answer to this document? This is a complete lie, is it not? You admit one sinking; that you cannot get away from. And you deny the others. You deny that there was a German U-boat anywhere near, and you are telling this Tribunal that you were justified in order to conceal the weapons you were using. Is that the best answer you can give?
A. Yes, certainly, We had no interest at all in letting the enemy know what means we were operating with in this area.
Q. You are admitting that one of them was sunk by a U-boat. Why not admit the other two as well? Why not say it was the same U-boat?
A. I assume that we were concerned in an area in which the situation was different.
Q. What was the difference? Why didn't you say, "One of our U-boats has made a mistake, or disobeyed his orders, and is responsible for all those three sinkings"? Or, alternatively, why didn't you say, " We have given you fair warning we are going to sink on sight anyone in this area. And what is your complaint?"
A. It obviously was not expedient.
Q. It was considered expedient to deceive the neutrals. And you, an admiral in the German Navy, told me you did not do that, ten minutes are. As a matter of fact, these three boats were all sunk by the same U-boat, were they not?
A. At the moment I cannot tell you that.
Q. I say they were all sunk by U-38, and the dates of sinking were: the Deptford, on the 13th of December, the Garoufalia on the 11th, and the Thomas Walton on the 7th.
Do you dispute that?
A. I did not understand the last sentence.
Q. Do you dispute those details, or don't you remember?
A. I cannot recall; but I believe it is impossible.
Q. I will show you another instance of deceiving the neutrals; and this time it was your friends, the Spanish. Would you look at C-105?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, that is a new document; it becomes GB-455. It is an extract from the SKL War Diary for the 19th of December 1940. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. You kept the SKL War Diary yourself at that time, did you not?
A. No, I did not keep it.
Q. Didn't you sign it?
A. I signed it.
Q. You signed it. Did you read it before you signed it?
A. The essential parts, yes.
Q. You see, it is headed "News from the Neutrals", and begins with "Spain." It reads:
"According to a report from the Naval Attache, a Spanish fishing-vessel was sunk by a submarine of unknown nationality between Las Palmas and Cape Juey. In the rescue boats, the crew was subjected to machine gun fire. 3 men badly wounded. Landed at Las Palmas on the 18th December. Italians suspected (also possibility it might have been U-37)".
Then, on the 20th of December, the next day:
"B.d.U. will be informed of Spanish report regarding sinking of Spanish fishing-vessel by submarine of unknown nationality on 16th December between Las Palmas and Cape Juey, and will be requested to conduct an investigation.
"On the responsibility of the Naval War Staff it has been confirmed to our Naval Attache in Madrid that, regarding the sinking, there is no question of a German submarine."
have been U-37; isn't that so?
A. It seems to me that it was not by a submarine.
Q. I will read on. This is under date of 21 December.
"U-37 reports: a torpedo fired at a tanker of the "Kopbard" type had a giro failure, and probably hit an Amphitrite submarine in the tanker's convoy. The tanker is burnt out. Spanish steamer 'St. Carlos' without distinguishing mark sunk by gunfire. 9 torpedoes left.
"According to this, U-37 has torpedoed the French tanker 'Rhone' and the submarine 'Sfax', as well as sunk the Spanish fishing-vessel."
"We shall continue to maintain to the outside world that there is no question of a German or Italian submarine being in the sea-area in question for the sinkings."
Q. Do you still say that you did net deceive the neutrals?
A. This case is doubtless a case of deception, but I do not remember this deception was carried through, or what the reasons for it were.
Q. But it is creditable, is it not? Do you regard that as creditable to the German Navy, that conduct?
A. No.
Q. Did the defendant Raeder sign the War Diary?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you tell the other defendant, Doenitz, what answer you were giving to the Spaniards and the Norwegians?
A. That I do not recall.
Q. He would get a copy, would he not?
A. I did not understand you.
Q. You would, send him a copy, would you not, of your note to the Foreign Office?
A. That is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, does the signature of the defendant Raeder appear at the end of this document, C-105?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I regret to say I have not checked that. But as the witness has said, the practice was that he was to sign the War Diary, and that the commander-in-chief was to sign it periodically. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. Is that right, witness?
A. Yes. On the next page, on the 12th, you can see my signature as well as these of Fricke, Schniewind, and Raeder.
DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for Admiral Raeder): Mr. President, I would be very grateful to the prosecution if the document which concerns the defendant Raeder would be given to me, for it is relatively difficult for me to follow the Situation otherwise. None of these documents was given to me.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: I am extremely sorry, My Lord. That is my fault, and I will see that Dr. Siemers has a copy tonight.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this point until tomorrow morning.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I am afraid I have a little more.
(A recess was takne until 1000 hours, Tuesday, 14 May 1946.)
Military Tribunal in the matter of: The Germany on 14.
May 1946, 1400-1700. Lord BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. Do you remember the sinking of the "Monte Garbea" in September, 1942?
A. I have a certain recollection of it.
Q. That was the ship in respect of which the Defendant Doenitz sent a telegram to the U-boat Commander threatening him with court martial on his return because he had sunk the ship after recognizing it as a neutral. Now in 1942 the friendship of Spain was very important to Germany, was it not?
A. I assume so.
Q. You told us yesterday that Admiral Raeder was recommending a Mediterranean policy. Now that was the reason, wasn't it, why the U-boat Commander was threatened with court martial, that it mattered in 1942 if you sank a Spanish ship?
A. No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the Commander of the U-boat had not acted according to the directives of the Commander in Chief of the U-boats.
Q. It didn't matter in 1940 when you thought you were winning the war, but in September, 1942, I sugges to you it became politically inexpedient to sink a Spanish ship; isn't that right?
A. You will have to contact the political office of the German Reich to get that answer.
Q. If that is the answer, do you think it is unfair to describe your attitude to the sinking of neutral ships as cynical and opportunist?
A. No, I reject that completely.
Q. I want to ask you one or two questions about the witness Heisig. You spoke yesterday of a conversation in the jail here in the first week of December, 1945.
A. December, 1945.
Q. Yes. You knew at the time you spoke to Heisig that he was going to be called as a witness, didn't you?
A. I assumed that because of his presence? here at Nurnberg.
Q. And you knew you were going to be called as a witness, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you telling the Tribunal that you didn't tell the defense lawyers about this, conversation until quite recently?
A. I did not quite follow the sense of your question.
Q. Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not report this conversation with Heisig to the Defense lawyers until quite recently?
A. Perhaps in February or March it was that I told the defense counsel about this conversation.
Q. I just want to put the dates to you. The U-boat Commander Eck was sentenced to death on the 20th of October. Do you know that?
A. I did not know the date.
Q. Death sentence was taken by the Commission on the 21st of November and he was executed on the 30th of November. That is to say he was executed before you had this conversation. Did you know that?
A. No. I am just finding that out now.
Q. At any rate, the Witness Heisig knew it before he gave his evidence, didn't he?
A. Obviously. Otherwise, he most likely would have told me about it.
Q. Just listen to a question and answer from his cross examination. It si page 2676 of the transcript. This is a question by Dr. Kranzbuehler: "In your hearing on the 27th of November were you not told that the death sentence against Eck and Hoffmann had already been set?" Answer: I do not know whether it was on the 27th of November. I know only that here I was told of the fact that the death sentence had been carried out. The date I can not remember. I was in several hearings." Now if that is right -
THE PRESIDENT: When was that evidence given?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: That was given on the 14th of January, My Lord.
Page 2676 of the transcript.
A. I did not understand who gave this testimony.
Q. The witness Heisig, when he gave evidence here in Court. So that whether or not he was deceived, as you suggest, before he gave his affidavit, he at least knew the true facts before he gave evidence here to the Tribunal?
A. Then he told un untruth to me.
Q. Now, I want to ask you one question on the order of the 17th of September, 1942. That is the order that you say you monitored in the Naval War Staff and saw nothing wrong with. Did the Defendant Raeder see that order?
A. That I can not say with certainty.
Q. You were Chief of Staff Operations at that time?
A. Yes, but you can't expect of me that I could remember every incident which took place in six years of war.
Q. Oh, no, but this was an important order, wasn't it?
A. Certainly, but there were very many important orders in the course of six years.
Q. Would you normally show an important operational order to the Commander in Chief?
A. My task was to present to the Chief of the Staff of the Navy the important things and he decided which matters were to be presented to the Grand Admiral.
Q. Are you saying that you wouldn't have shown this to the Chief of the Staff?
A. No. I am sure he had knowledge of this.
Q. Have you any doubt that this order would have been shown to Admiral Raeder?
A. That I can not say for I do not recall.
Special Duties. You became Admiral Special Duties in June, 1944, is that right? Doenitz and in his absence represented him, did you not?
A I never participated at any discussions as his deputy. Doenitz Was represenented to the Chief of the SKL. they affected military operations in one way or another, were they not?
Q. What I am putting to you is that at that stage of the war the importance of all questions chiefly depended on how they affected the military situation. taken at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, wasn't it?
Q Now, I want you to look at a record of one of Admiral Doenitz's visits That is a record of a visit to the Fuehrer's Headquarters on the 28th and 29th of August, 1943.
You weren't there yourself, but your immediate superior, Vice-Admiral Meisel, accompanied. Admiral Doenitz, and the names of the Naval Delegation are set out at the top of the page, admiral Doenitz, Vice , Admiral Meisel, Chief of Staff of the SKL, Captain Rehm, etc. And your program as set out was: after your arrival, at half-past eleven, conversation With Commanderin chief of Navy, Commander-in-Chief Luftwaffe; 1300, situation conference with the Fuehrer closing with a further conversation between the Commander-in-Chief, Navy, and the Commander-in-Chief, Luftwaffe; then at 1900 the Commander-in-Chief Navy left. After that Admiral Meisel had a conversation with Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office. Then a conversation with General Jodl; an evening conference with the Fuehrer, and then a midnight conference with Himmler. On the next day a situation conference with the Fuehrer; then a conversation with the Chief. of the General Staff of the Air Force. And then he left. that he had conversations, various conferences with other officials?
quarters, and he participated in situation conferences with the Fuehrer, and on top of this he had military conversations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe.
Q And that shows, doesn't it, the whole business of government being carried on at the Fuehrer's Headquarters?
A No, not at all. I have already said the Grand Admiral solely and alone participated at the military situation conferences with the Fuehrer and beyond that one or two discussions with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. He had a conversation with him as well. Office, and so on?
A The Grand Admiral had no discussions like that at all. On the 28th of August at 1900 hours he returned as shown from the table, and further discussion with the Chiefs of Staff of the SKL were had.
Q But I was putting it to you that this was a typical visit. If Admiral Doenitz hadn't left, he would have had these other conversations and not Admiral Meisel, isn't that right? opportunity to come to the headquarters, and according to the minutes he obviously used his opportunity -
Q I don't want to waste time with it. I suggest to you --chat when admiral Doenitz went there he normally saw any other Ministers and conversed with then on any business affecting the Navy. the Navy and he spoke with those who Were concerned with these problems. to the Geneva Convention -- that is C-156, GB-209, page 69 of the English Prosecution Book, at page 102 of the German. Look at page 102.
Now, as you told us yesterday, you initialed those minutes, didn't you, and a copy was marked to you, isn't that right?
Q Were they accurate?
headquarters.
Q They were an accurate record, were they? them.
Q Now, did you agree with Admiral Doenitz's advice that it would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs to save face with the outer world? Did you agree with that? sentence which was formulated by me -- how I interpreted that, and I have nothing to add to that statement. In the sense in which I stated it yesterday, I agree with it. bombed towns, wasn't it? .Wasn't that the breach of the Convention that he wanted to make? only the agreement about prisoners of war, but everything else --all agreements which had been made at Geneva. without warning? Just look at that sentence.
Q Look at the last sentence, "It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary."What were these measures? giving then and the advice Which you described as the rather romantic ideas of a young expert on the document about sinkink without warning at night. Let me put it to you: What the naval Officer said --document C-191 --as to sinking without warning: Don't give written permission; don't tell anyone but at all costs save face with the world.
Do you see any difference?
A I already testified yesterday that the difference is very great. Grand Admiral Doenitz spoke against the renouncing of the Geneva Convention and he said if measures of intimidation or counter-measures against bombing attacks on cities are to be taken, then in any event the Geneva Convention cannot be renounced.
Q Now, I want to put to you a few questions about prisoners of war. So far as naval prisoners of war were concerned, they remained in the custody of the Navy, didn't they?
A I am not informed about the organisation of prisoner of war camps and its system, but in my recollection they were put into atemporary navy camp; then into further camps, about which I do not know as to whether they belonged to the navy or to the OKW, and to when they were subordinate.
telling us how well they were treated. Haven't you seen them? capture was reported to the Naval War Staff, wasn't it?
Q Now, do you remember the Commander Order of the 18th of October, 1942? commanders, didn't you?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the document is C-179, and that was put in as United States Exhibit 543. It is in the bundle
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: C-179.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: And it is in that bundle that Sir David Maxwell Fyfe handed to the Tribunal when cross-examining the defendant. I think it is either the last or very near to the last document in the bundle. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q Did you approve of that order? under No. 1, the reasons are given so clearly that I must realize and must at that time have realized its justification.
Q You knew what handing over to the SD meant, didn't you? You knew that meant shooting?
Q What do you think it meant? counter-espienage; that they were to be kept prisoners among more severe measures or, perhaps, that they, might be shot.
Q But you hadn't any doubt that it meant that they might be shot, had you?
is clear. it on to commanders?
A I would like to refer you to No. 1 of this order, in which it said -
Q Do you mind answering the question? Did it occur to you that they might be shot when you signed the order sending it on to commanders?
A Yes, yes; the possibility was there.
DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for defendant Raeder): Mr. President, the witness was asked whether he approved of these orders. I donot believe that Colonel Philliiore can cut off the answer from the witness by saying that he may not refer to No. 1 of the order. I believe that this point 1 of the order is decisive for this witness.
Mr. President, the witness, Admiral Wagner
THE PRESIDENT: You have an opportunity of reexamining the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, why do you interrupt?
DR. SIEMERS: Because Colonel Phillimore has interrupted the answer on the part of the witness and I believe in cross-examination the answer of the witness should be heard.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal does not agree with you.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I understood him to have already made the same point that the defendant made once. I only interrupted him when he sought to make it again. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q I put my question once again. When you signed the order sending this document on to lower commanders, did it occur to you then that these men would probably be shot? Service might be shot was clear to me.
Q Was it also --
A I haven't finished yet. But only those people were to be given over to the Security Service who had not been captured by the Wehrmacht, Commando Division.
Q Did it also occur to you that they would be shot without trial? captured by the Wehrmacht? Would you look at paragraph 3.
"From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and airplanes for their actions or whether they are dropped by parachute; even these individuals when fired should apparently be prepared to give themselves up. No pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW for publication in the report of the military forces."
Are you saying it didn't refer to men captured by the military forces?
A Yes, I am maintaining that statement. The entire paragraph does not say that the men who were captured by the Wehrmacht, by the armed forces, are to be turned over to the SD, to the Security Service, and that was the question.
Q Now, read on in the last paragraph.
"If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc., fall into thehands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD."
A Yes. It is expressly stated here that only those people are to be turned over to the SD who are not captured "by the Wehrmacht, but through the. police, and the Wehrmacht might not have any jurisdiction on this.
Q Indeed it's not. That capture by the police is given as one possible instance. But you know, you know in practice, don't you, that there were several instances where commandos were captured by the navy and handed ever to the SD under this order; don't you know that?
Q Well, let me just remind you. Would you look at the document 512-PS.
That's also in that bundle, My Lord, as United States Exhibit 546. It's the second document. October, "individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proved in the cases of --"
Haveyou got it?
A No, I'm sorry, I haven't found the place as yet.
A No, I can't find that place.
Q You got it now?
A No , the text which you are quoting, Mr. Colonel, I haven't found that spot. I haven't found the text you're quoting.
May I please ask you to repeat this passage?
Q You got it?
Q You just read the first sentence which I've read, and then go on to the second sentence.
"The importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, two-man torpedo Drontheim, and Glider Plane Stavanga, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions."