THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Kranzbuehler, you have been dealing with a document, Doenitz 60, which contains a great number of pages to which you wish to refer. When we have ruled on them you will have to give separate exhibit numbers to each one of the documents -- to each one of the pages which we will rule are admissible and which you wish to offer in evidence.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. Mr. President, may I point out that this is one book, Doenitz 60 is one book, one volume, and that is why I have given it one exhibit number, because I admit it is one.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but it contains so many pages that it will be more convenient, will it not, to give each page a separate exhibit number?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to relate to a great variety of subjects.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, a collection of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Now as you dealt with the various subjects in entirely different order than the way in which Sir David Fyfe dealt with them, I think it would be convenient if we heard anything he wants to say about it. Only if you do wish to say something, Sir David.
SIR DAVID FYFE: Certainly, My Lord. My Lord, I have heard the Tribunal say that they have had an opportunity of examining the documents and therefore I propose to be extremely brief in any remarks I have to make, and may I make one explanation before I deal with the very few points. it was clear to the Tribunal yesterday -- that there had been no objection to Documents 3 and 4 because in their they deal with a secret base in the north which is only of importance for the attacks against wood imports from the north Russian ports. The objectionable matter, as I think the Tribunal pointed out, was introduced in a statement of Dr. Kranzbuehler which has no foundation in the documents. Colonel Pokrowsky was very anxious that I should make that clear on behalf of the prosecution. emphasize in reply to the Tribunal. The first is on my Group 3, the details of the contraband control system.
My Lord, I submit that on this there is an essential no sequita in Dr. Kranzbuehler's argument. He says that, first of all, the carrying of contraband by merchant ships, to carry his argument to its logical conclusion, would entitle a belligerent to sinking at sight. That, I submit, with great respect to him, is completely wrong, and it doesn't follow that because you establish certain rules and lists of contraband that the right to sink at sight is effected at all. system. That system was used in World War I and is a well known system. But again, the essential non sequita or absence of connection is this, that if a neutral goes to one of the control ports and gets a navicest that does not put that neutral into so un-neutral an act as to make it the equivalent of a ship of war, which is the position that my friend -that Dr. Kranzbuehler would have to take if that argument were to succeed.
His third (division)?? wishes to put in documents showing economic pressures on, for example, Belgium, with regard to the import of goods. The naval defendant are not being charged with economic pressure; they are charged with killing people on the high seas. Now again, I have dealt with it very shortly, and the prosecution does submit and take the view very strongly that the whole of that documentary evidence is several steps removed from the issues in the case. take as an example the document making several score of allegations of un-neutral acts against the United States. The case for the Prosecution on sinking at sight is that sinking at sight against various groups of neutrals was adopted as a purely political matter, according to the advantage or, when it was abstained from the disadvantage which Germany might get from her relations with these neutrals. And it doesn't help in answering that allegation of the prosecution. That is a matter of fact which can be judged as to whether the prosecution are right. It doesn't help on that to say that the United States committed such nonneutral acts. If anything, it would be supporting the contention of the prosecution that sinking on sight was applied arbirarily according to the political advantages which could be obtained from it.
wishes me to emphasize it -- is that these, the Collection of unsworn statements, are of course in a very different position from any legal standard, from reports made by officers in the course of their duty. These are admissible in all military courts, probably in every country in the world. These are an ad hoc collection. They are not only unsworn but they are vague, indefinite, and insufficiently related to the order which is adhered to in the case of the prosecution. Tribunal to appreciate that on all these groups and especially, if I may say so, on Groups 3 and 4. The prosecution feels very strongly on this matter in the case. I am grateful to the Tribunal for giving me the opportunity of saying this.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
Official transcript of the International (The Tribunal convened for the afternoon session at 1440 hours.)
THE MARSHAL OF THE COURT: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Streicher is absent from this session.
THE PRESIDENT: I will deal with the documents in the order in which they were dealt with by Fleet Judge Kranzbuehler.
It rejects Doenitz 81, pages 233, 234; 234 being Doenitz net allowing -- page 58.
It rejects Goering No. 7, page 89. know from Fleet Judge Kranzbuehler whether that is already in evidence or not. It is page 91 in the Doenitz Document Book in English, volume 2, page 91. It is headed "C-21, GB-194."
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is an excerpt from a document which the Prosecution has submitted here and which is therefore already in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then; we need not be troubled about it. sitting in closed session thereafter.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call Grand Admiral Doenitz as witness.
(The Defendant Doenitz came to the witness-box.) BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: that correct?
Q Yes. During the first World War you were with the U-boats?
Q Until the end? U-boats? tilla Weddingen, the first U-boat flotilla after 1918 in Germany. As chief, the beginning of that command, some days before, two days before, I was in Turkey in order to go on a U-boat, and fill in the gap since 1918. boats?
Q What was your rank when you came to the U-boats in 1935?
Q What did the U-boat weapon at that time in Germany consist of? of three small boats of 250 ton each, so-called Einbaune. Besides, there were six somewhat smaller boats which were in a U-boat shcool which was not subordinate to me for the purpose of training. Then there were in the service another six of these small U-boats.
Q Who announced to you that you fot that command, Great Admiral? U-boat weapons should be prepared for war?
A No. I only received the order, the mission to train the U-boats for sailing, submersion and firing.
Q Did you prepare the U-boats for war against merchantmen?
merchantman and I also issued, accordingly, tactical orders for each individual commander. was a preparation concerning prize regulations? ships, surface ships? men was an instruction, how does the U-boat, submarine, behave in case of stopping and examining of the destination and so on of a merchantman. Later, I believe in the year 1938, when the drought of the German prize regulations came, I passed them on to the flotillas for the instruction of the commanders. name "Wolf pack tactics" or "pack tactics." What were these pack tactics about and did that mean anything in connection with the warfare against merchantmen and the prize regulations? other categories of ships, which by tactical maneuvers, collective maneuvers, try to got better results. The development of wolf pack tactics was nothing further than to break with that principle of individual action of U-boats and the attempt to use U-boats in the same manner as all other categories of warships, collectively. Such a method of collective action was naturally necessary when a group was to be attacked, be it a Group of warships -- that is several warships together, or be it a convoy or convoy escort. These wolf pack tactics, therefore, had nothing to do with war against merchantmen according to prize regulations; that is a tactical measure to fight groups; Of course, also convoys where measures, according to prize regulations, can not be applied. enemy?
A I did not receive such a general mission. I had the mission to develop U-boat weapons as well as I could, such as it is the duty of each front line officer of all armed forces of all nations to be able to be prepared against all emergencies.
Once in the year 1937 or 1938, in the mobilization plan of the Navy, I received the order for me that in case France should try to interrupt the rearmament by an attack on Germany it would be the task of the German Uboats to attack in the Mediterranean the transports which would go from North Africa to France.
Then I ordered a maneuver according to that in the North Sea. That was the only mission, if you ask me about a certain purpose, which I received from the Naval Warfare Command in that regard, and that occurred in the year 136 or 137. To my recollection, that plan had been issued over the concern that the rearmament of Germany, at that time unarmed, could be interrupted by some measures. and tactically for naval warfare against England?
A No. The German submarine weapons, in the fall of 1939, consisted of about thirty to forty main boats. That means that at all times about one-third could be used in the front lines, and in reality that looked much worse later. There was one month, for instance, when only two boats were on the sea. With that small number of submarines it was, of course, only possible to pinch a large sea power such as England that we in the navy were not prepared for a war against England. navy at the beginning of the year had to be changed most radically. It had been the intention to create a homogeneous fleet which, of course, since it was in proportion much smaller than the British, would not be capable for war against England. That building program of this fleet, then when war had started with England, had to be discontinued of the capital ships; only those ships were finished which were close to completion. Everything else was dropped, and that was necessary in order to free the building capacity to start building submarines. And that, also, explains why the German submarine warfare in this last war really has started in the year 1942; that is to say, when those submarines for which the order has been given for b uilding at the beginning of the war and had become ready for action. From previous years, that is 1940, the replacement of U-boats hardly covered the losses. weapon. What do you say to it?
A Yes, that is correct. Submarines have the mission to approach an enemy and to attack him by torpedoes, and, in that respect, the U-boat is an aggressive weapon.
for an aggressive war? it has nothing to do with military considerations. I can certainly use a submarine in a defensive war because, also in defensive warfare, vessels of the enemy have to be attacked. Of course, I can use the U-boats just the same in a political way as an aggressive war. If one should conclude that the navies which hav e submarines are planning aggressive war, then all nations and all navies of these nations have to be considered and they, more than Germany, twice as much or three times as much, could be accused of planning aggressive war. have anything to do with the planning of warfare as such?
A No, nothing, nothing at all. My tasks were in the front lines to train U-boats, militarily and tactically, and to train my troops, to educate my troops and my officers. make any proposals concerning the war against a definite enemy? enemy? orders from you to the U-boats before the beginning of this war; an order for the installation of certain U-boats in the Baltic and an order before the Norway action for the installation of U-boats along the Norwegian coast. I ask you, therefore, when, at what time, were you as Flag Officer of U-boats informed about the then existing plans? plans only after these plans had been completed; that is to say, only if I was expected to participate in the carrying out of these plans with a special task; and that only at that time when it was necessary to make possible the carrying out of my military tasks.
Q Let us take the case of the Norway action. When did you find out about the intention of the occupation of Norway and in what connection did you receive that information? I had my command, to Berlin, to the Naval Warfare Command, and on the occasion of that meeting I was instructed about the intention and my particular task. Command, which I submit to the Tribunal at Doenitz Exhibit No. 6. It is on page 8 of the first document book.
"The Commander of U-boats participates in a conference with the Chief of Staff of the naval command in Berlin.
"Contents of the conference:
"Preparation of the occupation of Norway and Denmark by the German Wehrmacht."
Is that the meeting which you have mentioned? outbreak of the war against Poland, did you have the opportunity to examine what tactical instructions, which you had to give to your U-boats, to your submarines, led to an aggressive war or had to lead to aggressive war? I should like to ask what soldier of whatever nation, who has just received a military task, would have the right to approach his government and ask for examination or justification as to whether from his task an aggressive war could evolve. That would mean, wouldn't it, that--
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has itself to decide from a matter of law whether the war was an aggressive war. It does not want to hear from this witness, who is a professional sailor, what his view is on the question of law.
CR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I believe my question has been misunderstood. I did not ask Admiral Doenitz whether he considered the warfare as an aggressive war or not; but I asked him whether he had the possibility or the task as a soldier to examine, to check whether his orders could become means for an aggressive war. He, therefore, should state his opinion or his attitude about the task which he had as a sailor, and not the question of an aggressive war or not.
THE PRESIDENT: He is able to tell us what his task was as a matter of fact, but he is not here to argue the case to us. He can state the facts as to what he did.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Does one have to give a defendant the right to say what deliberations he had on which, especially here, are based the accusations of the Prosecution? The defendant should have the possibility to state his position according to these accusations.
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want to hear his comments. You will argue his case on his behalf on the evidence he gives. He is not here to argue the law before us. That is not part of the evidence.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then I shall just ask him about his considerations. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: to the submarines or the orders which you issued before the beginning of the Norway action -- did you ever consider whether that would lead to aggressive war? had the thought uppermost in my mind to carry out that military task. Whether the leadership of the state politically made an aggressive war by doing so or Whether or not they were profylactic measures was not up to me to decide; I had nothing to do with that.
orders about U-Boat warfare?
Q Who was that? that is, the beginning of September 1939, for the conduct of submarine warfare? say, according to the London arrangement. warning? guarded either by naval vessels or planes. Furthermore, I was permitted to fire at any ship which, after the attempt to stop here sent radio messages or did not obey the order to stop. the war against merchantmen became more severe. Did you know whether that was planned, and if you do, why it was planned? development of the attitude of the enemy, to retaliate blow by blow, as it was said in the order, by more severe actions. experiences with the measures taken by the enemy which led to more severe measures? merchantmen not only took advantage of their radio installations at the first attempt to stop them, but that they immediately sent messages as soon as they could see a submarine on the horizon. ing in the military intelligence service. Furthermore, practically a few days after the beginning of the war, we had the experience that merchantmen were armed and used their arms.
Q To what orders on the part of Germany did these experiences lead?
A They led first to the order that merchantmen which used their radio equipment, which sent radio messages, on the occasion of being stopped, could be attacked without warning.
They led also to the order that merchantmen whose armament had been recognized beyond doubt, that is to say, whose armament one knew by British publications, could be attacked without warning. 4 October 1939, is that right? enemy merchantmen could be attacked, and why did that order come about? on the basis of a British publication which said that now the merchantmen had all been armed. In addition, there was a broadcast by the British Admiralty on the 1st of October that the merchantmen had been directed to attack German U-boats. Furthermore, as I have said before, it was clear beyond doubt that each merchantman was part of the intelligence service of the enemy, and that these radio messages at sight of a submarine were essential for the use of surface or aerial forces. because of this attitude of enemy merchantmen, submarines were put in danger and were attacked by surface or aerial forces?
A yes. I had received quite a number of reports in this connection, and since the German measures were always taken about four weeks after these facts had been recognized, I had very serious losses in the meantime, during the period when I had to keep myself bound by my one-sided obligations. merchantmen according to the Prize Regulations during the period when the ships of the enemy did not abide by them any more? approve?
A No, I did not protest against them. On the contrary, I considered these regulations correct, because, as I have said before, otherwise I would have had to remain bound to an obligation which was one-sided and caused serious losses to me.
merchantmen, such as firing on armed merchantmen, and then the order to attack all merchantmen, was that a forcible development which had to come?
A. This development, as I have said before, had to come. As soon as merchantmen are armed and make use of their arms, and send messages and thereby immediately call for protection, then they force the submarine to submerge and attack without warning. the case with the British submarines, and in exactly the same manner with American and Russian submarines.
Q. If, on one side, a merchantman sends a message first, and on the other side a submarine, for that reason, attacks without previous warning, which side has the advantage according to your experience, the side of the merchantman or the side of the submarine?
A. In an area, where there is no constant patrolling by the enemy, by naval forces of any kind or by planes, that is to say, close to the coast, the submarine ship becomes the bearer of the main weapons against the submarine, and the submarine is therefore compelled to consider that surface ship just like a battleship or naval warship. It is forced to submerge; it loses its speed. Therefore, in all ovean areas, with the exception of the areas right in front of the coast, which can be constantly patrolled, the advantage of arming of merchatmen is on the side of the merchantmen.
Q. Are you of the opinion that the orders of the Naval Warfare Command remained within the framework of that which was necessary against the enemy from a military point of view, or did these orders go beyond military necessity
A. They certainly remained within the scope of that which was necessary. I have explained already that the actions were taken slowly and after careful study may have been for the reason that politically all increasingly severe measures in the West should be avoided.
Q. Great Admiral, these orders which we have mentioned were based on that time only on German experiences and without thorough knowledge of orders which had been issued on the British side. Now, I should like to put to you these orders, the knowledge of which we have now based a ruling of the Tribunal and I should like to ask you whether these individual orders of with your experience, whether there is a difference? I submit the orders of the British Admiralty as Exhibit Doenitz 67. It is on page 168 in document book No. 3.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President; the document begins on page 163, not on page 168. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. As you know, we are confronted with the Handbook of the British Navy of 1938 and I put to you, from page 164, the paragraph about the reports, enemy reports.
A. There is no pagination here.
Q. It is DMS-3155, the paragraph about reports. The heading is "Enemy Reports."
A. Yes.
Q. I read the paragraph to you: "As soon as the captain of a merchant marine boat sights an enemy boat or plane, his first and most important duty is to report via wireless, on the type and position of the enemy. Such a report may, if submitted quickly, perhaps not only save the boat but also many others. This might give a chance -- which perhaps will never return -to destroy the steamer with one of our battle ships or planes." Then there are some more details which I do not care to read, about the manner in which these reports are to be given. Is this order according to your experience?
A. Yes. In this order, there is not only a directive to send wireless signals. If you are stopped by a U-boat, that alone would, according to international law, justify that the U-boat by force of arms proceed against the ship but beyond that, it is stated that as soon as an enemy boat is in sight that report is to be made.
Q. Yes, Admiral.
A. Through the purpose --
Q. So this order is in accord with the experiences which your boats reported?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. I put to you the paragraph DMS 2 VII, on page 165. That is the paragraph about, for opening fire, prerequisites for opening fire.
"(a) Against hostile actions in accordance with International Law. -Since armament is intended only for the purpose of self-defense it can only be used against an enemy who is obviously trying to capture or sink the mercha marine vessel. Upon the outbreak of war it must be assumed that the enemy will act according to international law, and therefore, first must not be opened as long as it is not evident that the enemy is attempting to capture the boat. As sson as it is clear that resistance has to be made in order to avoid capture, fire is to be opened.
"(b) Against actions of the enemy violating International Law. -If, while the war goes on it should unfortunately be found, that the enemy has gone over to the policy of attacking boats without warning in violation of international law, it will be permissible to open fire against enemy boats, submarines and planes, even if those have not attacked or asked for surrender, if such an action is apt to prevent the enemy from gaining an advantageous position for an attack." In this order in accord, that is to say, the order "a" and "b", with the experiences made.
A. In practive, between "a" and "b", one cannot find any difference. I should like to emphasize in this connection --- DMS 3 III, page 167, isn't it -- under 4, that is the last paragraph of "b" of that point.
Q. One moment, do you mean "b-V"?
A. It says here ---V---"Ships with defensive armament should open fire..
Q. That is "b-IV."
A. Yes, --"... should open fire to keep the enemy at a distance, if in your opinion, he intends dapture and if he comes near enough to endanger any attempt for flight." That is to say, that means therefore that as soon as the ship sights a U-boat, of which he has to assume during war that it isn't there for no reason, but wants to capture, he, for his own defense, will open fire as soon as he comes within range?
for his guns; that is to say, the submarine, until the submarine has come within range of his guns, the steamer, if he wants to use his guns offensively, cannot act any different.
Q. Grand Admiral, did the armed merchant men act in the manner in which your have described; that is, did they really fire as soon as the submarine came within range?
A. Yes. According to my recollection, the first report came from a U-boat about that on the 6th of September 1939.
Q. With this order, we find a supplement under AMS 1 118, on page 165, and here we read: "With reference to D.M.S. Part 1 article 53, it is now considered a fact that the enemy has gone over to the policy of attacking merchant marine vessels without warning as part of submarine and plane operations. The instructions in the second paragraph (b) of this article are therefore to be considered as being valid." That means that the order which we have read before, "b", now, from the 13th of June 1940, had to be considered valid. Do you mean to say that in fact before that, from the very beginning, one acted according to the order "b"?
A. I have already stated that between an aggressive and defensive use of arms on the part of the steamer captain, the surface ship against a submarine, there is practically no difference at all. This is purely theoretical differentiation but even if one differentiates between them, then beyond doubt which said -- and that was not according to facts --- that we were conducting unlimited submarine warfare. That report was designated to inform the steamer captains that now the case "b" was valid, part "b".
Q. I put to you now a directive about the handling of depth charges on merchant ships, That is on page 168, the reference list, and the date is the 14th of Spetember 1939.
A. What page.
Q. Page 168.