THE MARSHALL: May it please the Tribunal; the report is made that Defendant Schirach is absent.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now take my position on the documents to which reference has been made by the prosecution. things concerning the groups; First, I ask the Tribunal to recall that in general questions I am also counsel for Raeder. I have already mentioned, at the occasion of my first applications for documents, that I cannot separate all the charges against Doenitz and Raeder; and I agreed with Dr. Siemers that I should like to treat these charges together. documents. cution has made is directed against the fact that the war measures of the Allies are mentioned in the documents. I believe that especially in this field I have been completely misunderstood. It is not my intention to criticize any war measures, and I shall demonstrate in detail later that the documents mentioned do not serve that purpose. these documents what naval warfare was really like. I could not demonstrate this only be showing the German methods and practices, but I have to submit to this Tribunal also the methods of the Allies in order to prove that the German practices which are like the Allies' were legal, and the Tribunal even has recognized this to be correct by approving the use of British Admiralty orders and an interrogatory of Admiral Nimitz.
I am very grateful that these documents were approved; and my own documents are along the same line.
have been raised, first to the document Doenitz-5, which is in Document Book 1.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal has examined all these documents; so I think you can deal with them as far as possible in groups.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: If possible, you should follow the order of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, it would not be possible for me to follow the order of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, because then again and again I should have to return to deal with the same thing which I have already mentioned. I believe it will facilitate the proceedings if I form groups according to my order of presentation; and I should like to remind the Tribunal that that was approved for me yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, it would be very much more convenient to the Tribunal, if you followed the order in the groups. But if youfind that impossible, the Tribunal would not make it a matter of order.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I should be very grateful, Mr. President, if I could keep the order in which I intended to present them. In part, it is the same as the order that Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe suggested.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Concerning the problem of aggressive war, I have to submit another document which is Doenitz - 5. It is an excerpt from the document of German policies, and concerns the question of bases in Norway. I consider this document relevant because it shows that on the part of the British Admiralty an interrogatory has been prepared about the question of the necessity of a German base, which is quite according to the one which the prosecution has submitted in document G B 83 as proof against Admiral Doenitz, and proof for preparation of aggressive war. nothing to do with any consideration concerning an aggressive war, which a subordinate office could not even make. The document is in Group 2 of Sir David classification.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that the footnote stems on the same footing as the other part of the documents?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The footnote is the essential part for me. I had the other part copied only to keep the connection with the footnote.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, who wrote the footnote? Doesn't the footnote represent information which was not before the German Admiralty at the time?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, no.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, does the footnote state that it was before the German Admiralty at the time?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, Mr. President. The footnote was not known to the German Admiralty at the time?
THE PRESIDENT: That is what I said; the footnote was not known to the German Admiralty.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, it was not known.
THE PRESIDENT: Who wrote it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Please?
THE PRESIDENT: Who wrote the footnote?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The footnote is part of that document which can be found in the collection of documents of German politics, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant Ribbentrop the author of it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, Mr. President. The documents of German politics are in an official collection, and the footnotes have been written by the editor of that collection on the basis of official material.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Now I come to the documents concerning naval warfare in general. A large part of those are in Sir David's Group 3.
The first document is Doenitz-60, on page 152. It concerns an American note of the 6th of October, 1939, and is in connection with the document Doenitz-61, which has not been objected to by the prosecution. It is in Volume 3 of the document book, Mr. President, at page 152.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: This document is an American reply to the document which you will find two pages before this, at page 150. Both documents deal with the warning of neutral nations against suspicious actions concerning their merchant marine.
In this document a charge is made against an order that ships which act suspiciously -- that is, proceed without lights -- should be sunk.
The next document is from Sir David's Group 1, Doenitz 69, on page 170, in book 3. It is an excerpt from several copies of the Voelkischer Beobachter of November and December 1939. There are published lists of armed British and French passenger ships. This document also is in connection with the preceding document and the next one. All these documents deal with the question of treatment of passenger ships by the Naval Warfare Command.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better give the numbers of the documents You mentioned the next document and the one before it. I think you had better give the numbers of the documents.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, sir. That was document 69, Mr. President, Doenitz-69, and it is on page 170, in book number 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is, but you said something about documents that were akin, or some words to that effect, to the documents next to it.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. It is in relation to Doenitz-68, on page 169 of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Was that objected to?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, that was not objected to.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then, you needn't bother with it.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I only wanted to show, Mr. President, that this document which was objected to is only part of the proof about treatment of passenger ships, and it shows that the German press had warned against the using of armed passenger ships. contraband and control system.
These are the documents Doenitz-60, from page 173 to page 197 of the document book, and I should like to form three groups of these. contraband. I consider this question relevant because document GB-191 has stated that the German U-boats sunk a large number of allied ships while these ships were on a legal merchant trip; and the development of rules against contraband will show the Tribunal that from 12 December 1939 on, a legal import to England did not exist, but actually only contraband. for the German point of view, which became known under the slogan of "hunger blockade", and which played on important part in all German deliberations about the nature of naval warfare.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't hear the word you said. Some sort of blockade.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: "Hunger"--famine. "Hunger blockade."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The documents contain the German contraband regulations the British regulations, and two German statements concerning these regulations.
The next group is Doenitz-60, from page 183 to page 191. That concerns the regulations about control ports; that is to say, the British because in this document the German Naval Warfare Command is accused of the fact that its war measures against England were taken without consideration of the danger against neutrals. The group which I have mentioned shows that it was not possible for the British Admiralty either to take war measures without endangering the neutrals, because, by the establishment of control forms, the neutrals were forced into German zones of operations and thereby, of course, endangered. This danger was confirmed by the neutrals themselves, and the documents on page 186 to 189 will prove this. group, GB-194, at page 198, which contains a renewed American protest against the control ports.
concerned with the question of an export embargo. This export blockade is based on a British Order in Council of the 27 November 1939 and was expressed against Germany. This measure is essential to determine the question of legal trade because thereby legal export was not possible either. later declared by Germany against England. Since the document G.B. 191 disputes the legality of a total blockade I have two proofs, bases, for this blockade, and also the basis for the export blockade.
The next document objected to is Doenitz 72 on page 185. It is a note by Great Britain to Belgium of December 1939. In this note the British Government states that it will net tolerate any increase of trade between Belgium and Germany. I use it as a means of proof for the fact that the economic pressure which can be seen from this note was a natural and accepted means of warfare. This question is relevant concerning the document of the Prosecution, G.B. 2 to 4. There on Page 6 under Figure 6 it is stated that Germany necessarily had to exert economic pressure on the neutrals, and these statements represented were submitted by the Prosecution to prove illegal measures.
The next group contains the following documents: Doenitz 60, page 204; Doenitz 72, page 207; Doenitz 60, page 208; Doenitz 60, page 209; and Doenitz 75, page 218. All of these documents concern the development of German zones of operation and treat the zones of operation which have been stated by the opponents. These documents are relevant for the question of the treatment of neutrals. In document G.B. 191 the charge was made against the Naval Warfare Command that without any consideration it had given the order to torpedo neutral ships, and my evidence shall prove that that happened only in such areas as neutrals had been warned against the use, and that this is an accepted and permitted measure of warfare; which can be shown also by the practices of the enemy. the ether side, Doenitz 60, page 208, which concerns the statement by Mr. Churchill of 8 May, 1940, concerning the activities against ships in the Skagerrak.
This document and the next one, being Doenitz 60, page 209, I wanted to put to a witness. Doenitz 60, page 209, is a French statement concerning a warning of a dangerous area in Sicily. Both documents I am using as evidence for the practical facts of Naval warfare and should like to discuss them with a witness.
enemy also have some influence on German practices. 224. They deal with the British system of Navicerts. The British navicerts were certificates which all neutral ships had to get from the British Consulate before they could proceed. Ships which refused to use navicerts were confiscated. The navicert system is relevant for two reasons. First, it is mentioned in the German statement concerning the total blockade against England on the 17 August 1940 as one reason for that blockade. Secondly, from the German point of view it is a non-neutral act by the neutrals -- on the part of the neutrals-- if the submitted to that system. This question plays a considerable part in determinir to what extent Germany herself from that time on took consideration of neutrals in the zones of operations. val welfare law, and that is an important subject for me.
The next document is Doenitz 60, page 256. It is a French decree of the ls November 1939, concerning the creation of an insigna for the crew members of French merchant ships who can be mobilized. This document is relevant for the question of whether the crew of merchant ships at that stage of the war should be considered combatants or noncambatants. The details of the decree seem to me to show that they have to be considered combatants. the document of the Prosecution 181. These are my documents on page 233 and 234. I have said that these two documents shall dispute the probative value of the document G.B. 191, that is, the report of the British Foreign Office about German naval warfare. In this report on Page 1, Article 72 of the German Prize Regulations is attacked, in which it says that ships can be sunk if they cannot be brought into port. Document G.B. 191 says that this is contrary to traditions British way of thinking. My document Doenitz 81 shows the sinking of the German freighter "Olinda" by the British cruiser "Ajax" on the first day of the war. It is only one example to show that the statement made the report of the British Foreign Office in incorrect according to which the British fleet had not sunk ships if they could not bring them to port or would not bring them to port.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: In the same report of the British Foreign Office, German U-Boats are accused of never making any difference between armed and unarmed merchant ships. Later on I shall submit to the Court the orders concerning armed and unarmed merchant ships, but in my next document, however, I shall only try to clear the U-boats by providing that each case of mistake or error is always considered a case of bad intentions. from which we can see that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, in some cases to distinguish between armed merchant ships and unarmed merchant ships.
THE PRESIDENT: You said GB-82?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I said GB 191.
THE PRESIDENT: Doenitz 82 is on page 234, is that right?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: 234, yes, sir. American Secretary of the Navy Knox concerning secrecy about the sinking of German U-boats. For me it is essential in connection with the document of the Prosecution, GB 194. In this document the Naval Warfare Command, Seekriegsleitung, is reproached for the measures which it took to keep secrecy about the sinking of U-boats. That is the fiction of a mine hit. I should like to give this as an example that during war, of course, military measures can be kept secret, but that, in itself, is no proof for or against their legality.
The next document is Doenitz 89, on page 246. It is a list of the Naval War Command of violations of neutrality committed by the United States from September 1939 to September 1941. The document is essential against the document of the Prosecution, GB-195. In GB-195 an order from Adolf Hitler of July 1941 is mentioned in which it is stated that now, also, the merchant ships of the United States must be treated within the German zone of blockade in the same manner as all other neutral ships; that is to say, they should be sunk. portunistic handling of U-boat warfare by Grand Admiral Doenitz. I wish to show by submitting this list that from the German point of view, it can be understood and is quite justificable if in the summer of 1941 one did not grant the United States a better position than any other neutral.
Now I come to the subject of the treatment of shipwrecked survivors. The document Doenitz 9 -
THE PRESIDENT: The treatment of what? You said you came to the treatment of something or other.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The treatment of shipwrecked survivors.
These documents are in volume one of the document book. The first document Doenitz 9, on page 11 offers a description of exaggerated measures to save survivors taken by German U-boats from September-October 1939. This is essential
THE PRESIDENT: There must surely be a group of these, is there not? Have you not a number of document which deal with shipwrecks?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The group, Mr. President? I did not understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there not a number of these documents which fall into a group concerned with the subject of the treatment of shipwrecks?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, there are a number of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you not deal with them all together?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I can summarise. They are document Doenitz 19 on page 34. That is an order from the winter of 1939-1940 in which the rescue measures of U-boats are limited. Sir David objected to that group that it was not important if after this order of the winter 1939-1940, rescues were still carried out. I cannot share this opinion. If the Prosecution accuses Admiral Doenitz of having given an order about the limitation of rescue measures in the winter of 1939-1940, then it is essential to point out for what reasons such an order was issued and what practiced consequences it had in fact, and it is my assertion that that order can be traced, first, to the fighting conditions of the U-boats along the British coasts and, secondly, to exaggerated measures of rescue of the commanders. The order did not prohibit measures of rescue generally, and that will be shown by the statements made by the commanders, which I have submitted under Doenitz 13.
THE PRESIDENT: It is possible for you to give us a page where we can find these GB documents? For instance, GB 196.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. It is in the British document book on page 33. In the document book of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: GB-195?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Page 32, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to state my position on a formal objection. Some of these statements are not sworn statements, and I refer to Article 19 of the Charter, according to which the Tribunal is to use all matters of evidence which have probitive value. I believe that a written report by an officer about his activity as the commanding officer has probitive value, even if it is not sworn to. A report of this kind before a German Naval Court would certainly be accepted in evidence. ment of the Prosecution GB-199.
Prosecution. It is a radio message from the U-boat of Kapitanleutnant Schacht received from Admiral Doenitz, and deals with the rescue or non-rescue of Englishmen and Italians. armament and crew of the Laconia, which is the one in question, and then it explains why of the numerous Italians compared to the few and less numerous Englishmen, so few compared to the many had been rescued. ments and examined them, and therefore it isn't necessary for you to go into them as a small group, and it isn't necessary for you to go into each group, if you will indicate the nature of the group.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then I should like to mention the Documents, Doenitz 29 on pages 54 to 59 of my Document Book; Doenitz 61, page 54; Doenitz 32 on page 55; Doenitz 33 on page 66; Doenitz 37 on page 78; Doenitz 38 on page 88 and Doenitz 40 on page 86. Doenitz 29 is concerned with a statement of the witness Heisig. The prosecution has stated that I could not bring in anything concerning the character of the witness Heisig because I had not made any objection during the crossexamination of the witness Heisig, and, therefore, I wish to state that in my opinion I have attacked the credibility of Heisig during the cross examination as much as that was possible at the moment. Of the existence of that witness I knew only three days before he appeared here.
THE PRESIDENT: You are now proceeding to deal with each document. You have given us quite a number of documents of that group, and since we have already seen those documents, therefore, we consider them as a group. We do not need to have these details about the question of the credibility of Heisig, which is already before us.
DR. KRANSBUEHLER: I believe it is very difficult to state the relevancy of documents if I am not permitted to say what the connection is. For instance, the next three documents, Doenitz 31, 32 and 33, are related to GB-200.
That is an order by the flag officer of the U-boats dealing with the so-called rescue ships, and the Tribunal will recall that the Prosecution has stated it did not object to the order as such with reference to the sinking of rescue ships but they objected to the tendency that by the sinking of rescue ships also the ship crews would be killed, and my documents pertain to this issue, which shows that this means they applied moral measures which do not exist during war time, and that he was assured that the sea emergency planes would be shot down, and quite rightly so, by the German planes and air force, because there was no agreement which prohibited that. consideration, since the International Law does not prohibit it, and we have the same point of view concerning the rescue ships. correct an error. That is Document Doenitz 33. It does not deal, as Sir David mentioned yesterday, with the sinking of a Ship by Russian U-boats, but it is the sinking of a German Transport which carried injured. This sinking was quite in order, therefore, and I would like to show with this document that the Naval Warfare Command did not for a moment object to it.
I believe, Mr. President, that I should like to show from the above documents, Doenitz 37, 38 and 40, because also these documents have been objected to by the Prosecution, because they explain the measures taken by the Allies.
THE PRESIDENT: As I have told you more than once, the Tribunal does not wish to hear from you on each individual document. We have already considered the documents and we want to deal with them in a group. You have already given us the documents in a group and have indicated to what subject they relate.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, may I at least mention the document of the Prosecution to which my documents refer? Document 37 is a Document of the Prosecution D 638 (December, 1938). That is the statement by Great Admiral Doenitz concerning the case of the Athenia. At the end of that statement a question of the punishment of the U-boat Commander is mentioned and the Prosecution apparently accuses Admiral Doenitz that he had not punished the Commander in a different way. I want to prove only that a Commander-in-Chief has to tolerate certain measures during war time even if they were not quite correct or partly not correct. objected to by the Prosecution. It brings out only one detail from the Document 39. That is the attitude of the Naval Warfare Command to alleged reports about the Allies firing on ship wrecks, and Doenitz 38 is the only proof that the very careful attitude of the Naval Warfare Command was not based on lack of proof, but they did not have affidavits, and in spite of that rejected any thought of reprisals. against which no objection has been raised. In this document the question is raised as to whether a ship wreck could be shot at or not, and I should like to show that such considerations are considered inhumane and impossible, but that during war such conditions are examined and according to military necessity in certain cases have to be answered in the affirmative. deal with the document of the Prosecution GB-205. That was a radio message concerning the sinking of an Allied Sailing Ship.
G.B. 205 is on page 53 of the Document Book. The Prosecution in connection with this document has raised the accusation against our Naval Warfare Command that it tried to terrorize the crews of neutral ships. Both documents submitted by me give only a few examples to the effect that that terrorizing is nothing illegal but that each belligerent, of course, considered the psychological effect of military measures.
The next group is Document Doenitz 43, on page 95; Doenitz 92, on page 258, and Doenitz 67, on page 96. They all deal with the subject as to whether a ship is obliged to carry out rescues if this would endanger the ship itself, and that relates to the document of the Prosecution, GB-196, on page 33 of the Document Book of the Prosecution, and GB-199 on page 36 of the Document Book of the Prosecution. They show first the methods -
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us the subject they relate to. That is to say, they relate to the subject whether or not a ship is obliged to rescue if it would be endangered thereby, and that, you say, is an answer to No. 196 and 199. Why should you tell us anything more than that?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: If that is sufficient, then I shall proceed.
The last document in this group is Doenitz 530, page 99. It is a statement signed by some U-Boat Commanders from a prisoner-of-war camp, and it deals with the fact they they never received an order for the destruction of shipwreck. The Prosecution objected to it because it was considered too general and it wasn't sworn to. I believe that it is very concrete and contains very concrete statements concerning the alleged destruction order. Furthermore, it is an official report by the German Commanders who were prisoners of war, to the Commander of the Camp, and I received it through the British Ministry of War. I should ask the Tribunal especially to approve of this document, because it has a high probative value and moral value for myself and for my client. heading of "Conspiracy". It is in the Document Book, Volume 2, Doenitz 47, and relates to Document GB-212. Doenitz 47 is on page 120. The corresponding document of the Prosecution is GB-212, on page 75; it deals with an incident, namely, that Admiral Doenitz approved that a traitor should be removed in the prisoner-of-war camp.
Doenitz 47 will show that the removal of traitors is a necessary measure which during the war is approved by all governments. It is related to the document of the Prosecution, GB-209. 68 of the Document Book of the Prosecution. In connection with GB-209, the possibility of leaving the Geneva Convention is treated. Doenitz was accused of wanting, without any consideration, to risk the lives and safety of thousands of American and British prisoners. In my opinion, it is not sufficient to simply dispute a statement like that which is made by the Prosecution, but I must be allowed to prove that those prisoners of war for whom Admiral Doenitz himself was responsible were not only treated according to international law but even better; and as it can be seen from a British confirmation, which is among my documents, with fairness and consideration. It is on page 130. It is relevant to the documents of the Prosecution, GB-210, Prosecution Book page 69, and GB-211, Document Book of the Prosecution, page 72. With these two documents it is attempted to put Admiral Doenitz in connection with the conspiracy for the committing of crimes against the natives of the Occupied Territories. Here again, I would like to show that in that sector for which he personally was responsible he did everything necessary to protect the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories. Therefore, I have submitted the document concerning the sentences which have been imposed by the courts, the native courts, for the protection of the inhabitants, which have been confirmed even in the case of death sentences against German soldiers by Admiral Doenitz. Here also the Prosecution state that that document was very general, but it has an appendix with about 80 individual examples. I have not included these examples, in order to save the translators extra work, but if the Tribunal considers it essential I will certainly have that appendix translated.
The last group contains Doenitz 51, on page 134; Doenitz 52, on page 135. They are in connection with the Document of the Prosecution, GB-188, on page 10 of the British Document Book.
That is a speech made by Admiral Doenitz on the occasion of Adolf Hitler's death. In connection with that document and another, the Prosecution has accused him of being a fanatical Nazi, and as such had prolonged the war at the expense of the men, women and children of Germany. The documents of the Prosecution proper, however, show that he considered a delay of capitulation in order to make it possible for people to get from the East to the West and thereby in safety. of thousands -- if not millions -- of German people during these last weeks of the war were brought to safety -
THE PRESIDENT: We shall see that from the documents presumably.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Please?
THE PRESIDENT: That is part of the details in the documents, isn't it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. So I don't have to say anything further about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal are inclined to think that it would save time after the Tribunal has ruled on these documents, if you called the Defendant Doenitz first. Would you be willing to do that?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was not prepared for it, but of course I can do it.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the object of it is to try and save time, and the Tribunal thinks that in the course of the examination of the defendant a considerable number of these documents might possibly be dealt with in the course of direct -- and cross-examination.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The difficulty however, is that during the examination of Admiral Doenitz I should like to count on the knowledge of the contents of the documents, and I should like to discuss some documents with him. I don't know whether the Tribunal will approve these documents now or not.
THE PRESIDENT. But what I am suggesting was that the Tribunal should consider now the relevance of these documents, the admissibility of the documents, and then tell you -- make a rule -- as to what documents are admitted.
You will then know what documents are admitted. Or you can call Admiral Doenitz and of course examine him with reference to the documents which are admitted, and as I have told you, the Tribunal have already looked at those documents. They will now reconsider them, in order to see whether they are admissible, and in that way, to a large extent, fully acquainted with the documents.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, I agree to that, Mr. President. I agree to call Admiral Doenitz if the Tribunal wants it so.