SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Thank you.
BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
Q If I understand you, Mr. Goering, you said that all the basic decisions concerning foreign, political, and military matters were taken by Hitler alone? Individually?
A Yes, certainly. Also that he was the Fuehrer.
Q Should I understand that Hitler took those decisions without listening to the opinions of specialists who studied the question and the intelligence material concerned with these matters?
A That was different in various cases. In certain individual cases he certainly had evidence which was brought to him without which the experts could know for certain. In other cases, he probably expressed to the advisorsthat he intended to do something and what he demanded from them to be given. decision of serious matters, Hitler used the analysis and published material given to him by his close assistants who advised him according to their speciality. Is that correct? these things. associates of Hitler's on the subject of the airforce?
Q And on the question of economics? country?
A They were different. It depended on what question came up for discussion and it depended on how far the Fuehrer wanted to know about those things. On those would depend whom he would call for advice and consultation. associates? I, myself, and another close associate was -- perhaps it is the wrong word -Dr. Goebbels. Then, of course, you have got to consider the time. It differed during the 20 years, and in the end, to a very considerable degree. It was Bormann during the time of 1933 and 1934 , and shortly before the end, it was Himmler also, in certain instances and among certain questions. And if the Fuehrer was considering certain specific questions, then he would, of course, as it is the custom in every Government, call on that person who know most about the question and obtain the information from him.
in the field of foreign politics? the political decisions of the most important nature, were taken by himself after careful consideration, and he then conveyed them to ids officers. In very few cases only could there be a discussion through me and the necessary execution of policy took place between the foreign office and the ministry.
Q The defendant Ribbentrop? not make foreign policy.
Q And along strat egic questions, who advised Hitler?
A There were several people. As far as the sphere of influence is concerned, and when strategic questions were brought up, it concerned the three supreme commanders and chiefs of staffs, and particularly the leaders of the armed forces. consultants? matters was the chief of the leadership staff, Colonel General Jodl, and as far as the military administrative questions were concerned, the supreme commanders, of whom I was one, Raedar, and later Doenitz for the Navy. The other representatives of the Army did not take part. functionally, could we come to the conclusion that the purpose of thenature with regard to any question as regards any commendations made by Hitler's leading associates--did they have considerable influence on Hitler's final decisions? you are referring to the military subject, then the situation was . . .
Q No, I mean all spheres. All considerations of questions such as economies, interior politics, foreign policy, military and strategic questions. I mean all questions. I mean, if we approach the subject not theoretically, but functionally, did their recommendations have any considerable influence on Hitler's final decisions? That is what I mean.
A Partly, yes. It would partially depend on whether it would be right to the Fuehrer.
Q That's clear. Let's go on to the next question. Just whendid you begin preparing plans for the German military invasion against the Soviet Union in accordance with the plan Barbarossa. Just precisely when? carried out by my general staff after we received the first Fuehrer's order in that direction. That was in November.
Q In 1940?
A In 1940. But as far as we are concerned, we were not only concerned with Russia, but with all those countries who were not already involved with the war but could eventually be in the war.
Q All right. Was that in November 1940, when Germany was preparing to attack Russia? Plans were already being prepared for this attack with your participation? plan for the possible transfer of political balance had been worked out.
Q I ask you to reply to this question briefly, yes or no. I think it is possible to reply to the question briefly. attack on the Soviet Union, plans were already prepared, with your participation, for the attack on the Soviet Union. Can you reply to this briefly? there is no ambiguity at all here. How much time did it take for the Plan Barbarossa to be prepared? you to answer with regard to all phases of the Plan Barbarossa. pretty quickly. Barbarossa? confusion. I can't give you the exact date, but I have answered your question. As far as the air force was concerned, it happened comparatively quickly; as far as the army was concerned, it probably took longer. several months in advance of the attack itself, and that you, as chief of German aviation and Reichsmarshal, participated directly in preparation of the attack.
A May I divide your numerous questions. Firstly -
Q There were not too many questions asked at once. Excuse me please. You have admitted that in November 1940 the plan Barbarossa was prepared and developed.
A That's right. you, as chief of German aviation and Reichsmarshal, participated in plans for the attack months ahead of theirbeing put into effect. I asked you to reply to the last part of the question.
You admit that as chief of German aviation and Reichsmarshal you participated directly in preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union? Do you admit that? attack, first of all, within the limits given by the Fuehrer, that Soviet Russia was adopting a dangerous attitude; that from the beginning the certainty of an attack was not discussed, and that is contained in the directives of November 1940; of no importance here. That is a title and not a rag. already prepared in November 1940? detail before the Tribunal that we do not have to talk too much about the Plan Barbarossa, which is quite clear. I shall go on to the next question: consisted of invading and seizing Soviet territory up to the Ural Mountains and connecting it with the German Reich, including Crimea, the Caucasus; subjugation by Germany of the Ukraine, of Byelorussia, and of other regions of the Soviet Union? Do you admit that such were the objectives of that plan?
Q You do not admit that. Don't you remember that at the conference in Hitler's headquarters on the 16th of June 1941, at which you were present, as well as Bormann, Keitel, Rosenberg and others, Hitler stated the objectives of the attack against the Soviet Union in just the terms in which I have stated them? This was shown by the document submitted to the Tribunal. Have you forgotten that document? Have you forgotten about that?
A I can (remember the document exactly, and I can roughly remember the discussion at the conference. I said that this document written down by Bormann appears to me extremely exaggerated regarding these demands. At any rate, at the beginning of the war, such demands had not been discussed, nor had they before.
Q But you do admit that there are minutes of such a conference?
A I admit that because I have seen it. It was a document prepared by Bormann. participated in this conference. record. were formulated? I shall remind you of various parts of the minutes. It is not necessary to read all the minutes.
You would like a copy of the minutes of the meeting?
Q If you please. You would like to read the document?
Q Page 2, second paragraph, point 2, about Crimes:
"We emphasize" -- do you find the place? Have you got it?
A Just a moment. I haven't found it yet. Yes, I've got it.
Q "We emphasize ", states this point 2, "that we are bringing liberation to Crimea. Crimea must be liberated of all strangers, especially populated by the Germans. Also, Western Galicia must become a province of the German Reich."
Have you found that place?
Q "A province of the Reich," it says. last part. It says here:
"The Fuehrer stresses the fact that these parts must become provinces of the Reich."
Have you found the place, "The Fuehrer stresses the fact"?
A You mean the very last bit?
Q That's right.
A "Finally, it is ordered..."?
A "The Fuehrer orders...."?
Q That's right, "The Fuehrer orders that the Baltic countries as well must become provinces of the Reich." Then, it goes on, "The provinces of the Reich must also include Crimea, with its adjoining regions. These adjoining regions must be as big as possible. The Fuehrer says that about the Ukrainians, but that has no connection."
Go on further; skip one paragraph.
"The Fuehrer stresses that the Volga territory as well must become a province of the Reich , as well as the Baku Province which must become a military colony of the Reich. Eastern Karelia must also be included. However, in view of the large supplies of nickel available, regions where this is found must also be included. Great caution must be exercised in joining up with Finland and absorbing the Leningrad region into the Reich. The Fuehrer would like to have Leningrad razed altogether."
Haven't you found the place about Leningrad and Finland? on the 16th of June 1941, three weeks after Germany attacked the Soviet Union. You do not deny that such minutes exist, do you?
A You said three days, didn't you?
the 22ndof May, and the conference took place at Hitler's headquarters on the 16th of June at 15 hours, I think.
A That is quite right. I have emphasized it all alone, but the record of this thing isn't right.
Q And who took the minutes of the meeting?
Q What was the point of Bormann's taking the minutes incorrectly? As far as Crimea is concerned, it is correct.
Q Well, let's be a little more precise. Germany wanted the Crimea to become a region of the empire, correct? the war. The same applies to the free Balkan countries whichhad previously been taken by Russia. They, too, were to go to Germany.
Q Pardon me. You say that with regard to the Crimea, the question arose even before the war, that is, the question of trying to acquire Crimea for the Reich. How far ahead of the beginning of the war was that? He did not mention such territorial aims, but he did aim at them. At that time, if you read that record, I myself considered the question premature and I refrained from discussing anything but practical matters during that conference.
Q I still would like to be a little more precise. You state that with regard to the Crimea, there was some question about making the Crimea a region of the Reich? about those, too?
Q All right. With regard to the Caucasus, there was talk about annexing the Caucasus also?
A It was never mentioned that that should become German. We merely discussed the strongest German economic influence in that sphere.
Q So the Caucasus could be called a concession of the Reich? a victorious peace. You can see Iran that record that it would be quite mad to discuss a few days after a war broke out, matters on which Bormann stated his opinion long before we knew what the outcome of the war would be. and the colonies there? were discussed which you couldn't discuss in practice at that time at all. You might have talked about territory which you occupied, and the administration, that is all. these questions were discussed at the conference; they were posed there. You don't deny that, do you? record here.
Q I would like to draw just one conclusion. It seems obvious that even then, at that conference, plans of seizing the territories were discussed in accordance with the plan prepared months ago. That is correct, isn't it? permit me that I do emphasize -- that in connection with this record attribute these unlimited discussions to the fact that during the lengthy discussion of all these problems, it says:
"The Reichsmarshal underlined all the important points of view which must be exclusively decisive for us, namely, securing of the food supplies, economic system, and the securing of highways and communications."
Q All right. You describe rather accurately your objectives, but what was the reason for your objection?
The most important thing, it appeared to you, was food supplies, and the rest would came later, is that correct? In that case you objected not to the plan, but to the period at which the plan should be fulfilled. You wanted food first and territory second, is that it?
A No, that isn't the way it is stated. It is stated just as I have read it out. There were no secrets concerned, but it was just the way I read it. you disagreed. annexation of territory, with reference to that, "The Reichsmarshal emphasized the most important points of view which wouldhave to be the decisive factors for us, namely, securing of the food supplies, the securing of the economic situation, and the securing of highways and communications, etc." In other words, railroads and so forth were also discussed. intoxication of victory, and wanted to confine it to merely practical matters. a part. However, the objection you just gave does not mean that you objected to the annexation of the Crimea to the German Reich, or the annexation of other regions, isn't that correct? "opposed to that, the Reichsmarshal emphasized..." you would understand everything that is implied. In other words, I didn't say here, "I protest against the annexation of the Crimea," or, "I object to annexing the Baltic States." For that I had no reason. Had we been victorious, then after the declaration of peace we would have been able to gather how far we could use these territories or not, but at that moment we hand't finished the war, we hadn't won the war, and consequently I personally confined myself to practical problems.
Q I understand you. In that case, you considered the annexation of these regions a step to come later. As you said yourself, after it was won you would have seized these provinces and annexed them.
sharing the bearskin before it was shot.
Q I understand. And the bearskin should be divided only when the territories were seized completely, is that correct? ascertained definitely after the bear was shot. to my question, it has become quite clear, and I think you will agree, that -danger which Russia represented to Germany. before the beginning of the war this was not discussed. I said that it was not discussed, but that the Fuehrer gathered from the attitude of Russia that there was a vital threat against Germany, and that he wished to eliminate that threat, and that he felt that to be his duty. What might have been done in peace, after a victorious war, is an entirely new question which at that time was not discussed in any shape or form. But, by that I do not want to say that we did not expect anything but a victorious war in the East or that we did not have any wishes regarding territorial gains.
Q. I would not like to return to the question of the so-called primitive war but nevertheless, since you touched on the subject, I would like to ask you the following. Goering nor he wanted war with Russia. Do you remember that testimony of your witness, Field Marshal Milch?
A. Yes, certainly quite exactly.
Q. You do remember. In that case why did you not want war with Russia, when you saw the so-called Russian threat?
A. Firstly, I have emphasized that that danger appeared to the Fuehrer to be of considerable extent and to be so close and secondly, in connection with the question put by my defense counsel, I have clearly and exactly stated my reasons why I believed that as far as the time factor was concerned, that danger was not at that time so close and why I thought that other measures of security should be taken first.
Q. But you do not deny the testimony of your witness?
A. Milch was of a somewhat different opinion than I myself. He considered it a serious danger to Germany due to the fact that a war on two fronts was about to begin. He was not so much of the opinion that Russia did not represent a danger but he was of the opinion that in spite of that danger one should take the risk raid not use attack as a preventative measure against that danger. I as far as the same factor was concerned, was of the same opinion.
Q. On the basis of your reply to questions during several sessions, there appeared to have been no country which you did not regard as a threat.
A. Most countries did not represent a danger to Germany but I personally have always considered Russia the greatest threat after 1933.
Q. Well, of course, by "most of the countries" you mean your allies, is that right?
A. No, I am thinking of most of the countries. If you would ask me again I would say that the danger to Germany, as far as my own opinion was concerned, appeared to me to originate from Russia's urge to advance westward and naturally I also saw a certain amount of threat coming from the two western countries, England and France and I saw a further danger in that same connection, in the event of Germany being involved in a was, as coming from America.
As far as the other countries were concerned, on the other hand, I did not expect them to be am immediate threat to Germany, at least as far as small countries were concerned. They would not be an immediate threat but might be, if they were used as bases in a war against Germany by the large countries.
Q. Naturally small countries were not of the same threat because you had already occupied the small countires. That has been previously established.
A. No, a small country, as such, does not represent a threat to me but if another large country uses the small one against me, then the small country too can grow into a threat and danger.
Q. I would not like to discuss the same thing further as it does not relate to the question. The basic question here is Germany's intentions with regard to the territory of the USSR and to that question you have already answered quite affirmatively and decisively.
I shall go on to the next question. you were in direct charge of the preparations and of the working out of plans for the economic exploitation of all the occupied territory, as well as being in charge of the realization of these plans? economic policy in the occupied territory and the measures which I had taken for the exploitation and use of that territory. ducts were exported from the Soviet Union to Germany during the war?
A I cannot give you the figure. How could I know that from memory? But I am sure it is by no means as large as it was stated here. pass on to that question later. been mentioned. You remember the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution, the conference of the 16th of August, 1941, U.S.S.R. 170. On 16 August, 1941, there was a conference of commissars of the occupied regions and of the representatives of the military command. You stated at this conference -- and I would like to remind you of some of the things you said.
A May I have a look at that record?
Q You want to see the minutes of the meeting? Certainly. The point is that it is quite a long document. It might take too much time to read the whole thing. I will ask you to only look at page 111 of this stenographic record. There is marked with pencil, especially the citations which I plan to quote here. On page 111, it states the following:
"Gentlemen: Fuehrer asks me to give as the general plenipotentiary the plan on a scale and on a basis which he has not given to anyone so far. He also empowered me --"
A Just one moment. May I mention the Four Year Plan?
Q Yes. I knew that. Evidently the translation has not reached you. I mentioned the Four Year Plan.
"He gave me social powers with regard to every phase of our economic structure, with regard to what country was concerned, both inside the country, inside the Party and with regard to the Armed Forces."
with regard to the citing on such subject? it was formulated and for the first time authority was given without any limitation as far as the economic sphere was concerned. The highest authority in the Reich and the highest authority of the Armed Forces and the Party had to receive orders from me. After the beginning of the war these powers were extended to the economic structure of the occupied countries. conference correctly.
prepogatives and rights, the instructions which you gave as well as the orders you issued were compulsory for the other participants of the conference held on the 16th of August.
Q In that case, when you used such expressions as "squeeze out, get all that is possible out of the territory", such sentences in the directives issued became orders for your subordinates, is that not correct?
A Naturally, they were then out into their proper form. These conference utterances made during direct discussions, needless to say, were not worded properly and were then -
A You are referring to the passage:
"I may repeat you certainly were not sent there to look after the welfare and work for the welfare of the population."
Is that the piece you are referring to?
Q It states here:
"I repeatnow, you are sent there not to work for the welfare of possible out of those territories.
That is what I expect from you."
A You have left out a sentence -- "So that the German nation --"
"So as to exploit it to theutmost so that the German nation can live.
That is what I expect you to achieve." like to read:
"In theoccupied territories these people have eaten themselves full and our nation has starved."
Q And further you do not deny that these words belong to you:
"You are sent there not to work for the welfare of the population but to extract every possible --"
A You have to read that in connection with the preceding part. That certainly is not what was said.
Q Do you deny your own words as stated here? defending myself against the way you are underlining certain things and pulling them out of their context and I am stating they belong in the whole structure of the tiling.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, could you take slight pauses between your question and answer, between the answer and your question In order that the translators may get it more accurately.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Certainly, I will be glad to do that, Mr. President. BY GENERAL RUDENKO: is also underlined. Here are some of your orders.
"I will do one thing. I shall make you fill the quotas which I demand from each territory. If you cannot fullfil such quotas, in that case, I will reorganize and place there the agencies whichunder all circumstances will be able to make you fullfil these quotas, regardless of whether you like it or not."
Do you see that extract? Is it correct that this is what you said at the conference?
is written down here in the original. The interpreter who is translating your words into German is using certain expressions which are not contained in this document. Squeeze out . . .
A It says there "to get from and obtain." To get from and obtain, and to squeeze out, is a hell of a difference in German.
Q To get out and to squeeze out is about the same thing. And what about the phrase "I will place agencies there which under all circumstances will be able to make you place my orders." Have you found that place? territories, and whom do you refer to by "special agency"?
A This doesn't only concern the commissioners of the Eastern territories; the commissioners from all territories were present there. This concerned the supplies of food which were to be raised by those various countries, and we were concerned with the whole food organization in the entire European theatre which we had occupied. Shortly before that meeting I had been told, and this was perfectly understandable as it always is in connection with such matters, that everybody was holding back so as to have the other pers pushed to the foreground, So as to bring the whole thing on to a brief factor, I didn't want these chaps to get the better of me in this connection, and since I knew that they were only offering me half I wanted one hundred percent more so that we would meet in the middle.
Q I ask you; these demands which you have given to theparticipants in the conference, were they not mercilessly exploiting the occupied territories? I mean.
Q But I talk about plunder. Plunder can consist of plundering food supplies from the occupied territories?
the whole territory. Some of it was territory for subsidiary food supplies, and others produced more and a certain solution had to be found, and that was ninety percent the subject matter of that conference, namely, to find out how much the individual commissioner had to supply. And in the course of that conference that I used same rather sharp simple and lively words is something that I do not by any means deny. Later on exact figures were obtained and settled on, namely, what had to be supplied, and that was in fact the outcome of that meeting.
Q I want to draw your attention to page 116. It states here as follows, quoting you, page 118, please; have you found the place?
Q "Once upon a time it appeared to me that war was somewhat simple. At one time this was called plunder; this meant taking that which one has conquered. At present, however, the forms and the terms have changed. For the reason" -- have you found the place? conference. I emphasize once more that . . .
Q That is just what I wanted to establish; that you really said that. that this is a statement where I wanted to say that originally war fed war. Today you call it probably something different, but in practice it must remain the same thing.
Q All right. I draw your attention to page 119. There, addressing the ether participants of the conference you state:
"You must be present wherever anything is obtainable which the German people need; like hunting dogs you must follow it up and with a commitment of life must you bring everything to Germany." Have you found that place?