Now, these officers were of course not on the policy level, but they were high executive officers who had to deal with the actual facts that were carried out, were they not?
A They were not executive officers. So far as executive was concerned, it is not established for an officer. For the first question whether I know about this meeting, I would say no. Colone Walde I do not even know personally. were never told about this meeting at any time?
Q I just want you to look at--let him have Welder's statement-- I want you to look at the statement of one of the officers of your own ministry on this point. This is a statement made by Oberst Ernst Welder, and--I am sorry I haven't another German copy, but I will get one in due course--and in my copy, witness, it is at the foot of page two, the beginning of the paragraph which I want you to look at is:
"As recaptured prisoners were not to be taken back to their camp, according to an order issued several weeks previously"--can you find it?
AAnd whore should I find that? second page, and I want to ask you about the--the middle of that paragraph. I don't know if you see a name--it stands out in my copy--Major Dr. Huehnemoerder; do you see that? Huehmemoerder appears; "On this Monday"--have you got it?
Q Thank you. "On this Monday a conference took place at the Security Headquarters (Reichssicherungshauptamt) at Berlin, Albrechtsstrasse.
As far as I remember this conference had been called by the Director of Prisoners of War, OKW, Kriegsgefangenen Wesen, and I attended as representative of 'Luftwaffe Inspection 17', since General Grosch was unable to attend in person, for reasons which I cannot remember; the Director of Prisoners of War, as far as I know, was represented by Oberst von Reurmont, while the Security Office was represented by Gruppenfuehrer Mueller and Gruppenfuehrer Nebe, the Chief of the Kriminalpolizei at that time. I find it impossible to give a verbatim account of the conversation or to state what was said by every single person. But I remember this much: that we were informed about a conference which had take: place the previous day, that is Sunday, at the Fuehrer's headquarter in connection with mass escape from Sagan, in the course of which heated discussions had taken place between the participants. In this connection the names of Himmler, Goering and Keitel were mentioned. Whether Ribbentrop's name was also mentioned I do not remember. The Fuehrer was not mentioned. At this conference appropriate measures were said to have been discussed, or taken, to check any such mass escapes in future. The nature of these measure; was not disclosed. Later and more or less in conclusion Gruppenfuehrer Mueller declared that requisite orders had already been given and put into effect the previous morning. Regarding the search for escaped prisoners (Grossfahndung) he could or would not make any statement; he merely declared that according to reports so far received shootings had taken place at some points for attempted escapes. I think he said the number was ten or fifteen.
"After these last remarks by Gruppenfuehrer Mueller, which unmistakeably caused a shattering effect, it became clear to me the a decision had been made by the highest authority, and that therefore any intervention by subordinate departments was impossible and pointless.
executives, that the shooting had already begun. Are you telling this Tribunal that this matter was made clear to these executives, including one of your own officers, and was never told to you? Are you still saying that?
A. I am still saying that. I did not receive anything, any news of this meeting, and this officer is just assuming certain names; he is not making any assertion. And for the third part, I would like to mention the beginning of the statement, which begins as follows:
"In this matter of the mass escape of British officers from prisoner-ofwar camps No. 3, at Sagan on the 24th of 25th of March, 1944, I make the following statement.
"'I have to point out that in view of the absence of any documents, I am forces to reconstruct events, which happened almost a year and nine months ago completely from memory. I therefore ask that this fact and the possibility thus arising of my making a mistake be taken into consideration, and that due allowances be made."
Q. That is a fair point and the answer to it is that I will show you what this officer reported at the time to his general.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Give the witness General Frosch's statement.
(A paper was handed to the witness.)
We are getting reasonably high up. This officer, General Grosch, signs it as a Lieutenant General. Now, would you like, if you can, to help me again -- you were most helpful last time -- to try to find the place? This is a statement by Lieutenant General Grosch.
A. I request to have permission to read this document first, to see whether similar limitations apply here also.
Q. Will you read the first sentence? I don't want to take up time to read an account of the general matter. It says:
"During my interrogation on the 7th of December 1945 I was told to write down all I knew about the Sagan case"; and then he wrote it down. But I would like you to look at No. 1, the first page. Do you see at the foot of the page an account of the pyramid in your ministry of administration?
Do you see that at the foot of page 1?
(There was no response from the witness.)
Q. Do you see at the foot of page 1 the pyramid?
A. I am not that far along; I beg your pardon.
Q. It comes about the fourth paragraph.
A. I can see it, but I wanted to read the other first. Yes, I arrived at that point.
Q. Then, if you will look about four small paragraphs on, it begins:
"A few days after the day of the escape -- I cannot remember the date any more -- Oberst Walde informed me that the OKW had called a conference in Berlin."
Do you see that?
THE PRESIDENT: What page on the English version?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is page 4. I am sorry; it is my fault. I turned over two pages.
THE PRESIDENT: I have it on page 4.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE. Yes. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q. I don't mind you running through it quickly, but you may take it that the first two pages are what I said were there, the pyramid of your ministry.
A. Yes, I find it. The paragraph, please?
Q. "A few days after the escape" -- Do you find that? It is Part C the fourth paragraph, the Sagan case.
A. Yes, I find the place.
Q. Thank you.
"A few days after the day of the escape -- I cannot remember the date any more -- Oberst Walde informed me that the OKW had called a conference in Berlin -- I believe on the premises of a high SS and police authority, and that the inspectorate was to send representatives. I should have liked to have gone myself but had to attend another conferences in Berlin, and asked Walde to attend as repres-entative.
After his return Oberst Walde informed me that the spokesman of the OKW had informed than that there was a decision by the Fuehrer to the effect that, on recapture, the escaped British airmen were not to be handed back to the Luftwaffe, but were to be shot". next paragraph:
"It is, however, certain that the danger of their being shot was then clearly recognizable. I asked Oberst Walde whether such a far-reaching decision would, he notified in writing to the Supremem Command of the Luftwaffe or the Reichsluftfahrministerium or whether he had been given anything in writing. Oberst Walde gave we to understand that the Assembly were told that they would receive nothing in writing, nor was there to be any correspondence on the subject. The circle of those in the know was to be kept as small as possible. I asked Oberst Walde whether the spokesman of the OKW had said anything to the effect that the Reichsmarshal or the Oberkommando Luftwaffe had been informed about the matter. Oberst Walde assured me that the OKW spokesman had told them that the Reichsmarshal was informed".
I Won't ask you about that for the moment. I want you to look at what your general did. It says:
"Up to the time of Oberst Walde's report I had not received even so much as a hint from anywhere that escaped prisoners of war should he treated in any other way than according to the previsions of the Geneva Convention.
"The some afternoon I rang up my superior officer, the Director of Air Defense, to ask time for an interview with General der Flieger Foerster to be alloted to me. This took place tire next morning, the 28th.
"When I came to report I found General Foerster together with his Chief of Staff, I asked General Foerster for permission to speak to him alone and put the facts before him. In conclusion, I expressed the opinion that if the British airmen were to be shot, (a) there would he a breach of the Geneva Conventions, (b) reprisal measures endangering the lives of German airmen held by the British as prisoners of war would have to be expected.
I asked General Foerster to bring the matter to the notice of the Reichsmarschall even at this very late stage, and to stress those two points.
"General Foerster was immediately prepared to do this. When it came to the choice of the way in which the matter could be brought to the attention of the Reichsmarschall, it was decided to report to the Under-Secretary of State, Generalfeldmarschall Milch.
"In my presence General Foerster rang up the office of the Under-Secretary of State and obtained the interview at once. General Foerster left the room and while doing so he instructed me to wait for his return in his study. After some time, General Foerster came back and told me that he had reported the matter to the Under-Secretary of State and that Feldmarschall Milch had made the necessary notes".
Look at the last paragraph:
"I gave Oberst Walde the order, despite the ban on OKW, to incorporate a detailed written statement about the conference in our records. So far as I know, this was done."
DR. STAHMER (interposing): Attorney Stahmer on behalf of the defendant Goering. are in Nurnberg and who, in my opinion, could be brought as witness in person because of the importance of this matter, not only for Goering but for other defendants.
I object to this procedure under the assumption that the same rules apply for cross-examination as for testimony, By that I mean that we are not to be satisfied with an affidavit and rest on an affidavit, if the possibility is at hand that the Prosecution, without difficulty, can summon the witness in order to be have him testify before the Tribunal, so that the Defense may be in a position to cross examine these witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what you have said is entirely inaccurate. The rules with reference to cross examination are not the same as rules with reference to examination in chief, and what is being done at the present moment is that the Defendant Goering is being cross examined to his credit, He has said that he knew nothing about this matter, and he has been cross examined to prove that he has lied when he said that.
DR. STAHMER: Mr . President. according to my opinion it must be taken in such a matter that the witness will be brought here in person. It does not change The fact that, according to our opinion, a reference to an affidavit is a less desirable means that personal testimony of a witness, at which occasion the Defense would be empowered to bring proof from their side.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, as I have already printed out to you, you are quite in error in thinking that the rules for cross examination are the same as examination in Chief. The witness at the present moment is being cross examined as to credit; that is to say, to prove whether or not he is telling the truth. apply to call him if you want to do so. That is an entirely different matter.
DR. STAHMER: Yes. I quite understand, Mr. President; but I am interested in having the possibility of calling in the people who are mentioned in this affidavit -- if possible, to have them called in.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can apply to do that. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: which was not only known in the OKW, not only known in the Gestapo and the Kripo, but was known to your own director of operations, General Forrester who told General Grosch that he had informed Field Marshal Milch, I am suggesting to you, that it is absolutely impossible and untrue that in these circumstances you know nothing about it.
German interprtation regarding the first objection by Dr. Stahmer, the following came through:
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: The Tribunal doesn't want you to discuss legal objections.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please answer the question that is put to you? You have already been told that you must answer a question directly and make any explanation afterwards, and shorten it. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: from the officers of your own ministry, that you know nothing about this? a short clarification. We determined a date. You said it was the 27th. But in this statement by Grosch this date is not established. It says, "A few days after the escape." I do not recall the date Oberst Welder reported to me.
Point 2: It says here that General Forrester, who was not chief of my operational branch but chief of another branch of the ministry, mentioned this matter to Milch, without referring to the date. General Fieldmarshal Milch was here as a witness, and whether he gave me this report, and at what time, and whether to that he know nothing about it, that Forrester had never spoken to him. It was asked by my friend, Mr. Roberts. "Didn't General Forrester speak to you about it?" knew nothing about it, when you did, and are leaving the responsibility on the shoulders of your junior officers.
A. No, I do not wish to push responsibility to the shoulders of my subordinates, and I am establishing -- and this applies to me -- that Fieldmarshal Milch did not say that he reported this matter.
to me; and, secondly, that the date when Foerster told Milch about this is not established. It is entirely possible that the exact date when there matters took place, I have been told by one of my other officers, is decisive, and I maintain that I was not present when the Fuehrer gave his decree about this and when I heard about it I contradicted it in the strongest way. But it was, as I was told too late. A few were shot later, but it was not known at the time and the particulars as to time I did not have, but mostof them had been shot already.
Point 3: Those who had escaped, who were captured in the direct vicinity of this camp, were recaptured by our men and returned to the camp and were not transported off. Those prisoners who were apprehended by the police, and befo this decree of the Fuehrer was issued, were returned to the camp, were not transported off, and were not shot.
Q. You know that, according to Welend, who is going to give evidence, the selection of the officers to be shot -- a list as regards the selection of officers to be shot -- a list had been prepared by the camp authorities at th request of Department 5, that is, of the RSHA -- KRIPO Department, in which those officers were regarded as disturbing elements, plotters, and escape leaders, having been specifically mentioned. The names were selected either by the commandant or by one of these officers. Thereupon, the shooting of the officers mentioned by name was accordingly ordered by Department 4 of the RSHA and corresponding instructions sent to the Staatspolizei.
Are you telling the Tribunal you didn't know that your own officers were selecting the men to be shot on the ground that they were polotters and escape leaders? In any other service in the world, attempt to escape is regarded as a duty of on officer, isn't it, when he is a prisoner of war? Isn't that so?
A. That is correct, and I have emphasized that. To the first question, I would like to establish very definitely that we are concerned with the utterance of a man who will be testifying as a witness. Whether he actually wanted a list and saw a list, his utterance is illogical. There was no selection of shootings. Those were shot who were apprehended by the police, without exception, and thos who had not been returned to the camp. There was no selection according to those who were a disturning factor, but those who were returned to the camp were not shot.
Those who were recaptured by the police beyond the camp, according to the Fuehrer's decree, were shot without exception Therefore, the utterance is entirely illogical and not in accord with the facts. I know nothing about it. I personally pointed out to the Fuehrer repeatedly that it is the duty of these officers to escape, and that after their return after the war, as far as I could recall, they would have to prove this escape on their return to England.
Q. You remember that the government of Germany sent an official note about this matter, saying that they had been shot while resisting arrest whil trying to escape? Do you remember that?
A. With the reply to this note I heard for the first time that this note had been sent. I did not participate in the formulating of the note. I know its contents only through the reply, for I happened to be there when the reply came in.
Q. I am not at the moment on the point that everyone now admist that the note was a complete and utter lie. I am on the point of the seriousness of this matter. Do you know that General Westhoff says in his statement: "Then, when we read this note to England in the newspaper, we were all absolutely take aback. We all clutched out heads, mad." Accroding to Mr. Wielen, who will be here, it was a contributory cause for General Nebe of the KRIPO for nights on end, not going to bed, but passing the night on his office settee. You will agree, won't you, witness, that this was a serious and difficult matter? All these officers that had to deal with it found it a serious and difficult matter, isn't that so?
A. Not only that I found this Matter serious but I myself considered it as the worst matter during the whole war and expressed myself definitely and clearly on this point and later, when I knew of the contents of the note, I know that this note was not in accordance with the truth. I was upset and expressed my statement, that as a result I told my General Quartermaster to direct a letter to the OKW that we did not wish to keep the camps for prisoner of war any longer because under these circumstances, we did not wish to stay with them any longer.
Q. And according to your evidence in chief, what you did was to turn to Himmler, asking him if he had received the order, and then you said, "I told him what excitement would result in my branch becuase we could not understand such measures and if he had received such orders, he would please inform me before carrying them through so that I would have the possibility to prevent such orders from being carried through, if possible; "and then you said that you"talked to the Fuehrer and that he confirmed that he had given the order and told me why." You, according to that evidence, still had enough influence in Germany, in your own opinion, to stop even Himmler issuing such orders or carrying --- I am sorry, I said "issuing" --- carrying out such orders.
A. You are interpreting my statement completely wrong. I told Himmler that it was his duty to call me before the execution of this matter, to give me the possibility even at this time to use my decreased influence to prevent the Fuehrer from carrying out this decree. I did not wish to say that I would have been completely successful through this attempt but it was a matter of course that as chief of the Luftwaffe, I would give Himmler my clear expression that it would have been his duty to let me know this before because I was the one who was most concerned with this matter. I told the Fuehrer in very clear words just how I felt and saw from his answers that if I had known before this in advance, I could not have prevented this decree, and we must keep in mind that two different matters or channels are concerned. This order was not given to the Luftwaffe, that these people were to be shot through the Luftwaffe but the order was given to the police. If the Fuehrer had told me "I will persist in this decree which I gave the police," I would not have been able to tell the police not to carry through the Fuehrer's decree; only if this decree should have been executed through my people, I would have had the possibility perhaps to circumvent this decree and I would like to emphasize this point strongly.
Q. Well, that may be your view that you couldn't have gotten anywhere with the Fuehrer, but I suggested to you that when all these officers that I mentioned knew about it, you knew about it and that you did nothing to prevent these men from being shot but cooperated in this foul series of murders.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are you passing from that now ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You are putting in evidence these two documents ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting them in. I put them to the witness D-731 will ge GB 280 and D-730 will be GB 279.
THE PRESIDENT: And should, you not refer perhaps to the second paragraph in 731 ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes sure.
THE PRESIDENT: It shows that apparently that in the early hours of the 25th of March the matter was communicated to the office of the adjutant of the Reichsmarshall -- the second paragraph beginning with "the escape".
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The escape of about 20 to 30 prisoners, the exact number having to be ascertained by rollcall, was reported by telephone from the Sagan Camp to the Inspektion in the early hours of the 25th of March, Saturday morning, and duly passed on in the same way by this office to the higher authorities which were to be informed in case of mass escapes. Those were: One, the Office of the Adjutant of the Reichsmarshall. Two, the OKW, for Directors of these prisoners of war. Three, the Inspector General of Prisoners of War; and four, Director of Operations, Air Ministry. I am much obliged. You must remember that the witness did admit yesterday afternoon that the news of the escape had been given to the office of his adjutant.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVIT MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged to you.
THE WITNESS: The escape was transmitted to us relatively quickly and on the utterances that you made, I would like to say that on assertions made, that I will insist for now, that I heard about this incident retroactively afterwards, subsequently.
BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q I have put my questions on the incident. I pass to another point I want to ask you just two or three questions about the evidence that you gave two days age, dealing with the evidence of your own witness Herr Dahlerus, who made his first visit to London on the 25th of August, 1939, after an interview and a telephone conversation with you on the 24th. I just want you to fix the date because it is sometimes difficult to remember what these dates are. At that time, you were anxious that he should persuade the British Government to arrange a meeting of plenipotentiaries who would deal with the questions of Danzig and the Corridor. Is that right?
Q You know perfectly well, did you not, that as fas as the Fuehrer was concerned, Danzig and the Corridor was not the real matter that was operating in his mind at all.
Will you let me remind you what he said on the 23rd of May. "Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all; it is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies and of the settlement of the Baltic problem." You know that, didn't you? pointed out repeatedly, in order to get the value of those conferences, we have to consider the entire political picture. At the moment of these negotiations with England, we were concerned only with Danzig and the Corridor and only with that problem. at that moment Hitler was only concerned with Danzig and the Corridor? Do you say that seriously. it was the case solely, otherwise you could not understand any acts by Hitler. for you night take his book "Mein Kampf" as a basis and so refer back to all of his actions through his books.
Q I am interested in the last week of August at the moment. I want you now just to remember two points on what you said, with regard to Dahlerus, during the morning of the 25th. Do you remember, you had a telephone conversation with him at 11.30 on the 24th? On the 25th, were you sufficiently in Hitler's confidence to know that he was going to proffer the note verbale to Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador, on the 25th? Did you know that? was being given to the British Ambassador, the arrangement and crier was that you were going to attack Poland on the morning of the 26th, wasn't it?
THE PRESIDENT: I think there is some mechanical difficulty. Perhaps it would be a god thing to adjourn now for a few minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
Poland on the morning of the 26th were changed on the evening of the 25th. Before I come to that, I will ask you one or two......
A No, I didn't do that.
Q Wait a minute. I'm sorry, but that is what I understood you to say.
A No. I said explicitly that already, on the evening of the 25th, the attack had been cancelled. That is, the attack for the morning of the 26th. Technically, militarilly, it is impossible that a large attack of the whole armed force should be cancelled on the evening before the attack. The fastest time possible for such a change to be made would be 24 hours, or even 68 hours. the 24th. It was still the plan that the attack would take place on the 26th. Was not your object in sending Dahlerus to have the British Government discussing their next next when the attack took place, in order to make it more difficult for the British Government? have the document to recollect it -- that when I sent Dahlerus at that time and when, at that time, Sir Neville had been handed a note on behalf of the Fuehrer, the attack on the 26th had been cancelled . . . of August. "On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland, it was 5:30 on the 25th of August. The Fuehrer called to me on the phone and told me he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether it was just temporary or for good. He said 'No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.' I asked him 'Do you think that it will be definite within four or five days?' Isn't that right? curred on the 25th. I said that when the Fuehrer was clear about the Guarantee it would be given.
I emphasized that once more.
Q That was what I was quoting to you. When the official guarantee was given, the treaty was signed at 5:30 on the evening of the 25th of August. am putting your own words to you. It was after that that the Fuehrer rang you up and told you the invasion was off. Do you wish to withdraw your statement that it was after the official guarantee was given to Poland?
A I emphasize once more. After we knew that the guarantee would be given -- it is necessarily clear to you too that if the signing took place at 5:30 P.M. on the 25th the Fuehrer would then have to call a conference and at the earliest, it was possible to cancel it during the night. Every military expert must know that that is an absolute impossibility. was clear about the fact that the guarantee would be given, and I emphasize once more that I have not seen the record. . .
Q I admit that I don't know anything about that. I don't know whether you were still in Hitler's confidence at the time or not. But, wasn't it a fact that Signer Atolico came on the 25th and told Hitler that the Italian Army and Airforce were not ready for a campaign? Were you told that? on the 26th, wasn't it? when the Italian assistance came into play, it was the fact that a number of people doubted its value. During all the days of proceeding tension, it was becoming obvious because of certain demands made by the Italians which we found impossible to fulfil, that Hitler was trying to evade the whole situation. The Fuehrer was convinced that the British Government had, in the meantime, heard about.Italy's attitude and their resolve to become our ally.
said.
"I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention." Isn't it correct that you tried, through Mr. Dahlerus, in every way, to try and eliminate British intervention?
A Not at any time did I attempt that. It was my entire intention to avoid the war with England. If it was possible to avoid that war on the strength of an agreement with Poland, then that would have been accepted. If the war with England could be avoided in site of a war with Poland, then that was my task also.
It was clearly apparent, even after the beginning of the Polish campaign on the 5th of September, that I still made every attempt to avoid a war with England. In other words, to avoid a spreading of the war. was to get England to try and agree and help the Reich in the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, wasn't that right?
Q Now, you remember the interview with Mr. Dahlerus. It was the interview in which you colored the portions on the map. I only want you to have it in your mind. If I say 11:30 on the 29th of August it won't mean anything to you. I want you to see it so that I can ask you one or two questions about it. hadtaken place when Hitler handed Henderson the German reply and there had been the remark about the ultimatum. Do you remember that?
A Yes, of course I was upset, since that completely disturbed my whole position.
Q And is this correct? Mr. Dahlerus says on page 72 of his book that you came out with a tirade, strong words against the roles. Do you remember that he quotes you as saying, "Wirkennen die Polen"? Do you remember that ?
A Yes, of course. You must consider the situation at the time. I had heard about the excesses and I wouldn't stand and tell a neutral man, Dahlerus, I considered Germany guilty and the Poles completely innocent. The whole situation was like that, and it is correct that I did say that.
Q Are you still an admire of Bismarck? Bismarck.
Q No, I am not suggesting that. I thought you might have in mind his remark about the Poles. Do you remember, "Haut doch die Polen, dass sie am Leben verzagen", "Let us strike the Poles until they lose the courage to live"? Is that what was in your mind at the time? aware of the fact I had the friendship of Poland. not going to take time on it,but I just want to put one or two subsidiary points You remember the passage that I read from Mr. Dahlerus' book about the airplane and the sabotage, that he said that you had said to him, mentioning the defendant Ribbentrop -- you remember that passage? You have given your explanation and I just want to -concern that his airplane should not be shot down in making his journey. That is putting your explanation fairly, isn't it? You are saying that Herr Dahlerus was confused. What you were saying was your concern that his airplane should not be shot down. Isn't that right? That is as I understood it.
A No, I think I have expressed it very clear. Would you like me to give it again? I will repeat it.