Q Was this trip undertaken with Hitler's understanding?
Q With whom then did you have a discussion in London on the 25th?
A Before the evening. It was late in the afternoon, 6.30, with
Q What did Halifax tell you then?
and Henderson was expected in London on Saturday, the 26th. Then he opened, a settlement should be possible.
He thanked me for what I call with Goering?
Q What did you say?
A I tried at 8 o'clock in the evening to get him on the was it possible to establish connection.
Goering then told me that
Q Did you inform Lord Halifax of this conversation?
A Yes. Mr. Roberts, from the Foreign Office, obtained what was the content of that discussion?
A I met Lord Halifax on Saturday, the 26th, at 11 o'clock.
prevent war?
Q What suggestion did you make to Lord Halifax?
Q Did he agree to your proposal?
out the desire of His Majesty's Government to obtain a peaceful
Q Did you then fly back to Berlin with this letter?
A Yes. I reached Berlin in the evening and met Goering about 10 o'clock in the evening.
conference with Goering regarding your conference with Halifax?
headquarters. I told him about conditions in London and emphasized to avoid a crisis.
After having explained to him, I handed him the letter.
He tore it open, and after having read through it, he put to inform Hitler of the letter.
I followed him in the car to Berlin, and exactly at 12 o'clock midnight he stopped outside the Reichkanzlei, morning of the 27th of August?
Did you have a conference with Hitler?
of German policy. It lasted about twenty minutes, and I thought that no useful purpose would be served by my visit.
At a suitable England and the British people.
Afterwards, he started to explain to me how well the armed forces of Germany had been equipped.
He in a very excitable stage and told me that, if it same to war, "I will build U boats, U boats, U boats--U boats I will build," and he seemed to be speaking as if he didn't realize somebody was present.
After he would build and he would win the war.
After a while he calmed down and began to speak about England and said, Mr. Dahlerus, tell me Government.
You seem to know England so well, you might be able to explain?
I hesitated, but told him that with my intimate knowledge
A The conversation went on. He gave me a long resume about to go ever to London at once and explain his viewpoints.
I naturally that I should came over I was prepared to go.
The condition was, proposals that he wanted to make.
We spent an hour and a half, during
Q What specific proposals did you make?
A In condensed form, they are as follows:
(1) German to sign a pact or alliance with Great Britain.
(2) England was to help Germany to obtain Danzig and to obtain Corridor, (3) Germany pledged herself to care for Poland's populace.
(4) An agreement should be reached about Germany's colonies.
(5) Adequate provisions should be made for the treatment of the German minority in Poland.
(6) Germany pledged herself to defend the British Empire with the German Wiermacht whenever the former might be attacked.
Q Regarding point (2), was not Poland assured that it would have a free harbor in Danzig?
A Yes. That is true. This is only a condensed form of the proposals, of course.
Q Is it true that Poland did have a free harbor?
Q What was the further course of this conversation? with London, and met Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir Horace Wilson, and Sir Alexander Cadogan.
Q This is or the 27th of August, is that not so?
A The 27th of August, at Downing Street No. 10. Chamberlain?
A We discussed the proposals made in great detail. On certain points, as will be seen from the blue books, these proposals differed from these made to Henderson. I therefore suggested to the British Government, if they had full confidence in me as an intermediary, they should tell me how far they could accept he proposals or not, and I should go back to Berlin the same day and discuss the British viewpoints with Hitler and Goering. They should retain Henderson in London until Monday so that their reply could be given after they knew how Hitler viewed the British standpoint. adegan?
had a long conversation with Cadogan.
Q Did you receive specific proposals from him?
Q What were they? respectable way with the various points. Naturally, point (6), the offer of defending the British Empire, was turned down. Similarly, they refused to discuss colonies before Germany had demobilized, and in reference to the boundaries of Poland, they wanted these boundaries to be carried by five great powers: Russia, Germany, England, Prance and Italy. Poland.
In reference to point (8), rather to point (1), England was in principle willing to come to some agreement with Germany.
Q Did you then return to Germany with these proposals? promised to send Henderson back the same day, and obtaining confirmation from Berlin that they agreed with Henderson's delay in returning on Monday, I left that evening and arrived shortly before midnight at Berlin.
Q Did you then immediately have a conversation with Goering?
A I met Goering about 11:10 on Sunday evening and told him about the results.
Q Can you describe that conversation a little more exactly? events during recent years, he could hardly expect Great Britain to be satisfied with the Corridor of Poland. And in reference to the colonial question, I explained to him that any British Government trying to force this point in Parliament as long as Germany's forces were mobilized would be bound to fall at once. Britain, or the British Empire, wouldprefer to look after their own interests.
In the end, he said that it would be better if he saw Hitler alone. He left for Reichskenzlei and I went back to my hotel.
About 1:00 on Monday morning, the 28th, I received a telephone call that Hitler accepted the British viewpoints subject to the reply Henderson gave the next day would in general be the same as I had given.
Q Did you not then, on the same evening, talk to the English Ambassador?
A Yes. I went straight to the British Ambassador and reported to Sir George Ogilive Forbes the results of my conversation with Goering and he cabled to London.
Q Did you inform Goering of what happened during that conversation? intended to do so it was with full knowledge of the German Government that I discussed it with Forbes.
Q When did you then meet Goering next?
Q Wasn't this Tuesday?
A No, Monday morning. It was Monday morning, the 28th.
Q What took place during this conversation with Goering? the fact that Forbes had cabled to London.
Q Did you then visit Forbes again?
Q Then on Tuesday you met Goering again, Tuesday morning? or just after midnight, 1:15, on the 29th, I received a telephone call from the Reichskanzlei on the request of Goering, from Oberstleutnant Konrad, that Henderson had given his written reply and this was most satisfactory and there was every hope that there would be no risk of war. me his great pleasure that things had developed so well.
Q Didn't he make a statement as follows: We want peace and peace is assured? again by Goering. Why?
A I was at my hotel late in the evening, about 10:30. I was called up by Forbes, who told me he had to see me at once. He came to my hotel and explained that a meeting between Hitler and Henderson on Tuesday evening had been most unsatisfactory and they departed after a great quarrel. And he asked me what I could suggest under the circumstances. asked me to come to his house in Berlin. He told me the same thing, and seemed very upset at developments. He showed me the German reply to the British note and went through it carefully and tried to explain the reasons for the formulation of the note. In the end he asked me at once to proceed to London again and try to explain this unfortunate incident to the British Government, and if it is not, by explaining that Hitler was busy on a proposal to Poland that probably would be ready the next day.
a new visit to England, I left on Wednesday morning, 5 o'clock. Immediately after my arrival in London I met the same members of His Majesty's Government.
Q Whom did you meet there?
A I met some of the members, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Halifax, Mr. Horace Wilson, and Cadogan.
Q What took place during the conversation? suspicious, and rather inclined to feel that whatever efforts were made from their side nothing would prevent Hitler from declaring war on Poland. The British Government did everything they could. They sent their ambassador to Warsaw to request the Polish Government to do everything they possibly could to avoid incidents along the border, but they explained to me that it was hardly fair to expect the Polish Government to send delegates to Berlin to negotiate after the experience the other countries had had during recent years when they had been on similar missions to Berlin. of trying to persuade him to arrange for a meeting outside of Germany for the delegates, but he only said that this was impossible; that Hitler was in Berlin and the meeting had to take place in Berlin. They indicated proposals to Poland, but members of the British Government viewed these proposals with great suspicion. The Polish government was going to have a meeting in the afternoon, and cable results to Berlin. In the meantime I returned to Berlin.
Q When did you meet Goering there?
THE PRESIDENT: Could you make this a little bit shorter, Dr. Stahmer.
DR. STAHMER: Since these are very essential matter, I believe it is being shortened as much as possible, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dahlers, the Tribunal wishes you to get to the crucial matters as soon as possible.
THE WITNESS: Well, I met Goering just after a midnight on a Wednesday. He first informed me about the proposal made to Poland, and he showed me the note. I telephoned Forbes to obtain results. He then told me that Ribbentrop had refused to give him the note after he had read the proposal. I immediately told Goering that it would be impossible to treat an Ambassador of an empire like that, and suggested he should allow me to telephone Forbes, and to give Forbes the contents of the note on the telephone. I did this about one o'clock on Thursday morning.
BY DR. STAHMER: responsibility on himself? to convince yourself whether your telephonic communications had been correctly understood? 10 o'clock and discussed the note with him, and he requested me at once to proceed to Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, and to give him a copy.
Q Did that happen? but he did not seem to grasp the contents. I, therefore, left the room, dictated a note to the secretary, and handed it to him. In the meantime Lipski explained to Forbes that he was not interested in discussing this note with the German Government.
Q Did you give this conversation as closely verbatim as you can? It seems very important to me. Government if it came to war between Poland and Germany he knew because he had been living for five and a half years in Poland, that there would be a revolution in Germany and they would march on Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Stahmer, are you not going on? BY DR. STAHMER:
Did you then inform London of your conversation by telephone? Wilson about the conference we had.
Q Was there another discussion with Goering in the afternoon?
A I saw Goering at one o'clock in the afternoon. He then received a copy of a cablegram from the Polish Government to Lipski, to the effect that Lipski should not without special instructions from Warsaw negotiate with the German Government. It is obvious that the Poles during the existing circumstances were most scared what actions they took but this telegram did upset the German Government very much. Ambassador?
A The situation seemed to be impossible. Hitler called Sir Nevil Henderson. Ribbentrop had quarreled with him and I thought the only possibility was if Goering could come to an understanding with Henderson. I suggested a meeting between them. It took place at 4:50 in the afternoon at Goering's house. Forbes was present and I was present myself.
Q What took place during that talk? the German Government would try to arrange a settlement with England and make a split between England and Poland. Hendersonwas therefore very careful during the two hours conversation and the result of the conversation was only that both parties agreed it would be necessary to arrange for a meeting between delegates from both countries if that possibly should avoid war.
delegates immediately? and Goering should represent Germany.
Q What was Henderson's attitude to this proposal?
A Henderson promised to submit the proposal to his government. But I had the impression that he already knew that the German forces were moving and it did not seem as if he put great faith in the possibilities. did not submit Germany would crush these people and is quite prepared and "if we had to declare war we would regret it but that would simply be Great Britain's fault?
A I can't recollect those words but it is possible that during the two hour conversation they were uttered.
Q How did this talk conclude?
AAt 7 o'clock in the evening they parted and both parties agreed but tried to arrange for the meeting in Holland.
Q Did you then on the first of September meet Goering again?
A On the first of September I met Goering at eight o'clock in his headquarters. After some hesitation he told me that war had broken out due to the fact that the Poles had attacked the radio station at Gleiwitz and blown up the bridge at Birschau. Later he gave me more details from which I gathered that the full force of the German Army was attacking Poland. on that occasion, make the suggestion that Goering should fly to London for a direct conference? mention that I met Hitler in the Reichskanzlei on the first of September immediately after his speech before the Reichstag in the corridor. He was then exceedingly nervous and very agitated and he told me that he had all the time suspected that England wanted a war and he told me that he was going to smash up Poland and take the wholecountry.
Goering interrupted, indicating that they would advance to certain points. But Hitler was in an uncontrollable frame of mind and started to shout he would fight one year, two years and he started up in a great excitement saying that he would fight ten years. information from Forbes that an ultimatum would be given at nine o'clock. Conditions immediately ceased and withdrew the forces to the German border. I immediately went off to Goering's headquarters near Potsdam. He was there and not with Hitler. I appealed to him at least to try to arrange for a sensible reply to the ultimatum. I had the impression that certain members of the German Government were in favor of war and I was afraid if a written reply was given it would not be framed to help to prevent war with England. I therefore suggested that Goering should declare himself prepared to go to England at once before eleven o'clock to negotiate.
Q How did Goering react to this suggestion?
Q Did you then telephone London? and they gave the replythat I did expect, that they could not consider this proposal before they received a written reply to the ultimatum.
Q Did you communicate this to Goering?
Q What impression did that make on him?
Q Then on the 4 of September did you speak once more with Goering? any great importance.
would carry out the war as humanely as possible and that Germany would under no circumstances undertake war action against England but if England should shoot on Germany then Germany's answer would be inevitable?
Q Did you publish a book called "Last Attempt"?
Q Is the account you give there true?
A Yes, it is written with great care. The record as far as I humanly could is absolutely exact and correct.
Q Is what you say there based on notes that you took at the time?
Q When did you finish these notes? September, 1939.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I have three more small questions. Should I ask them now or should we now adjourn?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you could ask them now.
DR. STAHMER: Very well. BY DR. STAHMER: Stockholm? the occupation of Poland, in an endeavor to try to ascertain if there still was a possibility of preventing a world war. He gave me in writing the viewpoint of the British Government, summarized as follows: "The British Government had to put up -- "
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. What has this to do with the defendant Goering?
DR. STAHMER: This is evidence that he made efforts even later to bring about peace.
THE PRESIDENT: The fact that he met Sir George Ogilvie Forbes in Oslo on the 24th of September does not at present appear to have anything to do with Goering.
DR. STAHMER: It is significant to the extent that Dahlerus did this in order to put London and Berlin once more in touch with each other in order at this stage of events to bring about peace.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on with your next question then.
THE WITNESS: The provisions were: "To redeem Europe from perpetually recurring fear of German aggression and to enable peoples of Europe --"
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What has the letter that Sir George Ogilvie Forbes wrote got to do with Goering?
DR. STAHMER: The content of this letter was told to Herr Dahlerus on the 22 of September and Dahlerus discussed it with Goering and he attempted to reach some sort of agreement on that basis.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, may I enter a further objection?
It has nothing to do with the Indictment. We have not charged that a war against England was an aggressive war. The charge is that the war against Poland was an aggressive war. All of this negotiation to keep England out of the war while they took Poland is utterly irrelevant to the Indictment. I respectfully submit, and that because it has nothing to do with the Indictment, with the charge, it should be rejected.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, if the witness had an interview with Goering afterwards you can come to that but not to preliminary conferences with Sir George Ogilvie Forbes.
DR. STAHMER: It would not be comprehensible unless I do so. He had to tell Goering what Forbes told him. Forbes made certain suggestions to him and Dahlerus took these suggestions to Berlin and communicated them to Goering, told him what Forbes had told him.
THE PRESIDENT: Let the witness give the account of his meeting with Goering.
DR. STAHMER: Very well.
BY DR. STAHMER: up Goering in Berlin?
Q Did you inform Goering of what suggestions Forbes had made to you? make good the harm he had done to Poland and make peace, and to my great disappointment he then definitely declared that he was not prepared at all to discuss the question of Poland. Poland was occupied and that was no business any longer of Great Britain. I then realized that the aim, his aim had been to split Poland and England and with the consent of Great Britain have the opportunity of occupying Poland without running the risk of war with Great Britain and France.
Q In July 1940 did you again meet Goering? Sweden, should endeavor to approach the various powers for negotiations about peace.
DR. STAHMER: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2:10 p.m.
(A recess was taken until 1410 hours).
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of:
The
THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the defendants' coun sel wish to ask any questions?
BY DR. HORN: (counsel for the Defendant Ribbentrop)
Q. Witness, can you tell us the reason why the conference ults?
A. No, I only had the report that they disagreed and got
Q. Do you know about which of the six points the quarrel started?
A. As far as I recollect, it was on the wordking of the
A. Were you not later told by Hitler in the presence of A. Yes, explanations to that effect were given.
Q. Is it correct, witness, as you wrote in your book, that in the Polish Embassy, the Polish Ambassador, N. Lipski, told you that in case of a war the Polish Army would march to Berlin in triumph?
A. No, he did not say that to me, but he made remarks to that effect before Forbes.
Q. And Forbes transmitted these rewards to you. How did it come about that you had a meeting with Mr. Forbes on the 24th of September in Oslo?
A. I took the initiative and went to Oslo to see him.
Q. Please, could you tell us about the content of the letter from Forbes, briefly?
A. I read that -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have already said that they don't want to hear that. And I don't see what it has to do with von Ribbentrop.
DR. HORN: Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is under indictment on the basis of leading the entire German policy. I consider it, therefore, important that this letter which will give information about the further course of the foreign policy such as Ribbentrop saw it, that this letter was decisive for his later attempts toward peace, for instance.
THE WITNESS: To redeem Europe from perpetual German aggression BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Was this letter ever shown to von Ribbentrop?
A. No.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that they will not have the letter read. BY DR. HORN :
Q. Then on the 26th of September 1939 you had a conference with Hitler. Is it correct that at that time Hitler told you he could negotiate with England concerning Poland because the major part of Poland was occupied by Russia and Russia to his knowledge would not ceded it?
