We had no obligation to do that, nor was it opportune, Mr. Schacht, in the year 1933, in the beginning, could not raise funds, because in the beginning he had no function.
That also referred to a later date. And here it was a matter of course that the funds be raised through the Minister of Finance and the President of the Reichsbank, according to the orders of the Fuehrer. rearm. That was clearly expressed in our articles since 1921, and, therefore, for all the world.
Q Isn't it a fact that on the 21st of May, 1935, by a secret decree, Schacht was named Plenipotentiary for the War Economy? you exactly. I do not have the dates in my head, especially if they do not have anything to do with me personally, but that can be seen from the decree. missioner for war materials and foreign currency, didn't he?
A If Mr. Schacht, shortly after his appointment, suggested that, then that appointment could have taken place only in 1936, because only in December of 1936, Mr. Schacht, together with the war minister von Blomberg, made the proposals or suggestions that I should become commissar for raw materials and foreign currency.
Q Well, I ask you if you didn't give this answer to the American interrogator on the 10th day of October, 1945, referring to Schacht: war materials and foreign currency. He had the idea that in that position I could give the minister for economics and the president of the Reichsbank valuable support.
Now, did you give that answer, and is that information correct?
Q Referring to Schacht, the record shows that you said: war materials and foreign currency. He had the idea that in that position I could give the minister for economics and the president of the Reichsbank valuable support.
A That is absolutely correct, with the exception of the word "Reichstag". That ought to be president of the Reichsbank.
Q Yes. That is the way I have it.
Q (Reading) Moreover, he was very outspoken in the suggestion that he and Blomberg made that I was to be put in charge of the Four Year Plan. However, the idea that Schacht had there is that I myself did not know very much about economy and that he could very well hide in the protection of my broad back. in preparing a rearmament program, did you not? matters as far as the entire German economy was concerned, and also the armament economy, and, of course, as a prerequisite for the establishing of the German Army.
Q And you and he had some jurisdictional differences and executed on agreement setting up different spheres of authority, did you not?
Q And that was in 1937 on the 7th of July, right? thing final. That was in the background of the personalities and the two positions. I, Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, Schacht as President of the Reichsbank, both of us had great possibilities of influencing German economy. In the case of Schacht he was a very strong personality and whilst not wanting to overemphasize my importance and disregarding whether we were friends or not, on the basis of the two positions we had to got into difficulties and one or the other had to cede finally.
Q And there came a time when he left the Ministry of the Reichsbank? as much as I know as president of the Reichsbank he resigned at the end of 1938 but I could not be certain about that date. of rearmament should be carried through, was there? You disagreed as to methods of doing it.
A I assume for Mr. Schacht that as a good German, of course, he was ready to put all his strength and ability at the disposal of Germany to reestablish Germany as a strong nation and differences could only have occurred with regard to methods because neither Mr. Schacht nor I prepared for a war of aggression. out portfolio and act in the Reichstag for sometime, did he?
A That is correct. The Fuehrer desired that specifically and I believe he wanted to express his gratitude to Schacht in that way. fifteen year olds, the conscription of fifteen year olds?
A During the war you mean?
A That is with the Air Force, with the Luftwaffe as auxiliaries. They were fifteen or sixteen years, I don't remember that exactly, which were called as auxiliaries for the Air Force.
Q I will ask you be shown Document 3700 PS (U.S.A. Exhibit 780) and ask you whether you received from Schacht the letter of which that is a carbon copy.
(Document shown to witness)
A Yes, I have received that letter. The date is not given here, that is the year. That is missing from the copy.
Q Could you fix, approximately, the date of its receipt? on the other side, on the back, I assume it must be '43. On this copy the year is not given but I believe it is the year 1943 when I received this letter.
Q Did you reply to Document 3700 PS (Exhibit U.S.A. 780)? in a state of readiness for war, did it not?
A I have explained that it had two tasks; first to assure German economy against crises, that is to say to make it independent of difficulties of export and nutrition problems. Second, to establish it as independent of any blockade, that is to say, based on the experience of the First World War, to make sure that any blockade would not have the disasterous consequences that the first one had. But that the Four Year Plan in this respect was a basic prerequisite for the reestablishment of the armament industry, goes without saying. Without it rearmament could not have taken place. The armament industry could not have been reorganized. to Schacht, dated the 18th day of December, 1936, that you saw it to be your task, using these words -- "within four years to put the German economy in a state of readiness for war"? Did you say that or didn't you? may examine if you wish Document C 175, in which he starts his report by saying:
"The gcacz general political position justifies the supposition that Germany not consider an attack from any side"?
(Document shown to witness)
A That may have been probable for that moment. The situation of Germany in 1937, I considered that the most quiet one. At that period, at that time the general situation was quite peaceful. But that had nothing to do with the fact that I felt obliged, independent of changing difficulties and differences, to make the German economy ready against crises or blockades which could have been brought about by war and one year later incidents of a different nature occurred.
Q Well now, doesn't Blomberg continue:
"Grouhds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the western powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of states and of Russia in particular"?
That was the situation in 1937, was it not?
A That is the way Herr von Blomberg saw the situation. Concerning the readiness for war in Russia Herr von Blomberg in the same way as all the representatives of our Reichswehr, our Armed Forces, was in error contrary to the opinions which had been added from other sides concerning the armament in Russia. This is only the opinion of von Blomberg, not the Fuehrer's, not mine or not the opinion of other people. Forces on the 24th of June, 1937, was it not?
Q You organized one month later the Hermann Goering Works? Condition of readiness for war, was it not?
A No, that is not right. The Hermann Goering Works were concerned first exclusively with the improvement of production of German iron ore in the area of Salzgitter near Oberpfalz and after the annexation of Austria with the iron ore production in Austria. The Hermann Goering Works first established improvement on mines and foundries. Only much later steel works and rolling mills were added, and that is to say basic industry first.
not? to put the economy in a state of readiness for war; that the Hermann Goering Works was organized to exploit are mining and iron smelting resources and to carry the process through to completed guns and tanks, was it not?
A No. The Hermann Goering Works had at first no armament Gauleiters in the Fuehrer Building at Munich, is that right?
A I don't know the date, but around that time I made a short speech in connection with other speeches made to the Gauleiters.
As maybe the armament situation.
I do not remember the words of that "Germany, at the beginning of the war, was the only country in the world possessing an operative fighting air force.
The other auxiliary of the other branches of the forces.
In consequence, they and effective blows, namely, the operative air force.
In Germany we went into action on the front line in the battlefields.
You all know of air force."
A That is definitely true. I said that under all circumstances, and what is still more decisive, I acted like that, too.
But in order say:
shall the air force be an auxiliary of army and navy and part of forces?
the word "strong," and I explained what part we had taken, how we came to an operative air force.
As an expert I still am of the opinion yourself.
He said.
"I nave been under the impression that already at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland, he, Goering, was worried that Hitler's policies would lead to war."
Do you remember that?
Q And was it true or false? True or mistaken, perhaps I should "He who has a strong sword has peace."
Q You are still of that opinion?
Hitler's policies would lead to war at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland?
A Excuse me. I just understood that you asked whether it is the policy of the Fuehrer could lead to war.
I would like to say that temporarily about the reactions, repercussions.
Just the same, it
Q And when nothing happened, the next step was Austria?
relation to the other. Austria would never have caused me worries reunion of two brother nations was not clear to me.
I did not expect vital interest, was eliminated.
England and France had no business to
Q I ask you just a few questions about Austria. You said that you if it isn't a fact that Hitler put up a plaque in Vienna in honor graves when he was there.
Is that a fact? Can't you answer that yes or no?
the truth, because I cannot say, "Yes, he did it," because I don't know; I cannot say, "No, he didn't do it," because I don't know that either.
I wanted to say that I heard about that here and never before.
Q And it was Seyss-Inquart's desire to have an independent Austria, was it not?
in, do you recall?
earlier with Seyss-Inquart, do you recall that?
just been translated to me, "impudent." I said that this telegram had the move already, or at least they had the orders; the thing was
Q You had demanded that Seyss-Inquart be made Chancellor?
Is that right?
circumstances. He was at that time the only one who could assume the independent country?
I did not know Seyss-Inquart's attitude at that time for sure.
independent Austria?
First, if you ask me, "Did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor and was that demanded from Hitler?"
--yes.
And if you ask me then, "Did he become Chancellor under the assumption that he should send the telegram for troops to march in?"
-
If you ask me thirdly, "Did he become Chancellor under the assumption that he would be able to maintain an independent Austria?"
-
then I have to say again that the final turn of events on that evening \ was not clear even in the Fuehrer's mind.
Q Isn't it true that you expected that he might want to remain the troops were marched in?
A No. Excuse me, there are two questions. I absolutely and it would not have been necessary.
I gave my reasons for the were in control of Austria's fate?
Is that a fact?
A That was certainly not told to him before the Fuehrer. As
A I did not say "legally," I said "diplomatically."
THE PRESIDENT: Is that a convenient time to break off?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, your Honor.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, 19 March 1946.)
DR. STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): With the approval of the Tribunal, I call as witness Mr. Dahlerus, from Stockholm. follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you tell me your name?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: whole truth, and nothing but the truth,so help me God.
(The witness repeated the oath). BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Mr. Dahlerus, would you please tell the Court how it happened that you, as a private individual and a Swede, made efforts for reaching an understanding between England and Germany? years, and I also knew Germany very well. I had seen the First World War from both sides, having lived in Germany and England during the first war. number of cities, Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester and London, and I found all around a very determined position that the British public wouldn't stand for any aggression any longer from the German side. and we discussed the position and they summed up the general opinion in England in a rather clear way. As this summary of the general opinion in England was a basis for my discussions afterwards with Goering, I think I shall quote it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Russian translation is not coming through. I am told it is coming through with interruptions.
DR. STAHMER: Should the witness repeat his testimony?
THE PRESIDENT: Would you just repeat the last sentence that you stated You said that on the 2nd of July you met friends in the Constitutional Club and discussed the general situation.
AAnd they summed up the position in a rather clear way. This formed the basis for my discussions afterwards with Goering. I therefore think I shall quote exactly the summary they made up of the opinion in Great Britain: England and from discussion with ordinary people.
A. Agreement that Berchtesgaden and Czechoslovakia have shaken confidence. Immediately after Berchtesgaden and before Czechoslovakia possibly could have obtained by cooperation many things decided by Germany.
B. British public opinion now exasperated. Decided that we go so far and no further.
C. Britain now had commitments which did not exist at the time of the Berchtesgaden meeting.
Poland and Danzig. Invasion of Danzig means war with Poland and Britain.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid the French translation isn't coming through properly now. The French and Russian are coming together. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Now, Witness, would you go on with the document. You have given us a, b, and c, I think.
A Well, the end of c is as follows:
"Britain automatically involved by virtue of new commitments. Therefore, automatically war with Britain.
"d. Britain does not advertise her strength: not even fully appreciated by general British public."
Then follows Statement No.2, about Lord Halifax's sp "Own personal observation indicates that Britain solid behind his statement."
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. I am afraid the Russian is coming through on the French again.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Before the witness goes on with his evidence, the Tribunal ants me to say that the system by which the earphones are connected with the interpreters was checked over after the Court rose last night, was checked over gain at 9:30 this morning, and again at 9:35 this morning.
But everyone who comes into this Court must realize that it has not been possible to bury these cables so as to make them altogether safe. It is, therefore, of the very greatest importance that everybody who comes into this Court should take real care to avoid, if possible, treading upon these cables, which may become injured by being kicked and broken, and in that way the faults in the system occur. It, therefore, rests with those who use this Court to see that they do their best o assist in keep ing the system efficient. DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED):
Q Would you please continue, witness?
A Point Number Two: Lord Halifax's speech. Own personal observation indicates that Britain solidly behind his statement. Lord Halifax understates is case, as is British custom; that is to say, understates the strength of Great Britain's force. Is perhaps not fully understood by Germany.
Number Three: Britain desires peace, but not peace at any price. erman people very acceptable to British, and does not appear to be any good reason for armed conflict. As in past, Germany will certainly be defeated and rill obtain far less by means of war than by peaceful methods of negotiation. Britain and her friends will also suffer very heavily. May be end of civilization.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. *eich to forward unfavorable reports, I felt it was both my duty and it might be of great value if this exact opinion in Great Britain was brought to the highest quarters in Germany.
Q Mr. Dahlerus, one question. Were these friends of yours members of the English Parliament?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Stahmer.
Q What were their names?
A May I save time and hand in the list of names to the Court?
THE PRESIDENT: Their names are not of any great importance, are they, if they were people inthe business world? July, four o'clock in the afternoon, at Karinhall. the necessity to take such actions that no risk of war might occur. Goering doubted if these observations may not refer to an attempt on the British side to bluff and also emphasized that he was of the opinion that Great Britain wanted to control developments on the Continent.
at our disposal for such a meeting. I left on the 19th of July for
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, can't you take the witness on, in order to save time, to the actual negotiations?
All these Can't you take him on to the actual negotiations?
DR. STAHMER: I can, yes. He is about to speak of the
BY DR. STAHMER:
Q If the witness could please describe that meeting. You were about to say that on the 19th of July you flew to London.
Did you there meet Lore Halifax on the 20th?
Q I consider this report essential. Could you please tell us about that?
What took place during this conference with Lord Halifax?
to participate, but His Majesty's Government would, with interest, follow the results of the meeting.
The meeting took place at wife.
Seven Britishers, Goering, Bodenschatz, and Dr. Schoettl were
Q On what day was this?
10 o'clock. The meeting started, and Goering invited the Britishers to put any questions they liked.
Thereafter a long discussion took Munich.
The British representatives emphasized the necessity of possible.
The conference ended late at night, and next morning the to four nations, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany.
I went
Q Were British members of Parliament present at this meeting?
Q Has a report been given to Lord Halifax about this visit?
continue as before?
political questions. On the 23rd I was requested by a phone call from Goering early in the morning, 10.
30, if possible to come to
Q Was the danger of the situation discussed?
A Yes. Goering mentioned that in the meantime the situation
Q Then when did you meet Goering?
A I arrived in Berlin on the 24th and saw Goering at 2 o'clock
Q What took place in your conference?
Germany was perfectly prepared to reach an understanding with England?
A Yes. Goering explained that Germany was anxious to come to
Q When did you leave for London?