But this by no means rescinded the order that a review by courts of political arrests was permissible. I simply wanted to give these people the right to express their own opinions on what had happened to them. who had not committed any crime but who you thought might possibly commit a crime.
A Yes. People were arrested and taken into protective custody who had committed no crime, but of whom one could expect that if they remained in freedom they would do all sorts of things to damage the German state. you have some kind of organization to carry propaganda down to the people and to get their reactions and inform the leadership of it, is it not?
A I didn't quite understand the conclusion of that question. carry your propaganda in that kind of state didn't you? a propaganda department. did you not? propaganda and our attitude. blockleiters, commands and information went down from the authority, and information as to the people's reactions came back to the leadership, didn't it?
A That is correct. The orders that were given for propaganda or other purposes were passed down the line as far as necessary. On the other hand, it was a matter of course that the reactions on the part of the people were again transmitted up through the various offices, in order to keep us informed of the mood of the people. orders -- executive organizations, organizations to fight for you, if necessary, did you not?
AAdministrative organizations were, of course, necessary. I don't understand exactly what organizations you mean. For what fights? organization that would kill them, didn't you? Roehm and the rest of them were not killed by Hitler's own hands nor by yours, were they? necessity? have somebody to do it, didn't you? something else. the organizations that carried out the orders and dealt with people on a physical level,were they not?
A The SA never received such an order to kill people. The SAin my time did not. Later on I had no influence. The only orders that were carried out without court order that were given were against a few people in the Roehm Putsch, and this was carried out by the police or by a state organ.
Q What police?
A So far as I recall, through the Gestapo. At any rate, it received the order to fight against enemies of the state.
Q And the SS was for the same purpose, was it not?
AAt this time, in north Germany, not; what the case was in south Germany I don't know. of people to concentration camps, didn't it? You were arrested by the SS, weren't you? executor of the Nazi Party?
in the hands of Himmler,and it can no longer be understandable to somebody outside this picture where the SS was active and where the Gestapo was active. They worked very closely, hand in hand. It is known that the SS guarded concentration camps later.
Q And carried out other functions in the camps?
A What functions do you refer to?
Q All of the functions of the camps, didn't they? of it, then it could only be that unit that carried out all the functions necessary in the camp.
Q Now, this system was not a secret system. This entire system was openly avowed, its merits were publicly advocated by yourself and others, and every person entering into the Nazi Party was enabled to know the kind of system of government you were going to set up, wasn't he? principle, knew the specific measures we wanted to carry out, so far as they were stated in the program, but every member of the Party did not know what was going to happen up to the most minute details. not as to everyone of its details. As to organization, everybody knew who the Gestapo was, did they not?
Q And what its program was, in general, not in detail?
A I explained that program in detail. At the beginning I described that publicly, and I also spoke publicly of the tasks of the Gestapo, and also those in foreign countries. as a political police, about the fact that people were taken into protective custody, about the fact that there were concentration camps? Nothing secret about those things, was there?
and a part of the effectiveness of concentration camp penalties is that the people do know that there are such agencies, isn't it? he will end up in a concentration camp or will be accused before a court of high treason, that is to our advantage. But the original reason why concentration camps were created was to handle enemies of the state. just been describing is the only type of government which you think is necessary to govern Germany? government and what was most necessary about it was the immediate organization of the Gestapo and the concentration camps in order to receive our opponents. Over and above that, we had much more important things to take care of. These were not the basic foundations of our government. to protect?
A Yes. These things were all necessary because of the opposition that was present. think can function in Germany under present conditions? form, and we also demonstrated that Germany could be raised in a short time from its miserable poverty to relative prosperity.
Q Now, all of this authority of the state was concentrated? Perhaps I am taking up another subject.
Is it the intent to recess at this time?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours) DR. STAHMER: The witness Dahlerus has been in Nurnberg for several days and is waiting to testify.
I have been advised that he must be at Stockholm by Thursday, and for that reason he requests, and I am asking the High Tribunal's permission to call him as a witness tomorrow morning. Even if the crossexamination has not been completed, the representatives of the Prosecution have agreed to my proposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say the Prosecution had agreed to your proposal?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, My Lord. I contacted the four gentlemen involved and they have to a man agreed to this.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you anticipate that the examination in chief of the witness will take? You can't answer for the cross-examination.
DR. STAHMER: I believe that I will need half a day, that is, up until tomorrow noon. Of course I cannot speak definitely, but I assume that will take care of matters.
THE PRESIDENT: His evidence is only relevant to the few days before the 1st of September 1939?
DR. STAHMER: There are two additional questions, but these questions may be answered very briefly. He seems to have made further efforts after that date, but those are very brief questions.
THE PRESIDENT: It appears to the Tribunal that half a day is a totally unnecessary time for the examination in chief of a witness who is going to speak about events during a few days before the war began.
DR. STAHMER: I cannot say exactly, Mr. President. We are not concerned with just a few days. These negotiations already started in June or July. I would like to add further that I will try to be as brief as possible and wil l try to limit myself to relevant material, of course.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal agrees if the Prosecution is willing for this evidence to be interposed. The Tribunal trusts that you will find it possible to make your examination in chief much shorter than you have indicated. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ted in concentrating all authority in the German state in the hands of the Fuehrer, is that right?
direction. toward that end as far as was possible? opposition or obstructed the Fuehrer in any way is of course definite, but I would like to call your attention to the fact that we must differentiate between periods of time, for the questions that are being put to me are quite general and we are concerned with a period of time, of, say, twenty-four to twenty-five years if you consider the whole picture.
Q Now, I want to call your attention to the fruits of this system. You, as I understand it, were informed in 1940 of an impending attack by the German Army on Soviet Russia? unwise from the point of view of Germany itself?
A In the period of time. At that time I was of the opinion that this attack should be postponed in order to take care of more important tasks.
Q You didn't see any military necessity for an attack at that time even from the point of view of Germany? to put through measures which would be useful, and thought that time would prevent a danger toward Germany. Later on I was of the opinion that perhaps at any time this period of danger for Germany would arrive and might arrive at any later moment. Germany on Soviet Russia?
had not reached its zenith; therefore, at that time, the attack might not be necessary, but I emphasize that that was my personal view.
Q And you were the Number Two man at that time in all Germany? Two points of view were contradictory. The Fuehrer saw one danger, and the Fuehrer was the Number One man, and if you wish to put it that way, had I wished to put another strategic measure through and if my plans had gone through, then I would have become the Number One man, but since the Number One man was of a different opinion and I was only the second man, his opinion naturally prevailed. answer this Yes or No, and I would greatly appreciate it if you would -I have understood from your testimony that you were opposed and told the Fuehrer that you were opposed to an attack upon Russia at that time. Am I right or wrong? dangerous move for Germany to make; is that correct? again that at that time the decisive moment had not come and that more expedient measures should have been taken for Germany. you could give no warning to the German people; you could bring no pressure of any kind to bear to prevent that step, and you could not even resign to protect your own place in history. I would like to answer the first one. occasion to tell the German people about this danger. I had no responsibility in that connection. We were in the war and at war, and any difference of opinion as far as strategic problems were concerned could not be brought before the public during the course of a war. I believe that never in the course of history has anything like that happened.
that, for during a war I was an officer, a soldier, and I was not concerned with whether I shared an opinion or not. I had to serve my country as a soldier.
Point Three: It was not my task to tell a man whom I had given my oath of loyalty to and to separate myself from him if he was not of my opinion. If that had been the case, I would not have had to bind myself to him, and it never occurred to me to leave the Fuehrer. attacking Soviet Russia, under the belief that you favored it? the war on Russia had started. The German people cannot be brought in in this connection. The German people were not asked. It was notified of the fact and of the reasons for that fact. objectives that you had in mind, was a lost war?
A It is extraordinarily difficult to say that. According to my conviction, relatively late, and by that I mean at a late period of time the conviction grew within me that the war had been lost. Previous to that time, I thought we would have a chance, and I was hoping for a chance. it not?
A That is not right at all. We had reverses because of adverse weather, and the aims that we had set out for were not won. The pushthrough of 1913 proved that a military collapse is not even to be thought of. Some corps which had advanced were thrown back, or were taken back, and the frost that set in before we expected it was the cause of all of this.
Q You see, "relatively late", the expression you used, does not tell me anything because I do not know what you regard as relatively late. Will you fix in terms either of events or time when it was that the conviction came to you that the war was lost?
advanced as far as the Oder, and simultaneously the Ardennes offensive was not successful, at that period of time, I thought -- and I could not think otherwise -- that slowly, in all possibility, a defeat would result. Before that period of time, I had always hoped that perhaps either at Weichsel -- the position would change toward the East or perhaps towards the West Wall and could be held until new weapons would be put in production and used in such strength so that the American air war could be weakened.
Q Now, will you fix that by date; you told us when it was by events.
A I just said January 1915, middle or end of January 1915. At that point I saw no hope any longer. realize until January of 1915 that Germany could not be successful in the war? end the war successfully and to end it otherwise. At the period of time when we could do that there are two separate points. The fact that a defeat would take place -- and I am concerned with the collapse of the date that I just mentioned. of the war could only be accomplished if you could come to some kind of terms with the enemy; was that not true?
A Yes, of course. A successful termination of a war is only to be considered successful if I either conquer the enemy or through negotiations come to the conclusion that I am successful. That I would call a successful conclusion. negotiations and I do not achieve the result which victory would have brought but which precludes a defeat on my part. That is an ending without victorious or conquered people.
Q But you knew that it was Hitler's policy never to negotiate and you know that as long as he was head of the government, the enemy would not negotiate with Germany, did you not?
Hitler; that fact I knew. That Hitler did not wish to negotiate under any circumstances, that also was known to me, but not in the same connection. Hitler wanted to negotiate if negotiations would have given him an opportunity, but negotiating which would be completely without success, he did not wish. Through the declaration of the Western Powers after the landing in Africa that under no circumstances would they negotiate with Germany but were interested in forcing an unconditional victory, the resistance of Germany was stiffened to the utmost and had to be organized as such. If I have no chance to conclude a war tjrough negotiations, then negotiations are senseless, and I must try by using weapons to bring about a change in these conditions. defend the German cities against the air attacks of the Allies, did you not? to give you a picture of the possibility.
Q Can you not answer my question? Time may not mean quite as much to you as it does to the rest of us. Can you not Yes or No? Did you then know at the sane time that you knew that the war was lost that the German cities could not successfully be defended against air attack by the enemy? Can you not tell us Yes or No? England were well known to you that they could not turn the tide of war and were designed solely to effect a prolongation of what you then knew was a hopeless conflict?
A I believe you are mistaken. After January there were no attacks, except perhaps a plane at a time, because at that time I needed all of my fighters for defense. If I had had any bombers and oil, the, o f course, I would have used them up until the last minute to attack as reprisals for attacks which wer being carried out on German cities.
It would not have had anything to do with our chances.
Q What about robot attacks. Were there any robot attacks after January 1945? I have just set forth that as long as the fight was going on, we had to give return blows and as a soldier I can only regret that we did not have enough of these V-1's and V-2's, for this was the only means which perhaps would bring about an easing of the situation of the enemy attacks on our cities, if we were able to use reprisals against them. was the head of the German government, was there? solely and alone the war leadership. As long as the enemy threatened us with the fact that he would accept only unconditional capitulation, I fought up until the last breath, for that was the only thing that was left to me to perhaps have a chance to turn fate, even though it looked hopeless. to stop had no means to stop it except revolution or assassination of Hitler, did they?
AA revolution changes a situation: that is, if the revolution is successful. The murder or assassination of Hitler at that period of time, say January 1945, would have brought about my succession. If the opponent had given me the same answer, an unconditional surrender and those terrible conditions which had been handed out, I would have continued fighting under all circumstances.
Q There was an attack on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944? whereby he turned over the presidency to your co-defendant Admiral Doenitz. You know about that?
A That is correct. I read of this testament here.
to Admiral Doenitz, I call your attention to this statement: "Goering and Himmler, quite apart from their disloyalty to my person, have done immeasurable harm to the country and the whole nation by secret negotiations with the enemy which they conducted without my knowledge and against my wishes and by illegally attempting to seize power in the state for themselves." offices of the state.
A I can only reply for myself. What Himmler did I do not know. with even one foreign soldier. This will or this document of the Fuehrer's rests on an unfortunate mistake and a mistake which grieves me that the Fuehrer could believe in his last hours that I would ever be disloyal to him. It all rests on a mistake of the transmission and perhaps on a wrong picture which Bormann gave to the Fuehrer. I never thought for a minute to take ever power illegally or to act against the Fuehrer in any way.
Q In any event you were arrested and expected to be shot?
such thing, as for example, the Reichstag fire of the 27th off February 1933. There was a great purge following that fire, was there not, in which many people were arrested and many people were killed? of the Reichstag fire other than those who were convicted through a court. The othertwo were exonerated, and it was not as you believed the other day, that we incriminated Thaelmann as a Communist leader. He was also exonerated as well as a Bulgarian man by the name of Dimitrov. Arrests did take place in connection with the Reichstag fire, but they were comparatively few. The arrests which you refer to are the arrests of Communist functionaries, and I have stated repeatedly, and wish to emphasize at this point, they were completely independent of this fire, and would have been arrested nevertheless; the fire just accelerated their arrest, and some of the functionaries escaped. time of the Reichstag fire of persons who should be arrested, did you not? We had established those lists prior, and they were entirely independent of the Reichstag fire.
Q They were immediately put into execution?--the arrests, I mean, after the Reichstag fire? have then go through regular channels, the Fuehrer wished to take care of those matters during the night and immediately to have all those arrests made at that time.
Q You and the Fuehrer not at the fire, did you not? had theretofore listed? established several days prior, but the action of immediate arrest took place that same night. I would rather have waited a few days, then some of the more important men would not have been able to escape.
Hindenburg suspending the provisions of the constitution which we have discussed here, was it not?
Q Who was Karl Ernst? the SA leader or fuehrer of Berlin.
Q And who was Helldorf?
Q And Heines?
A Heines was the SA leader of Silesia at that period of time; I must stress that point. ing that these three burned the Reichstag and that you and Goebbels planned and furnished the incendiary materials consisting of liquid phosphorus and petroleum which was deposited at a subterranean passage by you for them to get, which passage led from your house to the Reichstag Building. You knew of such a statement, did you not?
AA statement by the SA leader Ernst I do not know; but I do know that a story was published in the foreign press by the chauffeur of Roehm. This happened after 1934. was there not? the palace of the Reichstag president. There is a chamber for coal cars to pass through, coal which was needed in the central heating system. and without a chance to tell his story, wasn't he?
A That is not correct. The Reichstag fire took place in February 1933. Ernst was shot on the 30th of June of 1934. Together with Roehm he had prepared a putsch against the Fuehrer. He had quite a bit of time to make statements regarding the Reichstag fire if he had wished to do so.
Q Well, he had begun to make statements, hadn't he, and you were generally being accused of burning the Reichstag? You knew that, didn't you? That was the . . .
press, that alleged that I fired the Reichstag; but that did not concern me because it was not consistent with the facts; it was not of advantage to me to fire the Reichstag. I am sorry from the point of view of art that the building was burned, and did not wish to construct a new one; but I was sorry. But I was forced to find a new meeting place for the Reichstag meetings, and since I did not find one my Kroll Opera building, the second state opera, had to be used for that purpose. And it seems to me that the opera was much more important there than the Reichstag. joking?
A No. I used a joke, if that is the one you are referring to, in that I said I would not wish to rival Nero. It will soon be said that I appeared in a red toga carrying a lyre in my hand and stood opposite the fire and played, and that was the joke. But the fact was that I almost died in the flame, and that would have been very unfortunate for the German people but very fortunate for her opponents.
Q You never stated then that you burned the Reichstag?
A No. I knew that Mr. Rauschnigg, as I later heard, said in his book that fires were started in various places and that I had discussed this possibility with him. I only saw him twice, and that was very briefly, in my entire life. If I had fired the Reichstag I would have let that known to just ve* very few people, but I would not have told it to a man whom I did not know at all and about whom I can not tell you today how he locked. I would not have uttered any statements to him. That is an absolute distortion of the fact.
Q Do you remember the luncheon on Hitler's birthday in 1942 at the Kasino, the officers' mess, at the headquarters of the Fuehrer in East Prussia?
Q You don't remember that. I will ask that you be shown the affidavit of General Franz Halder, and I call your attention to his statements which may refresh your recollection. I read it:
"On the occasion of a common meal on the birthday of the Fuehrer in 1942, the people around the Fuehrer turned the conversation to the Reichstag Building and its artistic value. I heard with my own ears when Goering shouted.
that everything that is written down here is utter and complete nonsense.
It says the only one who knows the Reichstag--I am that one; but the Reichstag was known by every representative in the Reichstag. The fire was in the central arena, and hundreds of thousands of people knew it as well as I did. An utterance of that type is utter nonsense. How Halder came to make that statement is entirely un-understandable, to me, and I can not feature how he would make such a statement.
Q Can you tell us what position he held in the German Army?
A I know it very well. He was chief of the General Staff of the Army, and I repeatedly pointed out to the Fuehrer, after the war started, to find a chief who knew something about such matters.
Q Now, the Roehm purge you have left a little indefinite. What was it that Roehm did for which he was shot? What acts did he commit? be killed, Also, he wished to start a revolution which was chiefly concerned against the Army, the Officer Corps, and everything else which he considered to be reactionary.
Q And you had evidence of that fact? to tell his story as you are telling yours, was he?
A That is correct. He wanted to bring about an act of a revolutionary nature, and the Fuehrer considered it correct and right to choke back this thing in its beginning; not through a court, but through a beating-down of this revolt from the beginning. the arrest of Reohm, ever published?
Q Who physically killed, if you know, Roehm?
A That I don't know, who personally carried out this action.
Q To what organization was the order given?
A That I don't know. The shooting of Reohm was decreed by the Fuehrer and not through me, for I was competent--had my jurisdiction in northern Germany.
Q Andwho took into custody those who were destined to concentration camps, and who were taken in?
gated; those who had not been incriminated too strongly and about whom we did not know how far they were initiated into the plans or were not initiated. Some of these people were taken in right away and some of them were released later on. Just how many were arrested at that time I can not tell you. The arrests were made by the police.
Q The Gestapo, you mean? Dachau in 1935 there must have been a very much larger number arrested, since you say many were released. Do you know the number that were arrested? or the number of arrests which were considered necessary, for I was not concerned with that matter; my responsibility ended on the date when the revolt was beaten down. I understood Milch a little differently, and sent a note to my counsel to show or clarify through a question or through a motion whether Milch meant by this seven hundred people that he saw seven hundred people who had been arrested or seven hundred with the members of their families. But to clarify this statement we would have to question Milch again, for I believe five, six, or seven hundred to be far too high for the total people who were arrested in connection with the Roehm purge. was one of your political opponents, was he not? of Germany? motivated me for requesting the Fuehrer to stop this action, for in my opinion Klausner was not innocently . . . and had disagreed with him in December 1932 -- Strasser was killed, was he not?
A Strasser was not, as we say, the second man after Hitler. He had an extraordinary important role before the taking over of power, that is, within the Party, but before the taking over of power he was banned from the Party.
Strasser was participating in this revolt, and he was also shot. on the list yet to be killed you intervened and asked to have it stopped; is that correct?
A No, that is not entirely correct. I thought I had made myself clear, and I repeat not when there were just two left I intervened, but when I saw that many were shot who were not concerned with this matter at that point I intervened; and when I did so two personalities were left who had participated strongly and whose shooting the Fuehrer had decreed, one of whom the Fuehrer considered one of the chief instigators and about whom he was very, very much upset. I wish to say I said to the Fuehrer, "Dispense with executing these two men and stop the whole thing immediately," and it is to be understood that my statement is to be understood that way.
Q What date was that? Did you fix the time?
A Yes, I can give you a definite time. As far as I recall the decisive day was Saturday evening between six and seven. The Fuehrer arrived by plane from Munich, and my request for stopping the action is to be placed on Sunday, between two and three in the afternoon. they ever brought to trial?
A No. One, as far as I remember, was taken into a concentration camp, and the other was temporarily taken into a sort of house custody, if I remember correctly. a man who had a serious and definite aim; that he was not content with the defeat of Germany and with the Versailles Treaty; do you recall that? not quite follow the question. I wonder if you would care to repeat it?
Q Maybe it is the question that is inadequate. When you met Hitler, as I understand your testimony, you found a man with a serious and definite aim, as you said, in that he was not content with the defeat of Germany in the previous war and was not content with the Versailles Treaty.
say things in that order. I did set forth that I noted that Hitler had a definite view of the impotency of protest; and as a second point that he was of the opinion that Germany should be freed from the peace of Versailles. It was not only Adolf Hitler, every German, every patriotic German had the same feeling, and since I was a glowing patriot as a glowing patriot I felt that the shame of Versailles was unbearable, and I identified myself with the man who thought the same as I, who saw the results which would come through Versailles, and that he perhaps would take the right way to set this Treaty of Versailles aside. But everything that was said in the Treaty of Versailles, if I may say so, was just empty chatter.
notoriously, it was the position of the Nazi Party that the Versailles Treaty must be set aside and that protest was impotent for that purpose? us in his movement, to free Germany of the shock of Versailles; by that we meant, not from the total Treaty but from those terms which were strangling Germany and which were to strangle Germany in the future.
Q And to do it by war, if necessary?
A We did not even debate about those things at that time. We debated only about the first condition, whether everyone else talked about the peace of Versailles, but we Germans always speak about the Dictate of Versailles. The first question was to achieve and establish a different political structure for Germany which would enable Germany to object against the Dictate and not only a protest, an objection, but objection of such a nature which would actually be considered.
Q That is it: that was the means; the means was the reorganization of the German State but your aim was to get rid of what you call a "Dictate of Versailles?" continued period of time would make German life impossible and that was the aim; and in that connection, we did not say we shall have to have a war and defeat our enemies; this was the aim, and the methods had to be adapted to the political situation. became members of the Nazi Party, gave to Hitler all power to make decisions for them and agreed in their oath of office to give him obedience?
AAgain, I had several questions put to me. I am now coming to question one. The battle against the Dictate of Versailles was, for me, the most decisive factor in my joining the Party -- for others, other points may have been more vital and may have beendecisive for them; for the Fuehrer, to give him all power, that was not a condition to get rid of Versailles but was motivated through our conception of the leadership principle; to give him our oath was, under the then existing conditions, a matter of course, that is, to give him cur oath before he became Head of the State -- those of as who considered themselves his inner leadership circle.