There was a telegram contained therein, containing a second request to Hitler asking for the marching in of the German troops. And I should like to say, from the beginning, I knew the third draft had no actual significance. These were my expressions on the 11th in Berlin.
Q. Then you flew to Vienna and met Syess-Inquart. What did you discuss with him ? What did you do in the morning of the 11th of March ?
A. Seyss-Inquart met me at the airport. I advised him personally about what had taken place in Berlin, and I told him about the grave doubts and concern which I had, and made it entirely clear to him. Together, SeyssInquart and I, at 11,00 in the morning, that is briefly after my arrival went to Schuschnigg. Before Schuschnigg -- certain inner-political problems had arrived and I did not know about these things because I had been absent Seyss-Inquart laced these questions and after Schuschnigg had a fit of weepi I told him the news and pointed out to him that there might be a possibility of a world war and implored him to give in and to rescind the request for a plebescite which was scheduled for Sunday.
Q. Did you and Syess-Inquart offer to resign ?
A. I cannot recall whether we did that orally. This discussion was rather brief, but afterwards, about 1,00 o'clock in the afternoon, we offered to resign. decree of the National Socialist leader, Klausner, was necessary for already, on Thursday evening, I had made my decision in front of Buerckel that in connection with the plebescite, I would go to the minister and ask him to resign so that more tragedies could be prevented.
Q. And how did Schuschnigg act to this offer in order to postpone the plebiscite ?
A. Schuschnigg at first was rather reserved, but at about 2,00 in the afternoon, Guido Schmidt and Zernatto, I do not have to tell you who these gentlemen are, decided to establish a modus prevention with Seyss-Inquart. I remember I left since my mission had been accepted and completed on the 12th of February.
Q. And what did Seyss-Inquart do in the afternoon ?
A. Certainly after this discussion, which led to no result, Schuschnigg still hesitated. But finally, he declared that he would indefinitely postpone the plebiscite which had been set for Sunday. I believe that the worst of the crisis had passed. end returned visibly agitated and excited saying, that he had been advised for Berlin that Hitler would not work any longer with Schuschnigg, and that Seyss-Inquart was to succeed in the position of Chancellor. Seyss-Inquart invited me to go with him to Schuschnigg, and I turned this down for certain reasons. Seyss-Inquart went in alone, and returned after a brief period of time and we had a discussion -- a discussion which seemed of importance to me. He was confident of the fact of receiving the Chancellorship, and he said to me, almost with an undertone of regret, "Now we will just have to take in the Nazis after all, and we shall work together with the Catholics and others who one of similar trends.
We will establish an organization together, over which I shall reign and govern However, I demand of Hitler, that as far as internal politics is concerned I will demand an agreement of 5 years silence."
Q. And of course, Hitler, did not react to that. He marched into Austria and you were confronted with a law and as Vice-Chancellor, you signed this law ?
A. Yes, I was a co-signer of this law. I entered into the Government and I counter-signed this law, for three reasons. world, and that no one was doing anything or lifting a finger in our behalf, Southern German press, I entered under the impression of the unheard of and fantastic street demonstrations that were taking place. You can call this mass psychology, but this mass psychology was resent and it was an unheard of demonstration between people and, the origination of this rule, on the night that I received this law in hand the German Panzer Division was rolling in.
The occupation of the country by Adolf Hitler was nearing its completion and to him it meant, "Now we shall deserve a break. This is the last job." And if anyone tried to force or prevent it, it would not have been possible. should have committed suicide, rather than be afraid of death.
DR. STEINBAUER: This is quite sufficient, and Mr. President, I have no further questions to this witness. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Von Papen):
Q. The July agreement, did it result through pressure from Germany or on mutual wish and mutual interest ?
A. On the basis of mutual wish it was concluded, and as a result of mutual interest.
in you? confidence to Schusnigg.
Q Don't you know anything about the intention of Mr. Von Papen to the effect of the removing of Chancellor Schusnigg?
Q What was the so-called Hilfsfond? a fund which was established for the help of National Socialist who had been arrested.
Q Did Schusnigg and the Government have knowledge of this fund? Mr. Von Papen?
A. The NSDAP and Leopold were completely adverse to Von Papen, first of all because he was a Catholic, and they distrusted him for certain reasons and in certain ways.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross examine? BY MR. DODD:
Q Did you know a man named General Muff? Ministerial Consulate of Austria, were you not?
Q Do you know Stephen Tauschitz, the Austrian Ambassador to Germany?
A Not him either. We spoke together perhaps, but I did not let myself be used as an informer. Buerckel from Stuttgart?
being brought from Stuttgart to Berlin in 1938, when Hitler wanted to see you?
A I did not go from Stuttgart, but rather from the Pfalz. Hitler had had me advised to come at all costs. I considered this matter and accepted, for at all costs, I wanted to find out what this was all about. you left, from wherever it was that you left, to go to Berlin. That's all.
A My intention was to comply with Hitler's invitation adn to see just what was taking place in Berlin. solution of the question. Surely, when you got the false telegram and the draft of the radio speech for Seyss-Inquart, you certainly didn't think you were proceeding in a peaceful manner insofar as Austria was concerned, were you? Schusnigg were to recall and not hold the plebiscite, then a peaceful solution would still be possible. which asked Hitler for a warning. You knew that this was a complete fraud, an obvious fraud. Why did you consent to carry this back to Austria? between myself and Fieldmarshal Goering. I did not take it along. It was given to a courier. carry it along.
A No, never did I say that. It would be against reality and truth. I never put down, in a note, or say that I took any of these three things along personally, but I emphasized that the courier did that, and I should like to call your attention to the fact that according to the agreement, Seyss-Inquart had the right to deal with the Reich agency in the Reich. didn't you? Whether you carried it or Globocnik did, it wasn't true, was it? and later on, I asked Seyss-Inquart whether this telegram had been sent off and he said no, it had never been sent. I have already said that all three documents were not used here in Austria.
waste basket, and when you consented to carry them, you did not know that they were going to be utilized did you? Berchestagen agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you try to answer the question instead of answering something else. BY MR. DODD:
Q Well, I am not going to press it any further. You seem to think that you had some other reasons, but I don't want to press it any further.
A No, I would be very grateful if I could follow. I do not quite follow it and I don't understand the point of your question.
Q Well, if you don't understand it, I do not think there's any point in pressing it. this false telegram which was drafted either by Hitler or by Goering. You were then a Minister without Portfolio of the Austrian Government. You knew it was a complete falsehood and yet you were willing to go back to Austria, knowing that this telegram had been arranged, and that it had been sent by courier. Schusnigg agreed not to hold the plebiscite, and I told Schusnigg that I was referring it to Seyss-Inquart to say anything that was to be said if Hitler would march in.
Q All right. That is not what I am talking about, but I am not going on with it. on the telephone, you found out that the defendant von Papen and Fritz Wiedemann were sitting beside Goering in Berlin?
A I am sorry. I only heard about that after the collapse in 1945.
Q What I want ti know is, how di you find that out?
A I found out from Wiedmann. with whom I just happened to be together.
Q All right. Now, you know defendant Von Papen once wrote a letter to Hitler and he said that you were a willing collaborator with him with respect to the possibility of union or Anschluss with Germany. and that was away back in 1936. Do you know about that? It is in evidence in this case, US 67, Document 2246-PS. Were you a willing collaborator with von Papen? ing out of the situation, but I am not familiar with this document.
MR. DODD: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: No, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken.)
FRIEDRICH RAINER, a witness, took the stand and tesified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
A Dr. Friedrich Rainer.
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q What functions did you have and how long did you have them, in the NSDAP?
A I have been a member of the NSDAP since 10 October 1930. Until 1934 I carried out no functions.
Afterwards Gauleiter Klausner of Corinthia called me to the Gauleiter's office. Beginning in 1936 I worked in the county offices. County Director Leopold in the autumn of 1936 relieved me of my position because there were differences of opinion between us. In February 1938 Klausner appointee me his political adviser and collaborator, after I had been called to the County Command Office again. In May 1938 the Fuehrer appointed me Gauleiter of Salzburg. On 1 December 1941 I was transferred to Corinthia. Those were my political function.
Q You were Gauleiter of Corinthia in the end, therefore? well?
Q Then when did you come to know Seyss-Inquart?
A The First time that I met Seyss-Inquart was in August 1933. We had a conversation which lasted only a few minutes. A few days later I was arrested, and for six and a half months I was in the custody of the Austrian police. After my release in approximately April or May 1936 I met Seyss-Inquart again in Vienna and remained in contact with him after that.
Q Was he a member of the Party? member of the NSDAP. He was a member of Steirischer Home Protection Organization. That organization was, I think, in 1933, and by agreement between their leaders with Habicht, a part was taken over as part of the Austrian NSDAP. After the Anschluss that transfer was not recognized by the Reich Treasurer, Dr. Schwartz, and the members of the Home Protection Organization, among them I believe Dr. Seyss-Inquart, had to apply for membership again. letter hence fort --is incorrect, is it? been recognized by the Reich Treasurer. quently, and surely he would have told you his ideas regarding the Anschluss.
Q What were these ideas? Please be very brief. discussion. The idea of the Anschluss was a point in the program of all Austrian parties; it remained the ideal or the target for all of us. In this case, however, what we were concerned with was that the Austrian State should once again steer a course towards Germany and that the interior conditions should be peaceful. and Schuschnigg excluded conditions of the Constitution, and the State, based thereon, was to be a system of only one party. It was particularly difficult, therefore, on the part of the opposition of the National Wing, to participate in the work and to make that legal.
That task, according to Seyss-Inquart's conception and my own, was to be carried out without further bloodshed and on the basis of a peaceful method. If there was sufficient good will and if the radicals could be gotten over to our side, such a way seemed practical.
Q There was an agreement on the 11th of July, 1936? attitude towards that party. What did Adolf Hitler have to say at the time? where I was called; and on the 16th or 17th of July I visited Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you can go a little faster than you are going, witness.
A (continuing) The Fuehrer made a very serious statement during that conference, and he demanded, in very severe words, that the Austrian National Socialists should respect the agreement of the 11th of July under all circumstances. He criticized the previous methods, and he used the expression that they had been heroic, but stupid. He pointed out that the continuation of such methods would lead to continue us foreign political difficulties. existing political possibilities. Upon my specific question regarding the Fatherland Front, he said "Yes". He assured us that in the near future the general atmosphere would be relieved and that the relationship between these two German states would thus be improved.
Q In principle, therefore, he approved of Seyss-Inquart's policy; is that right?
A The Fuehrer's statement, to me, meant a confirmation of the correctness of the way in which we had decided to go.
Q Was Seyss-Inquart the leader of the Party?
A No; Seyss-Inquart was never the Party Leader. you state in your letter? in that capacity he recognized the leaders wherever they were. recognized Klausner, because Klausner, after the Berchtesgaden agreement, had replaced Leopold by request of the Fuehrer, since he was steering a quiet, clear, and open course. In the cooperation with him there appeared to be a safeguarding for the Berchtesgaden agreement. trustee for the agreement of Berchtesgaden and Minister in Schuschnigg's government, he considered himself independent from Klausner.
Q Tell me, Mr. Witness, after the understanding of the 12th of February, 1938, did you, during a railway journey, meet Seyss-Inquart, who was coming back from his visit to the Fuehrer?
Q What did he tell you about his conference with the Fuehrer? compartment. He had a piece of paper -- I think it was an envelope -- and on that there were notes. I remember that he described the formalities which had taken place at the beginning by saying that he had come in his capacity as an Austrian Minister and that he wanted to deal with the Constitution, and that he considered himself responsible to the President and the Chancellor of Austria. He said that he was greeting, in Adolf Hitler, the leader of all Germans.
of which I can now remember. My total impression was that the discussion had a favorable outcome, and I recognized that the conference had been conducted with full loyalty to Chancellor Schuschnigg. As far as I can remember today, the Anschluss as such had not been dealt with at all. he wasSchuschnigg's living guarantor, and that he was not the driver of a Trojan horse?
A I don't wish to confirm just these words, that those were the words he used literally. The expression which Dr. Seyss particularly used was that he wasnot a Trojan horse leader. Furthermore, I remember that he had used the expression frequently that he was the living guarantor for adhering to the agreement of Berchtesgaden.
Q Did he also say that he refused to have a cultural fight?
A I think I can remember that. At any rate, that washis point of view, and I certainly expected that he would talk to the Fuehrer about that.
Q Did the Fuehrer agree to these proposals? suggestions from Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
Q Did Seyss-Inquart tell Schuschnigg that?
A That I must assume. At any rate, he did state that that was his intention.
Q Did he tellthe Austrian National Socialiststhe same thing?
A Yes, because that wasparticularly necessary. During a leader conference Seyss-Inquart made a speech -- and this was at the beginning of March. He pointed out that a revolutionary course and measures undesirable to the radical followers -- namely, the dissolution of the legal organizations had been specifically demanded by Adolf Hitler. and on the occasion of the demonstrations at Graz, he referred to that particularly. The visit to Adolf Hitler in Berlin gave him the necessary legitimate background in the eyes of the National Socialists.
been informed of preparations for revolutionary steps.
A May I ask you, Dr. Steinbauer, which revolutionary steps you mean?
A May I have permission to be a little explicit in this connection? The expression "revolutionary steps" is too far-reaching. The measures which were introduced were mainly these.
After Chancellor Schuschnigg's speech at Innsbruck, Major Klausner was convinced that with this, any basis of an inner political understanding had been destroyed and that this speech would be like a spot in a powder barrel.
which the vote might be "yes", it was now, with reference to the attitude of the masses, quite impossible. A clear-cut decision regarding the attitude of the National Socialist leaders had to be brought about. Still, during the night, the new Gualeiters were given their first news, according to which the Party was not agreeable to the proposed plebescite, and that therefore the rol would be to refrain from voting.
The keenest discipline was demanded, because we feared that the"waves" would soon run very high. On the 10th of March, the long prepared propaganda of Zernatto began, and clashes occurred. We had reports, in fact, to the effect that large groups of the protection unit, forbidden February, were being armed Strictest alert was ordered for the formations therefore, and the formations received orders to take care of the protection of nationals.
Principally, these were the steps ordered on the 10th; and regarding the atmosphere in the provinces, I think I informed Dr. Seyss generally in the afternoon. I probably did not inform him about the individual measures of organizations.
Q. Did he promote that atmosphere?
A. No.
Q. Did he ask people to demonstrate, or did he prevent them?
A. He neither promoted them, nor did he invite people to them. A prevention in that stage was no longer possible.
Q. Then what happened on the morning of the 11th?
A. On the 11th of May, in the forenoon, I was at the office of State Chancellor Jury, where I worked. I no longer know the details of what I was doing. We met Dr. Seyss, Glaise Horstenau, and several others about noon in the office of Dr. Fischboeck. Dr. Seyss-Inquart told us of the outcome of the conference with Dr. Schuschnigg. The result of our consultation was the letter which the ministers and state counsellors wrote to Dr. Schuschnigg, which had a time limit of two o'clock, and demanded the cancellation of that unconstitutional plebescite, and demanded arrangements for a new plebescite, a few weeks later, in accordance with the regulation of the constitution, announcing resignations if necessary demands were not met.
Q. Then what happened? Schuschnigg returned the plebescite, did he not, and you knew about that? Or how did you hear?
A. Yes. Schuschnigg postponed the plebescite, but he refused to give a date for a new plebescite, and he gave orders to Dr. Seyss, the Security Minister, to adopt severe measures. That solution was reported to the chancellory in Berlin by telephone in the afternoon, and it was because of the statement from the Reich that that solution, as a half-solution, was not acceptable any more. As far as I know, that started the intervention on the part of the German Reich.
Q. But was not that intervention brought about through Glaise Horstenau? It has been stated that Glaise Horstenau took a letter from Adolf Hitler, or a courier took a letter, from Adolf Hitler to Vienna.
A. It was my view that certain documents which Globocnik was showing me at mid-day, and which had been addressed to the county command offices, had been brought along by Glaise Horstenau, who come back from Berlin that morning. As I heard later, that was supposed to be done by a courrier. An intervention on the part of the Reich was not represented by that, in my opinion.
Q. Were there connections between the Party and the Reich on one side, and the Reich on the other? Did they work hand-in-glove?
A. If you mean, Dr. Steinbauer, "conspiracy" by "working hand-in-glove", then I must say definitely no. But the collaboration which seemed to be in the agreement at Berchtesgaden was, of course, carried out.
Q. Did Klausner give the order that the Party should be free to act and that it was to seize power?
A. Through a specific order from Adolf Hitler, it had become the duty of the Party not to undertake any revolutionary steps. That order had been repeated during the early days of March and transmitted by Hitler. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had talked to Hitler, who was already in his airplane
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Dr. Steinbauer, what was the question? Surely, the question was what Klausner did, and the witness did not answer it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. I have asked you, did Klausner give the order to the Gauleiters to seize power?
A. That order was given by Klausner on the evening of the 11th of March.
Q. Did SeyssOInquart approve?
A. Seyss-Inquart was not informed of that until sometime later.
Q. But then I shall have to put it to you that Gauleiter Eigruber, from Uppen Austria, has stated in an affidavit that he received a telegram in which he was addressed as Landeshauptmann. Do you know anything about that?
A. I know nothing whatever about telegrams, or a telegram. I know that Klausner's order was telephoned through from Seizer Gasse No. 1. That evening Globocnik was also putting through a call from the chancellery. I expect that Eigruber is probably referring to one of these telephone calls.
Q. Is it known to you that Gauleiter of Vienna has told you that he misused the name of Seyss-Inquart for the seizure of power?
A. Globocnik told me that several inquiring had been made to the chancellor's office which were passed on to him over the telephone, and that he did not always state his name in that connection. One special case in connection with Salzburg is, in fact, known to me in detail.
Q. In this Rainer letter, you have also made a statement which mentions same assistance on the 25th of July, 1934, and the prosecution considers that this has a connection with the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss. Will you clarify that for us?
A. That remark goes back to a conversation during which Seyss-Inquart told me that he, after the 25th of July, had been afraid for a few days to be connected with the events of these days, but that after a few days it had turned out that there was no such connection. Consequently he used, or tried to exert, personal influence, and he took over some defense cases.
Q. That is your explanation for the special help? I sec.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know that pressure was exercised on the president, Dr. Miklas, pressure on the part of the Austro-National Socialists, so that he would appoint Seyss-Inquart?
A. The negotiations which occupied the entire afternoon and late evening were under a certain amount of pressure, because practically in the whole of Austria the transfer had already been carried out. It was the overthrow of Schuschnigg's cabinet which caused a tremendous avalanche. During the negotiations,that found its expression.
Q. In other words, you mean that visibly there was pressure but not physically upon the person of the president ?
A. No. Of course there is no question of that.
Q. But, then how do you explain that at that time forty SS men marched into the Chancellery building and occupied it ?
A. An occupation by the SS is hardly the right expression. When, towards 8,00 o'clock in the evening, Niklas had again refused to nominate a National Socialist for the chancellor's position, Kepler stated that at 8,00 o'clock his fear for the safety of the negotiators. In fact, as one said, things in Austria were generally upside down and the situation appeared very unsafe. The building of the chancellor's office was occupied by the police and the guards and was transferred into a state of defense. I informed the county command offices of that situation and I asked them to introduce measures of safeguarding so that wilful acts would not cause tremendous misfortune; but the measures which were introduced caused, as one consequence that no earlier than 1),00 o'clock that same evening an SS leader reported in civilian clothes, stating that he and his men had been attached to us to protect the negotiators. Seyss-Inquart considered that step unnecessary; but I asked him to consider the facts and be careful, and he allowed these men to pass through the police and guards and they were admitted to the courtyard of the building. There was never any pressure nor were there acts of force. That was merely a measure of safeguarding.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
DR. SERVATIUS: Dr. Servatius, counsel for Sauckel. BY DR. SERVATIUS:
Q. Mr. Witness, you were Gauleiter of Corinthia. Did you have administrative powers during the war and during the subsequent Italian era ?
A. Yes. In September, 1943, I became the Supreme Commissioner in the operational zone of the Adriatic coastland with my seat in Trieste and I had six provinces under my command.
Q. Did you recruit foreign workers there for work in Germany ?
A. Yes.
Q. In what manner was this done ?
A. It was done through recruiting; that is to say, without employment of any coercion, since for many decades these workers were used to going to work northwards.
Q. These workers were used in your Gau, were they ?
A. The majority were put to work in my Gau, but also in other parts of the Alpine country.
Q. What were their living conditions, the conditions these people in your Gau lived under ?
A. Their living conditions were the general, ones, the normal ones.
Q. Where were they accommodated ? In camps ? Did you see any such camps ?
A. They were housed by their employers. Where larger numbers of them appeared they lived in camps which were looked after by the Italian Consulate and the German Labor Front.
Q. Did the D.A.F. look after conditions in practice ?
A. Yes. An agreement made the necessary provisions, an agreement of which I was informed. It was their duty and they went to great pains to carry out that task.
Q. Did you yourself inspect the camps ?
A. Yes. I have inspected camps frequently and I found conditions to be good and orderly. In the case of certain industries, I found that conditions were exceptionally good, for instance -
Q. Can you give us the names of these camps ?
A. The particularly good impression one camp made on me was that attached to some waterworks at Muent; the same applies to Schwabeck.
Q. How did those foreign workers behave at the end of the war ? Was there disquiet?
A. No. Because of the considerable number, considering my small district I was worried about the food supplies, The relation to the population was good because the Corinthian is a kind and agreeable type. I have experienced it myself, that French workers, who had already been collected by the British in camps to be transported away, went back to their farmers, preferring to wait there rather than waiting in the other camps.
Q. Was the National Socialist Party strongly represented in Corinthia ?
A. Yes. There were so many National Socialists in Corinthia that Schuschnigg had said on one occasion that one ought to put a barbed wire around that county and there you would have a concentration camp.
Q. But their relationship to the foreign workers was good ?
A. Yes, naturally.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. BY MR. DODD:
Q. Mr. Witness, when did you come to the conclusion that this defendant, Seyss-Inquart, was not a member of the party as you stated in your letter ? When did you, change your mind about that ?
A. I didn't learn until fairly late, after the Anschluss, that he wasn't a member of the party. I can't tell you the year for certain now.
Q. But it was not long after you wrote this report, was it, that you found out that what you had said in here was not exactly so ? That you had misunderstood ?
A. In that report I made several attempts to describe matters in a way favorable to Seyss-Inquart, because I refused to support the prosecutors against Dr. Seyss-
Q. Now that isn't what I asked you. I asked you if it was a fact that you found out seen after you wrote this letter that you were in error in stating that Seyss-Inquart had been a member of the party ? Now you can answer that very directly I think, without any long statement.
A. I don't believe that I noticed it shortly afterwards.
Q. Wel, when was it ? That is all we want to know. If at any time, you actually did receive such information, when did you receive it ?
A. That I can no longer say and it didn't appear important to me at the time.
Q. Now when did you change your mind or find that you were in error in saying that Seyss-Inquart knew about and participated in the staged demonstrations or the arrangements for the demonstrations which were to take place in Vienna ? When did you find that that was misinformation or a mistake ?
A. I am not aware that Dr. Seyss-Inquart participated in demonstrations in Vienna.
Q. Now that isn't what I said. If you misunderstood me, I am sorry. Now turn around and maybe if you will look at me it will help a little. You told the Tribunal, in answer to a question from Dr. Steinbauer, that Seyss-Inquart did not provoke the demonstrations and he could not prevent then at that stage. But what Dr. Steinbauer asked you was if what you said in your letter about his participation in the plans was ture. You know what you say in your letter or your report, don't you ? Do you remember what you said in this report about Seyss-Inquart and his particiaption ?
A. The details of my report are no longer in my memory, but -
Q. Would you like to look at it ?
A. Yes, please.
Q. While you are waiting for it I can clear up some other things here. Now as a matter of fact, you gave us an affidavit in November, swearing that this was true, didn't you ?
A. I have specifically stated in this connection that I was relying on information received from others and that afterwards I had further information showing me that not everything had been correctly represented. I stated that specifically and had it included in the record that I had made. These statements were included in an appendix and added to my affidavit.
Q. Just a minute. On the 15th day of November, 1945, right here in Nurnberg, under oath, you executed this affidavit in which you said that you confirmed the facts of this report and that they were all true to the best of your knowledge and belief. Now what information have you received since the 15th of November and from whom, that warrants you in making statements contrary to this report today before this Tribunal ?