In this camp there were excesses; beatings were heard of now and then. The head of the camp was removed and sent to the Reich. I point out that the Higher SS and Police Leader apparently tried to maintain order, although he was not in charge of the camps; they were under Gruppenfuehrer Pohl. with the words "Woman in Cell". number of women crowded into a cell overnight, and three or four women smothered to death. When we heard of that, we demanded court action. The Central Administration in Berlin refused, and we turned to Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and did not let up. The head of the camp was put on trial and received at least four years -- I believe it was a sentence of eight years. That is indicated in the French report.
Q. What about the Ammersford camp?
A. That was a police transit camp, that is, for prisoners who were to be turned over to the courts who were to be sent to the Reich, or persons who refused labor service who were being sent to the Reich. In general, they were not to be there more than six or eight weeks. There were Dutch guards in this camp; not Dutch police, but a voluntary SS guard company, I believe.
Excesses did occur here. General Secretary Van Damm called my attention to the fact that a Dutchman was supposed to have been killed there. I asked the Higher SS and Police Leader to clear up the case. He did this through his court officer, and sent the documents to me. According to the documents, severe mistreating occurred, but no one was killed, and the parsons responsible were punished. the fact that concentration camps and prisons in war-time gave an opportunity for excesses. If, here or there, not a severe case but certain mistreatment occurred, I always pointed it out. He then reported to me either that the case had not occurred, or that he had taken steps, and so forth. tion camps and prisons reported to me. The food rations were satisfactory.
I believe that the Dutch in the concentration camps and prisons, at the end of 1944 and in 1945, received more than the Dutch in the Western Netherlands, which I don't want to indicate as a special circumstance.
Then there was the Westerborg Camp. The Dutch Government set up Westerborg as a completely free camp for Jews who had fled from Germany. This was made over into an assembly camp for Jews. In the camp itself there were Jewish order guards, Dutch police guarded the camp, and locked the camp from the outside. There was a detail of the Security Police for supervision in the camp. In all the files I found no report about excesses in the camp itself. Every Sunday a clergyman went to the camp, at least one clergyman for the Catholics, Jews, and one for the so-called Christians.
Now I would like to speak about Ommen. There is a long report on that. Ommen was intended as a training camp for these Dutch who wanted to be employed economically in the Eastern Territories; that is, Volunteers. They were orientated on the country, the people. and the language there. The head of the camp borrowed prisoners from a neighboring penal institute, for work. I received the news that these prisoners were being mistreated; the judges of Amsterdam applied to me. I gave the Dutch judges of Amsterdam permission to inspect the camp personally and speak to the prisoners. That was done, according to document F-224, on the 5th of March, 1943. Thereupon the Amsterdam judges wrote a long letter to the General Secretary for Justice. They complained about mistreatment of the prisoners which they had noted, and about the fact that such prisoners were transferred to Reich institutions for labor. be removed from the Ommen Camp to the Dutch penal institution, that Dutch prisoners should be returned from German prisons to Dutch prisons. This procedure was correct, and therefore, of necessity, I took the necessary steps to settle the matter.
Q. I must now ask you another question. Document RF-931 shows that you removed judges who made similar complaints.
A. In my eyes the procedure of the court was incorrect. Those judges did not apply to me, but they asserted openly, publicly, that the Dutch prisoners were being sent to German concentration camps and shot. According to the state of affairs as I know it, that was false. I then informed them about the results obtained by the Amsterdam judges. The Neubaden judges refused to issue further judgments on the matter. I asked them to continue to officiate, but they refused. I then dismissed them as persons who refused to work. I could have had them tried by a German court.
Q. Did you receive complaints from the Red Cross about conditions in the camps?
A. In the Netherlands we had the arrangement that a representative of the Dutch Red Cross, Mrs. von Overlijn, could visit all concentration camps and prisons, especially in order to see whether the food packages were being forwarded. Neither Mrs. von Overlijn nor the heads of the Dutch Red Cross ever directed any complaint to me. I should like to say that this circumstance was especially significant for me because the Dutch complained about everything, and if I received no complaints, it had a vertain calming effect. information planed before me, about 12,000 Dutch persons were in concentration camps or prisons. That means the same thing as if today, in the whole German territory, 120,000 Germans were in prison comps. That occasioned me to set up court commissions to visit the camps in order to investigate whether the prisoners could not be released or placed on trial. where there were orders for arrest from Berlin, I could do nothing.
Q. Witness, you have said that without interruption you waved a struggle against the police in this question?
A. I do not want to speak about a struggle.
Q. Do you believe that you were successful?
A. Yes. I believe on the basis of certain definite facts -I followed the proceedings here very carefully, and we have heard terrible things -- the reports from the Netherlands, it seems to me, are not so bad. I do not want to say that I regret every excess, but such reports as in Breendonk in Belgium, do not exist. There are no such reports. The reports show beatings as the most serious charge. There is only a single report here -- that is F.677, the report of Brooder -- which attains the level of the usual atrocity reports. fully, since it does not say even who told him this. The reports are untrustworth. They state, for example, that the prisoners who were at work had to prostrate themselves before every SS man. I do not believe that the camp authorities would have permitted that, because then the prisoners would not have been able to work. it was perhaps not quite so bad in the Netherlands.
Q. To conclude this chapter, I will go over to the section of the indictment which deals with the question of labor service. That problems did you have in the Netherlands in the field of labor commitment?
A. In the field of labor commitment, we must distinguish between four or five different phases. When I care to the Netherlands, there were about 500,000 unemployed. We registered unemployed, those who expected to be released from the Netherlands military forces in demobilization, and then part-time workers, and so forth. It was an urgent problem for me to reduce the number of unemployed. In the first place, such an army of unemployed is without doubt the first source of recruits for illegal activities.
In the second place, at the start of the war, it was to be expected that the economic situation of the unemployed would become worse.
At that time we instituted measures which I must call voluntary labor recruitment. That lasted until the middle of 1942; that is, about two years. ities full power to obligate any worker to work abroad. Certainly there was a certain economic pressure; but I believe that always exists in this question. under the Dutch general secretary for social administration. There were German inspectors in the labor offices. There were also private hiring agencies; companies from the Reich hired their own workers. On the whole, about 530,000 Dutchmen were hired to work in the Reich. In the period which I called "volunteer", 240,000 to 250,000 volunteers went to the Reich and about 40,000 to France. By the first half of 1942, this reservoir had been used up. The reich demanded more workers. We then considered introducing compulsory labor service. Sauckel, but I received it from Bormann as a direct Fuehrer order. not exclusively in the following way. Young, and as far as possible, unmarried Dutchmen were called to the labor office, and they received certificates of obtligation to take up work in the Reich. The Dutch report says that only a few refused. Of course, there were some who refused and were arrested by the police and taken to the Reich. The Higher SS and police leader reported to me that this totaled 2,600. About 250,000 to 200,000 persons were obligated, and the total hired was 530,000. was no lower.
ment of workers. I was urged to draft whole age-groups to send them to the Reich. I made certain that all of these workers received free contracts in the Reich and were not put in labor camps. they were 21 to 23 years old -- and to spare married men. The success was satisfactory in the first group; in the second group it was moderate, and in the third it was quite bad. I realized that I could draft further groups only by force, and I refused to do so. But at that time, I managed, through Minister Speer, to arrange that the workers would not be taken to the work, but that the work would be brought to the workers. large contracts came to the Netherlands, and the concerns carrying out these contracts were declared "blocked" concerns. That included the Organization Todt. Dutchmen who were needed in the Netherlands were deferred. Deferments for those with dependents were set up by Dutch authorities, over a million. It was clear that that was a Dutch sabotage, but I did not want to take steps against it. not were young people under 18. Reich Minister Lammers confirmed here that at the beginning of 1944 he transmitted the Fuehrer order to me that 250,000 workers were to be brought to the Reich. He confirmed that I refused that. At that time, Gauleiter Sauckel came to me. He discussed this matter with me. quickly, and did not insist on carrying out the forced recruitment. By "forced recruitment", I mean blocking off whole districts and taking the men out.
pletely. Instead of 250,000 I believe 12,000 were sent to the Reich. Entirely different action took place in the fall of '44. From experience in France and Belgium, the High Command of the Army decided that able-bodied Dutchmen were to be drawn from Holland; that is the Western Netherlands. That was because the Netherlands government in England had set up an illegal army. I had the organizational charter in my hands. There was a complete General Staff and a complete War Ministry. We estimated 50,000 illegal troops. If even one able-bodied Dutchmen joined, the illegal forces would have been more numerous than the German troops in Holland. Moreover, they had received very good equipment from England. Full shiploads of the most modern submachine guns were confiscated by us, but I am convinced that the larger part of the weapons was not confiscated by us. The High Command of the Army through the military Commanders, ordered the removal of the able-bodied Dutchman. The measure was carried out completely by the Wehrmacht. A general who was sent for for that purpose, was entrusted with the task, with an operational staff of his own. The measure was carried out by the local commandants. My local authorities were informed at the last moment or not at all. Of course I knew about the measure and you have the reasons just presented. I could not take the responsibility of protesting against it. I only took a part in order to protect civilian interests, so that the workers in the vital concerns would not be removed. I entrusted the Plenipotentiary General for the total war effort with this, whom Dr. Goebbels had sent to the Netherlands in the meantime. His task was to issue deferment certificates. He issued 50,000 of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you mean that you entrusted it to Himmler?
THE WITNESS: Goebbels, the Plenipotentiary General for the total war effort. unbearable for the Dutch. I am certain that, as for feeding, tem porary lodging, and transportation, the population in the bombed German territories did not have any better conditions, but one could not demand this from the Dutch.
Many Dutch people told me at that time that they would be willing to agree this labor commitment, not to aid the German cause but only in order to avoid these severe conditions, if they would be drafted in orderly proceedings. I then did that. The Plenipotentiary General for the total war effort issued the proclamation which has been submitted to the Court. The people were called to the Labor offices. The lists were recorded. The people were sent home again to get clothes. They were ordered to report to the railroad stations. Not the police, but labor officials took them to the Reich for normal work. The Dutch report, in its objectivity, recognizes this fact. It speaks of the better transportation conditions of labor mobilization. I am responsible for this labor mobilization for the reasons which I have given.
DR STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I remark in this connection that my document No. 78, USA 195, page 200, excerpt from government report of the Netherlands government, confirms the statements of my client fully. I should like to read it briefly because it is important. "Page 2. Workmen who refused (relatively few were prosecuted by the 'Sicherheitsdienst' (SD)." Then: "Page 3. Apart from that, the measure was not very successful. Certain German authorities seem to have resisted its execution, because many former members of the armed forces received exemption; others went underground...... The result was that in the last month 1943 and in the greater part of 1944 relatively few persons were deported." And then: "Page 6. Until the end of 1944, the method of transportation for deportees was bearable. . . The one who reported for the manpower mobilization in January, 1945, enjoyed improved transportation facilities, that is, almost the whole journey by rail, although only in freight cars."
THE WITNESS: We had no other cars at that time. I should like to refer to the fact that I also drafted Dutch workers in order to carry out the construction work entrusted to me by the Fuehrer on the resistance lines cast of the Weichsel.
The transports which came from Rotterdam, and so forth, I used part of them for this purpose and thus I prevented these people being sent to the Reich. I only wished for further transports into the Gau Essen, because it was reported to me that in the Roes camp the treatment was so poor that some Dutch people had died.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next chapter of the indictment; that is, to the Jewish question. The Netherlands government report, USA 195, sums up all ordinances. This was submitted by the prosecution. To aid the memory, I should like to submit this document 1726, so that it may remind you of the laws. The Court already has it. BY DR. STEINBAUER: question? I of course realized that I had to take some position and would have to take some steps in regard to the Jews in the Netherlands. Amsterdam, in Western Europe, is perhaps the host known and one of the oldest Jewish communities in Western Europe. Moreover, in the Netherlands there were many German Jewish emigrants. I will say quite openly that from the First World War and the post-war period, I emerged as an anti-Semite. I need not explain that here. I have said that all in my speeches. I may refer to them.
I had the impression, which will be confirmed everywhere, that the Jews, of course, had to be against National Socialist Germany.
There was no discussion of the question of guilt as far as I was concerned. As head of an occupied territory, I had only to deal with the facts. I had to realize that I had to expect resistance, defeatism, and so on particularly from Jewish persons. that in the Netherlands I had to remove Jews from leading posts in economy, the press, and state positions.
The measures taken from May 1940 to May 1941 were limited to this. The Jewish officialswere dismissed, but with pension. The Jewish firms were registered and the heads of the firms were dismissed. In the spring of 1941, Heydrich came to me, to the Netherlands. He told me that we would have to expect that the greatest resistance would come from Jewish circles. He told me that the Jews would have to be treated like other enemy aliens. They, like the English in the Netherlands, were to be confined and their property confiscated. In view of the large number of persons involved here, about 140,000, this was not so simple. I admit frankly that I did not object to this argument to Heydrich's. I also felt it was necessary in this war which I absolutely considered a life and death struggle for the German people. For that reason, in March 1941, I ordered that the Jews in the Netherlands be registered. Now it went on step by step. concerned, were intended from the beginning, but we took this way. The regulations cited here, if they appeared in the Dutch Legal Gazette, were mostly signed by me personally. At least, they were published with my express permission. Individual measures which are mentioned here were outside my will. For example, in February 1,000 Jews are supposed to have been arrested and sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen. I know this about that matter -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): February of what your?
A (Continuing): February 1941. In the Amsterdam ghetto, a National Socialist was killed by Jews. Reichsfuehrer Himmler thereupon ordered 400 young Jews sent to Mauthausen. I was not in the Netherlands at that time That was the occasion for the general strike in Amsterdam in March 1941.
and to my knowledge such a mass transfer to Mauthausen did not occur again.
Synagogues were burned. Apparently someone was thinking of the 8th of November 1938. I immediately took steps so the cases did not increase. Police wanted to tear down the old temple in Amsterdam. General Secretary van Damm called this to my attention, and I prevented it. the consideration to treat Jews like enemy aliens. In the execution, this basis was certainly abandoned. It was nothing but the execution of measures against the Jews, such as had occurred in the Reich. Perhaps, in one case or another, even more was done, for I know that for example in the Netherlands there was a drive to force the Jews to be sterilized. Amsterdam and then in the Westerborg camp and in the Vught camp. We had also prepared to create the corresponding work opportunities. I instructed the General Secretary for Education to make available from the Dutch budget means which the Jewish population should have according to the proportion. districts and two camps, various difficulties occurred, various hardships which were perhaps unavoidable. Perhaps they might be considered excesses. Jewish Star. A not inconsiderable number of Jews were not in the confined areas, and the Security Police demanded that they be distinguished in order that they could be controlled, and in order that it might be ascertained whether the Jews adhered to the other restrictions.
In the eyes of Germans, this star was certainly a stigma. The Dutch did not consider it as such. There was many a Dutchman who, out of protest, were such a star himself.
In 1942, Heydrich again made demands that the Jews be evacuated. He explained this by saying that Holland would sooner or later be a theater of war, and that then one could not allow such a hostile population to remain in the theater of war. He pointed out that he was responsible for the security of the Reich in the this evacuation and attempted to find other ways out.
At the end, Heydrich carry out all measures in the occupied territories as well.
I inquired of Take 23-GES Ahuna I was told that the Jews were sent to Auschwitz.
I had people sent from the Netherlands to Auschwitz.
They came back with the report that that was a camp for 80,000 people.
The people were comparatively well off there. For example, they had an orchestra of 100 men.
A witness here confirmed that this
THE PRESIDENTL How long do you think you are likely to be?
DR. STEINBAUER: I hope to be finished at least by noon tomorrow, but perhaps it will take only an hour.
I have questions on plundering of economic measures, and destruction.
Then I will be finished.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 11 June 1946, at 1000 hours) MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to clear up the matter that I raised yesterday with respect to the notes of the conference between this Defendant and Hitler. I had the investigation made and I think these are the facts, apparently, Colonel Williams of our Staff, who interrogated this Defendant late in October, was handed these notes by the Defendant, and somehow or other they never did reach our files and have been misplaced. So the Defendant was quite right in saying that he turned them over, but I think in error in saying that he turned 1?hem over to me.DR. SEYSS-INQUART -- Resumed BY DR. STEINBAUER: indictment, the question of the evacuation of Jews from the Netherlands. Witness, what did you do when you learned of this removal of the Jews from the Netherlands? to the camp Auschwitz, which was indicated to me, in order to ascertain whether and what the possibilities of shelter there were, I reported the result of this inspection. I asked the Security Police or Heydrich whether it would not be possible for the evacuated Jews to remain in contact, by mail with the Netherlands. This concession was made to me. For about three quarters of a year or a year, such contact by mail was maintained; not only short post cards but long letters were permitted. I don't know how the camp administration did this. The letters were identified as authentic by the addressees. When the number of letters dropped off later -- it never stopped completely - the Security Police told me that the Jews in Auschwitz had only few acquaintances in the Netherlands, meaning other Jews, because most of them were already in Auschwitz.
Q Witness, did you not turn to Bormann, too?
A Yesterday I stated that, after learning of Heydrich's order. I turned to Bormann to inquire of the Fuehrer whether Heydrich actually had such powers. Bormann confirmed this. I admit frankly that I had misgivings against the evacuation.
Q Did you do anything to do away with these misgivings? course of the war - they were to the effect that the severity of the war would be an especial "burden on the Jews. If there was too little food in the Reich, the Jewish camps would receive little, and probably they would be strictly treated and comparatively slight occasions would be taken advantage of to impose severe penalties. Of course I also thought of the unavoidable tearing apart of families, at least in part, in the case of labor commitment. That was the reason why we resisted for three or four months. The decisive argument was the statement of the competent authorities, the Security Police, that in case of a landing attempt the Jews should not be in the immediate theater of war.
always that the German people were in a life and death struggle. Today things appear different in their actual effects. At that time, we might have said, "The Jews will be kept together in some camp, even if under severe conditions, and after the end of the war they will find a settlement somewhere.' But these considerations had to be put aside, for their presence in the battle area could weaken the German power of resistance. In the course of 1943 I spoke to Hitler. I called his attention to this problem in the Netherlands, In his own convincing way, he assured me at that time, but at the same time he admitted that he was thinking of a permanent evacuation of the Jews if possible, from all of Europe with which Germany wanted to maintain friendly relations. He wanted to see to it that the Jews would be settled en the eastern border of the German sphere of interest in so far as they could not emigrate to other parts of the earth. At the beginning of 1944, I spoke to Himmler, I met him occasionally in Southern Bavaria. I asked him about the Jews in the Netherlands. The fact that our eastern front was being with drawn meant that the camps would fall into the battle area in the course of time, or at least into the rear areas. I was afraid that the lot of the Jews would be even more serious then. Himmler said, approximately, "Don't worry; they are my best workers." I could not imagine that on the one hand the Jews capable of working were working, and on the other hand their relatives were destroyed. I believe that in such a case one could only expect that a Jew would spring at a German and strangle him. Reich Commissioner for the administration. Did you cooperate in them? myself with it to the extent that this was possible as Reich Commissioner. I gave my deputy in Amsterdam, Dr. Boehmke, powers to carry out the evacuation, to take steps if excesses occurred beyond unavoidable difficulties, or to report to no. Dr. Boehmke had a constant struggle with the so-called Central Office for Jewish Emigration. He had to intervene again and again, but I am convinced that we did not avoid all hardships.
The Jews were gathered in the Westerborg camp. When the first transport left, I received a report that the trains were over-crowded. I remonstrated to the Commander of the Security Police and I asked him to see that the transport was carried out in an orderly manner.
The Netherlands Report states that in the beginning the transports were made under bearable conditions; later, conditions generally became worse. But such overcrowding of trains as occurred, as indicated in the report, did not come to my knowledge. execution of these measures controlled. At the suggestion of a few Netherlands general secretaries, especially General Secretaries van Damm and Froehlich, I effected an exception for a number of Jews. One could effect individual exceptions. The basic measure could not be changed. I believe that the number of exceptions is greater than indicated in the Netherlands report, at least according to my reports.
These Jews were, at the last, in the Westerborg Camp. When the invasion began, Himmler wanted to remove them. When I objected, this was not done. After the battle of Arnhem, they were removed to Theresienstadt as he said, and I hope that they remained alive there.
Q Did you release property on this occasion?
DR. STEINBAUER: To close this chapter, I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal to Document 1726-PS, USA-195, in the document book of the Prosecution. This document sums up the whole Jewish problem in the Netherlands, and on page 6 it gives all the agencies which dealt with the Jewish problem.
Under No.3 you will find the General Commissar for Security, the Higher SS and police Leader H. Rauter, General of Police.
Under No.4 is the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, Leeder aus der Funte, under General Commissar. The report said, "Apparently an organization for Jewish emigration; in reality, an organization to rob the Jews of their rights, to segregate them, or to deport them."
not the defendant.
THE WITNESS: I should like to point out that Rauter functioned as Higher SS and Police Chief in this case, and not as General Commissar for Security. The measures were carried out by the German police, and not by the Netherlands police.
DR. STEINBAUER: The witness in a speech spoke about the Jewish problem at one time. The prosecution has submitted a part of this speech.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, you are putting this document 1726 PS to the witness, which contains an historical statement, apparently. Does the witness agree that the historical statement is accurate?
Do you, defendant, agree that this historical statement is accurate?
THE WITNESS: May I see the document?
(A document was handed to the witness)
DR. STEINBAUER: It is Appendix 2.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Steinbauer, you put forward the document and it is for you to ascertain from the witness whether he agrees with the document or whether he challenges it.
THE WITNESS: The presentation of facts is correct, with the addition which I made in connection with the General Commissar for Security.
THE PRESIDENT: There are certain passages in the document which your attention ought to be drawn to: February, 1941, forinstance. You have the document before you, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you look at the last entry under the heading, February, 1941? Do you see that?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I asked the witness, and he said that the facts are accurate. BY DR. STEINBAUER: I have the English here, saying that Jews were arrested and then sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen.
A I discussed the case yesterday. That was a measure on the direct order of Himmler, which I learned of after it had been carried out, and against which I protested. To my knowledge, the mass deportations to Mauthausen did not occur after that.
THE PRESIDENT: Then what I understand the defendant to say is that that document is accurate, with the exception of the two passages to which you referred under the numbers 3 and 4, on the last page. Is that right?
THE WITNESS: In my testimony yesterday, I confirmed the orders contained in this document, but not all the details of the actual events. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q The presentation on Page 6 of the individual agencies is correct? prevention of the destroying of synagogues in the Hague and Amsterdam.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Steinbauer. Go on.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I should like to refer to document 79, Page 203, U.S.A. 708. That is a speech which Seyss-Inquart made on the Jewish question The prosecution submitted this document; but I must add to that by reading the last sentence: "The only thing we may talk about is the creating of a tolerable transitory condition by maintaining our stand that the Jews are enemies and thus applying every precaution customarily observed against enemies. As regards the time when Germany will not be here as an occupational force to maintain order in public life, the Dutch people will have to decide for themselves whether they want to endanger the comradely union with the German people for the sake of the Jews ..." BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Witness, I should like to ask you about this speech. Were you thinking of the complete elimination and destruction of the Jews?
A I never thought of that. In this speech I was not even thinking of evacuation. At that time, I held the point of view that the Jews should be confined in the Netherlands, was done to enemy aliens. For the reasons which are given in the preceding part of this speech, which the American prosecution submitted, that was still the point of view, of treating them as enemy aliens. Englishmen, for example, were also transported to the Reich.
Jews which were customary in the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the speech?
THE WITNESS: This speech is March, 1941. and made the somewhat imaginative suggestion that all belligerent powers should pool one per cent of their funds to solve the economic problem of the Jews. I was of the opinion that the Jews still existed; I never called the Jews inferior. BY DR. STEINBAUER: violations of international, the chapter on plundering.
Who confiscated raw materials and machinery in the Netherlands? agencies. The execution was in part under my agencies and part with the Wehrmacht, the armament inspectorate, also with the police and the Waffen SS; and from the beginning of 1944 it was transferred eseentially to the agency of the armament minister, which was also my agency, and tothe field economic commands of the high command of the army. At that time, control was extremely difficult.
Q What was your attitude toward this problem? fare were obsolete and could not be applied to a modern war because the labor potentiality of the civilian population is at least as important as the war potentiality of the soldiers at the front. The limitation seemed, to me, to be according to circumstancesof the state of our own population. This was doubtless, quite different in the various countries. I therefore endeavored to obtain a statement from Reichsmarshal Goering that the Dutch must live under the same conditions as the German people, and this promise was not completely kept, however.
Q How was the confiscation carried out? By what authority?
A Until 1943, the Dutch agencies carried out our assignments. The technical work was done by many experts. I did not understand anything about such matters. I took steps when complaints reached me. For example, I prevented the removal of the factory in Dortrecht, and a new electrical works in Leuvarden. machines could be taken back to the Reich from factories which delivered more than one-half of total production to the Reich, for example Phillips in Einhoven. What do you have to say about this?
A We were against the black market from the beginning. It was always a so-called "grey market" with us. I had prohibited food from current production being bought on the black market. Every case was investigated by the competent authorities, agreement with the Dutch authorities. It was a business which had been forbidden by me. The good were confiscated and turned over to the Dutch authorities. This measure was 100% for the benefit of the Dutch. What the German Reich wanted officially it got anyhow. the lowest. The figures are deceptive since prices on the black market were several times higher than these on the normal market. The actual amount of goods is much lower.