Then in the second paragraph he says:
"It also has no other choice, because our country depends on the big powers for its supply of food, coal and industrial raw materials as well as in the re-establishment of its credit and money standard". Schober, which was proved by Document 17. Seipel, regarded as the greatest Austrian statesman of all times, said this at the time, that we should never believe that the Central European question is solved as long as the great state which makes up Central Europe, the German Reich, is not included in the solution. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. I want to ask you, Mr. Witness, do you still remember the time and the conditions after the year 1927?
A. The economic situation which you have just referred to was the reason why the great powers always fought Austria, to give a so-called voluntary forfeiture declaration regarding the Anschluss. The repercussions on Austrian politics were that the Austrians, resolved as they had been in 1918 to have pre-democratic parliamentary prosecution, turned to radical ideas which had an autocratic leaning.
Q. Then at that time a new party appeared. Which one was that?
A. At that time, there was the so-called fire of the Palace of Justice, which was an uprising of the Marxists, which resulted in the Marxist Party's connection with the so-called home guard, which was a para-military organization. Thus uniforms were introduced into the political life of Austria. and more clear. The only organization about the party was the German-Austrian People's Union at the time. The thought of the Anschluss was the only thought which still kept all the partices somewhat united.
Around the year 1930, the National Socialist German Laborers' Party became apparent.
Q. What impression did that party give you, particularly with reference to the seizure of power in the Reich?
A. I want to tell you quite openly that the impression the party made, as far as Austrian conditions were concerned, was a little strange. We had uniform politics in the national union because, I suppose, of the home guard. The N.S.D.A.P. gave uniformity to the actual political-leaders, and then made their march. But the type of politics which they presented to us was not in keeping with our accustomed political thoughts.
Q What about the reasons?
A Well, let me add first that that party wouldn't allow any pleasant courses in connection with other parties and that it never allowed cooperation with other parties either.
Q What possible concession of the party did you observe in the Reich? irrevocable will to attain the Anschluss. I think that the radical attitude can be traced back to preventing, for instance, the realization of the Austrian union, which might have been in favor of the democratic party leaders.
Q Were there not economic reasons which scored sucesses on behalf of the NSDA*
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I suppose you are hearing the words spoken by Dr. Steinbauer direct, and you are answering them without any pause, which gives the interpreter no chance. discrimination of the Versailles Treaty in the Reich, and secondly, the end of unemployment. In Austria, too, about ten per cent of the population were unemployed at that time. The Austrian workers, therefore, were hoping that there would be the end to their unemployment in the event of an Anschluss, and Austrian co commerce had the greatest interest in the food organization in the Reich and the marketing system there. of the Anschluss which took you, too, to the Party. The Party program which has been discussed again and again in this Court room, I need not touch upon.
I just want to ask you, please, when did you join the party? the membership number was above the seven million mark.
Q Did you have contact with Dr. Dollfuss?
A I met Dr. Dollfuss after the war. I knew that he wanted to include me in his Ministry in 1933, and eight days before the 25th of July of 1934, by his invitation, I had a discussion with him. murder of Chancelor Dr. Dollfuss?
A No, in no way. Dr. Dollfuss and I had planned to have another discussion.
He was interested in my opinion regarding the pacifying, calming down of that extremely radical situation at that time, and I told Dr. Dollfuss, even as early as that, that there were no mere Nattionalists in Austria then, only National Socialists. I told him that the National Socialists were doing only what Hitler told them.
Q But, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I must remind you that the prosecution have submitted a photograph which praises the murder of Dr. Dollfuss.
A That is the so-called annual Celebration, isn't it? During that celbration Dollfuss wasn't even thought of. That was a Party Festival, a Party celbration in memory of the seven SS men who, during that attempted revolt ot in connection with that attempted revolt, had been hanged. None of us ever referred to that death as a murder.
Q Well the, after Dollfuss, Dr. Schuschnigg became chancelor, and then I want to talk to you regarding the conclusions drawn by the NSDAP from those event
A The NSDAP thought it shoud be completely disorganized. A small circle of men at that time formed itself, which I joined. They drew the following conclusions from the events of the 25th of July: Firstly, that it presented considerable danger from the point of view of foreign policy. I remind you of the meeting of statements like Stressor and the resolutions passed with reference to Germany; and even though we were never worried about Italy, we had learned nevertheless to realize that in this very troubled atmosphere something might quite easily bring about a war. We were all agreed that it would have to be the main task of the heads of the German State to avoid a war. But here is something I must add, the 25th of July was the worst possible thing that could have happened in regard to the Anschluss. We reflected on what might be done and we came to the conclusion that the Party in the Reich would have to cease interfering with the Austrian National Socialist Party. The Austrian Party, so far as Anschluss was concerned, considered that a foregone conclusion. We decided that the National Socialists in Austria would have to once more be permitted to be active and we decided that most of all, there should be elections to ascertain the balance of power.
Q. What I am interested in is the question of whether you had contacts with sources in the Reich at that time, in 1936, and whether you entertained any such contacts?
A. I had no contact with any sources in the Reich. Only, as Reichsmarshal Goering has said, when I became a State councilor did I for the first time meet the leading Erman politicians.
Q. When was that?
A. That was in June or July of 1937.
Q. What was your position at that time? As a State Councilor, what was your attitude regarding the NSDAP in Austria?
A. when, on the 11th of July, 1936, an agreement was reached -- without my having had any part in that -- Dr. Schuschnigg had Minister Glaise ask me to cooperated in politics. At that time I had particularly close contact with Zernatto, the General Secretary of the National Front. Upon a suggestion made by Zernatto and his friends, I became an Austrian State Councilor, and Dr. Schuschnigg gave me the task, in writing, of investigating the prerequisites for having the National Front join our political work. In order to fulfill that task I did, of course, have to get in touch with the National Socialists, because the national opposition only consisted of National Socialists.
Q. Who was the head of the NSDAP in Austria?
A. The Party in Austria had collected again illegally and Captain Leopold was the head.
Q. How was your relationship to him? Was it good?
A. I could not define Captain Leopold's way of thinking; he did not understand my political thoughts. He thought that, on the basis of the agreement of the 11th of July, Dr. Schuschnigg ought to allow the NSDAP again in its original form. I think I only talked to Leopold twice, perhaps three times. He demanded that I be subordinated to him, something which I refused.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I, in this connection, draw your attention to the following documents without reading from them:
Exhibit No. 44, on page 103 of the document book, excerpts from the document USA 583.
Then there is Exhibit No. 45, on page 105. That is USA 581 Exhibit No. 47, on page 109, is a statement from Zernatto stating that Seyss-Inquart entirely disagreed with Leopold's endavor played a double game.
In rebuttal, I applied to have an interrogato* submitted to the former Gauleiter Ueberreiter. He has interrogated I want to quote from the interrogatory, which is Document No. 59. T were questions put by the Prosecution, and I want to read the follow which appears on page 140:
"Question:" -- put by the Prosecutor -- "Was not the defend Seyss-Inquart, before the time at which the Nazi Party had been legalized, i.e. declared as being legal, in February 1938, was he not in constant contact with the illegal Austrian Nazi Party?
"Answer: No. I personally did not know Seys-Inquart until his visit to Graz. In Nazi circles he was considered as a non-party member. I think -- I do not know for sure -- that he joined the NSD only when it was legalized. For this reason, he personally encounte strong opposition among the illegal Nazi circles."
Then, on page 6 of the same document it says:
"Question: Did not the defendant Seys-Inquart play a double game on one side his legal position with Schuschnigg's Cabinet and on the other side his cooperation with the Nazi party which was unlawful and illegal at that time and the activity of which had then been legalized to a certain extent through the efforts of the defendant at Berchtesgaden in February 1958?
"Answer: I do not know to what extent he was in touch with the illegal Nazi party before the 12th of February. I do not know about it because I was not in Vienna. But from the 18th of February the fact of being in contact with the Nazi party was not a double but his duty. Schuschnigg himself had discussions with Leopold, Nazi leader before Klausner.
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q This brings us to 1938. At the beginning of that year you were State Councillor in the Austrian Government. How did you find the political situation?
A During many conversations I had with Dr. Schuschnigg, but most of all during many continuous conversations I had with Zernatto, I had developed the plan which was in keeping with the conclusions I had drawn from the events of the 25th of July, that the Reich, and particularly Hitler, should be asked to refrain from interfering with Austrian politics through the Austrian National Socialist Party. should be given permission to become active again. That didn't mean at all that I would forego the thought of the Anschluss, but I was perfectly convinced that any policy which could be considered legal and responsible in Austria would have to be carried out by the Austri National Socialists who were collecting a clear majority amongst the Austrian voters -- I should have said, rather, the Germans in Austria I thought that such a demonstration of a leading majority would remov any resistance put up by the members of the League of Nations. such a policy, and the means would have to be that such an organization would support the Fuehrer and the aims of the German Reich. It was in the interest of that plan that I talked to Field Marshal Goeri and Mr. Hess. I reported the outcome to Dr. Schuschnigg and to Zerna and I recommended a coalition government including National Socialist ministers, subject, of course, to the corresponding guarantees being given by Adolf Hitler. make any headway, without directly turning me down. Meanwhile, Austr National Socialists continued to be active illegally. The police would interfere; there were arrests, and we had three concentration camps in Austria. In short, that was the predecessor of the de-nazi fication system of today.
February 1938? came about. First of all, there were renewed radical tendencies which were introduced into the Party. In 1938, the legitimate tendencies in Austria were being promoted. The State Councillors recommended laws regarding the return of the Habsburg property. For the moment, my own position became untenable, and I retired, something of which I informed Zernatto and Secretary of State Keppler wh had officially been nominated in the Reich to conduct the political affairs related to Austria. I felt that considering my task it was my duty to inform Keppler. Sport Leader von Tsehammer and Oston, went to Gramisch-Patenkirchen There I met von Paper without our having an appointment. We told each other of our companies and we reached the point of view that both parties, that is to say Hitler as well as the Austrian Governm Dr. Schuschnigg, would have to be made aware of the fact that a cle cut decision in the sense of my suggestions was necessary. At that time, participation of the National Socialists in the government was certainly amongst the points on discussed, and quite possibly the Ministry of the Interior was discussed. It is quite certain that my name was not mentioned but it appeared an obvious one, discussion which Herr von Papen had with Hitler, but I myself informed Zernatto of the contact of our conversation. Zernatto, at that time, was agreeable regarding certain questions I brought up, in particular with reference to the expansion of the National Socialist sections of the government. He did, in fact, place finance at disposal for that purpose. informed me that Hitler had invited Dr. Schuschnigg to Berchtesgade Dr. Reiner was a member of the circle who were working with me; so was Dr. Jury, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, Langhof, and several others.
discussion at the Obersalzberg?
A. I was only informed by Zernatto of the outcome of this conference. On the evening of the 11th, before Dr. Schuschnigg left for Berchtesgaden, I had a discussion, a detailed discussion with Zernatto and Dr. Schuschnigg. There was considerable agreement amongst us regarding the inclusion of national Socialists war instance, Jury, Reinthaler and Fischboeck, and that they should he given certain public functions. Not, however, ministerial positions. I myself did not touch upon the subject of ministerial positions at all Because I did not have the sufficient information.
Regarding Adolf Hitler's reaction to my suggestion which I made to Herr von Papen, on 13 February, Zernatto called no and communic ated to me the results and contents of the Berchtesgaden conference, which, of course, are known to you.
Q. In this connection, I want to refer to document 48, page 111, in which Zernatto states, "I had the defininte impression that Seyss-Inquart did not know about the result of the discussions and the contents of the agreement of the 12th of February.
Mr. Witness, on the basis of the strength of that agreement, you became Minister of the Interior and police, did you not?
A. Yes, on 17 February 1938.
Q. You had orders to create and improve contact with the Reich. Did you have a discussion with Hitler himself?
A. Yes. In the agreement made at Berchtesgaden on 12 February, there was a defininte clause that I was to be liaison man be two on the Austrian Government on one side, and the Austrian national Socialists on the other side, and the German Reich as well. The contents of the minutes of which I had been informed appeared to me unsatisfactory, and there was not doubt that my appointment to the Position of Minister of the Interior and Polic meant the signal to the Austrian Rational Socialists to expect an early realization of their political target. attitude, to state it openly, that is to say, that they were allowed to wear the swastika and to salute with the raised hand.
What was not permitted, however, was their organization. That is to say, that my National Socialist friends would have not possibility to yet in touch with national Socialists in any loyal way.
This agreement, however, opened the gates without a regaulr procedure being in any way planned for. With that, I was always resolved to see Adolf Hitler myself, and to make sue whether my plan had not with his approval. I went with Dr. Schuschnigg's agreement and was given an Austrian diplomatic passport.
Q. But what did you talk to Hitler about?
A. Just now I mentioned the wrong date, it was on the 16th of February that I became Mininster and I went to Berlin on the 17th. than two hours. It was pointed out by the Prosecution here that I had saluted Adolf Hitler with the raised right arm. That was perfectly permissable under the agreement but I would like the Proseuction to admit that during every one of my interrogations, I have admitted that I had emphasised before Adolf Hitler at once that I was an Austrian Minister and in that respect, responsible for my actions to Austria. a letter. A few wholes later, I dictated those notes into a typewriter, and I should like to repeat the contents of my talk with Hitler on the basis of those notes. My explanation...
Q. Witness, will you be as brief as possible?
A. But this is the most important point with reference to my entire responsibility. I said that it was a condition for Chancellor Schuschnigg that I should stand on the basis of an independent Austria. Further developmen, including the Anschluss, would have to be based on the Austrian. The formation of the will of the Austrians would have to be allowed to proceed without interference, and on the basis of the policies given. I would have to be the guarantee for a proper development of Dr. Schuschnigg.
I said I did lid not offer myself as a Trojan horse driver. The Party and political movement would not be allowed, to adopt the part of a greater Party.
The Party in Austria must not aim at totalitarian conditions. The Socialists thoughts would only have to be reliazed in keeping with the conditions in Austria, and must not be forces upon the others in any way. The illegal Party as such, of course, did not disappear at once, but it must not be allowed to be active illegally, otherwise, in my capacity as Minister of the Interior and Security, I would have to lock up individuals. that the 25 points of the Party program were not necessarily material. "You cannot", he said, "announce a dogma;. You have to base your thoughts on German thoughts and you must cone to National Socialism trends through them." Those were ,the conyents of our discussion 17 February, starting at 12:00 and ending at 2:10.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I understand the witness to say that he made his notes of the meeting and later dictated it int* the typewriter. It Is not clear to re whether lie was reading from those notes. Furthermore, we have never seen such notes and I think it should be made clear on the record.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, had the defendant got the notes?
DR. STEINBAUER: The original was taken away from him when he was arrested.
THE PRESIDENT: You heard the question I asked, have you got the notes?
WITNESS: The original of the notes was amongst my files in Vienna. I have made application to have the files which were found with me searched for that note. A copy of that note which Iad in hand, was handed to the Prosecution by me on the occasion of one of my first interrogations, and are in the file of the Prosecution. I myself have only copies here, and not the
THE PRESIDENT: The copy would be just, as good for the purposes.
WITNESS: I have placed a copy at the disposal of the Defense.
DR. STEINBAUER: But Defendant, I gave it back to you. Perhaps you can let we have it and I will present it to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give it an exhibit number Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, number 61, so that I won't muddle it up with the other exhibit numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am still confused about this, and I am sure that my colleagues are. We have never received any copies of any notes which the Defendant claims to have made at the time of his conference with Hitler, be have no such copy in our files. What is not clear is whether he made these notes up immediately after the conference or a few weeks later, the original of which he claims he gave to us.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that what you say, Defendant, that the Document which you have just handed to your Counsel is a copy of your document which you say you presented to the Prosecution during your interrogations, which was a copy of the shorthand notes you made at that time?
WITNESS: Mr. President, the original notes I made in the afternoon of February 17 were made a few weeks later. I dictated these notes, which were in shorthand, to my secretary who took them down on a typewriter, so that I have several copies. One of the copies which I had;, I gave to the Prosecution on the occasion of one of my interrogations last summer. I have now given a second copy to my Defense Counsel. These are copies prepared in accordance with my notes a few weeks after the actual talk. The original is In my files in Vienna.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I wonder if we could learn just who it was that the Defendant gave those copies to?
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know who the interrogating counsel was?
WITNESS: Mr. Dodd himself.
MR. DODD: We don't have it.
WITNEESS: I think I am quite right in saying so.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the contents, in its important point s, coincide with a voluntary statement made by this...
MR. DODD: I think this is important enough a matter so that we have to clear it up here. I have a copy of the interrogation, one of the first ones of this witness, in which he said that he did not have a copy, but that they were in a flack leather brief case in Mendorf, and he asked me if we could yet it, and I said we would try but we never found it. That's in the record of the interrogation.
WITNESS: May I say that I did produce the black briefcase, and the notes were in it, and during a subsequent interrogation I took a copy and showed it.
(A short pause)
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: I was going to say that in principle Document No.490, page 113, corroborates these facts, and that the Defendant, wht witness, informed Schuschnigg of the contents of that talk. Document No:65 proves this. It is on page 158.
Q And now, Mr. Witness, I want to ask you this: Did Hitler agree to your proposal? to certain other points he expressed doubts whether the Austrian Government might agree. The principal impression was, however, that this policy was possible. Interior and the Police had placed executive powers in the hands of the Nazis. witness, Dr. Scubl. After Dollfuss's death Dr. Scubl was a confidence man in the Austrian Government and he became a Secretary of State and General Secretary for the Security System, in which capacity he was attached to my office. Quite obviously he had a certain amount of authority. I had no objection at all to that. In fact, I was very pleased to have such an export at my disposal. I only wanted to mention quite briefly that orders regarding all executive powers came from Scubl. I myself never gave any direct orders to the Austrian police. Scubl was given the instruction by Dr. Schuschnigg, particularly on the 10th and 11th of March, and I myself didn't introduce a single National Socialist into the Austrian police. servants -
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I want to refer to two documents, Nos. 51 and 52, on pages 117 and 119 respectively. We have now reached Document Book No.2. officials, and the second speech a radio talk he gave at length.
Q And now we reach the critical days in March. Did you -- and from whom did you -- hear of the plebiscite plans of Dr. Schuschnigg?
A The day before Dr. Schuschnigg announced the plan for the plebiscite in Innsbrueck he told me and informed me of his plans. At that time I asked him whether that decision was unalterable and he confirmed that. I expressed the view that this might lead to difficulties. But I promised him that I would help him wherever I could, either to get over the difficulties in connection with that plebiscite or to leave it to a suitable outcome, suitable, that is to say, even to the National Socialists. Of course, I had continuous contact with the Austrian National Socialists since I was the liaison man. I spoke with Zernatto's and Schuschnigg's knowledge at several meetings and I spoke about what I had said to Adolf Hitler and what we had discussed. I avoided demonstrations wherever I could. Then, o f course, as Minister of the Interior I prohibited demonstrations. In that connection I refer you to the prohibition of all demonstrations and meetings, published by me, and the special prohibition of a demonstration of an individual demonstration at that time at Graz, something which is proved by the interrogatory submitted to the witness, Dr. Ueberreiter.
Q Did Schuschnigg give you any promises?
A No. I want to say that still on that same evening I was approached by Dr. Jury who in some way or other had already heard of the plan for this plebiscite. I did not in any way express agreement with Dr. Schuschnigg, although I should, of course, not have allowed myself to exercise self-imposed silence,because there was this liaison man position of the 12th of February.
DR. STEINBAUER: I think, Mr. President, this would be an excellent moment to Interrupt the session.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
(A recess was taken.) It became known. Now we come to the 11th of March. What did you do in the forenoon of that day? consultation with the Austrian National Socialists, I wrote a letter to Dr.
Schuschnigg in which I commented on the plebiscite in an unfavorable sense. The reasons were primarily that a regular plebiscite result was not guaranteed because it was not a real plebiscite in the sense of the State Laws. It was not decided on by the Council of Minister but by the Fatherland Front, that is, the Party, and it was to be carried out by the Party too.
election should be held, with all the legal requisites for an election. a detailed conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg. We reached an agreement that the Government -- as well as the provincial governments, and so forth -- was to be filled with National Socialists, that in effect a coalition government was to be formed, in which case the National Socialists would vote "yes". differences of opinion, I reported to the Austrian National Socialists, but they were not much interested because news had come from Berlin that Hitler had refused the plebiscite. I was told that on the next day I would receive a letter from Hitler.
Q Did you receive such a letter?
A Yes. I received, by courier, a letter from Hitler. I believe I can say with some certainty that the letter contained the proposal of a march into Austria, but I cannot recall whether the draft of a radio speech was contained in it.
Q What did you do in the morning, after receiving the letter?
AAfter receiving this letter I went to Dr. Schuschnigg, with Minister Glaise, and we were at the Federal Chancellor's office at 10 o'clock. I informed Chancellor Schuschnigg of the contents of this letter, without reservation. In particular, I pointed out that in the case of refusal, Adolf Hitler counted on unrest amongst the Austrian National Socialists, and that he was ready, if disturbances occurred, to march in in answer to an appeal for help. In other words, I called Chancellor Schuschnigg's attention to the possibility of such a development.
Q Did you demand an answer from him?
A The letter set a deadline for 12 o'clock noon. Our talk lasted until about 11:30. I asked Chancellor Schuschnigg to give me an answer by 2 o'clock. I know that in the meantime, and on the day before too, be had taken security measures, through Dr. Scubl, which I did not approve of. Several year classes of the Austrian Federal Army were called up; the police was alerted; and a curfew was set up in the evening.
Q What about the afternoon of the 11th of March?
AAt 2 o'clock I went to the Chancellery office with Minister Glaise. First we had a talk with Dr. Schuschnigg, and Dr. Schuschnigg refused to postpone the matter. At about the same moment I was called to the telephone; Reichsmarshal Goering was on the telephone. That telephone conversation is here under the number USA-76. the postponement, he declared, in the name of the Reich, that he had to ask for Schuschnigg's resignation because of the agreement of the 12th of February, and the Reich had confidence in him. Dr. Schuschnigg was ready to postpone, but not ready to resign. Thereupon Reichsmarshal Goering demanded not only Schuschnigg's resignation, but my appointment as Federal Chancellor.
In a talk with Chancellor Schuschnigg at 3:30 in the afternoon, the latter said that he would offer the President the resignation of the whole cabinet. When I was informed of this I left the Federal Chancellor's office because I considered my function as a middle-men, in the sense of the agreement of the 12th of February, concluded. I did not want to intervene; I did not want to do anything to become Federal Chancellor myself. This is an excerpt from the record of the telephone conversation with Goering where Seyss-Inquart spooks about the relationship between Germany and Austria and it states here: "Well, he means that Austrian independence has to be preserved."
What happened on the 11th of March, in the late afternoon? formations were to come to Austria. From that bane telephone conversation it can be seen that I did not want this, that before the entry of any formations I wanted an election or a plebiscite in Autria. asked me for information. I then went to the Federal Chancellor's office ag* Berlin repeatedly asked no to intervene with the Federal President to become Federal Chancellor; I always refused to do so.
Q What did the Austrian NSDAP do?
A The party in Austria began demonstrations. The Party members went out and filled the streets. Further, they were only Party members or followers, and it became an enormous demonstration against the system and for the National Socialists.
Q What was the feeling in the Federal Counties?
A I had no contact. Quito late that night, or the next day, I learned that there, even more than in Vienna, there were big demonstrations by large crowds against the Fatherland Front and for the National Socialists. about in this situation?
A I cannot say from my own knowledge; until 8 o'clock in the evening I had nothing to do with chat. No one spoke to ran about the Chancellorship. No other possibility of solution was discussed with me. I heard that the President wanted to make Dr. Ender, of Vorarlberg, Chancello and me Vice Chancellor. I believe that would have been a good suggestion, but I could not discuss it, least of all with Berlin, because no one said anything to me about it. resignation, did you set up a cabinet list? and the Reich would not permit any but a National Socialist Government. Therefore I considered it my task, in order not to be taken by surprise, to think of whom I would take into the cabinet. I remarked that the suggestions mentioned in the telephone conversation were not made to me. National Socialists. They included people with Catholic ties, such as Professor Mendin, Dr. Wolf, and others.
I asked Foreign Minister Schmidt to enter the cabinet. When he asked why, I told him I would like to keep Austria independent, that I needed a for minister who had connections with the Western Powers. Schmidt refused, remarking that Chancellor Schuschnigg introduced him into politics and that would remain loyal to Schuschnigg.